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ABSTRACT 
A family unit is the basic unit in a society. The collapse of a family unit will ultimately 
lead to the collapse of the society. In a family unit comprising of a man, his wife and 
child, the child is the most vulnerable person, as he has to depend on his parents for his 
survival. The parents have a responsibility towards the child, one of which is to maintain 
the child. The parents have a legal as well as a moral duty to maintain their child. Breach 
of the moral duty will not attract any penalties whereas breach of a legal duty would. In 
Malaysia, there are two systems of maintenance laws:- one for the Muslims and one for 
the non-Muslims. This thesis, as the title states, examines the non-Muslim maintenance 
laws. There are about five maintenance laws, which are in force currently for the non-
Muslims. However, despite the existence of these laws, the number of child maintenance 
cases is increasing annually. In addition, the number of articles or reports reported in the 
press on children being neglected or abandoned by their parents or guardians is also high. 
Further thereto, there are judicial decisions which state that a maintenance order in favour 
of a child ceases when the child reaches the age of eighteen, thereby leaving the child to 
fend for himself once he is eighteen years of age. The problems stated above leads to the 
research questions for this thesis. The research questions are two-fold, i.e. a) do the child 
maintenance laws and the enforcement of maintenance orders laws in Malaysia 
adequately safeguard the rights and interests of the children? b) If the answer is no, what 
are the defects or weaknesses in these laws that need to be rectified in order to protect the 
welfare of the children? In order to answer these research questions, the thesis aims: a) to 
identify the current situations concerning the problems faced by non-Muslim children in 
obtaining maintenance from their parents; b) to identify and critically analyse the laws on 
maintenance concerning non-Muslim children in Malaysia; c) to analyse the stakeholders’ 
perception on the laws on child maintenance and the problems concerning enforcement 
of maintenance orders; d) to compare the existing maintenance laws in Malaysia with 
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other jurisdictions such as England and Wales, Singapore and Australia; and e) to suggest 
or recommend reforms to the existing legislations. This research would be significant as 
it would gather the most recent data, opinions and feedback from respondents who are 
either directly or indirectly affected by the weaknesses in the maintenance laws, alert the 
relevant authorities to revisit the current laws and rectify the weaknesses and finally, on 
the whole, it would contribute towards “reviving the rights of the children”  (which have 
been lying dormant for a considerable period of time due to the enforcement of archaic 
laws) to claim maintenance from their parents. 
  
v 
ABSTRAK 
Keluarga merupakan unit yang paling asas dalam sesebuah masyarakat. Keruntuhan 
sebuah keluarga akan mengakibatkan masyarakat tersebut juga runtuh. Di dalam sebuah 
keluarga biasa, yang terdiri daripada seorang lelaki, isterinya dan anak mereka, yang 
mana si anaklah yang menjadi pihak yang paling lemah (vulnerable). Ini kerana si anak 
perlu bergantung kepada ibubapa untuk menyaranya. Ibubapa bertanggungjawab untuk 
menyara anak mereka. Salah satu daripada tanggungjawab ibubapa adalah untuk memberi 
nafkah kepada anak mereka.  Ibubapa mempunyai tugas di sisi undang-undang dan juga 
moral untuk memberi nafkah kepada anak mereka. Kemungkiran tugas moral tersebut 
tidak akan mengakibatkan apa-apa tindakan diambil terhadap mereka. Walau 
bagaimanapun, jika mereka memungkiri tugas di sisi undang-undang maka mereka akan 
dijatuhkan hukuman.  Di Malaysia, terdapat dua sistem undang-undang berkenaan nafkah 
iaitu untuk orang-orang yang beragama Islam dan juga untuk mereka yang bukan 
beragama Islam. Sepertimana  tajuk di atas, tesis ini akan mengkaji undang-undang 
berkenaan nafkah orang bukan Islam. Terdapat lebih kurang lima undang-undang 
berkenaan nafkah yang diluluskan bagi orang bukan Islam. Sungguhpun terdapat undang-
undang tersebut, bilangan kes yang melibatkan nafkah kanak-kanak semakin bertambah 
setiap tahun.  Selain daripada peningkatan kes nafkah yang melibatkan kanak-kanak, 
terdapat juga kes yang memutuskan bahawa sesuatu perintah nafkah yang memerintahkan 
ibu atau bapa membayar nafkah kepada anak mereka tamat apabila kanak-kanak itu 
mencapai usia lapan belas tahun. Oleh sebab itu, kanak-kanak tersebut perlu menyara 
dirinya sendiri apabila dia berusia lapan belas tahun. Masalah-masalah yang dinyatakan 
di atas menimbulkan soalan-soalan kajian (research questions) bagi tesis ini. Soalan-
soalan kajian yang timbul adalah seperti berikut: a) adakah undang-undang berkenaan 
nafkah kanak-kanak dan undang-undang berkenaan penguatkuasaan perintah-perintah 
nafkah di Malaysia menjaga hak-hak dan kepentingan kanak-kanak? b) Jika jawapan 
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adalah tidak, apakah kekurangan atau kelemahan dalam undang-undang berkenaan yang 
perlu diatasi bagi menjaga kebajikan kanak-kanak? Bagi menjawab soalan-soalan 
tersebut, tesis ini akan: a) mengenalpasti situasi-situasi semasa berkenaan masalah-
masalah yang dihadapi oleh kanak-kanak bukan Islam dalam mendapat nafkah daripada 
ibubapa mereka; b) mengenalpasti dan menganalisa secara kritikal undang-undang 
nafkah yang berkaitan dengan kanak-kanak bukan Islam di Malaysia; c) menganalisa 
persepsi mereka yang berkepentingan berkenaan undang-undang nafkah kanak-kanak dan 
masalah berkenaan penguatkuasaan perintah nafkah; d) membuat perbandingan undang-
undang nafkah yang berkuatkuasa di Malaysia dengan bidang kuasa lain seperti England 
dan Wales, Singapore dan Australia; dan e) memberi cadangan untuk penambahbaikan 
undang-undang yang sedia ada. Kajian ini adalah penting ‘mengingatkan’pihak berkuasa 
yang berkenaan tentang keperluan untuk mengkaji semula undang-undang yang sedia ada 
dan mengatasi kelemahan-kelemahan yang wujud. Secara keseluruhan, kajian ini akan 
menyumbang terhadap usaha untuk mengembalikan hak-hak kanak-kanak yang telah 
lama tidak ditekankan akibat kewujudan undang-undang lapuk. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FAMILY SYSTEMS 
A society basically consists of families. There are generally two types of families, i.e. the 
nuclear family and the extended family. A nuclear family which consists of a man, his wife 
and their children, could be largely seen in the modern society. On the other hand, an 
extended family comprises a man, his wife, their children, the man’s or wife’s siblings or 
parents.1 This form still largely exists in rural areas. There is also a third type of family, 
which is called a polygamous family. Here, a man is married to two or more wives according 
to his religion, custom or practice. He thus heads two or more families.  
Family systems vary from country to country depending on the country's culture and 
tradition. As an examination of all the family systems in the world is not possible, the writer 
would next look at selected family systems that exist globally. These family systems would 
be discussed under two categories, i.e. the Western families and the Eastern families. 
 
1.1.1 Western families 
Western families are generally nuclear families, comprising a husband, wife and their 
children. Rarely do the grandparents live with the family. The concept of individualism is 
well developed in the West. For example, in the United States of America, children are 
encouraged to be individual and independent.2 Children start fending for themselves once 
                                                          
1 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1999), at 1 
2Benson,R,(ed.)  ‘Am I smart?’  AFA Journal January 2017, accessed at the American Family Association Journal’s website at 
http://www.afajournal.org/past-issues/2017/january/am-i-smart/ on 3 January 2017.  
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they either complete their high school or tertiary education. They rarely stay with their 
parents once they start earning a living. 
When the children are young, both the mother and the father share the responsibility of 
raising them. Usually, the father manages the financial matters, while the mother takes care 
of the housework.3 
 
1.1.2 Asian families 
When compared to the Western families, it is more common to see extended families 
among the Asian families. Families live with the grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins. 
The grandparents are treated as the head of the family. However, this trend has started 
changing in the last two decades as children leave their parents’ home when they start earning 
a living and start a family of their own. The writer would briefly examine the family systems 
of the majority Asian communities such as the Malays, Chinese, Indians and the Japanese. 
In the Malay community (which professes the religion of Islam) both the husband-wife 
relationship and parent-child relationship are considered as very important.4 The father has 
the primary duty to feed, clothe and protect his children until they become adults. Parents 
also have a duty to provide education to their children. Education, in Islam, does not only 
refer to bookish knowledge but it also refers to moral and religious training. In addition, 
children, especially small children, have a right to love and affection. Parents too have an 
obligation to provide for their children’s welfare.5 
                                                          
3Ibid 
4 I.A. Arshed, Parent-Child Relationship in Islam, http://www.islam101.com/sociology/parchild.htm accessed on 3 January 2017. 
5 Ibid. 
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Among the Chinese community, male babies traditionally, were valued more than female 
babies (even currently in rural areas). This is due to the fact that females were considered a 
liability and also because in their old age, the parents can depend on their son to look after 
them as he owes a duty of care to them. Unfortunately, with the Chinese government’s one-
child policy, there is an increase in the rate of female infanticide and abandonment.6 
Similarly, the Indians too prefer male offspring for the same reason as the Chinese. In 
addition to the above reasons, it is a financial burden for the families with daughters when it 
comes to getting them married as they have to be given a lot of dowry. On the other hand, 
sons support their parents when they start earning.7 It used to be a practice among the Indians 
a few decades ago, especially those in the rural areas, to kill baby girls as soon as they are 
born as they are considered a burden to their families. Although this practice has considerably 
reduced now, unfortunately it is still practised in the remote areas in India. 
According to the Indian tradition, men shoulder the burden of supporting their families 
financially while the women are responsible for maintaining their household and caring for 
their children and aged relatives. However, in modern times, Indian women have progressed 
in various fields.8 
In Japan, most of the families are nuclear families. The population of children however 
has been decreasing, with the average currently being one or two per family.9 The men in 
Japan have a duty to financially support their families, while the women raise their children, 
supervise their education and do the housework.10 The Japanese place a lot of emphasis on 
                                                          
6Culture of China – tradition, history, people, clothing, women, beliefs, food, customs, social, dress, marriage, men, life, population, 
religion, rituals, http://www.everyculture.com/Bo-Co/China.html#ixzzorBGgutQ2 accessed on  3 January 2017. 
7Chanda,R.K. & Deb K.S.,Indian family systems, collective society and psychotherapy, Indian J Psychiatry, 2013 Jan; 55 (Suppl 2): S299-
S309. 
8 Ibid 
9 Immamura, A.E., The Japanese Family, For Video Letter from Japan II: A Young Family. Asia Society (1990): 7-17 accessed at 
http://www.exeas.org/resources/pdf/japanese-family-imamura.pdf on 3 January 2017. 
10 Ibid 
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education. Japanese parents invest large amounts of money on their children’s education to 
ensure that they graduate from college. 
Having looked at certain family systems that exist globally, it is pertinent to state that the 
strength and stability of a society depends on a family unit. The parents play a major role in 
ensuring the stability and harmony of the family. Based on the examination of the different 
family systems, it could be observed that generally the husband or father shoulders the 
financial burden of providing basic necessaries to his wife and children. The wife or mother 
on the other hand takes on the responsibility of looking after the welfare of the family and 
nurturing her children. If the parents fail to play their respective roles, the family would 
disintegrate. When families disintegrate, society’s harmony and well-being are jeopardized.11 
Therefore, family law steps in to play a big role in ensuring that the family unit is maintained 
and strengthened.12 One of the methods in which family law protects the family unit is by 
ensuring that parents do not neglect their duty of providing maintenance to their children, 
which would be examined in this thesis. 
As to what constitutes maintenance, the Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary defines 
‘maintenance’ as ‘the supply of necessaries of life for a person’.13 A similar definition is 
given by LB Curzon, Dictionary of Law, where it is explained as ‘the supply of necessaries, 
e.g. food, clothing.’14 Hence, parents have an obligation to maintain their children by way of 
providing basic necessities such as food, clothing, shelter and education.  
 
                                                          
11Supra n1 
12Ibid 
13Rutherford, Leslie and Bone, Sheila (eds), Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) at 209. 
14 LB Curzon, Dictionary of Law, 6th ed, (London: Longman, 2002) at 236. 
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1.2 TERMS AND TERMINOLOGIES USED IN THIS THESIS 
In this thesis, the writer has used the following terms, the meanings of which are given 
below. Some of these meanings may vary from the interpretations given by other authors. 
1.2.1: ‘Adult children’ refers to persons who are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
four as generally, an undergraduate in Malaysia graduates at the age of twenty-four. 
1.2.2: ‘Children’ refers to non-Muslim persons below the age of eighteen as defined by the 
Age of Majority Act 1971 
1.2.3: ‘Child support’ refers to child maintenance. 
1.2.4: ‘Illegitimate child’ refers to a child born out of a lawful wedlock. 
1.2.5: ‘Institutions of higher learning’ refer to both public and private institutions of higher 
learning. 
1.2.6: ‘Legitimate child’ refers to a child born during a lawful wedlock, though conceived 
before the parents’ marriage. It would also include a child born within a reasonable 
period after the dissolution of the parents’ marriage or after the father’s death. 
1.2.7: ‘Maintenance’ basically refers to provision of basic necessities such food, clothing 
and shelter. It could also be extended to other essential necessities such as education 
and medical treatment. 
1.2.8: ‘Neglect or abandon’refers to the failure or refusal of the parents to maintain their 
children. 
1.2.9: ‘Parents’ refer to the natural and adoptive parents of the child concerned.  
1.2.10: ‘Paying parent’ refers to the parent against whom the maintenance order has been 
issued. 
1.2.11: ‘Single mother’ refers to a woman who is unmarried and has a child. 
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1.2.12: ‘Stakeholders’ in this thesis refer to single mothers, undergraduates and social 
workers. 
1.2.13: ‘Tertiary education’ refers to A-Levels, Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia 
(Malaysian Higher Schooling Certificate), Diploma, Matriculation and undergraduate 
studies. 
1.2.14: ‘Young vulnerable adults’ bears the same meaning as ‘adult children’ as defined in 
1.2.1. 
1.2.15: ‘Young persons’ stated in the title of this thesis bears the same meaning as ‘adult 
children’ as defined in 1.2.1. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite there being laws that impose a legal duty on the parents to maintain their children 
in Malaysia,15 it is disheartening to note that the number of cases claiming for child 
maintenance seems to be increasing every year. This could be seen from the tables below, 
which show the number of cases registered for child maintenance in the Magistrate’s Court 
in 1983 and 1984 as well as between 1999 and 2002 and the High Court (Civil Division) 
between 1999 and 2001 as well as in the High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Family Court) from 
2000 to 2011. 
 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the number of maintenance cases registered for maintenance 
cases in the 1980s as well as from 1999 to 2002 respectively. 
 
  
                                                          
15 For example, the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 and the Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983 (Kelantan) for the 
Muslims and the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 and the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 for the 
non-Muslims. 
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Table 1.1: Types of Maintenance Cases in the Magistrate’s Court in 1983 and 1984 
 
Types of maintenance 
orders 
1983 1984 
Maintenance for wife and 
child assessed separately 
 
3 
 
2 
Maintenance for wife and 
child assessed together 
 
 
7 
 
7 
Maintenance for child alone - 1 
 
Source: Data obtained from Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Family Law: Maintenance and Other 
Financial Rights, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, at 72 
 
From the above table, it could be noted that in 1983, cases concerning child maintenance 
were either assessed separately or jointly with the wife. There was no case filed solely for 
child maintenance. In 1984, there was only one case where the maintenance order was made 
for the child alone. On the other hand, in Table 1.2 as shown below, it could be noted that 
the number of cases registered for child maintenance alone has increased substantially when 
compared to the 1980s. 
Table 1.2: Cases registered for child maintenance between 1999 and 2002 
(Magistrate’s Court) 
 
Year Total 
1999 17 
2000 17 
2001 10 
200216 5 
Total 49 
Source: Civil Suits Register of the Magistrate’s Court17 
                                                          
16 Data obtained until March 2002 
17 Data obtained from Noor Aziah Haji Mohd Awal, “Nafkah Anak: Kedudukannya di sisi Undang-Undang di Malaysia”, Abdul Monir 
Yaakob and Siti Shamsiah Md Supi (eds), Manual Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam, (Kuala Lumpur:IKIM 2006) at 53 
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The number of cases registered in the High Court is much higher when compared to the 
Magistrate’s Court. This could be seen in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 as follows: 
 
Table 1.3: Cases registered for child maintenance between 1999and 2001 (High Court) 
Year Number of Cases 
1999 2650 
2000 3771 
2001 4881 
Source: Main Causes Register of the High Court Civil Division18 
 
The latest statistics from the year 2006 until October 2016 concerning the number of child 
maintenance, wife maintenance and committal cases could be seen in the table below: 
 
Table 1.4: Number of Cases From 2006 To 2016 At High Court of Kuala Lumpur 
(Family Court) As At 31 October 2016 
 
Number of Cases According to Type Of Cases 
 
Year 
 
Child 
Maintenance 
 
Wife 
Maintenance 
 
Total 
2006 799 882 1681 
2007 813 998 1811 
2008 886 817 1703 
 
 
 
                                                          
18Ibid at 55 
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Table 1.4: Number of Cases From 2006 To 2016 At High Court of Kuala Lumpur 
(Family Court) As At 31 October 2016 (Continued) 
Number of Cases According to Type Of Cases 
Year Child 
Maintenance 
 
Wife 
Maintenance 
Total 
2009 901 1005 1906 
2010 743 688 1431 
2011 612 151 763 
2012 653 167 820 
2013 638 152 790 
2014 633 141 774 
2015 630 160 790 
2016 (Up To 31 
October 2016) 
652 155 807 
TOTAL 7,960 5,316 13,276 
Source: Family Court Registry, High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Family Court). 
 
The statistics shown in all the four tables prove that more and more parents are failing in 
or neglecting their duties to maintain their children despite there being laws that impose such 
an obligation and impose penalties if they (the parents) fail to do so. 
 
Apart from the increase in the number of child maintenance cases filed in the courts of 
law, the number of articles or reports concerning children being neglected or abandoned19 by 
their parents or guardians published in the press is also relatively high. Based on newspaper 
                                                          
19‘’Neglected or abandoned’ in this context refers to the failure or refusal of the parents to maintain their children (see 1.2.8) 
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reports from 1 January 2016 to 22 December 2016, there are more than 60 articles published 
in leading newspapers in Malaysia on this issue.20 
 
Hence, the first question that arises at this juncture is whether there are any defects in the 
laws pertaining to child maintenance in Malaysia? Secondly, if the petitioner succeeds in 
obtaining a maintenance order, the issue that arises then is whether the respondent would 
comply with the order? In other words, the question of enforcement of the maintenance order 
arises.  
 
As mentioned earlier, maintenance means provision of basic necessities which includes 
education. When it is said that a father has neglected to maintain his child, this includes the 
fact that he is not supporting the child’s education. One may argue that school going children 
do not need to fear as the Government has waived school fees for government schools. But 
what about other expenses such as school uniforms, books and tuition fees (for those who are 
weak in their studies)?  What about children who intend to pursue their tertiary education in 
universities? Would he or she be able to pay the university fees without any financial support 
from their parents?  
 
The situation mentioned above has been made far worse by the Federal Court decision in 
the case of Karunairajah a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Ponniah,21 where the court held 
that parents need not maintain their children upon them (the children) reaching the age of 18 
years. This decision applied a literal interpretation to section 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976, which states that the duty to maintain a child ceases upon the child 
reaching the age of 18 years or if the child is disabled, physically or mentally, upon the 
                                                          
20 See Appendix A on the List of Newspaper Reports Concerning Children Being Abandoned or Neglected By Their Parents or Guardians 
obtained from the New Straits Times, The Star, Utusan Malaysia and Harian Metro from 01/01/2016 to 22/12/2016. It is pertinent to note 
at this juncture that the reports here include Muslim children. 
21[2004] 2 MLJ 401. 
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ceasing of such disability, whichever is later. The existence of such a provision needs to be 
seriously reviewed by the legislature as these are the very children who would be pursuing 
their tertiary education upon reaching 18 years and need financial support from their parents, 
bearing in mind at the same time that Malaysia is not a welfare state. 
 
At this juncture, reference is made to the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, which is the 
supreme law of the land,22 in order to see if the right to free education is guaranteed 
thereunder as a fundamental liberty in Part II. Unfortunately, the only provision as regards to 
education is Article 12, which guarantees the right in respect of education. Article 12(1) 
provides as follows: 
 
12. (1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 8, there shall be no 
discrimination against any citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, descent or 
place of birth- 
(a) in the administration of any educational institution maintained by a public 
authority, and, in particular, the admission of pupils or students or the payment 
of fees: or 
(b) in providing out of the funds of a public authority financial aid for the 
maintenance or education of pupil's or students in any educational institution 
(whether or not maintained by a public authority and whether within or outside 
the Federation.) 
 
Article 12 (1) as stated above does not guarantee the right to receive free education. Hence, 
it is disheartening to note that the right to free education is not guaranteed by the supreme 
                                                          
22Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution. 
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law of the land. Nevertheless, at this juncture, an interesting issue that arises is whether the 
right to free education could fall within the meaning of right to life guaranteed by Article 
5(1) of the Federal Constitution?  Reference could be made to the landmark case in 
Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan 
Pendidikan.23 In this case his Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) gave a very wide 
interpretation to the ‘Right of life’ in Article 5(1) as follows:24 
 
... I have reached the conclusion that the expression "life" appearing in article 5(1) 
does not refer to mere existence. It incorporates all those facets that are an integral 
part of life itself and those matters which go to form the quality of life. Of these are 
the right to seek and be engaged in lawful and gainful employment and to receive 
those benefits that our society has to offer to its members. It includes the right to live 
in a reasonable healthy and pollution free environment. 
 
As the right to receive free education was not stated expressly by His Lordship above, the 
issue that arises next is whether the said right could be implied within the phrase ‘all those 
facets that are an integral part of life itself’, bearing in mind that education is indeed an 
integral part of a person's life? 
In addition, it is also to be noted that Malaysia is a signatory to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. Article 13(2) of the Covenant provides that 
‘primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all’.  It also provides that 
secondary, technical, vocational and higher education shall be accessible to everyone. 
Primary and secondary education is free in Malaysia. Tertiary education is highly subsidised 
                                                          
23[1996] 1 MLJ 261. 
24Ibid at 288. 
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by the Government in the public institution of higher learning.25 Howsoever, students who 
are unable to get a place in the public universities will have to apply to private institutions of 
higher learning, where they would have to fork out a substantial amount to pay for their fees. 
These students have no choice but to rely on their parents to pay their fees or in the alternative 
apply for scholarships or loans. 
 
Thus, this dissertation seeks to critically examine such provisions that exist concerning 
maintenance of non-Muslim children in Malaysia, the problems faced in enforcing 
maintenance orders issued by the courts and seeks to suggest recommendations to amend the 
relevant provisions so that the rights of these children to claim maintenance from their parents 
is protected and guaranteed. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Based on the problem statement above, the research question that arises is two-fold, first, 
whether there are any defects in the laws pertaining to child maintenance in Malaysia? 
Secondly, if the petitioner succeeds in obtaining a maintenance order, the issue that arises 
then is whether the respondent would comply with the order? In other words, the question of 
enforcement of the maintenance order arises.  
 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
The objectives of the study are as follows: 
(a) To identify the current situations concerning the problems faced by non-Muslim 
children in obtaining maintenance from their parents; 
                                                          
25 Shad Saleem Faruqi, Document of Destiny, The Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Star Publications (Malaysia) 
Bhd, Malaysia, 2008). 
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(b) To identify and critically analyse the laws on maintenance concerning non-Muslim 
children in Malaysia; 
(c) To analyse the stakeholders’ perception on the laws on child maintenance 
(d)  To compare the existing maintenance laws in Malaysia with Singapore, England and 
Wales and Australia. 
(e)  To suggest or recommend reforms to the existing legislations on maintenance. 
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
“Methodology of study” refers to “various methods adopted by a researcher in conducting 
the research as well as the logic, reasons or rationale behind them. It refers not only to the 
research methods followed but also the reasons why the researcher selected a particular 
method or technique and why he or she did not use others”.26 In adhering to the definition, 
the following methods were used in this study: 
 
1.6.1 Library research 
As far as lawyers are concerned, the law library could be described as their workshop. 
This is due to the fact that most legal studies are essentially a library-based exercise.27The 
most efficient way to acquire knowledge about the law and to keep up-to-date is through an 
informed use of the library.28 
Research on the laws on maintenance in Malaysia was conducted and a comparison with 
Singapore, England and Wales and Australia were made in this thesis, where the respective 
                                                          
26Anwarul Yaqin, Legal Research and Writing (Malaysia: Lexis-Nexis,2007) at 20. 
27Ibid at 53. 
28Ibid. 
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legislatures in these countries had amended their laws on child maintenance in order to 
safeguard the interests of the children.  Reference was also made to Malaysian, Singaporean, 
English and Australian text books, statutes, law reports, law journals, legal encyclopaedias, 
press reports, academic articles and dissertations. Internet sources such as Lexis-Nexis, CLJ 
online, HEIN online, JSTOR and WOS (World of Sciences), to name a few, were referred to 
by the writer. 
 
1.6.2 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were distributed to undergraduates pursuing their tertiary education in 
public institutions of higher learning. The objective of distributing the questionnaires to the 
undergraduates is to get their perception regarding the laws concerning extending the duty to 
maintain young vulnerable adults in Malaysia. Further thereto, they are the persons who are 
directly affected by the statutory provision which states that the parents' duty to maintain his 
or her child ceases when the child reaches the age of eighteen years, unless he or she is 
physically or mentally disabled. These undergraduates, especially non-law undergraduates, 
are not aware of the existence of such a legal provision. 
 
These questionnaires were distributed in public institutions of higher learning in West 
Malaysia as well as Sabah and Sarawak. The respondents were chosen at random. Please 
refer to Appendix B for a sample of the questionnaires that were distributed among the 
undergraduates). Data was analysed using SPSS 22 for Windows. Data is presented in a 
descriptive manner in order to observe the frequency of the respondents' answers. 
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1.6.3 Interviews 
According to Anwarul Yaqin in his book Legal Research and Writing,29 ‘interview is a 
widely-used method of information collection’.30 Further thereto, he also states that ‘face to 
face interviews or personal interviewing is the oldest and the most widely used method of 
survey research’.31 
In this study, face to face interviews were conducted with social workers and single 
mothers in shelter homes in West Malaysia as well as East Malaysia32 in order to obtain their 
views on the child maintenance laws concerning non-Muslims in Malaysia. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted where the respondents were asked the same questions in the same 
manner. However, towards the end of the interviews, the writer asked other relevant 
questions to find out more about the respondent’s opinion. 
The objective of the interviews is to find out if the respondents, especially the single 
mothers, are aware of the existing laws that confer a right on illegitimate children to claim 
maintenance from their parents. The respondents were chosen from non-Muslim shelter 
homes that housed single mothers. The interviews with the social workers took about half an 
hour per session as the writer asked them questions based on their experience dealing with 
the single mothers in their respective shelter homes and also on the existing maintenance 
laws. On the other hand, the interviews with the single mothers took about twenty minutes 
per session. (Please refer to Appendix C for the semi-structured questions which were posed 
                                                          
29Supra n 26. 
30Ibid at 169-170. 
31Ibid. 
32Due to the request by the social workers to maintain confidentiality of their names and the shelter homes, the writer is unable to reveal 
the names of these homes as well as the names of the social workers and the single mothers who were interviewed. 
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to the social workers and Appendix D for the semi-structured questions that were asked 
during the interviews with the single mothers).  
1.7 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
 
The proposed thesis will be examining child maintenance in Malaysia as follows: 
 
 
1.7.1 Statutes 
As mentioned in the Problem Statement, the main aim of this thesis is to critically analyse 
the existing laws on child maintenance in Malaysia and enforcement of maintenance orders 
concerning non-Muslim children. The following laws would be examined: 
(a) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
(b) Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
(c) Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
(d) Child Act 2001 
(e) Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968 
(f) Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 
 
1.7.2 Non-Muslim children 
Malaysia has two systems of family law, one for the Muslims and one for the non-
Muslims. The Muslims are governed by the Syariah law. Each State has enacted its own 
Enactment concerning Islamic family law matters. The thesis would only focus on the non-
Muslim family laws in Malaysia. The reason for this is because it would be beyond the scope 
of this thesis to examine Muslim laws as the examination of such laws would constitute a 
thesis by itself. On the other hand, the aim of this thesis is to critically analyse the laws 
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concerning maintenance for non-Muslim children in Malaysia in order to extract the defects 
in such laws and to suggest reforms to the existing laws. Nevertheless, this thesis would not 
altogether ignore Muslim law. A comparison with Muslim child maintenance laws will be 
made when the writer proposes reforms to the relevant non-Muslim laws. 
 
1.7.3 Sabah and Sarawak 
As stated above, this thesis would be examining child maintenance laws concerning non-
Muslim children in Malaysia. Non-Muslim children here refers not only to the Chinese, 
Indian and other non-Muslim races, it also includes the natives of Sabah and Sarawak who 
are non-Muslims (who decide to be governed by the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) 
Act 1976). 33 Further thereto, Sabah has its own Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah. This 
ordinance will also be critically analysed in this thesis in order to see whether it adequately 
safeguards the interests of the children in Sabah. As far as Sarawak is concerned, 
maintenance matters used to be provided for in Chapter XXXIII of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of Sarawak.34 However, according to the Modification of Laws (Married Women and 
Children (Maintenance) Act (Extension to the State of Sarawak) Order 1992 (P.U.(A) 
271/92), Chapter XXXIII is repealed and the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) 
Ordinance 1950 is extended to Sarawak from 24 July 1992.  
 
 
 
                                                          
33 It is to be noted that the Orang Aslis (natives) in West Malaysia are governed by their native customary laws. The Law Reform(Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976 however provides in section 3 that these natives have an option to either be bound by the LRA or their personal 
laws. Due to space constraint, the writer would not be examining the native customary laws pertaining to maintenance of the native children. 
34 Cap 62: 1949, revised edition. 
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1.7.4 Comparison with laws of other countries 
This thesis would be examining the laws of other countries, in particular, England and Wales, 
Singapore and Australia. The reason why the writer intends to refer to the above three 
jurisdictions is because the laws in these countries have been amended over the years so that 
the rights of children are protected in relation to maintenance. For example, in all the above 
jurisdictions, a parent is still under a duty to maintain his child, even though the child has 
attained the age of majority, if the child intends to pursue his or her tertiary education at an 
institution of higher learning. This is a positive development in these countries, when 
compared to Malaysia where the law provides that a parent’s duty to maintain his child ceases 
upon the child attaining the age of majority, save if the child is disabled, physically or 
mentally, such duty continues until the disability ceases, whichever is the later. 
Thus, comparison with the laws in the above jurisdictions would be beneficial especially 
when suggesting reforms to amend the domestic legislations on maintenance which are 
defective. 
 
1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before embarking on the journey to write this thesis, the writer reviewed various 
literatures, both local and foreign in order to see if there have been any publications on this 
topic. The literature reviewed is discussed below under two broad categories: local literature 
and foreign literature. 
 
1.8.1 Local Literature 
Several authors have written on child maintenance in Malaysia. Their contribution to this 
topic mostly consists of chapters in books on Family Law in Malaysia, where the authors 
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generally discuss the laws and cases pertaining to child maintenance in Malaysia. So far, only 
one author has written a book on Maintenance and Other Financial Rights in Malaysia.35 
Hence, the gaps that exist in the local literature are as follows: First, there is no publication 
which shows the latest statistics on child maintenance cases in Malaysia, Secondly, there is 
a lacuna on the feedback from the respective stakeholders pertaining to the existing 
maintenance laws. Thirdly, comparison with the laws in other countries is rarely made, 
especially in the text books. One or two of the articles published on this topic may have 
compared the local position with one or two countries. Fourthly, the literature available 
hardly discusses the child welfare principle as the underlying basis of the right to 
maintenance of a child. The writer intends to fill up the above gaps by addressing these four 
issues in this thesis. The writer would next review the literature available to point out what 
has been discussed in each of them. 
The late Professor Ahmad Ibrahim has discussed non-Muslim child maintenance in 
Chapter 5 of his book entitled Family Law in Malaysia.36 Chapter 5 entitled ‘Parent and 
Child’ discusses various matters concerning children, for example, guardianship and custody, 
adoption, legitimacy and legitimation and maintenance in Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and 
Sabah. Maintenance is discussed as a small part in the above chapter, where the author briefly 
states the laws applicable in Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah concerning 
maintenance as well as a few cases. 
As mentioned earlier, Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah has written a book on maintenance 
entitled Maintenance and Other Financial Rights in Malaysia.37 In her book, she discusses 
the laws and cases on maintenance, both under Muslim and non-Muslim laws. She has also 
                                                          
35 Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Family Law, Maintenance and Other Financial Rights, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1993). 
36 Ahmad Ibrahim, Family Law in Malaysia,3rd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1997) 
37Supra n 35. 
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discussed maintenance as regards wife and child. She has commented on decided cases and 
has suggested or recommended reforms in the future. 
In 1999, Professor Mimi Kamariah Majid published her book entitled Family Law in 
Malaysia.38 In this book, there is a chapter on maintenance where the author discusses the 
position concerning maintenance, both for the Muslims and the non-Muslims, as well as for 
the wife and child. She has discussed the problems concerning maintenance that arise, both 
for the wife and the child, by giving her opinion on how to resolve such problems. The writer 
submits that the author of this book has raised salient issues pertaining to child maintenance, 
which would be referred to in this thesis. 
In 2004, the Child Handbook was published as a practical reference as to the law and 
procedure on matters pertaining to child.39 In this Handbook, child maintenance is discussed 
as a sub topic.40 The laws pertaining to, inter alia, the duty to maintain children, the courts 
power to make a maintenance order, expiration of maintenance order, arrears of maintenance, 
assessment of maintenance and recovery of arrears of maintenance are stated in this sub topic, 
together with a few cases. 
In 2006, a manual entitled Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam41 (Islamic Family Law) 
containing various articles written by revered authors was published. One of the articles 
published here is on child maintenance, entitled Nafkah Anak: Kedudukannya di sisi Undang-
Undang Malaysia (Child Maintenance: The Islamic Law Position) by Noor Aziah Haji Mohd 
Awal.42 The author discusses the laws and decided cases concerning child maintenance 
                                                          
38 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1999). 
39 Rasamani Kandiah (Advisory Editor), Child Handbook, Malayan Law Journal Handbook Series, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal 
Sdn Bhd, 2004). 
40Ibid at 70-77. 
41 Abdul Monir Yacoob & Siti Shamsiah Md Supi (eds), Manual Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam,(Kuala Lumpur: Institut Kefahaman 
Islam Malaysia (IKIM), 2006). 
42Ibid at 35-60 
22 
 
applicable both to the Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia. She has also discussed the 
various issues that arise concerning child maintenance. Nevertheless, it is submitted that there 
is a gap pertaining to the comparison with other countries as well as the perception of 
stakeholders on the existing maintenance laws.  
In an article entitled Parents Obligation Towards Maintenance of Children in Tertiary 
Education: An Overview of the Islamic Law and Family Laws in Malaysia in Comparison 
With UK,43 Nuraisyah Chua Abdullah looks at maintaining non-Muslim children above the 
age of 18 years in Malaysia who wish to pursue their tertiary education. She compares the 
position with the Islamic law and Enactments and also highlights the English law in 
comparison with the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. 
In the following year, 2007, an article on maintenance written by Shamsuddin Suhor was 
published in Undang-Undang Keluarga (Sivil)44(Family Law (Civil)). The contents of this 
article too cover laws and cases on maintenance for non-Muslim wives and children. The 
author has generally described the maintenance laws under different sub topics, for example 
the duty to maintain, the relevant Acts of Parliament, duration of maintenance orders, 
variation of maintenance orders, enforcement of maintenance orders to name a few.  
In 2009, Kamala M.G. Pillai published a book entitled Family Law in Malaysia.45 In this 
book too, there is a chapter on maintenance, where the author discusses the laws and cases 
concerning maintenance, both for the wife and child. This chapter discusses the latest cases 
that have been decided on maintenance.  The author has divided the discussion on child 
maintenance into four parts, i.e., maintenance of children generally, maintenance of disabled 
                                                          
43[2006] 5 MLJ cvi; [2006] 5 MLJA 106. 
44 Shamsuddin Suhor , “Nafkah”, Siri Perkembangan Undang-Undang di Malaysia, Undang-Undang Keluarga (Sivil), Vol.9, Shamsuddin 
Suhor & Noor Aziah Mohd Awal (eds), (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2007). 
45 Kamala M.G. Pillai, Family Law in Malaysia, (Petaling Jaya: Lexis Nexis, 2009). 
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children, maintenance of children above the age of 18 years of age and maintenance of 
illegitimate children. 
In 2010, in an article entitled The Role of Law and The Courts in Preventing the Abuse 
of Children-The Malaysian Perspective,46 the author focusses on the issue of child abuse and 
the role of the law in protecting children. The author refers to maintenance of a child in one 
of the sub-topics. Nevertheless, the main focus is on the protection provided in the Child Act 
2001. 
In 2012, a family law book in Bahasa Melayu entitled Undang-Undang Keluarga Di 
Malaysia (Family Law in Malaysia) was published by Nor Aini Abdullah.47 The author 
discussed the laws and judicial decisions concerning both child maintenance and spouse 
maintenance in Chapter 8 of this book. The following statutes were examined i.e. the Married 
Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950,48 the Married Women and Children 
(Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968,49 the Maintenance Act (Facilities for Enforcement) 
Act 194950 and the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976.51 
In 2013, in an article entitled Bayi Yang Dibuang: Hak dan Kedudukan Bayi Di Sisi 
Undang-Undang,52 (Baby Dumping: Legal Rights and the Position of Babies) the authors 
examine the rights of babies who are dumped by their mothers under Islamic law, civil law, 
and Western laws. The authors also give their suggestions to overcome this problem. 
                                                          
46Murugesu, N, The Role of Law And the Courts in Preventing the Abuse of Children, [2010] 5 MLJ cxxv 
47 Nor Aini Abdullah, Undang-Undang Keluarga, (Kuala Lumpur: MDC Publishers Sdn Bhd , 2012). 
48 Act 263. 
49 Act 356. 
50 Act 34. 
51 Act 164. 
52Mustafa ‘Afifa Ab Halim, Mohd Mahyeddin Mohd Salleh, Razlei Perdani Sawai, Nurhafizah Muhd Shukor, Dini Farhana Baharuddin, 
Joki Perdani Sawai, Abdul Halim Mohd Hussin, Bayi Yang Dibuang: Hak dan Kedudukan Bayi Di Sisi Undang-Undang, [2013] 5 MLJ 
lxii 
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In 2014, in an article entitled A Review of Married Women and Children (Maintenance) 
Act 1950 and Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968,53the 
authors examine the lacuna that exist in the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 
1950 and the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968. A 
comparison is also made with the laws in Singapore, Ireland and Australia as well as the laws 
in East Malaysia in order to recommend suggestions to overcome the weaknesses that exist 
in these two statutes. The lacuna that exists in this article is that the discussion is restricted 
to only two of the maintenance laws in Malaysia. 
 In addition to books and articles as mentioned above, a dissertation for a Master of 
Comparative Laws degree was written by Shafiah Mohd Shariff entitled “Maintenance of 
Married Women and Children: A Comparative Studies Under The Civil Law and Syariah”54 
in 1992. In this thesis, the author discusses the position regarding maintenance of women and 
children both under the Syariah law as well as the Civil law. She then makes a comparison 
between both the laws. 
In the following year, a dissertation on the “Right of a Wife To Maintenance and Ancillary 
Relief: A Comparative Study of the Shariah and The Common Law”55 was submitted by 
Noraini bt Mohd Hashim for a Master of Comparative Laws degree. In this thesis, the writer 
mainly discusses a wife’s right to maintenance both under the Syariah law as well as under 
the common law. She concludes her dissertation by making a comparison between the laws 
in the final chapter. In the course of discussing a wife’s right to maintenance, the author has 
also referred to the maintenance of children. 
                                                          
53Nair,H., Dhanapal,S. & Kanapathy,J A Review of Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 and Married Women and 
Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968, European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, Vol.3 No.4,pp 257-272, July 2014. 
54Shafiah Mohd Shariff  “Maintenance of Married Women and Children: A Comparative Studies Under The Civil Law and 
Syariah”,(Diss: M.C.L,Kulliyah of Laws, International Islamic University, Petaling Jaya 1992). 
55Noraini bt Mohd Hashim, “Right of a Wife To Maintenance and Ancillary Relief: A Comparative Study of the Shariah and The Common 
Law”, (Diss: M.C.L Kulliyah of Laws, International Islamic University, Petaling Jaya, 1993) 
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In 2006, a dissertation on the “Impact of Divorce On Children’s Welfare: A Pilot Study 
On Children Living With Single Mothers In Selected Rural Areas in Selangor”56 was 
submitted by Nor’Asyikin Bt Hamzah for a Master of Comparative Laws degree. In this 
thesis, the focus is on the impact of divorce on children from the socio-legal perspective. This 
thesis discusses the plight of single mothers who have to depend on their family members in 
the rural areas to bring up their children, when the children’s father neglects to pay 
maintenance. 
 
1.8.2 Foreign Literature 
Foreign literature here refers to the literature on family law, specifically on child 
maintenance laws, available in the three jurisdictions that the writer intends to refer to for the 
purpose of comparing the Malaysian laws with the laws of the said countries, i.e. Singapore, 
England and Wales and Australia. It is respectfully submitted that when comparing the local 
literature to the foreign literature, the latter contains discussion of child maintenance issues 
in depth. The respective authors, especially of the literature in Singapore, have examined in 
detail the issues that arise when it comes to child maintenance. Hence, the writer is of the 
opinion that these foreign literatures are of great help when it comes to recommending 
reforms to the existing maintenance laws in Malaysia, as the laws in all the three countries 
that would be examined below have undergone several amendments since they were enacted.  
 
A. Singapore 
Several books have been published on Family Law in Singapore. Professor Leong Wai 
Kum could be said to be the Family Law exponent in Singapore, having published several 
                                                          
56Nor’Asyikin Bt Hamzah, “Impact of Divorce On Children’s Welfare: A Pilot Study On Children Living With Single Mothers In Selected 
Rural Areas in Selangor”,(Diss: M.C.L Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia, December 2006.) 
26 
 
books and articles in this field of law. In one of her earlier books, Principles of Family 
Law,57one of the Chapters is entitled "Maintenance Among Family Members". In this 
chapter, maintenance of child is discussed as one of the subtopics where the author traces the 
development of the duty of maintenance of a child back to common law. She then discusses 
the provisions in the Singapore Women's Charter on child maintenance pertaining to various 
issues that arise concerning child maintenance and the enforcement of maintenance orders. 
In her next book, Cases and Materials of Family Law in Singapore,58 there is a similar 
chapter as her earlier book stated above59, on ‘Maintenance Among Family Members’. In 
this Chapter too, she discusses ‘Maintenance of Child’ as a subtopic. Specific provisions in 
the Women's Charter on child maintenance are highlighted. Questions are posed to the reader 
based on the provisions highlighted. Thereafter, the author refers to the articles written and 
cases decided on that particular issue. Having done so, she then poses questions to the reader. 
In 2007, Professor Leong Wai Kum published a book entitled Elements of Family Law in 
Singapore.60 In this book, there is a chapter specifically on maintenance, i.e. Chapter 12 
entitled ‘Maintenance of Child and Child's Maintenance of Aged Parents’. The author 
discusses both the parents' duty to maintain a child as well as the child's duty to maintain his 
or her aged parent. The first part of the Chapter discusses child maintenance issues under 
Singaporean law, similar to the issues discussed in the Principles of Family Law in 
Singapore.61 The author ends the discussion on child maintenance issue with the enforcement 
of maintenance orders in Singapore. 
                                                          
57 Leong, Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law, (Singapore:  Butterworths Asia, 1997). 
58Leong, Wai Kum, Cases and Materials of Family Law, (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1999) 
59Supra n 57 
60Leong, Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Lexis-Nexis 2007). 
61Supra n 57 
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One of the earlier books published on Family Law in Singapore was by O.S. Khoo in 
1984, entitled Parent-Child Law in Singapore.62 In this book, the author specifically 
discusses several issues regarding parent-child relationship such as guardianship, custody, 
adoption and maintenance, to name a few.  Chapter 5 specifically discusses maintenance in 
Singapore where the author traces the historical background of the maintenance laws in 
Singapore and then goes on to discuss the law on maintenance and enforcement of 
maintenance orders under the Women's Charter. However, as the Women's Charter has 
undergone several amendments since 1984, the discussion on the legal provisions under the 
Women's Charter in this book cannot be referred to now. Nevertheless, this book could be 
referred to as a source of reference when examining the historical background of the 
Women’s Charter 
Another book that was referred to by the writer when researching maintenance laws in 
Singapore was the book written by Foo Siew Fong entitled When Marriages Break Down: 
Rights, Obligations and Division of Property.63 The author of this book looks at marital 
breakdowns and the legal issues that arise once a marriage is dissolved in Singapore. One of 
the legal issues that is discussed in this book is pertaining to maintenance for the child. The 
writer looks at the procedural as well as the substantive laws in a maintenance claim, 
compared to the books referred to above, which only discuss the substantive laws. In addition, 
the author here also looks at the enforcement of maintenance procedure and states the steps 
that need to be taken in order to enforce a maintenance order. 
In 2011, Professor Leong Wai Kum published a book entitled The Singapore Women's 
Charter: 50 Questions.64 In this book, the author has basically divided the chapters according 
                                                          
62 Khoo, O.S., Parent-Child Law in Singapore, (Singapore:  Butterworths, Singapore 1984). 
63 Foo, Siew Fong, When Marriages Break Down: Rights, Obligations and Division of Property, (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 
2005). 
64 Leong, Wai Kum, The Singapore Women's Charter: 50 Questions, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011). 
28 
 
to Family Law issues such as, Marriage, Regulation of Husband Wife Relationship, 
Regulation of Parent-Child Relationship, Violence in the Family, Divorce and the Process, 
Maintenance, Division of Matrimonial Assets and Muslims. In each chapter, the writer poses 
questions and answers these questions by citing the Women's Charter as the authority. 
However, no judicial decisions were referred to in this book. This book could be said to be a 
handbook for anyone who wants to find out the answers to any Family Law issue in 
Singapore. In the Chapter on ‘Maintenance’, the author has posed various questions on the 
issue of maintenance of a wife as well as a child. 
Apart from books, articles have also been written on maintenance laws in Singapore. In 
1987, an article on the provisions concerning maintenance in the Women’s Charter65 was 
written by Professor Leong Wai Kum entitled ‘The Duty to Maintain Spouse and Children 
During Marriage’.66 This article examines issues concerning the law of maintenance during 
the subsistence of marriage. The author has divided the discussion onto two parts, the first 
part concerning the husband’s duty to maintain his wife and the second part referring to the 
duty of a parent to maintain his children. In the first part, the author examines the validity of 
the High Court decision (on appeal) in Quek Ah Chian v Ng Guan Chg,67 where the court 
held that the husband’s duty to maintain his wife rests on proof of the husband’s culpability. 
In this respect, the author further examines the 1980 amendments to the Women’s Charter. 
In the second part, the author examines the duty of a parent to maintain his child by examining 
statutory provisions and case law. 
In 2011, Professor Leong Wai Kum also wrote an article entitled The Next Fifty Years of 
the Women's Charter - Ripples of Change.68 In this article, the author discusses the 
                                                          
65(Cap 353) 1985 (Rev Ed) Statutes of the Republic of Singapore. 
66 (1987) 29 Mal LR pp 56 – 79. 
67[1968] 1 MLJ 255. 
68 [2011] SJLS 152-177. 
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developments that have taken place in the past fifty years in the Family Law of Singapore 
since the Women’s Charter was passed (i.e. from 1961 – 2011). The author looks at the 
various amendments that have taken place since 1961, the significant amendments taking 
place in 1967, 1980, 1996 and 2011. The author then discusses in detail provisions 
concerning the protection of children in order to see whether the rights of children are 
adequately protected in the Charter. The main focus of the author in this article is concerning 
the usage of the word ’illegitimate child’ in the Charter. The author traces the history as to 
how legitimacy came to Singapore law, the developments of the concept of legitimacy in 
Singapore and the judicial call to remove the word ’illegitimate children, from the 
Singaporean Laws. The author then gives her own opinion on this issue. Having discussed 
the rights of children, the author then goes on to discuss other developments in Singaporean 
laws such as equalising maintenance obligation between spouses and responding to diverse 
family forms in Singapore. 
 
B. England and Wales 
The English legal position on child maintenance could be obtained from various reference 
books. One of the leading books on Family Law is Bromley’s Family Law69 written by Nigel 
Lowe and Gillian Douglas. This book basically discusses family law in England by looking 
at various topic starting from Formation of Marriage and Civil Partnership to International 
Aspects of Child Law. More than half the contents of this book refer to issues concerning 
children. The position as to child maintenance could be found in Chapter 2 – Financial 
Obligations to Members of the Family. This chapter very briefly looks at the Parents’ Duty 
to support their children. The focus in this chapter is more on the role of the State in providing 
                                                          
69Lowe, Nigel and Douglas, Gillian, Bromley’s Family Law, (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
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child support. Child support laws in England and Wales are more developed and 
sophisticated when compared to Malaysia as they have Child Support Agencies which assess 
the maintenance that needs to be paid by the parents and ensures that the maintenance amount 
is collected and enforced. In addition to the existence of the Child Support Agency, the social 
security system is also available. It provides a means of supporting family members whose 
income is not adequate to meet their needs. It would also provide additional income where 
there are dependent children.  
Jonathan Herring has also published a book entitled Family Law.70 The author discusses 
both spousal maintenance as well as child support. He looks at the recent law pertaining to 
child support, i.e. the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008, in addition to the 
existing laws such as the Children Act 1989 and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The 
author discusses the theoretical issues around child support, including the issue as to whether 
the obligation to support children falls on the state or on the parents. The welfare principle is 
also discussed in depth here. 
Hayes and Williams’ Family Law’s 71 contents are divided into two parts, Part 1 deals with 
Adult Family Law and Part 2 deals with Child Family Law. Chapter 6 in Part 2, entitled 
‘Financial Support for Children’, discusses the background and recent reforms to the Child 
Support Act 1991. In addition, the chapter also discusses the courts’ powers under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Children Act 1989. 
In addition to the books written on Family Law in the United Kingdom, several books 
have also been written on children's rights.  One particular book which the writer has referred 
to is by Jane Fortin entitled Children's Rights and the Developing Law.72 This book examines 
                                                          
70 Herring, Jonathan, Family Law, 7th ed (United Kingdom: Pearson, 2015) 
71Gilmore, Stephens and Glennon, Lisa, Hayes and Williams’ Family Law, 5th ed, (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016) 
72 Jane Fortin, Children's Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edition, (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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the various rights of children, for example, the right to support, healthcare, education, 
representation and state protection. The author looks at the theoretical perspectives 
concerning children's rights. A child's right to support is specifically discussed in Chapter 9 
entitled ‘Children's rights versus family privacy - physical punishment and financial support’. 
The author looks at the right guaranteed by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
as well as the Child Support Act 1991. The author goes on to assess the child support scheme 
prescribed by the Child Support Act, looking at the weaknesses that exist. In addition to that, 
she finally discusses the role of the state in protecting the rights of the children, by 
‘maintaining a safety-net approach to family support’. 
In addition to the above book, Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore have also written a 
book which focusses on children, entitled Children, The Modern Law.73 This book has four 
parts. Part I deals with the Background and Sources of Children Law, Part II on Children and 
Families, Part III on Children and Local Authorities and Part IV is on Children and Society. 
Child Support is discussed in Chapter 9 which falls under Part II. This Chapter looks at the 
Child Support Act 1991 and the Children Act 1989 as well as other issues such as variation, 
rescissions, welfare principle and the court’s powers to make financial provisions. 
The English position on the maintenance of a child could also be seen in Michael Lett’s 
article on Children-The Continuing Duty to Maintain.74 In this article, the author examines 
the right of a child to claim financial support from his parents continuing beyond the age 
limits set by the Child Support Act 1991. The author states that in certain circumstances, the 
child may be able to claim financial support if his or her parents have separated or divorced 
by referring to the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Children Act 1989. 
                                                          
73Bainham, Andrew and Gilmore, Stephen, Children, The Modern Law, 4th ed. (Bristol: Family Law, 2013) 
74 Lett, Michael, ‘Children – The Continuing Duty to Maintain’, Fam Law 31 (839). 
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The possibility of claiming under both the abovementioned statutes is considered in this 
article. 
C. Australia 
One of the earlier books written on Family Law in Australia was by H.A. Finlay entitled 
Family Law in Australia.75 In this book, the author discusses Family Law issues such as 
marriage, divorce, the legal position of children, Maintenance in Family Law, Property in 
Family Law and the Adoption of Children. In the chapter entitled ‘Maintenance in Family 
Law’, the author looks at maintenance between spouse as well as maintenance of children. 
He also goes on to examine maintenance orders and maintenance agreements and concludes 
the chapter with an examination of enforcement of maintenance orders and maintenance 
agreements overseas. 
In 1993, Richard Ingleby published his book entitled Family Law and Society.76 The 
author divided the chapters into three parts, i.e. Part A - Families and the Law, Part B - 
Children and Part C - Financial Matters. Child support is discussed in Part B, where the 
author discusses the reforms to the law governing the calculation and child support orders 
under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1984 (Cth), Child Support (Registration and 
Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) and the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). The author concludes the 
chapter by evaluating the law reform that has taken place in Australia at that point of time 
and considering whether future reforms to the law might introduce parental support 
obligations. 
                                                          
75 Finlay, H.A., Family Law in Australia, (Australia: Butterworths, 1983). 
76 Ingleby, Richard, Family Law and Society, (Australia: Butterworths, 1993). 
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In the following year, 1994, two more books were published. First, the Australian Family 
Law in Context: Commentary and Materials77 by Stephen Parker, Patrick Parkinson and 
Juliet Behrens. The authors have discussed Family Law in Australia by dividing the book 
into five parts. Part A looks at ‘The Family In Context’, Part B on ‘Family Law in Context’, 
Part C on ‘Marriage and Cohabitation’, Part D on ‘Economic Aspects of Relationship 
Breakdown’ and Part E on ‘Children in Family Law’. Although Part E states ‘Children in 
Family Law’, the discussion in that part is basically on child custody and access as well as 
child abuse and neglect. Child maintenance is in fact discussed in Part D. This Part discusses 
not only child support, but also spousal maintenance as well as property rights during 
marriage. Chapter 13 which discusses on child support traces the background of child support 
in Australia. It then goes on to look at the provisions concerning child support in the Family 
Law Act, followed by the Child Support scheme under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 
1989. The authors conclude the chapter by evaluating the child support scheme in Australia. 
The second book that was published is by Jan Bowen entitled Child Support: A 
Practitioner's Guide.78 This book was published in association with the Child Support 
Agency. As the name suggests, this book was written with the aim of providing information 
on child support, specifically on the Child Support Scheme in Australia to practitioners. The 
discussion in this book is divided in two parts. Part 1 discusses how the child support scheme 
works, child support assessment, child support agreements, court orders, child support 
applications and payment, social security and child support, employers and the child support 
scheme, reviewing an assessment and the enforcement of child support obligations. Part II 
discusses how a child support assessment is worked out. 
                                                          
77  Parker, Stephen, Parkinson, Patrick and Behrens, Juliet, Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials, (Australia: The 
Law Book Company Limited, 1994). 
78 Jan Bowen, Child Support: A Practitioner's Guide, (Australia: The Law Book Company Ltd 1994). 
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Having examined the literature available on child maintenance, the writer is of the opinion 
that there is much to be done to solve the current problems that arise. Research has to be 
carried out to find out the actual problems faced by the children in getting maintenance and 
in enforcing the maintenance orders. Only one or two of the Malaysian authors mentioned 
above have done some fieldwork and obtained statistics from the courts to show the number 
of child maintenance cases. However, the statistics published in their respective books were 
obtained more than six years ago. Further thereto, only one or two of the above Malaysian 
literature contains discussion on interviews held with the ‘victims’, for example, single 
mothers and children (of sufficient age of maturity to express the opinions), to reflect the true 
picture. It is of no use to merely rely on judicial decisions when critically analysing the 
position as to child maintenance. The actual situation would only be discovered when 
fieldwork is carried out, which the writer intends to do in the course of writing this thesis.  
In addition thereto, comparison with the maintenance laws in other jurisdictions has not 
been discussed in depth in the Malaysian literature. Save for one article which refers to 
Singapore, Ireland and Australia,79 the rest of the literature refer mainly to the United 
Kingdom laws. As such, the writer is of the opinion that in suggesting reforms to our present 
maintenance laws, it is pertinent to look at the laws in more than one country, where there 
have been positive developments in safeguarding the interests of children. 
1.9 SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Having examined the local literature on child maintenance, the writer is of the view that  
 
                                                          
79Supra n.53 
35 
 
this issue needs further study as there is insufficient coverage in the local material. Hence, 
this research, by critically analysing all laws concerning child maintenance concerning non-
Muslims in Malaysia and conducting fieldwork to find out the actual state of matters, is 
hoped to contribute to the existing knowledge and will be useful to ensuring the welfare of 
these innocent children is safeguarded as well as to preserve harmony in the society. 
 
1.10 LIMITATIONS 
The following limitations arose in the preparation of this thesis: 
 
1.10.1 Interviews 
The writer faced difficulties in getting the single mothers to consent to being interviewed 
in Sabah. The reason for the reluctance was the embarrassment it would cause then if they 
were to reveal their experiences. However, the writer managed to get a few of them to agree 
after promising them anonymity and stating that they have the right to refuse to answer the 
questions posed to them if they felt uncomfortable answering them. 
In addition to the above limitation, due to time constraint, the writer was unable to 
interview policy-makers as regards to the issue as to why the laws in Malaysia have not 
undergone amendments for a long time. 
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1.10.2 Accuracy in the responses 
The issue as to whether the responses given by the respondents were genuine during the 
interviews conducted with single mothers. The reason for this is that when these single 
mothers were interviewed, they became very emotional, some even getting very angry with 
the father of their child. Hence, in the heat of the moment, the writer had to decide whether 
to accept the responses as true, as it was doubtful whether they were able to think with an 
open mind. However, this issue was resolved when the writer managed to speak to the social 
workers who worked with these single mothers. Some of the questions that were put to the 
single mothers were also asked of the social workers. Based on the answers given by the 
social workers, the writer was able to observe if their answers are consistent with that of the 
single mothers. 
 
 
1.10.3 Access to foreign literature 
The writer faced a problem in accessing recent foreign literature, especially Australian 
text books, in the library. As could be seen in the Literature Review, the Australian text books 
that were available in the library were published in the 1980s and 1990s. In order to overcome 
this limitation, the writer referred to the text books that were available to examine the basic 
principles of child maintenance in Australia as well as a source of reference pertaining to the 
origins of child maintenance laws in Australia. As to find out the current laws and judicial 
decisions in Australia, the writer had to rely on the resources available on the internet such 
as www.austlii.edu.au. 
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF CHILD MAINTENANCE LAWS 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having briefly examined selected family systems that exist globally in Chapter 1, the 
writer next intends to zoom in to the issue of child maintenance, which forms the crux of this 
thesis, in this Chapter. Before examining the non-Muslim maintenance laws in Malaysia, the 
writer would first refer to child maintenance laws in selected Western and Eastern countries 
to see who shoulders the duty to maintain a child in those societies. The writer would next 
trace the development of maintenance laws in Malaysia, i.e. from the Straits Settlements era 
to the present time in order to see if there have been any developments concerning these laws. 
Thereafter, the writer would compare with the development of maintenance laws in 
Singapore. The writer would conclude this Chapter by examining the child maintenance 
issues which would be examined in detail in the following Chapters. 
A parent has a legal as well as a moral duty to maintain his children. A breach of a moral 
duty to maintain would not attract any penalties. However, the breach of a legal duty would. 
Before discussing the laws concerning maintenance, it is pertinent to first find out the 
meaning of ‘maintenance’. ‘Maintenance’ basically refers to the provision of basic 
necessaries such as food, clothing, shelter and education. In Re Borthwick (Deceased), 
Borthwick v Beauvis,1 Harman J. Explained ‘maintenance’ as follows:2 
 
                                                          
1 [1949] Ch. 395. 
2Ibid at 401. 
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It is said that maintenance is the only thing that you can look at. What does it mean? 
It does not mean that you can only give the dependant just enough to put a little jam 
on his bread and butter. It has already been held that what is reasonable for one may 
not be reasonable for another. It must depend on the circumstances of the case. It 
certainly depends to some extent on the circumstances of the widow, but I think it 
may also depend on the circumstances of the testator, that is to say, whether he dies 
a rich man or no, because a rich man may be supposed to have made better provision 
for his wife’s maintenance that a poor one. Maintenance does not only mean the food 
she puts in her mouth, it means the clothes on her back, the house in which she lives, 
and the money which she has put in her pocket, all of which vary according to the 
means of the man who leaves a wife behind him. I think that must be so. Maintenance 
cannot mean only a mere subsistence. 
 
The above definition, although concerns a testator and provision for his widow, it should 
be applicable to the meaning of ‘maintenance’ generally for a wife and a child. This 
explanation was adopted in the local cases of Sivajothy a/p Suppiah v Kunathasan a/l 
Chelliah3 and Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso.4 The Law Reform (Marriage and 
Divorce) Act 1976, in placing the duty to maintain a child on the parents, states that 
maintenance refers to providing accommodation clothing, food and education. One pertinent 
matter is missing in this explanation. i.e. medical treatment for a child. In comparison, the 
Indian counterpart to this provision, i.e. the Indian Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 in 
                                                          
3 [2000] 6 MLJ 48. 
4 [2005] 1 CLJ 247. Note that both these cases were concerning maintenance for the wife. However, the same explanation could be 
applied for child maintenance as well. 
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its section 3(b)(i) defines “maintenance” to include provision for food, clothing, residence 
and medical attention and treatment. 
The importance of medical treatment was explained in the Indian case of Ajay Saxena v 
Rachna Saxena,5 where the court held as follows: 
It is trite to state that medical assistance, just like food, clothing, shelter and education 
is an essential requirement for survival and cannot be withheld by the husband from 
the wife and children till final adjudication of the suit. 
The state too plays an important role in enacting laws which impose a duty upon parents 
to maintain their children. However, mere enactment of legislations is insufficient. It is 
equally important to ensure that such laws do indeed adequately protect the rights of children 
regarding maintenance.  
 
A brief insight into the position concerning child maintenance globally (which includes 
different religions) and in Malaysia is stated below. This insight is pertinent in order to see 
the values each culture and religion referred to below, places on the duty to maintain children, 
be it on the child’s parents, grandparents, relatives and so on. Finally, the writer would briefly 
state the position in Malaysia before going into the details in the Chapters that follow. 
 
2.2 GLOBAL OVERVIEW ON CHILD MAINTENANCE 
Prior to examining the Malaysian laws on child maintenance, the writer would first 
briefly look at the maintenance laws in selected legal systems such as the common law, civil 
law (the laws in France and China) and also under selected religions such as Christianity, 
Islam and Hinduism. 
                                                          
5 AIR 2007 Del. 39. 
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2.2.1 Common Law 
Under common law, there is no legal obligation on parents to maintain their children. The 
law has left it to the parents own sense of morals.6 Blackstone states that the duty of a parent 
to maintain his or her child is a principle of natural law. He elaborates on this duty laid by 
nature as follows: 
... an obligation, ... laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper 
act, in bringing them into the world; for they would be in the highest manner injurious 
to their issue if they only gave their children life, that they might afterwards see them 
perish. By begetting them, therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to 
endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be 
supported and preserved.7 
 
Further thereto, in National Assistance Board v Wilkinson,8 Lord Goddard CJ, citing 
Lindley LJ in Thomasset v Thomasset9 stated as follows:10 
I know of no case in which a father has been ordered by a Court of Equity to maintain 
his child. 
Thus, in common law there is no civil obligation on a parent to maintain his child. 
However, if a father neglects to maintain his child, the matter could be brought under criminal 
law. The liability to maintain was imposed by criminal law statutes.11 
  
                                                          
6 Leong Wai Kum, “The Duty to Maintain Spouse and Children During Marriage” (1987) 29 Mal LR 56. 
7Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 1, 16th ed. 1825, London, pp 446-447. 
8 [1952] 2 QB 255 
9 [1894] P 295  
10Ibid at 299. 
11 For example, statutes such as The Poor Relief Act 1601 and the Poor Relief Act (Deserted Wives and Children) 1718. 
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2.2.2 Civil Law/Communist Law 
2.2.2.1 Child Maintenance Laws in France 
 
In France, the law imposes the duty of providing maintenance on close relatives for their 
relatives who are in dire need.12 Such a duty is imposed between relatives on the vertical axis 
of consanguinity, descendants and ancestors provided that the relationship is legal but not 
between peripheral relatives.13 Parents who adopt children are under a duty to maintain their 
adopted children but for one degree only, i.e. a duty to maintain the adopted child, but has no 
duty to maintain the child of the adopted child. Further thereto, in France, a parent’s duty to 
maintain his children does not cease for any reason. 
 
2.2.2.2 Child Maintenance Laws in China 
 
With the establishment of the Chinese Communists in the Chinese Soviet Republic in 
1931, marriage law and the land reform law were promulgated. The same happened in 1950 
with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.14 Land reform and marriage policy 
supplemented one another in various fields of social and economic organisation, all aimed at 
realization of socialism.15 
The Marriage Regulations 1931 was enacted on 1st December 1931 which was later 
abolished by the Marriage Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic on 8th April 1934. 
Nevertheless, both these laws were more or less similar with one another.16 The parents’ duty 
to maintain their children is expressly stated in Article 13 of the Marriage Law as follows: 
                                                          
12Ala’eddin Kharefa, Islamic Family Law, A Comparative Study With Other Religions, (Kuala Lumpur: International Law Books 
Services, 2004) at 280. 
13Ibid. 
14Marinus J Meijer, Marriage Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China, Chinese Family Law and Social Changes in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective, David C Buxbaum (editor), (Hong Kong: University of Washington Press, 1978), at 436. 
15 M J Meijer, Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People’s Republic, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1971), 42 
16Ibid at 48. 
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The parents have a duty to bring up and to educate their children. The children should 
be taught to be loyal to their father and mother and to the socialist enterprise; they 
should love the Party, love the leadership, love collectively, love labour and common 
production.17 
 
Parents have a legal duty under the Marriage Law to provide education to their children. 
Children who have been abandoned by their parents have a right to institute legal proceedings 
against them. The duty to maintain a child ceases upon the child attaining the age of 
majority.18 In the event the child is suffering from an illness or for any other reason, the child 
is unable to earn a livelihood, the parents are still under a duty to maintain him even though 
he is a major. 
 
2.2.4 Christianity Law 
Referring to the Code of Anglicans, a father is responsible for providing maintenance for 
his young child who has no money of his own.19 Basically, under this Code, assessment of 
maintenance is done by considering the needs of the child and the financial ability of the 
spender. The father could be asked to pay maintenance in advance every month or if 
convenient, tri-monthly.20 
                                                          
17Questions and Answers on the Marriage Law, Anhui Provincial Court and the Judicial Bureau of that Province. 
18Ibid. 
19 Article 38 of the Code of Anglicans. 
20Ibid. 
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2.2.5 Islamic Law 
In Islam, generally blood relationship is the reason for imposing the duty of 
maintenance.21 However, the definitions of ‘blood relationship’ vary between the different 
jurists.22 According to the Maliki School of Thought, Imam Malek refers to Surah Al-Talaq:7 
as evidence to state that maintenance is only due to direct parents: father and mother and to 
the immediate children. Immediate children here refer to a son until he reaches puberty and 
to the daughter until she gets married. Al-Talaq: 7 states as follows: 
Let the man of means spend according to his means: and the man whose resources 
are restricted, let him spend according to what Allah has given him. Allah puts no 
burden on any person beyond what He has given him. After a difficulty, Allah will 
soon grant relief. 
The scholars attached to the Shafei, Hanafi and Hambali Schools of Thought state that 
maintenance is due to all the relatives on the lineage scale that is to ancestors and to 
descendants.23 They refer to the following Quranic verse as proof:24 
A grandson is still called a son, even if he is low on the scale of lineage. The Quranic 
verse stipulates that inheritance should be divided in accordance with Quranic 
teachings: the son has two shares and the daughter one. 
Hence, it could be observed that the difference between the Maliki School of Thought 
and the other three Schools of Thought is that the former restricts the duty to maintain to the 
                                                          
21Supra n 12 at 266 
22Ibid. 
23Supra n 12 at 268-269. 
24Al-Nisa:11. 
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immediate dependent, be it from the parent to the child or vice versa whereas the latter extend 
the duty to all the dependents on the lineage scale, be it the ancestors or the descendants. 
2.2.6 Hindu Law 
A Hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his wife, his minor sons, his unmarried 
daughters and his aged parents whether he possesses any property or not. The obligation to 
maintain these relations is personal in character and arises from the very existence of the 
relation between the parties.25 
As mentioned above, a father is bound to maintain his minor sons until they reach the age 
of majority. This obligation to minor sons exists even if it means maintaining out of the 
father’s self-acquired property.26 Where it concerns daughters, a father is bound to maintain 
his daughter until she gets married. If the father dies before her marriage, she is entitled to be 
maintained out of his estate.27 When the daughter gets married, she becomes a member of 
her husband’s family and therefore has to be maintained by her husband. After the husband’s 
death, she is entitled to be maintained out of his estate.28 
 
2.3 THE MALAYSIAN POSITION 
Malaysia, consisting of various races such as the Malays, Chinese, Indians, Natives of 
Sabah and Sarawak and Sikh, has two systems of family laws, i.e. one for the Muslims and 
one for the non-Muslims.29 A general overview on the position concerning maintaining 
children under Muslim and non-Muslim laws in Malaysia is stated as below. 
                                                          
25Savitribai v Luxmibai&SadasivGanoba (1878) 2 Bom 573, 597-598 [F.B.] 
26Ammakannu v Appu (1888) 11 Mad 91; Premchand v Hullaschand (1869) 4 Beng L.R. App 23; Ramachandra v Sakaram (1878) 3 Bom 
346, 350, 351; Bhoopathi Nath Chakrabarti v Basanta Kumaree Debee (1936) 63 Cal 1098 (136) A.C. 556 
27Bai Mangal v Bai Rukhmini (1899) 23 Bom 291; Tulsha v Gopal Rai (1884) 6 All 632. 
28Kartic Chunder v Saroda Sundari (1891) 18 Cal 642, 646 
29 See Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution which provides that the courts referred to in clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in 
respect of any matters within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. See also Article 74(2) of the Federal Constitution which provides that 
the State Legislature may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List. The State List refers to the Second 
List, which falls under the Ninth Schedule. Matters enumerated in the Second List include family law of persons professing the religion of 
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2.3.1 Muslim children 
Generally, in Islam, a father is under a duty to maintain his children who fall under any 
one of the following categories: 
(a) his children who are infants, irrespective of whether or not he has custody of them; 
(b) his son’s infant children, where the son is unable to maintain them; 
(c) his son who is disabled or is a student; 
(d) his daughter who is unmarried, irrespective of her age; and 
(e) his daughter who is widowed or divorced, if she is ill.30 
 
 
In Malaysia, each state has its own Enactment concerning Islamic Family Law. The State 
Enactments basically impose a duty on the father of the child to pay maintenance in 
accordance with the Hukum Syarak or the Syariah principles for the benefit of his child: 
(a) if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for his child; 
(b) if he has totally deserted his wife and the child is in her charge; 
(c) during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or 
(d) when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the 
custody of any other person.31 
 
2.3.2 Non-Muslim children 
The non-Muslims in Malaysia have their own set of laws concerning maintenance. In 
Malaysia, the origin of the parent’s duty to maintain their children is the Straits Settlements 
                                                          
Islam, including the Islamic Law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, 
legitimacy, guardianship and gifts. 
30 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1999) at 344. 
31 For example, see the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 (Act 303) and the Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983 
(Kelantan) Enactment No.1 of 1983. 
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Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1872. This Ordinance has placed the duty to 
maintain their child on both the parents. 
Pursuant to the above Ordinance, various laws have been enacted pertaining to the issue 
of maintenance. Upon observing these subsequent laws, it could be noted that the duty to 
maintain as provided under the Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance 
of 1872 was gradually extended. The current laws that lay down the duty to maintain are as 
follows: 
(a) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act (Act 164) which applies throughout 
Malaysia; 
(b) Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (Act 263), which applies 
to West Malaysia and the State of Sarawak: 
(c) Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah; 
 
2.4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS RELATING TO MAINTENANCE IN 
MALAYSIA 
Prior to examining the development of maintenance laws in Malaysia, it is pertinent to 
note that Malaysia comprises of West Malaysia (or also referred to as Peninsular Malaysia), 
Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah and Sarawak are also referred to as East Malaysia.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the earliest legislations to be enacted pertaining to 
maintenance of a child is the Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance 
of 1872. Pursuant to this Ordinance various laws on maintenance have been passed. The 
stages of development concerning maintenance laws will be discussed below. 
47 
 
2.4.1 Stage One: 1870 - 1910 
This initial stage contains the pioneer batch of maintenance statutes in our country. There 
are two statutes which were passed in this stage, i.e. the Straits Settlements Summary 
Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1872 and the Straits Settlements Minor Offences 
Ordinance No. XIII of 1906. 
 
2.4.1.1 Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1872 
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, there is no legal obligation under the common law 
on a parent to maintain his or her child. The duty to maintain was codified for the first time 
in the Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1872. This 
Ordinance, which came into force on 8 November 1872, was passed to consolidate and 
amend the law relating to Summary Criminal Jurisdiction in the three colonies that fall under 
the Straits Settlements, i.e. Penang, Malacca and Singapore. 
Provisions concerning maintenance could be found in section 45, which falls under 
Chapter 4 entitled Preventive Jurisdiction.  Section 45, inter alia, provides as follows: 
I.  If any person neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or legitimate child unable 
to maintain itself, it shall be lawful for the Court of Quarter Sessions or for Magistrate, 
upon due proof thereof, to order such person to make a monthly allowance for the 
maintenance of his wife or such child as aforesaid, in proportion to the means of such 
person, as to the Court or Magistrate shall seem reasonable; and 
II.  If any person neglects or refuses to maintain his illegitimate child unable to 
maintain itself, it shall be lawful on due proof thereof, to order such person to make 
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such monthly allowance not exceeding ten dollars, as to the Court or Magistrate may 
seem reasonable. 
III. Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order. 
IV. If such person shall wilfully neglect to comply with any such order, the Court or 
Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, by Warrant, direct the amount due to 
be levied in the manner by law provided for levying fines imposed by Magistrates; or 
may sentence him to imprisonment of either description for any term not exceeding 
one month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid. 
 
Upon perusing the above provisions, it is to be noted that similar wordings could be found 
in later legislations concerning maintenance, which would be discussed below. 
According to Professor Leong Wai Kum in her book, Principles of Family Law in 
Singapore,32 the codification of a parent’s duty to maintain his or her child under this 
Ordinance is two-fold, as section 45 is a substantive enactment as well as means of 
enforcement. This could be described as a quantum leap when compared to the common law 
position, which did not impose any such obligation on a parent. In the words of Professor 
Leong Wai Kum:33 
The first provision allowing the courts, directly, to enforce the husband’s duty, in the 
Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance 1872, referred both to 
the duty of the husband to maintain his wife and of a parent to a child. The latter was, 
                                                          
32 Leong, Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1997) at 842. 
33Ibid 
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clearly, both a substantive enactment and means of enforcement as the common law 
never imposed a duty on a parent to a child. 
 
2.4.1.2 Straits Settlements Minor Offences Ordinance No. XIII of 1906.34 
In 1906, with the enforcement of the Straits Settlements Minor Offences Ordinance 1906, 
section 39 of this Ordinance repealed section 45 of the Straits Settlements Summary Criminal 
Jurisdiction Ordinance 1872. The new section 39 was a similar to section 45, save for 
subsection III which provides that a wife loses her right to maintenance only if ‘she is living 
in adultery or if without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with him’. 
 
2.4.2 Stage Two: 1911-1950 
Stage 2 witnessed maintenance laws being enacted in the rest of the parts of the country, 
which included the Federated Malays States (F.M.S.). The F.M.S. was a federation of four 
protected states established by the British government in 1895. This federation lasted until 
1946. The four protected states are West Malaysia, i.e. Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan and 
Pahang. 
 
2.4.2.1 Ordinance No. 96 (Minor Offences), Straits Settlements Laws, Revised, Ed. 1926 
Section 39 of the Straits Settlements Minor Offences Ordinance 1906 became section 38 
without any alteration in the 1926 Revision of the Straits Settlements Laws.35 
 
                                                          
34 Straits Settlements Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Ordinance No. 26 of 1949. 
35 Ordinance No.96. 
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2.4.2.2 Federated Malay States (F.M.S.) Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 6 
Having looked at the laws concerning maintenance in the Straits Settlements, it is equally 
important to look at the maintenance laws in the other states before the Federation of Malaya 
was formed. Kedah had its own Enactment on maintenance entitled Enactment No. 61 
(Maintenance of Wives and Children) and Johore had a law specifically on maintenance of 
wives, The Maintenance of Wives Enactment, Enactment No. 79. 
On 1 January 1927, the Federated Malay States Criminal Procedure Code Cap 6 was 
brought into force to repeal and re-enact with amendments the Criminal Procedure Codes, 
1902 and 1903. Provisions concerning maintenance of wives and children could be seen in 
Chapter XXXV of the Code, in particular sections 360,361,362,363 and 364. Section 360, 
similar to the provisions in the maintenance legislations governing the Straits Settlements, 
provides as follows: 
 
If any person neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or legitimate child unable to 
maintain itself, it shall be lawful for a Magistrate, upon due proof thereof, to order 
such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such 
child as aforesaid, in proportion to the means of such person, as to the Magistrate 
shall seem reasonable. 
 
Section 361 confers the right to an illegitimate child to claim maintenance from his 
parent. However, this provision states that the maximum amount of maintenance which a 
Magistrate could award is twenty dollars. 
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Section 362 provides for the penalty for wilfully neglecting to comply with the 
Magistrate’ order as follows: 
(i) If such person shall wilfully neglect to comply with any such order, the Magistrate 
may for every breach of the order, by warrant, direct the amount due to be levied in 
the manner by law provided for levying fines imposed by Magistrates, or may 
sentence him to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding one 
month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid. 
Provided that if any person against whom an order has been made for the 
maintenance of his wife offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with 
him, and his wife shall refuse to live with him, it shall be lawful to consider any 
grounds of refusal stated by such wife, and the Magistrate may make the order 
aforesaid notwithstanding such offer, if he be satisfied that such person is living in 
adultery, or that he has habitually treated his wife with cruelty. 
 
2.4.2.3 Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 
In order to safeguard the interests and rights of the beneficiary of a maintenance order, 
where the defendant lives and works in a foreign country, the legislature enacted the 
Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949. The predecessor to this Act was 
the Straits Settlements Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Ordinance No. 8 of 
1921 to 'facilitate the enforcement in the Colony of maintenance orders made in England or 
Ireland or vice versa’. 
In 1949, the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 (which was later 
revised in 1971) was enacted to facilitate the enforcement in Malaysia of maintenance orders 
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made in reciprocating countries and vice versa.36  This Act which originally applied in West 
Malaysia was extended to East Malaysia from 1 January 1971.37 
‘Reciprocating country’ is defined in section 2 to mean ‘any country or territory including 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, to which this Act for the time being applies and which 
is specified in the Schedule’.38 In the year 2004, vide P.U.(A) 33/04, this Act was extended 
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. 
Basically, this Act applies when the defendant is a resident in a reciprocating country. 
The Malaysian court, which made a maintenance order against the defendant, shall send a 
certified copy of the said maintenance order to the Minister charged with the responsibility 
for foreign affairs for transmission to the appropriate authority in the reciprocating country. 
The same procedure applies if a reciprocating country intends to enforce a maintenance order 
issued in that country. 
 
2.4.2.4 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Ordinance No.36 of 1950 
In 1950, the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) 1950 (“the 1950 Ordinance”) 
was enacted. This Ordinance specifically provided for the maintenance of wives and children. 
Section 38 of the Ordinance 96 (Minor Offences) Straits Settlements Laws 1926 was 
removed from the Ordinance and reproduced in the 1950 Ordinance without any alteration  
The 1950 Ordinance was later superseded by the Married Women and Children 
(Maintenance) Act 1950 (Act 263) (Rev. 1981) with effect from 11 December 1982 which is 
currently in force. In 1982, with the coming into force of the Law Reform (Marriage and 
Divorce) Act 1976 on 1 March 1982, the maximum maintenance limit of fifty ringgit to 
                                                          
36 Long title of the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949. 
37 Vide P.U.(A) 460/70. 
38 See Appendix E for the Schedule of reciprocating countries. 
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illegitimate children was repealed in section 3(2) by the 1950 Ordinance.39 With the deletion 
of the ceiling of the maintenance sum the court may award to an illegitimate child, the right 
of an illegitimate child is now in pari materia with a legitimate child, thus, ensuring that an 
illegitimate child is not discriminated against and his welfare safeguarded. 
With the coming into force of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) 
Ordinance 1950 on 4th July 1950, all the following legislations were either wholly or partially 
repealed: 
(a) Kedah Enactment No 61 (Maintenance of Wives and Children) - Whole 
(b) The Maintenance of Wives Enactment of Johore, Enactment No 79 - Whole 
(c) The F.M.S. Criminal Procedure Code Cap 6- Sections 360, 361, 362, 363 and 
364 
(d) Straits Settlements Minor Offences Ordinance Cap 24 - Section 37 
 
With the repeal of the laws above, only one single statute applied throughout West 
Malaysia with effect from 4th July 1950. 
 
2.4.3 Stage Three: 1951-1990 
The statutes on maintenance that were enacted during this stage are currently still in force. 
Most of these statutes repealed the old statutes when they came into force.  
 
2.4.3.1 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 40 
The 1950 Act applies only to West Malaysia, Sarawak and the Federal Territory of 
Labuan. Sabah has its own statute on maintenance, i.e. the Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of 
                                                          
39 Vide Act 164/76, section 109. 
40 No. 7 of 1959. 
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Sabah (the 1959 Ordinance). The provisions in this Ordinance are similar to those in the 1950 
Act save for two provisions. The first difference is regarding the maximum amount of 
maintenance the court may award to an illegitimate child. Section 3(2) of this 1959 Ordinance 
provides that the amount that a court can order cannot exceed RM50 on the whole. It is 
submitted that as this limit was removed in the 1950 Act with the enforcement of the LRA, 
section 3(2) of the 1959 Ordinance should also be amended to reflect the same41 in order to 
ensure that the law does not discriminate against illegitimate children but on the other hand 
safeguards their welfare. 
The second difference is concerning the arrears of maintenance which may be ordered. 
Under the 1950 Act, section 3(3) provides that maintenance may be payable from the date of 
such neglect or refusal or from such later date as may be specified in the order. However, 
under the 1959 Ordinance, section 3(3) provides that maintenance, which is payable may be 
ordered from the date of the order or from the date of the application form. The court may 
however, for special reasons which should be recorded and having regard to the means of the 
parties order the payment of a lump sum by way of arrears in respect of any prior period but 
not exceeding twelve times the amount of any allowance ordered under subsection (1) or (2). 
When compared to the 1950 Act, section 3(3) of the 1959 Ordinance seems to be more 
specific concerning the arrears of maintenance which may be claimed. Prima facie the 
provision in the 1950 Act allows the child concerned to claim maintenance from the date his 
or her parent neglected or refused to pay maintenance,42 whereas the 1959 Ordinance reduces 
the time frame to from the date of the maintenance order or from the date of the application 
form. Hence, it could be observed that a child applying for arrears of maintenance under the 
                                                          
41Ibid 
42 However, it is to be noted at this juncture that two cases have restricted the time frame to claim the arrears of maintenance under the 
1950 Act to one year, i.e. the cases of Amrick Lall v Sombaiavati [1973] 2 MLJ 191 and Gangagharan v Sathiabama [1979] 2 MLJ 77.  
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1950 Act is in a better position compared to a child in Sabah, claiming under the 1959 
Ordinance, as the former would be able to claim for arrears from the date his father neglected 
or refused to pay maintenance, whereas the latter is restricted to twelve months prior to the 
date of his petition for maintenance. 
2.4.3.2 Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968 
The Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968 (the 1968 
Act) was enacted in 1968 to apply in situations where a man refuses to comply with a 
maintenance order. Prior to the enactment of the 1968 Act, a man who failed to comply with 
a maintenance order could only either be imprisoned or be imposed with a penalty or levy. 
The wife and children would not benefit by punishing the husband or father. 
Hence, 1968 Act, as the name suggests, was enacted to enforce maintenance orders. This 
Act, however, only applies to the States of West Malaysia.43 The method of enforcing 
maintenance orders under the 1968 Act is by way of attaching the earnings of the defendant. 
This could be seen in section 4(1) of the Act which states that the court may on the application 
of the beneficiary of a maintenance order, make an attachment order if it (the court) considers 
it just so to do. 
The nature of the attachment order is provided for in section 5 of the 1968 Act. Basically, 
the attachment of earnings order is directed to the defendant’s employer to attach a specific 
amount of the defendant’s earnings as prescribed in the said order.44 However, if the 
defendant does not have an employer or is self-employed, sections 4 and 5 of the 1968 Act 
do not apply. Section 13(1) of the 1968 Act would come in to help the beneficiary of the 
                                                          
43States of West Malaysia include Perlis, Kedah, Penang, Perak, Selangor, Malaccca, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Johore, Kelantan and 
Terengganu. It also includes the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. 
44The nature of section 5 was explained by the learned judge in the case of Thelagavathi a/p Murugesu (IC No.: 660803-10-6372) v 
Karuppusamy @ Selvaraj A/L K. Munisamy (IC No.: 601220-10-5933 )[2010] MLJU 1887as follows: ‘Under s.5 of Act 356, an attachment 
of earnings order shall require the person to whom the order in question is directed, i.e. the Respondent's employer, to appear in Court to 
make out the earnings to be paid in satisfaction of the order.’ 
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maintenance order in such an instance. According to section 13(1), if the defendant’s income 
is derived from other sources other than earnings the court may on the application of the 
beneficiary, make an order directing the defendant to directly pay the sum of money payable 
under the maintenance order to the court. The court will then pay the sum to the beneficiary.  
The 1968 Act applies to maintenance orders issued under the following Acts: 
(a) Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950; 
(b) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976; 
(c) Maintenance order confirmed by the court under the Maintenance Orders 
(Facilities for Enforcement) Act 194945; and 
(d) Where this Act is made applicable by virtue of an authorization under section 14 
to or in respect of a maintenance order made by a Syariah Court46 shall include 
such order. 
 
2.4.3.3 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) came into force on 1 March 
1982 throughout Malaysia (both West Malaysia and East Malaysia). As stated in its long 
title, the LRA is an Act to provide for monogamous marriages and the solemnization and 
registration of such marriages; to amend and consolidate the law relating to divorce; and to 
provide for matters incidental thereto. Apart from marriage and divorce, ancillary matters 
such as maintenance for spouses and children, custody of children as well as matrimonial 
property are also provided for in the LRA. Basically, the LRA applies to the non-Muslim 
Malaysians. 
                                                          
45 Act 34 
46‘Syariah Courts’ which has jurisdiction only over Muslims is a creature of state law according to Article 74(2) of the Federal 
Constitution 
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The provisions as to maintenance of children in the LRA are broader when compared to 
the earlier legislations mentioned above in four instances. For example, under the LRA, in 
addition to ordering the father of the child to pay the child maintenance47 the court may also 
order the mother of the child to pay maintenance for the benefit of her child where it is 
satisfied having regard to her means it is reasonable so to order.48 In this respect, if the child’s 
mother is earning and is able to provide or contribute towards the maintenance of her child, 
the child would be able to claim maintenance from both the parents. 
The second instance is the situations under which the court may order a man to pay 
maintenance under the LRA. The LRA provides four situations when the court may order a 
man to pay maintenance to his child, whereas the 1950 Act merely provides that the court 
may order a person who has neglected or refused to maintain, inter alia, his child. The four 
situations in section 93(1) of the LRA are as follows: 
 
(a) If he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child; 
(b) If he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge; 
(c) During the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or 
(d) When making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the 
custody of any other person.  
The third instance is under section 99 of the LRA which provides that a child who has 
been accepted by a man as a member of his family shall be maintained by him while he or 
she remains a child, so far as the father and the mother of the child fails to do so. If the child 
                                                          
47Section 93(1) of the LRA 
48Section 93(2) of the LRA 
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is taken away by his father or mother, the duty of the man ceases and any sums spent by him 
in maintaining the child shall be recoverable as a debt from the child’s father or mother. 
According to Professor Mimi Kamariah Majid in her book Family Law in Malaysia,49 
child in section 99 ‘refers to other children accepted as members of the family, such as foster 
children or children adopted in accordance with custom and whose adoptions may be 
registered under the Registration of Adoptions Act 1952. This provision obviously seeks to 
protect such children and to provide for their maintenance’. 
The fourth instance is where the LRA in section 100 provides that when considering any 
question relating to the maintenance of a child, the court must whenever it is practicable take 
advice of a person who is trained or experienced in child welfare. However, the same section 
provides that that the court is not bound to follow such advice. The person who is trained or 
experienced in child welfare here usually refers to a social welfare worker or a child 
psychologist.50 The 1950 Act does not contain a similar provision as the above. 
 
2.4.4 Stage Four: 1991 - Present 
Stage Four denotes the development in the last twenty years. It is disheartening to note 
that only one statute was passed during this stage concerning children’s rights, i.e. the Child 
Act 2001. Howsoever, at the same time, it is to be noted that some of the maintenance 
legislations passed earlier are still in force, such as the Married Women and Children 
(Maintenance) Act 1950, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, the 
Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah 1959, the Married Women and Children (Enforcement of 
Maintenance) Act 1968 and Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949. 
                                                          
49Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1999) at 337. 
50Ibid at 338. 
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2.4.4.1 Child Act 2001 
In 2001, the legislature, realising that there is an immediate need to protect the rights of 
the children in Malaysia passed the Child Act 2001. In its Preamble, this Act states, inter 
alia, as follows: 
 
An Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the care, protection and 
rehabilitation of children and to provide for matters connected therewith and 
incidental thereto. 
 
With the coming into force of this Act, three Acts which were in force then were repealed, 
i.e. the Juveniles Courts Act 1947, the Women and Girls Protection Act 1973 and the Child 
Protection Act 1991.51 
The provisions in this Act concerning maintenance are in Part V, Chapter 3. The 
provisions in this Act provide strict penalties for parents or guardians or any person who has 
the care of a child for failing to maintain the child properly. In relation to maintenance, the 
relevant provision is section 31. Section 31 was recently amended in 201652 where the 
penalties provided in section 31(1) and (2) were increased as could be seen below. The duty 
to maintain of a parent or a guardian or other person legally liable to maintain a child could 
be seen in section 31(4), which reads as follows: 
A parent or guardian or other person legally liable to maintain a child shall be deemed 
to have neglected him in a manner likely to cause him physical or emotional injury 
                                                          
51 Section 130 of the Child Act. 
52Vide Child (Amendment) Act 2016 (Act A1511). The amendments came into force from 25 July 2016. 
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if, being able to so provide from his own resources, he fails to provide adequate food, 
clothing, medical or dental treatment, lodging or care for the child. 
The penalty for neglecting a child is provided in section 31(1) and (2) as follows: 
(1) Any person who being a person having the care of a child – 
(a) abuses, neglects, abandons or exposes the child or acts negligently in a manner 
likely to cause him physical or emotional injury or cause or permit him to be so 
abused, neglected, abandoned or exposed; or 
(b) ... 
commits an offence and shall on conviction be eligible to a fine not exceeding 
fifty thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years 
or to both. 
(2) The Court shall, in addition to any punishment specified in subsection (1), order 
the person convicted of an offence under that subsection- 
(a) execute a bond with sureties to be of good behaviour for such period and on 
such conditions as the Court thinks fit; and 
(b) to perform community service.’ 
 
Subsection 3B further states that ‘Any person who fails to comply with the order of the 
Court to perform community service under paragraph 2(b) commits an offence and shall on 
conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit.’ 
The enactment and passing of this Act with its strict penalties shows that the government 
has indeed taken positive steps in addressing the issue of child abuse and neglect in Malaysia. 
However, the issue that arises at this juncture is concerning the enforcement of this Act. The 
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issue as to whether the implementation of this Act has reduced the number of child neglect 
cases in Malaysia would be discussed at length later in this thesis. 
 
2.4.5 Government Policies 
Having ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on 17 February 1995, 
the Malaysian Cabinet approved two policies concerning children in 2009, namely:53 
1. National Child Policy; and 
2. Child Protection Policy. 
The National Child Policy is a policy on the rights of survival, protection, development 
and participation of children so that they can enjoy the opportunity and space to achieve a 
holistic development in a conducive environment. The Child Protection Policy is to ensure 
that every child in this country is protected from neglect, abuse, violence and exploitation.54 
Both the said policies would be examined below in order to observe if it contains provisions 
on child maintenance. 
2.4.5.1 National Child Policy 
The Statement of Policy states that this ‘is a policy on the rights of survival, protection, 
development and participation of children in order to enjoy the opportunity and space in 
achieving a holistic development in a conducive environment.’ 
In its Statement of Goal, the Policy aims to produce individuals who are healthy, active, 
knowledgeable, creative, self-sufficient, competitive, and progressive and has good values. 
The objectives of the Policy are to ensure the following: 
                                                          
53 Press Statement By Senator YB Dato’ Seri Sharizat Abdul Jalil, the then Minister of Women, Family and Community Development on 
National Child Policy and Child Protection Policy on 15 September 2009 accessed from www.kpwkm.gov.my/ on 21 April 2011. 
54Ibid. 
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(a) each child has a right to live by receiving care, love, health services, support and 
social assistance; 
(b) each child, including disabled children, have the right to be protected from any 
act of neglect, abuse, violence and exploitation; and further be given rehabilitation 
and integrated into the family and society; 
(c) each child has the right to holistic development from the physical, cognitive, 
language, socio-emotional, personality and spirituality perspective; 
(d) each child has the right to speak out, participate and get involved according to 
their capacity level in matters relating to their best interests and welfare; 
(e) children, parents, guardian, community and society are aware of children’s rights 
for survival, protection, development and participation; and 
(f) research and development on children’s survival, protection, development and 
participation be carried out from time to time. 
 
The Policy also lays down the various strategies designed to achieve the objectives 
mentioned above. The following strategies concerning ‘Survival’ are stated as follows: 
(a) Provide basic needs such as identity, shelter, food, drink, clothing, love, security 
and a conducive and child friendly environment; 
(b) Enhance collaboration between government agencies, NGOs, private sector and 
local communities in health care, safety and education for prosperity and welfare 
of children; 
(c) Improve quality and expand support services and social assistance according to 
the needs of children including disabled children and orphans; 
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(d) Expand access to appropriate information and materials from various sources so 
that the children have the knowledge and skills for their survival; and 
(e) Ensuring that children received social security protection. 
 
The strategies stated above emphasise the importance of providing maintenance to 
children. The writer intends to focus on strategies (b) and (e) for the purpose of this thesis. 
Strategies (a), (c) and (d) would not be discussed here as these strategies are already codified 
in the existing maintenance laws. On the contrary, strategies (b) and (e) are new issues that 
need to be discussed in order to ensure that the authorities concerned do indeed implement 
these measures to safeguard the welfare of our children. 
Strategy (b) suggests that in order to protect the welfare of children, there is an inevitable 
need to promote cooperation between government agencies, NGOs, private sectors and the 
local communities in health care, safety and education. It is submitted that it is insufficient 
to merely state on paper the need for such collaboration. Positive steps need to be taken to 
ensure that all the parties mentioned in strategy (b) join hands in ensuring that the welfare of 
children in Malaysia is not neglected. 
In addition to strategy (b), it is interesting to note that strategy (e) clearly provides that it 
must be ensured that children received social security protection. The policy, howsoever, 
does not define ‘social security protection’. At this juncture, two issues arise. First, who 
would be giving out this social security protection to the children? Would it be given by the 
state as is done by Western countries? It is respectfully submitted that as Malaysia is not a 
welfare state as the Western countries, she is not in a position to provide social security 
protection to the children. At the most, it could be observed that the Social Welfare 
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Department provides financial assistance to a certain extent to the poor and needy. Hence, 
this financial assistance is only provided to children who are ‘poor and needy’. 
The second question that arises is as to who is entitled to this social security protection? 
The strategy merely states ‘children’ Does it mean that all the children in Malaysia are 
entitled to receive this protection or is it only meant for the poor and needy? 
Reference at this point could be made to the definition of ‘children’ in the policy. 
‘Children’ are defined as a person below the age of eighteen as enshrined in the CRC and the 
Child Act 2001. The CRC in Article 1 states that child for the purpose of the CRC means 
every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier. 
The Child Act 2001 defines ‘child’ as: 
‘child’ – 
(a) means a person below the age of eighteen years; and 
(b) in relation to criminal proceedings, means a person who has attained the age of 
criminal responsibility as prescribed in section 82 of the Penal Code.’ 
Referring to the above definitions, it could be noted that they (the said definitions) merely 
state that a child is a person below the age of eighteen. Thus, the question that arises at this 
juncture, is whether all the children in Malaysia below the age of eighteen are entitled to 
social security protection? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, single mothers 
and children who are abandoned or neglected by their parents or guardians need not worry 
about their financial support. However, it is sad to note that this is not the case in Malaysia. 
There are many children who are left to fend for themselves on the streets, some even 
begging, as a result of being abandoned by their parents or guardians.  
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The situation in Malaysia pertaining to abandonment of children could be observed from 
the following examples, taken from press reports. On 2 November 2015, the Malay Mail 
reported that ‘A baby is found abandoned in the country every four days based on the 
statistics acquired from the police over five years but the figure could be much higher’.55 The 
report referred to a statement made by a psychiatrist, Dr Salmi Razali who said, ‘For every 
100,000 live births, there is an estimated 16.33 babies found abandoned illegally in 2011, 
compared to 13.06 in 2007’.  
The Home Minister, Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, in his interview to the The 
Star, referred to the act of baby dumping as someone’s ‘inappropriate behaviour’.56 The 
Minister also said that ‘Based on investigations conducted by the police, baby dumping cases 
are also a fast way to cover up embarrassment’. 
In January 2016, in her interview to the Star, the current Women, Family and Community 
Development Minister, Datuk Seri Rohani Abdul Karim said that the number of baby 
dumping cases in 2015 was the highest, at 104, since 2011. 57She also stated that the number 
stood at 98 in 2011, 90 in 2013 and 103 in 2014. She encouraged out-of-wedlock pregnant 
women and girls to seek advice and counselling through Childline 15999 (TalianNur 
15999).58 This is a line set up by the Women, Family and Community Development Ministry 
for children, which includes girls, to call and seek information or to report abuse and neglect.  
In this regard, the Minister also said that her ministry fully supported the ‘baby hatch’ concept 
mooted by OrphanCare as it has reduced fatalities among the babies being dumped. The 
ministry has, through the Department of Social Welfare, established Taman Seri Puteri (TSP) 
                                                          
55S.K. Thanusha Devi, ‘Born to be abandoned and left to chance’, The Malay Mail, 2 November 2015. 
56T.Avineshwaran, ‘Zahid: 87 baby dumping cases reported as of September this year’, The Star, 5 November 2015. 
57Loh Foon Fong, ‘More than half of 104 dumped babies found dead in 2015’, The Star, 17 January 2016. 
58Childline 15999 is a helpline for distress set up by the government to report on matters such as abuse, neglect, domestic violence, 
juvenile issues, poverty, single mothers, to name a few. Information obtained from the Official Website of the National Population and 
Family Development Board at http://www.lppkn.gov.my/index.php/en/nur-info.html 
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and Pusat Jagaan Sinar Kasih shelter homes. These homes provide protection and care to 
pregnant women and girls out-of-wedlock. 
As stated in pages 62 and 63 above, the Social Welfare Department provides financial 
assistance to a certain extent to the poor and needy. However, this Department would only 
be able to assist if the individuals or NGOs apply (on behalf of the poor and needy) for such 
assistance. However, the problem that arises is how would a child know the procedure to 
apply for such assistance from this Department if he or she is abandoned or neglected by his 
parents?  Hence, it is important for the relevant authorities to take positive steps to ensure 
that strategy (e) in the National Child Policy is successfully implemented in the interests of 
these children. 
In addition to the strategies mentioned above, realizing the importance of creating 
awareness among the families and the communities on the rights of children, the following 
strategies have been designed under Objective 5 ‘Advocacy’: 
(a) To increase awareness among families and communities on the importance of 
health care to children; 
(b) To increase awareness among families and communities on equal rights of 
children from any form of discrimination; 
(c) Strengthen existing programmes and introduce a suitable programme for the 
prevention of abuse, neglect, violence and exploitation of children; 
(d) Raising awareness of parents, guardians and community members on the 
importance of care and education for children; and 
(e) Increase awareness and understanding of the rights, welfare and interests of the 
child to all parties concerned. 
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Having looked at some of the important strategies designed to achieve the objectives of 
the Policy which are relevant to this thesis stated above, it could be observed that all these 
strategies are drafted with the sole and noble aim of protecting and safeguarding the welfare 
of the children in Malaysia. At the same time, it is disheartening to note that these strategies 
are mere clauses in a policy and not provisions in a statute. Policies have to be enacted into 
laws in order for them to be enforceable in the courts.  Hence, it is submitted that it is time 
that the Malaysian legislature takes positive steps to incorporate these strategies in the laws 
concerning children in Malaysia in order to ensure that their (the children’s) welfare is indeed 
safeguarded. 
 
2.4.5.2 Child Protection Policy 
The National Child Policy was drawn up with the intention of safeguarding the welfare 
and lives of children on the whole. On the other hand, the Child Protection Policy was drawn 
up to specifically protect children against neglect, abuse, violence and exploitation. This 
Policy is also in line with the philosophy of the Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC) 
and the Child Act 2001. 
The definition of ‘child’ under this Policy is similar to the definition under the National 
Child Policy. ‘Child protection’ refers to the strategies and activities to prevent and respond 
to neglect, abuse, violence and exploitation of children.  
The drafters of this Policy have defined the meanings of ‘neglect’, ‘child abuse’, ‘physical 
abuse’, ‘emotional abuse’, ‘sexual abuse’, ‘violence’ and ‘exploitation’. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the writer intends to specifically refer to the definition of ‘neglect” which states 
as follows: 
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‘Neglect’ refers to a continuous and serious failure to provide basic physical, 
emotional and development in health, education, emotional development, nutrition, 
shelter and safe living for children. Neglect can expose children to all forms of harm, 
including threatening their lives.’ 
 
In short, the definition of ‘neglect’ above refers to the failure to maintain a child. 
In its Policy Statement, the policy states that it focuses on advocacy, prevention, support 
and research and development to protect children. The Policy is a catalyst for awareness and 
commitment of all parties including all members of the society in protecting children. 
The seven main objectives of the policy are as follows: 
(a) To increase awareness and commitment of various parties towards the 
safeguarding of children as a shared responsibility; 
(b) To create a safe and child friendly environment; 
(c) To encourage organizations that deal directly or indirectly with children to 
develop a policy on child protection for their respective organizations; 
(d) To protect all children from any form neglect, abuse, violence and exploitation; 
(e) To decide that only appropriate individuals should deal directly with children; 
(f) To improve support services to address the issues of neglect, abuse, violence and 
exploitation of children; and 
(g) To increase research and development to improve child protection. 
One of the strategies outlined to promote advocacy is ‘to adopt and promote awareness 
of the importance of the responsibility of protecting children to all levels of society including 
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the creation of partnerships (smart partnerships) with the media and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) including the private sector and community organizations.’ 
Three strategies have been designed to prevent children from being neglected, abused 
and exploited. One of the strategies, which the writer feels is crucial to provide basic 
knowledge to children to enable them to protect themselves from neglect, abuse, violence 
and exploitation and to identify the risk to them. 
The Policy goes on provide information on places such as the police station, the Social 
Welfare Office, Childline 15999 and the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development which the public could turn to in the event there is a child abuse or baby 
dumping case. 
 
2.5 COMPARING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE LAWS IN 
SINGAPORE 
As Singapore and Malaysia share the same origin of maintenance laws, the writer would 
next examine the development of maintenance laws in Singapore in order to see if their 
maintenance laws are pro the welfare of a child.  
Singapore was part of the Straits Settlements via the Second Charter of Justice 1826. 
Therefore, the origin of a parent’s duty to maintain his or her child in Singapore too is found 
in the Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance 1872.  This Ordinance 
places the duty on both the parents. When the Straits Settlements was dismantled, Penang 
and Malacca joined the other states in Peninsular Malaya after World War 2. Singapore 
became a separate Crown Colony. Under the British control, Singapore was granted 
increased levels of self-government. In 1963, Singapore merged with the Federation of 
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Malaya to form Malaysia. However, as a result of social unrest and dispute between the 
Singapore People’s Action Party and the Malaysia’s Alliance Party, Singapore became an 
independent republic in 1965.59 
The Women’s Charter, which forms the key piece of legislation in Singapore of matters 
concerning family law in Singapore was enacted in 1961. One major amendment made under 
this Charter, when compared to the provisions in the Straits Settlements Summary Criminal 
Jurisdiction Ordinance 1872, was the removal of the maximum amount awarded to 
illegitimate children under the said Ordinance and place the illegitimate children on an equal 
footing with the legitimate children.60 
Since it was enacted, the Women’s Charter has undergone several amendments, including 
provisions on maintenance. The writer will focus on the key amendments pertaining to 
maintenance. In 1980, the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 1980 amended the existing 
laws on maintenance by dividing the persons liable to maintain children into two groups: 1) 
parent and 2) persons who accept the child as a member of the family. 
In 1996, the Women’s Charter Amendment Act 1996 passed two major amendments. 
First, the duty to maintain a child is the same, whether the parents’ marriage is still subsisting 
or has been terminated. Previously, there were separate provisions in the Women’s Charter 
pertaining to the duty to maintain: 1) duty to maintain when the parents’ marriage still 
subsists and 2) the duty to maintain upon termination of marriage. Secondly, the amendment 
also extended the duty to main children who have reached the age of majority in Singapore, 
                                                          
59Information obtained from ‘Singapore Separates From Malaysia and Becomes Independent’ accessed at the Singapore Government’s 
website at http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/dc1efe7a-8159-40b2-9244-cdb078755013 on 1 February 2017. 
60Leong, Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1997), at 855. 
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i.e. 21 years in exceptional circumstances, one of which is if the child is pursuing tertiary 
education. 
In 2011, the Women’s Charter Amendment Act 2011 introduced some substantial 
amendments to the Charter. One of the key amendments was to enhance the enforcement of 
maintenance orders. The court is empowered to impose new sanctions and penalties (in 
addition to the existing penalties) on persons who default on maintenance orders such as: 
(a) ordering defaulters to set up a banker’s guarantee against future defaults; 
(b) perform community service orders; 
(c) attend financial counselling; 
(d) direct the Central Provident Fund Board to disclose the employment information 
of a defaulter for attachment of earnings orders. 
Finally, in February 2016, the Charter was once again amended. On the issue of 
maintenance, it stated that spousal maintenance is to be extended to incapacitated husbands 
or ex-husbands. This provision is similar to section 77(2) of the Malaysia Law Reform 
(Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. 
From the above examination of the development of maintenance laws in Singapore, it 
could be noted that the Singapore legislature has been pro-active in ensuring that the 
children’s welfare is safeguarded. It is indeed disheartening to note that although Malaysia 
and Singapore have the same roots in maintenance laws, Singapore has advanced far ahead, 
even though they have only one piece of legislation to work on, whereas there are about two 
or three pieces of legislation in Malaysia. 
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2.6 DISCUSSION 
Having examined the right to maintenance of a child under different religions as well as 
different nations, the writer is able to arrive at one conclusion. Save for the position under 
common law, all the religions examined as well as the different legal systems looked at in 
this Chapter, impose a duty on the father to maintain his child. Therefore, it is submitted that 
the duty to maintain a child is considered as an inevitable duty on the parents, especially the 
father, by religions as well as the legal systems. 
The various pieces of legislations and policies passed by the Malaysian Legislature and 
the Cabinet in the last two centuries have also been highlighted above. Looking at the number 
of legislations on children’s rights, it cannot be said that Malaysia does not have sufficient 
laws to protect such rights, in particular the right to maintenance. The existence of these laws 
and policies shows that the Government has given recognition to the fact that the right of a 
child to maintenance is crucial and needs to be safeguarded. Nevertheless, despite the 
existence of these pieces of legislations, the real question that needs to be answered at the 
end of the day is whether these laws are indeed effective in protecting and safeguarding the 
rights, interests and welfare of the children in Malaysia. 
In order to answer the question above, the writer intends to examine certain important 
issues pertaining to the right of a child to maintenance. The relevant provisions in the 
maintenance laws would be examined when discussing these issues to see if there are any 
weaknesses or lacunae in the laws that need to be rectified.   
In examining whether the current maintenance laws in Malaysia have indeed safeguarded 
a child’s right to maintenance, the writer would be discussing several issues in the following 
order: 
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(a) Children’s (both legitimate and illegitimate) right to maintenance as provided for 
under the relevant maintenance laws; 
(b) Whether young vulnerable adults61 have a right to continue claiming maintenance 
under the existing maintenance laws, in particular, the right to pursue their tertiary 
education; 
(c) Arrears of maintenance and variation/rescission of maintenance orders; and 
(d) Enforcement of maintenance orders. 
As an examination of all the provisions in the maintenance laws would be beyond the 
scope of this thesis and would also exceed the word limit imposed, the writer would focus on 
certain pertinent issues (as stated above) in relation to a child’s right to maintenance in 
Chapters 4, 5,6 and 7 of this thesis. Having discussed these crucial issues, the writer would 
then attempt to recommend reforms to the existing laws in order to ensure that the right to 
maintenance, in particular, and the welfare of children, as a whole, is protected in Chapter 8 
of this thesis. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is reiterated here that the benchmark set by the various religions and 
legal systems is that the parents have a duty to maintain their child. The duty imposed by the 
religions, however, could be described as a moral duty and does not attract any penalties. On 
the other hand, the legal systems impose penalties if the parents neglect or fail to maintain 
their child.  
                                                          
61‘Young vulnerable adults’ as explained under Terms and Terminologies in Chapter 1 refers to persons between the ages of eighteen to 
twenty-four. 
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It is also submitted that having examined the development of the maintenance laws in 
Malaysia and Singapore, we are lagging far behind when compared to Singapore in many 
aspects as would be discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Hence, the writer aims to examine 
the weaknesses that exist in our laws and compare the position in Singapore, England and 
Wales and Australia and would attempt to suggest certain recommendations in order the 
safeguard the right to maintenance of the innocent children in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CHILD WELFARE PRINCIPLE 
IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE 
 
“It is the theory that decides what can be observed” 
- Albert Einstein 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before proceeding to discuss child maintenance issues, it is trite to examine the 
foundation on which the right to claim maintenance is based.  It is pertinent to see whether 
the foundation is strong before examining the problematic issues concerning child 
maintenance. If the foundation is weak, the arguments in favour of protecting the child’s right 
to claim maintenance would collapse. Therefore, the purpose of this Chapter is to examine 
the relevant theoretical framework which constitutes the foundation for the right to claim 
maintenance. 
In a basic family unit comprising a father, mother and children, the child is the most 
vulnerable person and as such the welfare of the child requires maximum deliberation. The 
state, therefore, plays an important role in enacting laws concerning children which should 
focus on one very important aspect, i.e. the welfare of the child. 
The principle of welfare of children or ‘the paramountcy’, which originated in the 
Chancery Courts, has been applied by the judiciary when deciding any question with respect 
to a child’s upbringing. The court states that the welfare of the child is to be the single 
deciding factor1, which is paramount over and in fact, displacing all other considerations.2 
                                                          
1J v C (1970) AC 668. 
2Shazia Choudhry and Fenwick, Helen“Taking the Rights of Parents and Children Seriously: Confronting Welfare Principle under the 
Human Rights Act”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 25, No.3, 453-492. 
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Thus, the purpose of this Chapter is to examine the welfare principle in relation to child 
maintenance and in particular, to analyse the relevant theoretical framework that is 
applicable. 
 
3.2 THE CHILD WELFARE PRINCIPLE IN RELATION TO CHILD 
MAINTENANCE 
Judicial decisions generally have applied the welfare principle in relation to matters 
concerning adoption,3 custody and guardianship4 of children. In this thesis, the writer will 
attempt to connect the welfare principle to child maintenance, the reason being, adoption, 
custody and guardianship refer to the duty to maintain children, which includes providing 
food, clothing, shelter and education to the child. Therefore, the welfare principle should 
equally apply to maintenance of children. 
The welfare principle forms the basis for the protection of the rights and interests of 
children. The landmark case in England on the welfare principle is the case of J v C.5 In this 
case, Lord Mac Dermott described the paramountcy of welfare principle as:6 
... a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of 
parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, 
the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child's 
welfare as that term is now to be understood. That is the first consideration because 
                                                          
3Re L (An Infant) [1962] 3 All ER 1, Re V (A Minor) [1986] 1 All ER 752., Re TSY(An Infant) [1988] 3 MLJ 43. See also section 13 of the 
Adoption Act 1952,which provides for the duties of a guardian ad litem. A guardian ad litem has a duty to investigate all the circumstances 
of the child applicant and all other matters relevant to the proposed adoption in order to protect the welfare and interest of the child. 
4Re Satpal Singh, An Infant [1958] MLJ 283, Masam v Salina Saropa& Anor [1974] 2 MLJ 559, Tey Leng Yeow v Tan Poh Hing[1973] 2 
MLJ 53, Chua Thye Peng v Kuan Huah Ong [1978] 2 MLJ 217, Mahabir Prasad v Mahabir Prasad  [1982] 1 MLJ 189, Loura Doris a/p 
Laurence v Thuraisingam a/l James [1995] 2 MLJ 229. 
5 [1970] AC 668; [1969] 1 All ER 788. 
6[1970] AC 668, at pp. 710-711; [1969] 1 All ER 788 at pp.820-821. Reference could also be made to the cases of Re Mc Grath(Infants) 
[1893] 1 Ch 145 and Walker v Walker and Harrison [1981] NZ Recent Law 257 regarding the paramountcy of the welfare principle. 
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of its first importance and the paramount consideration because it rules upon or 
determines the course to be followed. 
In relation to child maintenance cases, the court’s role is to ensure that the right of a child 
to be maintained by his parents is adequately protected. Parents, as primary caregivers, have 
the duty to maintain their child. The duty to maintain children is provided for in section 92 
of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 19767 (hereafter referred to as the ‘LRA’) 
as: 
... it shall be the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his 
or her children, ... either by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, food 
and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means and station in 
life or by paying the cost thereof. 
Hence, the court in exercising its judicial function should always refer to the welfare 
principle as the basic premise in upholding the child’s right to maintenance. 
 
3.3 Theories in relation to child welfare 
According to Karla T. Washington in her article Attachment and Alternatives: Theory in 
Child Welfare Research,8 ‘if theory serves as an anchor for decision-making in child welfare, 
it is important that the theories be appropriate to and useful in child welfare practice, as well 
as in accordance with professional ethics’. Hence, it is pertinent, at this juncture, to refer to 
the relevant theories in relation to child welfare and determine which theory is the most 
appropriate to child maintenance. A detailed study of the various theories that apply to child 
                                                          
7 Act 164. 
8 Washington, Karla T., Attachment and Alternatives: Theory in Child Welfare Research, Advances in Social Work, Vol. 9, No.1 (Spring 
2008), 8-16. 
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welfare was done by the Karla T. Washington.9 These theories would be briefly looked at 
below, after which, the writer would conclude by stating which theory best suits child 
maintenance and the reasons for it. 
 
3.3.1 Crisis Intervention Theories 
These theories basically look at how individuals are able to cope with change.10 Generally 
when a person experiences a taxing or stressful situation, he may learn new skills in order to 
cope with the situation and emerge from the situation better able to handle the situation. On 
the other hand, if the person fails to acquire the relevant coping skills, he will be susceptible 
to behavioural and mental problems.11 
In relation to children, children who have been abused or neglected, may be removed 
from their families and sent to protective services, where they would experience events that 
challenge their ability to cope. According to Karla T. Washington (in her article stated 
above)12, if the critical intervention theories are applied, the following could be observed 
concerning children: 
(a) it would be useful to see how these children cope with maltreatment; 
(b) how children regain a sense of normalcy following removal from their homes of 
origin, entry into the foster care system, and introduction of new caregivers; 
(c) research findings may also inform child welfare workers, law enforcement 
officers and mental health professionals of which interventions improve the 
experiences of children in the children welfare system. 
                                                          
9Ibid. 
10 Roberts, A.R,“An overview of crisis theory and crisis intervention”, In A.R. Roberts (Ed.), Crisis Intervention handbook, 2nd ed., (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press,2000,) at 30. 
11Ibid. 
12Supra n 8. 
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As to the question whether the critical intervention theories is applicable to child 
maintenance, the writer submits that these theories mainly look at situations where children, 
who have been abused or neglected, are removed from their family homes and sent to 
protective services. In this thesis, the main objective is to examine whether the child 
maintenance laws in Malaysia adequately protect the rights of children to get maintenance 
from their parents. As such, the child would generally be staying with at least one parent in 
this context. Thus, the issue of whether a child adapts himself in a new environment would 
not be examined in this thesis.  Therefore, the critical intervention theories would not be 
appropriate. 
 
3.3.2 Anti-discrimination Theories 
Anti-discrimination theories, as the name suggests, looks at the conditions that exist 
which empower the privileged groups or oppressive forces present in our society’s 
institutions and which pose a threat to society and individuals.13 
In relation to child welfare, the most discussed discrimination in the past decade is with 
regard to members of the gay, bisexual, lesbians and transgendered community and whether 
they are capable of providing a stable environment for children whom they intend to adopt.14 
In addition, research may also look into whether adolescents who are homosexuals are 
adequately supported in foster homes or alternative care setting.15 
It is submitted that the anti-discrimination theories do not apply to child maintenance as 
the main focus in child maintenance cases is on the right of a child to get maintenance from 
                                                          
13 Thompson, N, Anti-discriminatory practice, 3rded, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) cited in supra n 8 at 12. 
14Supra n 8 
15Ibid. 
80 
 
his parents or guardians. There is no reference to the issue of whether members of the gay, 
lesbian, transsexuals or bisexuals are capable of looking after children. 
 
3.3.3 Social Construction Theories 
As a result of participating in social processes, human beings start to understand reality.16 
A social phenomenon which is labelled as ‘social problems’ is not inherently problematic. It 
only becomes a social problem when a group of influential persons call for political or social 
action in order to alter a certain condition.17 For example, research applying the social 
construction theories may examine if there is anything wrong with single parent families. 
Another issue that may be examined, applying these theories is whether studies looking into 
the ‘problem’ of children being brought up by their grandparents have different results if 
society generally accepts this as legitimate.18 
With the gaining of popularity in child welfare settings by the strengths perspective in 
the last decade, child welfare workers now face a challenge in changing the ways they have 
thought or wrote so far about their clients and their families. What has been labelled as 
‘problems’ all this while would now be referred to as opportunities or needs.19 
In relation to child welfare, the questions that arise when applying the strengths 
perspectives, first, the effectiveness of this perspective in changing the attitudes of child 
welfare workers, and secondly, if there is a change in the attitudes of these workers, is the 
end result beneficial to the clients, i.e. the children? 
                                                          
16 Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T., The social construction of reality, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), cited in supra n 8 at 12 
17Kituse, J.I. and Spector, M. “The definition of social problems”, (1973), Social Problems, 20(4), 407-419. 
18Supra n 8 
19Saleebey, D. (Ed.), The strengths perspective in social work practice, 3rd ed., (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon., 2001), cited in supra n 8 at 
13. 
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The above explanation shows that the social construction theories deal mainly with 
specific isolated situations or problems raised by groups who have considerable influence. 
As such, it is submitted that these theories would not be applicable to child maintenance as 
child maintenance covers various issues such as the meaning of child, illegitimate children, 
the duration of the parents’ duty to maintain, enforcement of the maintenance orders, to name 
a few. 
 
3.3.4 Critical Theories 
Critical theories believe that the political and economic inequalities that exist in the 
society should be rectified. Critical theories believe that changes at a macro-level should be 
created by the members of the society so that exploitation at a macro level could be 
minimized. They also believe that power should be distributed more equitably.20 
In relation to child welfare, the studies applying critical theories may question the 
intention or ‘hidden agendas’ of social workers by asking questions such as whether the work 
is actually based on the child’s best interests or whether there is any politically or 
economically motive behind it, considering the rise in the number of private agencies 
providing child welfare services. Further thereto, these theorists may also examine the legal 
processes involved in child welfare system and see whether the children concerned or their 
families actually understand the legal issues that arise.21 
Although critical theories do apply to a certain extent to child maintenance as the focus 
is on whether child welfare decisions are made in the child’s best interest, it is submitted that 
these theories only apply when decisions are made after the problem arises, whereas in this 
                                                          
20Pozzuto,R., Angell, G.B. &Dezendorf, P.K “Therapeutic critique: Traditional versus critical perspectives”, In S.Hick, J.Fook&R.Pozzuto 
(Eds), Social Work: A critical turn,(Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing,2005). 
21Supra n 8 
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thesis, the main focus is on the adequacy of protection provided by the child maintenance 
laws. If the maintenance laws are effective, then the problems relating to the neglect of a 
child by his parents or guardian by not providing maintenance will be minimal. 
 
3.3.5 Attachment Theory 
The basis of the attachment theory is that a child’s relationship with a primary caregiver 
during infancy is critically important to later development and serves as a prototype for the 
child’s relationship throughout the lifespan.22 According to this theory, a consistent primary 
caregiver (which is usually the mother) is necessary for the child’s optimal development.23 
However if the mother is not present, a primary caregiver would then step into shoes of the 
child’s mother in order to play the same role. 
The presence of a caregiver tends to make the child feel safe and secure. Children, whose 
lives start with the essential basis of secure attachment, tend to fare well in every aspect as 
they grow up.24 
Based on the brief explanation above, the writer is of the opinion that this theory best 
suites child maintenance. The main reason for this is due to the fact that maintenance 
basically deals with the duty of parents as primary caregivers to maintain their child. 
Although the attachment theory generally looks at the role a primary caregiver plays in a 
child’s emotional development, it is submitted that this theory is also applicable to other 
aspects of a child’s development, such as his physical development (which includes the need 
                                                          
22 Howe, D, Attachment theory for social work practice, (Bassingstoke: Macmillan, 1995). 
23 Deanna, M. Swartaout-Corbeil RN, “Attachment between infant and caregiver”, Encyclopedia of Children’sHealth, 
http://www.healthofchildren.com/A/Attachment-Between-Infant-and-Caregiver.html accessed on 4 January 2017. 
24Ibid. 
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for basic necessities) and educational needs. The attachment theory would be discussed in 
detail below in order to see how it applies in relation to child welfare. 
3.4 THE ATTACHMENT THEORY 
A brief explanation on the attachment theory was given above. In this section, the writer 
would attempt to examine the attachment theory in depth in order to observe its application 
to child welfare, in particular, to child maintenance (for the purposes of this thesis). This part 
would first look at the definition of ‘infant attachment’, the history or origin of the theory, 
the main propositions of this theory, the criticisms raised against this theory and finally the 
theorists’ response to the said criticisms. 
 
3.4.1 Definition of ‘Infant Attachment’ 
‘Infant Attachment’’ has been defined by Deanna M. Swartaout-Corbeil RN in her article 
entitled ‘Attachment between infant and caregiver’ as: 
... the deep emotional connection that an infant forms with his or her primary 
caregiver, often the mother. It is the tie that binds them together, endures over time, 
and leads the infant to experience pleasure, joy, safety and comfort in the caregiver’s 
company.25 
The above definition denotes the important role a primary caregiver plays in the 
emotional development of a child. It is stated in the above definition that the primary 
caregiver is often the mother, as the mother plays a pivotal role in a child’s life. This fact is 
acknowledged by the law as well. For example, section 88(3)of the LRA provides that there 
is a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a child below the age of seven years to 
                                                          
25Ibid. 
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be in his or her mother’s custody.  This provision shows the importance the law places on a 
mother’s natural love and affection towards her child. However, in exceptional cases, if the 
mother is dead or has abandoned the child, the father steps into the shoes of the mother as 
the primary caregiver. In the absence of both the parents, the court then appoints a third party, 
usually a relative of the child, as the child’s guardian. This guardian then assumes the role of 
a primary caregiver. 
 
3.4.2 History of the Attachment Theory 
Before looking at the propositions of the Attachment theory and how this theory applies 
in child welfare, it is pertinent to look at the brief history behind this theory. 
Prior to the development of the modern Attachment theory in the 1950s, the traditional 
view by many developmental psychologists concerning this theory was that attachment is ‘a 
special relationship between an infant and a caregiver’.26 It is also viewed ‘as an important 
building block for later relationships and adult personality’.27 
In addition, the traditional view was that attachment was a secondary drive, as a result of 
primary drives like hunger. As such, a child’s attachment to his mother arose as a result of 
the fact that she supplied him with food and warmth.28 
The origin of the Attachment theory could be traced back to as early as the turn of the 
20th century, to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of development. Freud was the first 
theorist who proposed a stage theory development,29  wherein he states that in the first stage, 
                                                          
26 Attachment, http://psychology.jrank.org/pages/49/Attachment.html accessed on 4 January 2017. 
27Ibid. 
28Ibid. 
29 Attachment – History of Attachment Theory, http://social.jrank.org/pages/45/Attachment-History of Attachment Theory.html accessed 
on 4  January 2017.  
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i.e. the oral stage, an infant’s relationship with his mother develops due to the fact that she 
satisfies his hunger.30 
However, a contrast opinion was formed by Harry Hurlow, who together with some 
colleagues, stated that feeding alone is not the basis for attachment relationships. This 
conclusion was reached as a result of a series of famous experiments which were done on 
infant rhesus monkeys. These experiments showed that the monkeys, who were raised in 
isolation, preferred the comfort of a surrogate mother covered in cloth to a surrogate mother 
made out of wire-mesh holding a feeding bottle.31 
Sigmund Freud’s student, Erik Erikson also stressed that it is pertinent that children 
should be able to trust that their parents are capable of satisfying their needs. This trust would 
be the basis for the child’s later social and emotional development. 
The above-mentioned theorists held the traditional view of the Attachment theory. The 
first theorist who developed a modern Attachment theory in 1950 was John Bowlby, a British 
psychiatrist. His modern Attachment theory was a variant of Freud’s theory that an infant’s 
relationship with his mother was important to build his adult personality.32 Bowlby’s works 
became prominent after World War II. He worked in the orphanages in London with children 
and adolescents after the World War II. He found that children who had been separated from 
their caregivers, especially their mothers, were the ones who were most disturbed.33 During 
his service at these orphanages, he noticed that children, whose parents displayed 
ambivalence or outright rejection, were the ones who suffered from behavioural and 
emotional problems.34 As a result of the above observations, Bowlby made a hypothesis that 
                                                          
30Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
32Supra n26. 
33Supra n29. 
34Ibid. 
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a child’s later mental health depended on a caregiver’s emotional attitude towards him, and 
a child’s mental health is dependent upon a child feeling wanted and loved.35 
Following Bowlby’s footsteps, Mary Ainsworth, an associate of his, came up with a test 
called the Ainsworth Strange Situation test. This test basically measures a child’s type and 
degree of attachment that he feels for his mother. Having undergone this test, the children 
would be labelled as ‘securely attached’, ‘insecure-avoidant’ and ‘insecure-resistant’.36 
 
3.4.3 Three Main Propositions of the Attachment Theory 
Both John Bowlby’s and Mary Ainsworth’s works form the core of the Attachment 
theory. Three main propositions could be drawn from both their works, which are as 
follows:37 
The first proposition states that a child’s emotional ties to his caregiver could be 
looked at from an evolutionary perspective.38 Infants who develop a close relationship 
with their caregivers are more likely to survive and more likely to reproduce. Their 
closeness with their caregivers could be said to be an adaptive strategy as it would 
protect them from environmental hazards and thus provide an evolutionary 
advantage.39 
The second proposition states that attachment is grounded in a motivational control 
system which organizes a child’s behaviour.40 The main goal of a child is to feel safe 
in the arms of his caregiver in the presence of danger. The child’s sense or feeling of 
                                                          
35Ibid. 
36Supra n 26. This test would be discussed in detail later in this Chapter under sub-topic 3.4.5 Ainsworth’s Attachment Theory. 
37As discussed in the following article :- Attachment-Three Main Propositions of Attachment Theory, 
http://social.jrank.org/pages/46/Attachment/-Three-Main-Propositions-Attachment-Theory.html#ixzz1x749t2 accessed on 4  January 
2017. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid. 
40Ibid. 
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security depends on how the caregiver responds to his needs. If the caregiver cares 
about the needs of the child, the latter would not feel scared about his needs not being 
met in times of danger and would then tend to depend on his caregiver. On the other 
hand, if the caregiver is not responsive to the needs of the child, the latter then would 
not trust the caregiver and would not turn to him in times of distress.  
The third proposition states that internal working models during the early stages of a 
child’s life guide the child’s behaviours and feelings later in life. ‘Internal working 
models’ here refer to the following:41 
‘Internal’ refers to the fact that they reside in the child’s mind; 
‘Working’ refers to the fact that they guide the child’s behaviour and 
perceptions; and 
‘Models’ refers to the fact that they are cognitive representations of 
relationship experiences. 
 
Children tend to rely on these models who guide their future interactions. A child’s 
knowledge which he gains from his interaction with his primary caregiver, usually the parent, 
is extremely important. This is because loving parents tend to mould the child’s positive 
models of relationships based on trust. The child concerned views himself worthy of care. At 
the same time, these children who have loving parents also tend to simultaneously assume 
that other people in their lives, including their teachers and friends are also trustworthy. These 
are called parallel working models. 
                                                          
41Ibid. 
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3.4.4. Bowlby’s Attachment Theory 
John Bowlby’s initial work was to attempt to understand the distress an infant felt upon 
being separated from his primary caregiver. He looked at their behavioural patterns when 
they were separated from their parents which usually would be crying and frantically 
searching for the parents. These, according to Bowlby, are adaptive responses to separation 
from a primary attachment figure, i.e. someone who provides the child support, protection 
and care.42 Infants are dependent on adults for care and protection as they are unable to fend 
for themselves.  
Although the discussion above so far seems to indicate that the Attachment theory centres 
on the relationship between an infant with a primary caregiver, a child is capable of multiple 
attachments. Children usually become attached to more than one person during their first 
year.43 The factors or variables that decide on who will serve as an attachment figure, 
according to Bowlby would be ‘responsiveness to crying and readiness to interact socially’.44 
The multiple attachments that a child forms in most cultures would refer to biological 
parents, grandparents, older siblings, aunts and uncles.45 Although a child may be attached 
to more than one person, the fact that a child is most attached to the primary caregiver, who 
is usually the mother, cannot be denied. The effect of separation from a primary caregiver on 
a child is more stressful when compared to separation from subsidiary caregivers. The reason 
as to why a child needs a primary attachment figure even though there are several subsidiary 
figures around him was explained by Bowlby as follows: 
                                                          
42 Farley, R, Chris, A Brief Overview of Adult Attachment Theory and Research, 
https://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~rcfraley/attachment.htm accessed on 4 January 2017. 
43Loewenton, Edward, “Attachment Security in Infancy and its Consequences for Development of the Individual: The Origins of Attachment 
Theory and the varieties of parent-child interaction,” http://loewenton.org/security_and_attachment/default.htm accessed on 4 January 
2017. 
44 Bowlby, John A Secure Base, (New York: Basic Books Inc.,1988) 
45Supra n 43 
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Most importantly, however, is that the mother, with the strongest genetics and 
metabolic investment in the child’s well-being, is generally self-selected as the 
primary caregiver. It follows that the most adaptive for the child to use a primary 
attachment figure the person who is reciprocally most strongly bonded to the infant, 
and most heavily invested in the baby’s healthy development.46 
 
In addition, Bowlby also states that the existence of many subsidiary attachment figures 
does not mean that a child would be looked after very well. These subsidiary figures would 
have equal responsibilities to look after more than one child and thus, the care of a particular 
child may be overlooked. Further thereto, in times of stress, the child concerned does not 
have to assess and decide which caregiver he should turn to. On the other hand, if there is a 
principal or primary caregiver, the child would immediately seek the help of this person.47 
In forming a conclusion, Bowlby said that in order for a child to grow up mentally 
healthy, ‘the infant and young child should experience a warm, intimate and continuous 
relationship with his mother (or permanent mother substitute) in which both find satisfaction 
and enjoyment’.48 Bowlby comments that the female parent plays a primary role in the 
emotional development of a child whereas the male parent plays second fiddle to the mother. 
The father’s main role is to provide emotional support to his wifes’ mothering. 
 
3.4.5 Ainsworth’s Attachment Theory 
Mary Ainsworth, who is six years younger than Bowlby and a colleague of his, graduated 
just before World War 2. She conducted a study on the individual differences in infant 
                                                          
46Supra n 44 
47Ibid. 
48 Bowlby, J. Maternal care and mental health, World Health Organization Monograph (Serial No.2), (1951), 
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attachment when both the infant and the parents are separated. Based on this study, 
Ainsworth and her students developed a technique called the ‘Strange Situation’. In this 
study, infants and parents are brought into the laboratory. They are then separated and later 
reunited with one another. 
Based on her observation, Ainsworth noticed that there are three categories of infants. 
The first category of infants is securely attached infants. About 60% of the infants became 
upset when their parents left the room. However, when they are reunited with their parents, 
these infants actively seek the parents and are comforted by them.  
The second category is labelled as insecure-avoidant. These infants, upon reunion with 
their parents, avoid and ignore them. They continue playing with their toys and may not want 
to communicate with their parents. 
The third category of infants is insecure-resistant. These infants show mixed emotions 
upon being separated from their parents. They may seem independent one moment and then 
suddenly trying to find their mothers the next moment. When they are reunited with their 
mothers, they cling and cry, but at the same time exhibit conflicting behaviours that suggest 
that they want to ‘punish’ the parents for leaving them alone. 
The above study by Mary Ainsworth is pertinent to note the emotional effect on an infant 
upon being separated from the parent. The different feelings exhibited by the infants upon 
reunion with their parents, according to Ainsworth, are correlated with the infant-parent 
interactions at home. Generally, securely attached children have parents who respond to their 
needs while insecure children (avoidant and resistant children), tend to have parents who do 
not respond to their needs or are not consistent in the care they provide. 
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3.4.6 Criticisms against the Attachment theory and the theorists’ responses 
The attachment theory has received criticisms, especially from feminist theorists, who 
state that this theory supports the traditional view of women as caregivers.49 The feminist 
theorists further comment that as this theory advocates that the relationship between a child 
and his primary caregiver (again often a female) plays an important role in the psychological 
development of a child, it (the theory) then implies that any complications in the development 
can be attributed to problems within the child-caregiver relationship. This so-called ‘mother-
blaming’ has been described by feminist writers as problematic, sexist and designed to 
support the status quo.50 
In response to the above criticisms, the Attachment theorists state that the theory actually 
honours women and respect the significant contributions that women as caregivers make to 
the society as a whole.51 Further thereto, the criticisms above by the feminist theorists is also 
not justified as the Attachment theory does not state that primary caregivers must only be 
mothers or be restricted to females.52 The most important factor for an infant’s healthy 
development, according to the Attachment theory, is that the infant needs a committed care 
giving relationship with one or a few adults. Although most of the studies tend to refer to the 
mothers as they are the ones who usually fill this role, there is evidence to show that infants 
are capable of multiple attachments (as discussed earlier in this Chapter), which include 
                                                          
49Chodorow, N., The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender, (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press 1978); Johnson, M.M., Strong mothers, weak wives, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,1988). 
50Controtto, S., “A feminist critique of attachment theory and evolutionary psychology”, In M. Ballou & L.S. Brown (Eds), Rethinking 
Mental health and disorder: Feminist perspectives, Vol. xxii, (New York, NY: Guilford Press,2002) pp 29-47, 
51 Harvey, A.M.,), Interview with Dr Margaret Keiley, A feminist journey to attachment theory, Journal of Feminist Family Therapy, 15(1), 
65-712003. 
52 Morris, P., Widows and their families, London: Routledge,1958, cited in Bretherton, Inge, “The Origins of Attachment Theory: John 
Bowlby And Mary Ainsworth”, Development Psychology (1992), 28, 759-775, at 770.  
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fathers, grandparents and siblings.53 Apart from these relatives, infants are also capable of 
being attached to their day-care providers.54 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
Based on both Bowlby’s and Ainsworth’s Attachment Theory, it could be observed that 
both these theorists emphasise the importance of the relationship between a parent and the 
child for the latter’s emotional development. A child, who has insensitive parents who do not 
respond to his needs, would grow up not feeling wanted and may also be emotionally 
distressed. On the other hand, a child with loving parents who play an active role in 
responding immediately to his needs and shower him with love and affection would grow up 
being fond of or attached to his parents. 
According to Bowlby, in his book A Secure Base,55 children of insensitive parents stop 
communicating their distress to their parents by the age of twelve months. He explains the 
process by which different types of abuse would result in particular kinds of psychopathology 
in children and later in adulthood. This in turn affects the interaction between the parent and 
the child, and between the child and outsiders. Bowlby further states that as a consequence 
of the abovementioned situation, much of the child’s emotions and early perceptions become 
unavailable to him and the child’s ability to form relationships would be seriously and 
perhaps permanently impaired.56 Bowlby’s Infant’s Attachment Patterns theory could be 
observed in the following table: 
 
                                                          
53 Schaffer, H.R. & Emerson, P.F., The development of social attachments in infancy, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child 
Development, 29 (Serial No. 94),1964 
54 Howes, C. Rodney, C., Galuzzo, D.C. & Myers, I., Attachment and child care: Relationships with mother and caregiver, Early Childhood 
Research Quarterly, 3, 403-416,1988 
55Supra n 44. 
56Ibid. 
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Table 3.1: Infant Attachment Pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fraley and Shane (2000) cited in Fraley, R. Chris, ‘A Brief Overview of Adult 
AttachmentTheory and Research, accessed at the following website 
 https://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~rcfraley/attachment.htm 
 
Thus, it is submitted that parents who do not care for their children (for the purposes of 
this thesis, who do not maintain them), may end up causing emotional distress to the latter. 
Responsible parents would not fail in their duties to maintain their children and this in turn, 
according to Ainsworth’s study, result in children who are securely attached. 
Parents, who neglect their duty to maintain their child could be said to have abandoned 
their child. In an article by Ken R. Wells,57 abandonment by parents could be due to three 
factors, i.e., by desertion, divorce and death. He further states that the effect of abandonment 
                                                          
57 Wells, Ken R., Abandonment, Encyclopedia of children’s health, http://www.healthofchildren.com/A/Abandonment.html accessed on 5 
January 2017. 
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on children could be observed by dividing the children into two categories, i.e. children below 
the age of 9 years and adolescents from the age of 9 years to 18 years. 
Children below the age of 9 years are further divided into three stages, first, infancy or 
toddlerhood, secondly, the preschool stage and thirdly, the school age (from 6years to 9 
years). In the first stage, infants and toddlers, according to Wells, understand little about 
abandonment. Therefore, it is important for the remaining parent to shower the infant or 
toddler with affection frequently as the relationship between the parent and the child continue 
to be central to the child’s sense of security and independence.58 
Children, during the preschool stage, have a limited perception of abandonment and 
mistakenly tend to think that the parent who abandoned did so as a personal rejection. They 
have the fear that the remaining parent would also abandon him. As for the school-aged 
children, they are aware of the pervasive pain and sadness of a parent abandoning them. 
These children, especially the boys, mourn for their fathers and show their anger at their 
mothers. As a result, they often cry and some have problems with their friends and in school. 
Adolescents could also be divided into two stages, i.e. from the age of 9 years to 12 years 
and from the age of 13 years to 18 years. As a result of a parent’s abandonment, the first 
category of adolescents usually is anxious, restless, unable to concentrate on their studies and 
tend to worry about the family’s finances. The second category becomes concerned about 
their own future. They too have problems in school and turn to drugs and alcohol. They 
become extremely dependent on the remaining parent.59 Hence, it is extremely important for 
the remaining parent to re-assure the child that he or she would not abandon the child. 
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Therefore, in order to ensure that the welfare of children generally is protected, it is 
pertinent to have effective laws and policies on child maintenance. These laws should ensure 
that parents do not neglect their duties as primary caregivers in not only showering them with 
love and affection, but also by responding to their child’s immediate needs, such as his basic 
necessities.  
In this thesis, as stated in the ‘Problem Statement’ in Chapter 1, the writer intends to 
examine the maintenance laws that are currently in force in Malaysia in order to observe the 
weaknesses that exist in these laws and to suggest reforms to these weaknesses. In order to 
examine the effectiveness of these laws, the writer would refer to the Attachment theory as 
the foundation upon which these laws should be based. It is of no use having these laws that 
provide for a child's right to claim maintenance if the foundation is weak. It would then result 
in the right conferred by these laws becoming redundant. 
The attachment theory is also pertinent in achieving the objectives of this study which 
have been stated in Chapter 1 and which are reproduced below: 
(a) To identify the current situations concerning the problems faced by non-Muslim children 
in obtaining maintenance from their parents. 
This objective refers to the practical issues that arise in claiming maintenance from their 
parents. Applying the attachment theory here, it is submitted that parents as primary 
caregivers, and who are attached to their children, would never in the first place neglect in 
maintaining their children and cause hardship to them. Such situations concerning children 
facing difficulties in claiming maintenance from their parents would not arise if the parents 
perform their duties as primary caregivers. 
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(b) To identify and critically analyse the laws on maintenance concerning non-Muslim 
children in Malaysia. 
It is disheartening to note that the lacuna that exists in the non-Muslim maintenance laws 
in Malaysia is that there is no mention in these laws that the Court has to consider the welfare 
of the child concerned before it (the Court) makes a maintenance order. In the writer's 
opinion, this is a serious omission on the part of the legislature as the welfare of the child 
should be the paramount consideration in any child related matter, be it adoption, 
guardianship, custody or maintenance. The maintenance laws that are in force in Malaysia 
(which would be examined in detail in the following chapters) merely state the Court would 
consider the means and station in life of the parties.60 Nowhere is it stated that the Court 
would consider the welfare of the child, which would include the child's needs. This is where 
the attachment theory plays a pertinent role. According to both Bowlby and Ainsworth, 
responsible parents would not neglect their duty towards their children and would result in 
children who are securely attached.  On the other hand, parents who do not care for their 
children would end up causing emotional distress to them. Hence, it is pivotal to have 
maintenance laws that emphasise this principle in order for the judiciary to take the same into 
consideration when deciding cases on child maintenance. 
(c)  To analyse the stake holders’ perception on the laws on child maintenance. 
The stakeholders’ perception of the law is pertinent to find out if they are aware of their 
legal rights. Unfortunately, despite the maxim ‘Ignorance of the law is no excuse’, many 
people are unaware of their legal rights. This is indeed disheartening as the laws then become 
redundant. On the same note, it is sad to observe that a certain segment of the stakeholders, 
                                                          
60 Provided in the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 and the 
Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah. 
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i.e. single mothers with illegitimate children, are not aware that their child has a right to claim 
maintenance from their respective putative fathers. Hence, the question that arises at this 
juncture is whether it is indeed necessary to have these laws if they are not fulfilling their 
purposes? At the same time, it is important to educate the public of their legal rights as the 
‘perpetrators’ who owe a duty to maintain to their young ones should not be freed from their 
obligations, knowing very well that their children rely on the them for their basic necessities. 
If they abandon their duties towards their children, the latter would suffer from emotional 
distress when he or she realizes that his or her parents, on whom he or she relies on as primary 
caregivers, do not care about him or her.  
(d) To compare the existing maintenance laws in Malaysia with other jurisdictions such as 
Singapore, England and Wales and Australia. 
In order to understand the importance of the welfare principle, the writer would refer to 
the jurisdictions mentioned above, Singapore, England and Wales and Australia, where the 
laws there expressly state that the Courts should always refer to this principle when deciding 
a matter on child maintenance.61 As mentioned earlier the non-Muslim laws in Malaysia on 
maintenance are silent on the child welfare principle.  
(e) To suggest or recommend reforms to the existing legislations on maintenance to rectify 
the weaknesses that exist in these statutes. 
Having examined the weaknesses that exist in the local statutes on maintenance and 
having referred to the laws in Singapore, England and Wales and Australia, the writer would 
in Chapter 8 suggest or recommend reforms to the existing legislations. One of the reforms 
                                                          
61For instance, section 31(7) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which is applicable to England and Wales provides that in exercising its 
power to vary or discharge a maintenance order, the first consideration the court should give is to the welfare of the child. 
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which would definitely be recommended is incorporating the welfare of the child as the 
paramount consideration when the Court decides whether a maintenance order should be 
made. At the moment, unfortunately, the statutes merely state that the Court shall have regard 
to the means and station in life of the parents before it (the Court) makes a maintenance order. 
The legislature has omitted the welfare of the child as a factor that the Court should consider. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the welfare principle plays a pivotal role in matters 
concerning children, be it adoption, guardianship or maintenance. Hence, it is submitted that 
this principle should be the underlying basis in any statute enacted concerning children.  If 
this is done, maintenance laws concerning children would provide that the court would take 
into account the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration. 
A child, being the most vulnerable member in a family, needs to depend on his parents 
for his survival. It is pertinent not only to provide him with the basic necessities in life for 
his physical development, but also to shower him with love and affection for his emotional 
development. The writer submits that both emotional as well as physical development of a 
child is pertinent in making the child a well-balanced person in his growing up process. 
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CHAPTER 4: MAINTENANCE LAWS IN MALAYSIA: 
SAFEGUARDING THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As was stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Malaysian legislature has enacted various 
maintenance laws applicable to non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the real question that arises is 
whether these laws are indeed effective. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to examine 
whether the existing maintenance laws adequately protect the rights of non-Muslim children 
in Malaysia to claim maintenance from their parents and whether there are any weaknesses 
in these laws that need to be rectified. The position of children (below the age of eighteen 
years) would be examined in this Chapter whereas Chapter 5 would look at the rights of 
young vulnerable adults to continue receiving maintenance from their parents. 
 
4.2 DUTY TO MAINTAIN 
The following legislations have express provisions on the duty of parents to maintain 
their children: 
(a) Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (the 1950 Act);1 
(b) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (the LRA);2 and 
(c) Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah (Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah).3 
 
                                                          
1 Act 263. 
2 Act 164. 
3 No.7 of 1959. 
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The 1950 Act (which applies to West Malaysia and Sarawak) provides in section 3(1) the 
duty of a parent to maintain his legitimate child as follows: 
(1) If any person neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or a legitimate child of 
his which is unable to maintain itself, a court, upon due proof thereof, may order such 
person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, in 
proportion to the means of such person, as to the court seems reasonable. 
Section 3(2) of the 1950 Act imposes a similar duty on a parent to maintain his 
illegitimate child. 
The LRA (which applies to West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak) provides, in section 92, 
as follows 
Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty 
of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether 
they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing 
them with such accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable 
having regard to his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. 
Section 3(1) of the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah is similar to section 3(1) of the 1950 
Act concerning the duty of a parent to maintain his legitimate child, whereas section 3(2) 
provides for the duty to maintain an illegitimate child. 
Perusing the abovementioned provisions in the relevant statutes, prima facie, gives an 
impression that the laws in Malaysia adequately protect the welfare of children by 
empowering the courts to order the parents, upon due proof that they have neglected or 
refused to maintain their children, to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of their 
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children. However, the real question that arises at this juncture is whether in actual fact these 
laws do indeed protect the welfare of these children? In order to answer this question, the 
writer would be analysing five main issues in this thesis. The meaning of a ‘child’ would be 
examined in this Chapter, while Chapter 5 would examine the right of young vulnerable 
adults to receive maintenance. Chapter 6 would look at the arrears of maintenance and 
variation of or rescinding a maintenance order and Chapter 7 would examine the enforcement 
of maintenance orders. 
 
4.3 FACTORS IN DECIDING A MAINTENANCE ORDER  
Before discussing the issues that arise with regard to maintenance of children, it is 
pertinent to first observe the factors that the court considers prior to granting a maintenance 
order. The factors or circumstances that the court has to consider are as follows:4 
(a) The earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each relevant 
person has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(b) The financial needs and obligations and responsibilities of which each relevant 
person has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(c) The financial needs of the child; 
(d) The income, earning capacity (if any) and other financial resources of the child; 
(e) Any physical or mental disability of the child; and 
(f) The manner in which the child was being, or was expected to be educated or 
trained. 
 
                                                          
4Rasamani Kandiah, (Advisory Editor), Child Handbook, MLJ Book Series, Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 2004 at 125. 
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4.4 MEANING OF A ‘CHILD’ 
The writer is of the opinion that it is crucial to first look at the meaning of a ‘child’ as 
defined by all the three statutes mentioned above in this Chapter. This is due to the fact that 
if the definition of a ‘child’ varies from one statute to another, it would then result in the 
petitioner shopping for the relevant statute applicable to his or her case. The meaning of a 
‘child’ would be examined in the context of the following issues, namely, the age of a child, 
adopted children, step children and illegitimate children.  
 
4.4.1 Age of a child 
As the main theme of this thesis is the right of a child to maintenance, it is important to 
first determine who is a ‘child’ under the relevant maintenance statutes. Reference needs to 
be made to each of these statutes conferring the right to maintenance to a child, in order to 
see whether there is any age limit imposed and whether there are any differences in the 
definition of a ‘child’ among the statutes concerned. 
 
4.4.1.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
The writer would first examine the 1950 Act as it is the oldest piece of legislation on 
maintenance in force at the moment. This Act applies to West Malaysia and Sarawak.5 Upon 
examining section 2 of the 1950 Act, which is an Interpretation provision, it could be noted 
that ‘child’ is not defined in the said provision. Therefore, this Act is silent on the meaning 
of child, which then leads us to the question of whether there is no age limit imposed on a 
child. 
                                                          
5 Section 1(2) of the 1950 Act. 
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This particular issue arose in the case of Kulasingam v Rasammah6 more than thirty years 
ago. In this case, the respondent wife had applied for maintenance for herself and her 
daughter who was over twenty years old. One of the issues before the court was whether the 
daughter fell within the meaning of ‘child’ under section 3 of the Married Women and 
Children (Maintenance) Ordinance 1950 (as it was then). Justice Hashim Yeop A. Sani (as 
he then was) stated that in order for the court to make a maintenance order under section 3, 
the court must be satisfied that child is a legitimate child and that it is not able to maintain 
itself. 
His Lordship stated that as this Ordinance was silent on the definition of ‘child’, reference 
would have to be made to the Age of Majority Act 1971,7 which provides that the age of 
majority shall be eighteen years. The learned judge further stated that there are no decided 
cases on this issue. However, he referred to a previous decision by the late Justice Sharma  
in Yong May Inn v Sia Kuan Seng,8where his Lordship used the word ‘infant’ when referring 
to the order compelling the father to maintain his child under the 1950 Ordinance. 
In the present case, his Lordship also referred to the United Kingdom Children Act 1975, 
where ‘child’ is defined as ‘except where used to express a relationship, means a person who 
has not attained the age of eighteen’. Therefore, the learned judge in the present case held 
that the proper construction of the 1950 Ordinance would be that only children who have not 
attained the age of majority (below the age of eighteen years) can claim for maintenance 
under section 3 of the said Ordinance. Hence, the court held that the child who was above 
the age of twenty is not a child within the meaning of the 1950 Ordinance and as such, did 
not qualify to claim for maintenance. 
                                                          
6 [1981] 2 MLJ 36. 
7 Act 21. 
8 [1971] 1 MLJ 280. 
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4.4.1.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
The LRA, which came into force on 1 March 1982, applies to West Malaysia, Sabah and 
Sarawak.9‘Child’ is defined in section 87 of the LRA which provides as follows: 
... ‘child’ has the meaning of ‘child of the marriage’ as defined in section 2 who is 
under the age of eighteen years.’ 
 
Therefore, there is an express definition as to the meaning of ‘child’ in the LRA, which 
clearly refers to a child below the age of eighteen years, unlike the 1950 Act. 
 
4.4.1.3 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
Section 2 of this Ordinance defines a ‘child’ to include a legitimate or illegitimate child 
who is unable to maintain itself. 
The above definition merely states that ‘child’ in this Ordinance includes legitimate as 
well as illegitimate children. Howsoever, the definition does not go any further to state the 
age limit of a child. Therefore, it could be stated here that this Ordinance too is silent on the 
age limit of a child as the 1950 Act. 
 
4.4.1.4 Discussion 
Based on the above provisions of the relevant statutes, the writer is of the opinion that 
the following issues could be raised: 
                                                          
9 Section 1 of the LRA. 
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The first issue that could be observed is in relation to the absence of the definition of 
‘child’ in the 1950 Act. The decision in Kulasingam v Rasammah10 held that a ‘child’ under 
the 1950 Act refers to a person below the age of eighteen years. If the person is above the 
age of eighteen, he or she is automatically disqualified from having a right to claim 
maintenance under the said Act. The question that arises here then is what about a disabled 
person who is above the age of eighteen years? Does he or she lose his or her right to 
maintenance under the 1950 Act? This decision has been criticised by Professor Mimi 
Kamariah Majid in her book Family Law in Malaysia11 as follows:12 
It is submitted that the learned judge should have been guided by the qualifying phrase 
following the term ‘child’, that is, ‘which is unable to maintain itself’, irrespective of 
age. He, of course, has to be a child of the person who has been issued a maintenance 
order. Hence, if the child is aged 30 years and is mentally retarded, and therefore, 
unable to maintain itself, the child should be eligible to be maintained. Similarly, a 
child who is mentally sound and who is pursuing tertiary education, and therefore 
unable to maintain itself, should be eligible to be maintained. 
The writer concurs with the views expressed by the above author. The views expressed 
by her are actually in line with John Bowlby’s Attachment theory as discussed in Chapter 3 
of this thesis, where he states that a primary caregiver plays an important role in the emotional 
development of an infant or child. The writer submits that a disabled person, especially a 
mentally disabled person, is akin to an infant as he or she does not know how to fend for him 
or herself. He or she is wholly dependent on his or her primary caregiver not only to shower 
him or her with love and affection, but also to respond to her immediate needs. As such, if 
                                                          
10Supra n6 
11 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1999). 
12 Ibid at 312. 
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we strictly adhere to the interpretation of ‘child’ as given in Kulasingam, the 1950 Act then 
could be said not to protect the welfare of these children. It could be concluded that this Act 
only protects able bodied legitimate children and is discriminatory against disabled children 
above the age of eighteen. 
Therefore, the writer submits that as there is a lacuna in the 1950 Act as well as the 
Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah as to the definition of ‘child’, it is time for the respective 
Legislatures to revisit these two antiquated statutes, which were passed more than fifty years 
ago, and insert the definition of ‘child’ by stating the age limit therein. In addition, it is also 
submitted that in order to safeguard the welfare of legitimate children who are disabled, the 
Legislature should also include a clause to state that the duty of a parent or parents to maintain 
his or her child who is physically or mentally disabled continues until the disability ceases. 
This is to ensure that the parents of a disabled child, who are the primary caregivers, do not 
neglect their vulnerable child once he or she attains the age of eighteen. 
The LRA actually contains such a provision in section 95, where it states as follows: 
Except where an order for ... maintenance of a child is expressed to be for any shorter 
period or where any such order has been rescinded, it shall expire on the attainment by 
the child of the age of eighteen years or where the child is under physical or mental 
disability, on the ceasing of such disability, whichever is the latter. 
The second issue that arises as to the age of a child (in a broader sense) is whether all 
family law statutes in Malaysia concerning non-Muslims should standardise the age of a 
‘child’ in their respective definitions. This is due to the fact that some legislations state that 
a child is a person below the age of eighteen, whereas some state the age of majority as 
twenty-one years. For example, the LRA states that a child is below the age of eighteen years, 
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whereas the Adoption Act 195213  states that a child is a person below the age of twenty-one. 
Similarly, the Guardianship of Infants Act14 states that a non-Muslim child is a person below 
the age of twenty-one. 
A peculiar situation may arise if there is a difference in the definition of a ‘child’ in the 
abovementioned statutes. For example, a couple applies to the court to adopt a ‘child’ who is 
nineteen years old (as under the Adoption Act 1952, a child is a person below the age of 
twenty-one). The court grants an adoption order to the couple. Upon adoption, this couple 
step into the shoes of the nineteen- year old ‘child’s’ natural parents, which means that they 
then become the child’s primary caregivers. This is provided for in the proviso to section 9(1) 
of the Adoptions Act which provides that ‘…in any case where two spouses are the adopters, 
such spouses shall in respect of the matters aforesaid and for the purpose of the jurisdiction 
of any Court to make orders as to the custody and maintenance of and right to access to 
children stand to each other and to the adopted child in the same relation as they would have 
stood if they had been the lawful father and mother of the adopted child, and the adopted 
child shall stand to them respectively in the same relation as a child would have stood to a 
lawful father and mother, respectively.’ 
Looking at the above provision, it seems to indicate that the adopters take on the duties, 
obligations and liabilities of natural parents in relation to the future custody, maintenance 
and education of the adopted child. However, since the LRA states that the duty to maintain 
or the maintenance order expires upon the child attaining the age of eighteen, hence, the 
adopters in the example above do not have to maintain their adopted child. They are also 
                                                          
13 Act 257. 
14 Act 351. 
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under no legal obligation to pay for the child’s education as the child is above the age of 
eighteen. 
It is respectfully submitted that the above example would lead to gross injustice as the 
Adoption Act itself states in section 6(b) that the Court shall be satisfied before making the 
order, that the order, inter alia, if made will be for the welfare of the child. The question that 
arises is whether the welfare of such a nineteen-year old ‘child’ would be safeguarded if a 
strict interpretation is given to the definition of ‘child’ to refer solely to children below the 
age of eighteen for the purpose of maintenance? The same question arises for guardianship 
issues concerning ‘children’ who are nineteen and twenty years old. 
Hence, it is submitted that in order to avoid the above dilemma, Parliament should make 
a decision to standardise the age of children in all the relevant family law statutes. It is 
submitted that the definition of a minor in the Age of Majority Act 1971, that is, a person 
below the age of eighteen years, should be applied to all the relevant family law statutes 
concerning children so that a person who is aged either nineteen or twenty years old would 
not be considered a child under one statute, but an adult under another. 
 
4.4.1.5 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
Having looked at the weaknesses that exist in the statutes stated above concerning the 
age of a child, the writer would next examine the position concerning the same issue in other 
jurisdictions. The jurisdictions which the writer would be examining are Singapore, England 
and Wales and Australia. 
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(a) Singapore 
The main statute concerning family law in Singapore is the Women's Charter.15 The 
provisions as to maintenance of a child are also to be found in the Women's Charter. The 
origin of the Women's Charter and the major amendments that have taken place from 1961 
to 2016 have been examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis and hence need not be repeated here. 
On the issue of who is a ‘child’ under Singaporean law, section 2 of the Women’s Charter 
defines ‘minor’ as ‘a person who is below the age of 21 years and who is not married or a 
widower or a widow’. It is to be noted here that Singapore does not have an Age of Majority 
Act, like Malaysia. The courts too have generally decided that a child reaches the age of 
majority on the child's twenty-first birthday. The Court of Appeal in the case of Bank of India 
v Rai Bahadur Singh16 stated as follows: 
... There was no local statute which fixed the age of majority and in his judgment that 
question was governed by common law and permanently received in Singapore by the 
Second Charter of Justice 1826 and at common law the age of majority is twenty-one 
years. 
Coming back to the issue of who is a ‘child’, the provision on this issue under the 
Women's Charter prior to the 1996 amendment differs from the post amendment provision. 
Prior to the 1996 amendment, the then section 125 of the Women's Charter provided that the 
duty to maintain ends when a child reached the age of twenty-one years and was therefore, 
no longer a ‘child’. This provision was criticised by academicians as follows:17 
                                                          
15 Cap.353. 
16 [1994] 1 S.L.R 328. 
17 Leong, Wai Kum, The Duty to Maintain Spouse and Children During Marriage, (1987) 20 Mal LR 56 at 77-78. 
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... it fails to create an exception in the case of children beyond the age of twenty-one 
who are still receiving education. Should not parents still be liable to maintain them? 
It is anomalous that there ought not be a legal liability in a society as committed to 
education and training in Singapore? 
 In 1996, the Select Committee18 made a significant amendment to this provision. Section 
69(5) was introduced to allow a child to receive maintenance from a parent even though he 
or she has reached the age of twenty-one years. This duty is extended to a non-parent who 
has assumed the responsibility to maintain a child under section 70(5). Thus, as a result of 
the amendment in 1996, the law now in Singapore is that under section 69(6), a parent has a 
duty to maintain his or her child until the age of twenty-one years. However, this duty may 
be extended by the court under the following situations laid down in section 69(5): 
(a) mental or physical disability of the child; 
(b) child is or will be serving full-time national service; 
(c) the child is or will be or (if an order is made under subsection (2)) would be 
receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a 
trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment; or 
(d) special circumstances, other than those stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), exist 
which justify the making of the order. 
The above situations also apply to a non-parent who has accepted a child who is not his 
as a member of his family by virtue of section 70(5). Hence, the amendment has led to an 
                                                          
18There are seven Standing Select Committees in Singapore. These Committees are appointed for the duration of a Parliament to undertake 
several functions. In addition to these Standing Select Committees, the Parliament sometimes forms ad hoc Select Committees set up on a 
motion approved by the House to deal with Bills or other matters referred to it. The Select Committees are mostly formed to discuss details 
of a Bill which affects the daily lives of the public. Information obtained from the Singapore Parliament’s website at 
https://www.parliament.gov.sg/select-committee-parliament accessed on 31 January 2017.  
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improvement in the law on child maintenance in Singapore as a maintenance order may 
continue to benefit a young vulnerable adult19 who is still financially dependent. 
It is submitted that the Malaysian laws on maintenance are in dire need of being amended 
and it is suggested herein that the Malaysian legislature could take a lead from the 
amendments made to the Women’s Charter in 1996. The main reason for this suggestion is 
due to the fact that there are many financially dependent young vulnerable adults in Malaysia 
who are affected by the clause in the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 that 
states that the duty to maintain a child ceases when the child attains the age of eighteen unless 
the child is physically or mentally disabled.20 This issue will be discussed in depth in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. 
 
(b) England and Wales 
In England and Wales, there are various legislations on the duty of parents to maintain 
their children.21 Due to the limitation on words, the writer will focus on three main statutes 
in the England and Wales on the duty to maintain children, i.e.: 
(a) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973;22 
(b) Children's Act 1989;23 and 
(c) Child Support Acts 199124 and 1995.25 
                                                          
19 ‘Young vulnerable adult’ in the Singapore context refers to persons who are aged between twenty-one years and  twenty-five years as 
the duty to maintain a child generally ceases when the child attains the age of twenty-one. 
20 Section 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. 
21 For example, the Children Act 1989, Family Law Act 1996, Human Rights Act 1998, Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Child Support Acts 
1991 and 1995, Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, Social Security Act 1998, Child Support, Pensions and Social Security 
Act 2000, Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2000 and Welfare Reform Act 2012, to name a few. 
22 c.18. 
23 c.41. 
24 c.48. 
25 c.26. 
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Basically, the Child Support Acts 1991 and 1995 (CSA) (as amended by the Child 
Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000) established the Child Support Agency to 
assess and enforce of child maintenance.26 In 2008, the Child Maintenance and Other 
Payments Act 2008 (the 2008 Act) was passed to establish the Child Maintenance and 
Enforcement Commission (C-MEC) to replace the Child Support Agency. Following that in 
2012, the Welfare Reform Act 2012 amended the 2008 Act and abolished the C-MEC. It was 
replaced with the Child Maintenance Services. This development pertaining to the 
enforcement of maintenance orders would be discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. For the 
purposes of this Chapter and Chapter 5, the writer would focus on the CSA. 
The CSA applies only for periodical payments. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
(MCA) applies to children falling outside the remit of the CSA. The MCA provides for the 
financial provision and property adjustment orders. Finally, the Children's Act 1989 applies 
for periodical payments, lump sums, settlements and transfer of property.27 
As to the issue of who is a ‘child’ in family law proceedings, reference is first and 
foremost made to a general statute on family law. i.e. the Family Law Reform Act 1969.28 
Section 1(1) of this Act provides as follows: 
 1. Reduction of age of majority from 21 to 18 
(1) As from the date on which this section comes into force a person shall attain full 
age on attaining the age of eighteen instead of attaining the age of twenty-one, and a 
person shall attain full age on that day if he has already attained the age of eighteen 
but not the age of twenty-one. 
                                                          
26Family Law 2010-2011, (London and New York: Routledge Taylors and Francis Group, 2011). 
27 Section 15 and Schedule 1. If an application is made in the Family Proceedings Court, only the monetary orders are available, not the 
property orders. 
28 c.46. 
113 
 
Hence, from the above provision, it could be noted that the age of majority has been 
reduced from twenty-one to eighteen in England and Wales via the Family Law Reform Act 
1969.29 However, subsection (2)(a) of the same Act provides as follows: 
(2) The foregoing subsection applies for the purposes of any rule of law, and in the 
absence of a definition or of any indication of a contrary intention, for the construction 
of 'full age', 'infant', 'infancy', 'minor', 'minority' and similar expressions in -  
(a) any statutory provision, whether passed or made before, on or after the date 
on which this section comes into force; and 
(b) ... 
Thus, subsection (2) clearly states that the age of majority as provided for in subsection 
(1) only applies in the absence of any specific definitions in any statutory provisions. 
Therefore, it would next be pertinent to examine the three main statutes which contain 
provisions on maintenance in England and Wales (as stated earlier) in order to see if the age 
of a child is mentioned therein and whether it differs from the definition in the Family Law 
Reform Act 1969. 
According to the Children's Act 1989, paragraph 16 of Schedule 130 provides as follows: 
16-(1) In this Schedule 'child' includes, in any case where an application is made 
under paragraph 2 or 16 in relation to a person who has reached the age of eighteen, 
that person. 
                                                          
29It is to be noted here that the age of majority in England and Wales is the same as in Malaysia, i.e. eighteen years. This could be 
distinguished from the position in Singapore where the age of majority is twenty-one. 
30 Schedule 1 provides for Financial Provisions for Children. 
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Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 enables a person who has reached the age of eighteen to apply 
to court to order for financial relief if he or she would be receiving instruction at an 
educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether 
or not while in gainful employment; or that there are special circumstances which justify the 
making the making of an order under this paragraph. 
Therefore, the Children's Act 1989 generally defines ‘child’ as a person below the age of 
eighteen. However, the Act provides that a person who has reached the age of eighteen is 
permitted to apply to court for a financial relief in the circumstances specified in paragraph 
2 of Schedule 1 as stated above. 
Secondly, section 52 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 defines ‘child’ as a child to 
one or both of the parties to a marriage and it includes an illegitimate child. Hence, it does 
not state the age limit of a child. Howsoever, reference could be made to section 29 of the 
same Act which provides for the ‘Duration of continuing financial provision orders in favour 
of children and age limit on making certain orders in their favour’. Section 29(1) provides, 
inter alia, that subject to section 29(3) a financial provision order shall not be made in favour 
of a child who has attained the age of eighteen. This age limit is reiterated in section 29(2)(b) 
concerning the term to be specified in a periodical payments order or secured periodical 
payments order in favour of a child. 
However, section 29(3) provides that section 29(1) and (2)(b) shall not apply if it appears 
to a court that: 
(a)  the child is or will be ‘receiving instruction at an educational establishment or 
undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not he is also 
or will also be, in gainful employment; or 
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(b) there are special circumstances which justify the making of an order without 
complying with either or both of those provisions’. 
It could be noted that the exceptions stated in paragraph (a) and (b) similar to the 
exceptions in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 of the Children's Act 1989 (as discussed above). 
Halsbury's Laws of England 31 states that ‘physical or other disability may amount to such 
special circumstances’.32 
Thirdly, reference could also be made to the Child Support Act 1991. Section 55(1) 
defines ‘child’ as follows: 
(a) he is under the age of 16; 
(b) he is under the age of 19 and receiving full-time education (which is not advanced 
education)- 
(i) by attendance at a recognised educational establishment; or 
(ii) elsewhere, if the education is recognised by the Secretary of State; or 
(c) he does not fall within paragraph (a) or (b) but- 
(i) he is under the age of 18 and 
(ii) prescribed conditions are satisfied with respect to him. 
It is respectfully submitted that the above provision is quite complicated as it divides the 
meaning of child into three categories: - 
(a) generally, a person below the age of sixteen; 
                                                          
31Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition Reissue) (Vol. 29(3)) 
32Ibid at para 847 at f.n. 18. Reference is made to the case of C v F (Disabled Child: Maintenance Orders) [1999] 1 FCR 39, [1998] 2 
FLR 1, CA; T v S (Financial Provision for Children) [1994] 1 FCR 743, [1994] 2 FLR 883. 
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(b) a person below the age of nineteen and is receiving full time education which is 
not advanced education; and 
(c) a person who does not fall within any of the above two definitions, but who is 
below the age of eighteen and there are certain prescribed conditions which are 
satisfied with respect to him. 
Although the section above stipulates the different age limits of a child, there is however, 
an exception to the age limit in section 8. Section 8 provides for the ‘Role of the courts with 
respect to maintenance for children’. Section 8(7) empowers the court to make a maintenance 
order in respect of a child if the child is or will be ‘receiving instruction at an educational 
establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation (whether or not while 
in gainful employment)’ whereas section 8(8) provides that this section does not prevent a 
court from making a maintenance order in relation to a disabled child where the order is made 
for the ‘purpose of requiring the person making or securing the making of periodical 
payments fixed by the order to meet some or all of any expenses attributable to the child's 
disability’. 
Hence, having referred to the statutes above with regard to the age limit of a child in 
England, it could be noted that the age limit is more or less similar to the age limit in 
Malaysia, i.e. eighteen years. However, the main difference between the laws in England and 
Wales and Malaysia is concerning the exceptions to the limitation on the age of a child. Most 
of the statutes in England and Wales contain a similar exception to the age limit rule as 
provided for in section 95 of the Malaysian LRA, i.e. a disabled child could continue 
receiving maintenance although he or she reaches the age of eighteen. However, there is a 
second exception in England and Wales laws that cannot be found in the Malaysia 
counterpart, i.e. that the court may make an order that the child, though having reached the 
117 
 
age of eighteen years may continue receiving maintenance if it could be proven that he or she 
is or would be receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training 
for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment. This second 
exception, as discussed earlier could also be found in Singapore's Women's Charter. 
 
(b) Australia 
The year 1988 witnessed reforms in two stages to child maintenance or support laws in 
Australia. The first stage made amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Commonwealth) 
and social security legislation. In addition, a new collection system was established to 
routinely collect maintenance orders by deduction from wages. The Child Support Agency 
(CSA) was established within the Australian Tax Office to handle the collection and 
enforcement of payments of maintenance orders by the court. The CSA would also undertake 
the assessment and the enforcement of child support under stage two.33 
Stage two commenced with the passing of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, 
(‘Assessment Act’) which came into force on 1 October 1989 and the Child Support 
(Registration and Collection) Act 1989 (‘Registration and Collection Act’). Both these Acts 
form the legal basis for the Child Support Scheme (CSS) which was established in 1988. The 
CSA, as stated above, administers these two Acts.34 
The position in Australia concerning child support after the passing of the above Acts is 
as follows:                                 
                                                          
33Parker, Stephen,  et al,, Australian Family Law in Context, Commentary & Materials, (Australia: The Law Book Company, 1994) at 
457 
34Child Support Laws, Australian Law Reform Commission, accessed at www.alrc.gov.au on 12 April 2016. 
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1. If the parents separate on or after 1 October 1989, the custodial parent can no 
longer apply to the court under the Family Law Act for child maintenance. She must 
apply to the CSA, who will assess the entitlement to child support and set about 
collection of the assessment amounts.35 
2. Certain categories of children and parents do not fall within the ambit of the 
Assessment Act. Hence, these categories of children and plaintiff would then come 
under the Family Law Act, i.e.36: 
1. applications against a step-parent; 
2. applications in respect of ‘children’ over the age of 18 (primarily for the 
support during higher education); 
3.   applications by children themselves for their own maintenance; 
4. applications to modify existing child maintenance orders (that is, orders made 
concerning children not within the Child Support (Assessment) Act); and 
5. applications which otherwise fall outside the Child Support (Assessment) 
Act) because either the child or the liable parent lacks the necessary 
connection with Australia. 
 
Hence, for the purpose of this thesis and taking the above limitations into consideration, 
the writer will refer to the Family Law Act 1975 whenever the subject matter that is discussed 
does not fall within the ambit of the Assessment Act. In all other cases, reference will be 
made to the latter. 
                                                          
35 This could also be seen in section 66BA Family Law Act. Stephen Parker, Patrick Parkinson & Juliet Behrens, Australian Family Law 
in Context, Commentary & Materials, The Law Book Company, 1994, at 457 
36Ibid at 458. 
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The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) defines ‘child’ in section 4 as, inter alia, ‘a person who 
is below the age of 18’ The above definition, prima facie, denotes that children below the 
age of eighteen years are eligible to claim for maintenance under the Family Law Act. 
However, the issues that arise are whether: 
(a) a child, upon reaching the age of eighteen years, is barred from claiming for 
maintenance; and 
(b) whether the maintenance order, which was issued when he was below the age of 
eighteen, ceases upon him reaching the age of eighteen.  
The answers to both the issues in (a) and (b) are found in section 66L of the Family Law 
Act. Section 66L(1) states that the Court must not make a maintenance order in relation to a 
child who is eighteen or above unless the court is satisfied that maintenance is necessary for 
the child to complete his or her education, or due to the mental or physical disability of the 
child. Whereas, section 66L(2) provides that a court may not make a maintenance order that 
extends beyond the day when the child reaches the age of eighteen unless the maintenance is 
necessary for the child to complete his or her education or because of mental or physical 
disability of the child. 
Subsection (3) of section 66L provides that, ‘A child maintenance order in relation to a 
child stops being in force when the child turns 18 unless the order is expressed to continue 
in force after then.’ 
Perusing the above provision, it is to be noted that generally a maintenance order cannot 
be claimed by a child who is aged eighteen years or above or a current maintenance order 
ceases upon the child reaching the age of eighteen. However, there are two exceptions where 
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the court is allowed to either entertain a maintenance application by a child who is eighteen 
or above or extend the maintenance order although the child has turned eighteen. 
When comparing section 66L of the Family Law Act to our section 95 of the LRA, it 
could be noted that the former is more flexible as the latter merely states that a maintenance 
order ceases when a child reaches the age of eighteen years, unless he or she is physically or 
mentally disabled. It (section 95) neither contains an exception on the need of the child to 
continue his studies, nor is there any provision on whether an eighteen-year old child may 
make a fresh application for a maintenance order. 
 
4.4.1.6 Discussion 
Having examined the Malaysian position and the positions in the three jurisdictions, the 
writer would submit as follows: First, the definition of a ‘child’ should be incorporated in the 
1950 Act which should also state the age-limit of the child. The definition of a ‘child’ in the 
Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah should be amended to include the age-limit of the child. It 
is also submitted that in addition to inserting the definition of a ‘child’ and the age-limit, the 
legislature should ensure that the definitions in all the three statutes, i.e. the 1950 Act, LRA 
and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah are in pari materia. This is to avoid any confusion 
that may arise later. 
Secondly, the Malaysian Legislature should revisit the statutes concerning family law in 
order to standardize the age-limit of a child. This is to avoid any dilemmas from arising. 
Hence, whether it is an issue concerning adoption, guardianship or maintenance, the age limit 
of the child should be the same in the relevant statutes. At this juncture, it is also submitted 
that the legislature set the age-limit of a child at 18, so that it is in line with the Age of 
Majority Act 1971. 
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Finally, in addition to setting the age-limit at eighteen years, the writer also submits that 
the statutes should create an exception therein, where the duty to maintain should continue 
in the event the child is physically or mentally disabled, or where the child is pursuing his or 
her tertiary education or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation. This issue 
would be dealt with in depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
4.4.2 Adopted children 
The second issue that arises under the sub-topic of the ‘Meaning of a Child’ is whether 
adopted children have a right to claim maintenance from their adoptive parents. In order to 
answer this question, reference would have to be made to the three statutes which have been 
referred to earlier i.e. the 1950 Act, the LRA and the 1959 Ordinance, in order to examine if 
the provisions therein confer such a right to the adopted children. 
Before the writer examines the three statutes mentioned above, it is pertinent to note that 
adopted children discussed below refer specifically to children adopted under the Adoptions 
Act 1952 and not to children adopted in accordance with the Registration of Adoptions Act 
1952.37 
 
4.4.2.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
As discussed earlier in sub topic 4.4.1 Age of a child, the 1950 Act is silent on the 
definition of a ‘child’. Hence, it is not clear if an adopted child could apply under section 
                                                          
37Malaysia has two statutes pertaining to adoption of children: the Registration of Adoption Act 1952 and the Adoption Act 1952. Basically 
the former deals with the registration of de facto adoptions whereas the latter deals with application to the court for an adoption order. The 
reason for specifically referring to adoptions under the Adoptions Act 1952 is because an adoption order issued by the court under this Act 
is more effective than an adoption registered under the Registration of Adoptions Act 1952. This because section 11 of the Registration of 
Adoptions Act 1952, inter alia, states that ‘Neither the registration of nor the omission to register any adoption shall affect the validity of 
the adoption’. Hence, the registration of an adoption under this Act is not legally enforceable, when compared to an adoption order issued 
by the court under the Adoption Act 1952. Therefore, for an adoption to be effective, the petitioner should apply for an adoption order from 
the court under the Adoptions Act 1952. 
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3(1) of this Act to claim for maintenance from his adoptive father. Reference would have to 
be made to case law.  
Based on the writer’s research, it was observed that there are no cases reported on whether 
an adopted child could claim maintenance from his or her adoptive father according to section 
3(1) of the 1950 Act. Nevertheless, the closest case reported would be the case of Kulasingam 
v Rasammah38 which was discussed earlier in this Chapter. In this case, the High Court held 
that in order for a court to order a person to pay maintenance to his child under section 3(1) 
of the 1950 Act, ‘the court must be satisfied that the child is a legitimate child and that it is 
not able to maintain itself’. The High Court later went on to examine whether the ‘child’ 
concerned in the present case was indeed a child and referred to the Age of Majority Act 
1971 which provided that the person is a minor if he or she is below the age of eighteen years. 
The court then held as follows:39 
The 1950 Ordinance should in my opinion be regarded as a statutory provision for the 
maintenance of legitimate children. Thus the construction that the statutory provision 
covers only children who have not yet attained the age of majority would seem to be 
the more correct construction. 
Although there are no cases which have dealt with the issue of whether an adopted child 
can claim for maintenance under the 1950 Act, the writer is of the opinion that by virtue of 
section 9(1) of the Adoptions Act (as discussed earlier), which provides that the adoptive 
parents step into the shoes of the natural parents once the court makes an adoption order, it 
                                                          
38Supra n 6 
39Ibid at 38. 
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could be seen that the law imposes, inter alia, a duty to maintain the adopted child on the 
adoptive parents. 
In addition to referring to section 9(1) of the Adoptions Act, the writer is also of the 
opinion that as the case of Kulasingam stated that the court must be satisfied that the child is, 
inter alia, a legitimate child before it could order the parent to pay maintenance, an adopted 
child would indeed qualify to claim maintenance if he or she was born legitimate. Even if the 
child was born out of wedlock, once the court issues an adoption order under the Adoptions 
Act, the child would become legitimated as could be observed in the last few words in section 
9(1) of the said Act which states as follows: 
... and all such rights, duties, obligations and liabilities shall vest in and be exercisable 
by and enforceable against the adopter as though the adopted child was a child born 
to the adopter in lawful wedlock (emphasis added). 
 
4.4.2.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
The answer to the question as to whether an adopted child could claim for maintenance 
under the LRA could be found in section 87 of the LRA. Section 87 provides that a ‘child’ 
means a ‘child of the marriage’ as defined in section 2 who is below eighteen years old. 
Section 2 of the LRA defines ‘child’ to ‘include an illegitimate child of, and a child adopted 
by either of the parties to the marriage in pursuance of an adoption order made under any 
written law relating to adoption.’ Therefore, it is clearly stated that an adopted child is entitled 
to claim for maintenance under the LRA.  
However, there is an issue that arises in the definition in section 2 as stated above. In the 
abovementioned definition, there is a comma after ‘illegitimate child’, thereby raising the 
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question as to whether the provision should be read as including an illegitimate child who 
has been adopted (connoting a conjunctive view) or should be read in a disjunctive manner, 
i.e. includes an illegitimate child and an adopted child. If it is read in a conjunctive manner, 
it would then restrict the application of the provision to illegitimate children of either parties 
to the marriage who are adopted by either of the parties. On the other hand, if a disjunctive 
view is taken, then it does not limit the application to illegitimate children of one of the parties 
to the marriage who is adopted. It would then include any child adopted by the parties to the 
marriage. 
In the case of T v O,40 the court in discussing the definition of a ‘child of the marriage’ in 
section 2 of the LRA stated as follows:41 
This definition under section 2 includes an illegitimate child of either parties to the 
marriage, accepted as one of the family by the other party and an adopted child, who, 
as has already be seen, could also be an illegitimate child of the adoptive parent. There 
is a duty on the man to maintain the child. 
The above explanation by the court seems to suggest that the learned judge has taken a 
disjunctive view on the meaning of a ‘child’ in section 2 of the LRA. His Lordship states 
‘and an adopted child, ... could also be an illegitimate child’.  The phrase ‘could also be an 
illegitimate child’ seems to denote that an adopted child referred to in section 2 of the LRA 
need not be confined only to illegitimate children of either of the parties to the marriage. It 
is submitted that the approach taken by the court in T v O is welcomed as it does not restrict 
                                                          
40 [1993] 1 MLJ 168. 
41Ibid at 174. 
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‘adopted children’ who could claim maintenance under the LRA to illegitimate children of 
either party to the marriage who has been adopted. 
In addition, section 99 of the LRA states that if a man has accepted a child who is not his 
as a member of his family, it is his duty to maintain the said child. The question that arises at 
this juncture is whether the child referred to in section 99 implies an adopted child. The writer 
submits that the answer to the above question is no, as the section merely states ‘accepted a 
child who is not his as a member of his family’ and not ‘adopts a child’. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that the courts would refer to section 99 as an authority to impose a duty on adoptive 
parents to maintain their adopted child. Be that as it may, the writer reiterates her earlier 
stance that an adopted child could always fall back on section 9(1) of the Adoptions Act to 
state that his or her adoptive parent steps into the shoes of his or her natural parents once the 
adoption order has been made by the court and as such he has the duty to maintain him or 
her. 
 
4.4.2.3Maintenance Ordinance1959 of Sabah 
The Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah defines ‘child’ to include a legitimate or 
illegitimate child who is unable to maintain itself. This definition is similar to sections 3(1) 
and (2) of the 1950 Act which confers the powers to the court to order a person to pay 
maintenance to his legitimate and illegitimate child respectively who is unable to maintain 
itself. 
Once again, there is no mention of whether an adopted child could claim for maintenance 
under this Ordinance. Reference, at this juncture, could be made to the Adoption Ordinance 
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1960 of Sabah.42 Section 16(1) of the Adoption Ordinance is similar to section 9(1) of the 
Adoption Act (as discussed above). Section 16(1) of the Adoption Ordinance provides as 
follows: 
Upon an adoption order being made, all rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the 
parents or guardians of the infant in relation to the future custody, maintenance and 
education of the infant, including all rights to appoint a guardian or to consent or give 
notice of dissent to marriage, shall be extinguished, and all such rights, duties, 
obligations and liabilities shall vest in and be exercisable by and enforceable against 
the adopter as if the infant were a child born to the adopter in lawful wedlock; and in 
respect of the matters aforesaid the infant shall stand to the adopter exclusively in the 
position of a child born to the adopter in lawful wedlock.(Emphasis added) 
The last part of the provision above is emphasised to prove the fact that the adopted child 
shall be treated as the lawful child of the adopter once the court issues an adoption order. 
Thus, it is submitted that since the child is considered to be the lawful child of the adopter, 
in other words the legitimate child of the adopter, the adopted child would then indeed fall 
within the meaning of ‘child’ in the 1959 Ordinance and be entitled to claim maintenance 
from his or her adoptive parents. 
 
4.4.2.4 Discussion 
Based on the examination of the Malaysian statutes on maintenance so far, it could be 
noted that the right of an adopted child to claim maintenance from his or her adoptive parents 
                                                          
42 Sabah No. 23 of 1960. 
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is not clearly spelt out in any of the aforesaid statutes. Such a right could only be implied 
when reference is made to the definition of a ‘child’ section 2 of the LRA. 
It is submitted that although the 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah do 
not specifically refer to an adopted child's right to claim maintenance from his or her adoptive 
parents, the Adoption Act and the Adoption Ordinance of Sabah would respectively come in 
to help resolve this issue. This is due to the fact that both these Acts specifically provide for 
the rights of adopted children, which includes the right to be maintained by their respective 
adoptive parents. Nevertheless, it is further submitted that instead of scratching our head to 
find the answer to the issue of whether an adopted child has a right to be maintained by his 
or her adoptive parents under the 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah and 
having to refer to the relevant statutes on adoption, it would be easier if both these statutes 
be amended to include adopted children within the definition of a ‘child’ as was done in the 
Distribution Act 1958,43 where ‘child’ is defined as follows: 
"child" means a legitimate child and where the deceased is permitted by his personal 
law a plurality of wives, includes a child by any of such wives, but does not include an 
adopted child other than a child adopted under the provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 
or the Adoption Ordinance of the State of Sarawak. 
The above definition therefore clearly includes an adopted child who has been adopted 
under the Adoption Act 1952 or the Adoption Ordinance of Sarawak within the meaning of 
‘child’ in the Distribution Act 1958. 
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4.4.2.5 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
The writer will next examine the legal position on the right of an adopted child to 
maintenance from his or her adoptive parents in three jurisdictions, i.e. Singapore, England 
and Wales and Australia, as was done earlier in this Chapter.  
 
(a) Singapore 
Prior to looking at the issue whether an adoptive parent has a duty to maintain the adopted 
child in Singapore, it is pertinent to look at the important principles under the Women's 
Charter as to who has a liability to maintain a child. Halsbury Laws of Singapore44 explains 
that there are two groups of people who are liable to be ordered by the court to provide 
maintenance to a child. First, the parents of the child, who are primarily responsible, as 
provided for under section 46(1) of the Women’s Charter. The basis for this responsibility 
flows from the idea of the parent owing responsibility to his or her child. 
The second category of people are non-parents, who are subject to be ordered to provide 
maintenance to the child if he or she had voluntarily assumed responsibility to maintain the 
child. If such responsibility is relinquished, the basis of the duty is also relinquished. 
Looking at the two categories of people, the next question that arises is whether an 
adoptive parent falls under any of the above categories. This is due to the fact that ‘parent’ is 
not defined in the Women's Charter for the purpose of the maintenance of a child. However, 
views expressed by various Singaporean writers seem to indicate that adoptive parents should 
be included within the meaning of ‘parents’. 
                                                          
44Family Law, Halsbury Laws of Singapore, Vol. 11, Butterworths Asia,2001 at [130.644]  
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For example, Professor Leong Wai Kum, in her book entitled Principles of Family Law 
in Singapore,45 stated as follows:46 
The relationship of 'parent' and 'child' consist, first of a biological parent-child 
relationship that the law recognizes and second, of a parent-child relationship created 
by a court order of adoption that the law also recognizes. 
Under the Adoption of Children Act, Cap. 4, Singapore Statutes, Revised Edition, 
1985, section 7 provides that if the potential adopter is a married person, his or her 
spouse should join in the adoption petition. Where the adoption order is given to the 
spouses, both are adoptive parents. Where, exceptionally one spouse is allowed to 
adopt without the other joining in, only the spouse who is granted the adoption order 
is the adoptive parent of the child and, therefore, only this adoptive parent is liable, 
under section 69(2) to maintain the child. The spouse who did not join is not liable 
under this provision. 
Thus, the above statement by the author indicates that the duty to maintain on an adoptive 
parent arises once an adoption order is issued under the Adoption of Children Act. The same 
view is shared by Halsbury Laws of Singapore where it states as follows:47 
'Parent' for the purposes of maintenance of a child … It should also include the adoptive 
parent (section 3(3) and (4) and (5) of the Adoption of Children Act (Singapore) - when 
exceptionally an adoption order is sought and granted to only one of two spouses, it is 
the spouse who is granted the order of adoption who is liable to maintain the child). 
                                                          
45 Leong, Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1997). 
46Ibid at 859. 
47Supra n.44 at [130.646] 
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Foo Siew Fong in When Marriages Break Down: Rights, Obligations and Division of 
Property48 too states as follows:49 
For the purposes of the law, a "child" could include an adopted child, an illegitimate 
child as well as a child accepted as a member of the family, e.g. stepchild under sections 
68 and 70. 
Professor Leong Wai Kum reiterated her earlier opinion on the meaning of a parent to 
include an adoptive parent in her book entitled Elements of Family Law in Singapore:50 
"Parent" must include the adoptive parent as section 7 of the Adoption of Children Act 
provides that the effect of the court awarding an adoption order is that the person named 
as adoptive parent steps into the shoes vacated by the biological parent who gave up 
the child for adoption. 
Therefore, although the Women's Charter does not define ‘parent’ for the purpose of 
maintenance of child, the writers as stated above seem to have expressed their views that 
‘parents’ should include ‘adoptive parents’. Hence, an adopted child would also have a right 
to claim maintenance from his adoptive parents under the Women's Charter. In order to claim 
such maintenance, the next question that is whether he has to prove anything in court? 
Although there are no cases decided nor any statutory provision on the issue raised above, 
reference could be made to Professor Leong Wai Kum's book entitled Elements of Family 
Law in Singapore,51 where she states as follows: 
                                                          
48 Foo, Siew Fong, When Marriages Break Down: Rights, Obligations and Division of Property, (Singapore: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 
2005). 
49Ibid at [8.20]. 
50 Leong, Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Lexis Nexis, 2007), at 438-439. 
51Ibid. 
131 
 
Where put to proof, the child seeking an order of maintenance from the person which 
he or she claims to be a "parent" must succeed in proving the parentage. Proof of 
adoptive parentage, whether an adoptive mother or adoptive father, is achieved simply 
by reference to a court order of adoption since legal adoption is only through a court 
order. 
Thus, it could be said that in Singapore, in order to claim maintenance from an adoptive 
parent, the adopted child merely has to produce the adoption order to proof his or her adoptive 
parentage. At this juncture, the writer submits that although the Malaysian maintenance laws 
and judicial decisions are silent, the above principle could also be applied in Malaysia. This 
is due to the fact that when a court issues an adoption order under the Adoption Act 1952, 
the said order could be adduced by the adopted child in court to prove his or her adoptive 
parentage. 
 
(b) England and Wales 
Shifting the discussion to the England and Wales as to the duty of adoptive parents to 
maintain their adopted children, it is to be noted first, that in England and Wales prior to 
1926, child adoption had no legal status. Child adoption was considered as an informal and 
generally secretive procedure. The adoptive parents did not have any rights over the child 
concerned. The biological parents could demand the custody of their child, whom they had 
not contributed to the care at any time.52 Finally, after much debates and discussions, the 
Adoption of Children Act 1926 was passed.53 
                                                          
52 Grey, Daniel, Review of "A Child for Keeps: The History of Adoption in England, 1918-45" (review no. 806), accessed at 
http://www.history.ac.uk./reviews/review/806 on 13 August 2016. 
53Ibid. 
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Since the enactment of this Act, many amendments have taken place. Currently in 
England and Wales, there are two adoption laws in force, i.e. the Adoption Act 197654 and 
the Adoption & Children Act 2002.55 The effect of an adoption order under both these Acts 
could be said to be similar to the Malaysian Adoption Act 1952. This could be seen in section 
39 of the Adoption Act 1976 and section 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. For 
example, section 39(1) of the Adoption Act 1976 provides as follows: 
(1) An adopted child shall be treated in law - 
(a) where the adopters are a married couple as if he had been born as a child of 
the marriage (whether or not he was in fact born after the marriage was 
solemnized) 
(b) in any other case, as if he had been born to the adopter in wedlock (but not as 
a child of any actual marriage of the adopter). 
 
In addition to the status conferred by the adoption orders, section 46(1) of the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002 expressly states that ‘an adoption order is an order made by the court 
... giving parental responsibility for a child to the adopters or adopter’. 
Subsection (2)(a) further states that once an adoption order is made, the parental 
responsibility which any person (other than the adopters or adopter) currently has for the 
adopted child is extinguished. Therefore, this basically means that once an adoption order is 
made, the adopter steps into the shoes of the child’s natural parents and takes on the parental 
responsibility for the said child. 
                                                          
54 1976 c.36 
55 2002 c.28 
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It is respectfully submitted that ‘parental responsibility’ here includes the duty to 
maintain the adopted child. This could also be noted in section 46(2)(d) which states that the 
adoption order extinguishes ‘any duty arising by virtue of an agreement or order of a court 
to make payments, so far as the payments are in respect of the adopted child’s maintenance 
or upbringing for any period after the making of the adoption order.’ Hence, this clearly 
means that the adopter takes on the duty to maintain the child once the adoption order is 
made, thus safeguarding the welfare of the child. 
In addition to the above protection afforded by the relevant adoption laws, reference 
could also be made to the respective laws on maintenance in England and Wales in order to 
examine if these statutes include adopted children. First, reference could be made to the 
Family Law Reform Act 1987. Section 1(3) of the Act generally refers to persons to whom 
the Act is applicable. Section 1(3)(c) specifically refers to ‘any person who is an adopted 
child within the meaning of Part IV of the Adoption Act 1976’. Hence, an adopted child who 
is adopted pursuant to the Adoption Act 1976 is entitled to benefit from the protection 
guaranteed under this Act. 
However, if reference is made to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (which contains 
provisions on child maintenance), it could be observed that the definition of ‘child’ or ‘child 
of the family’ in section 52 does not expressly include an adopted child. ‘Child’ is defined in 
section 52 as ‘in relation to one or both of the parties to a marriage, includes an illegitimate 
child of that party, or as the case maybe, of both parties’. ‘Child of the family’ is defined ‘in 
relation to the parties to a marriage, means (a) a child of both of these parties; and (b) any 
other child, not being a child who has been treated by both of those parties as a child of their 
family’. 
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Perusing the above definition, the writer submits that although section 52 does not 
expressly include an ‘adopted child’ within either of the definitions in paragraph (a) or (b), 
an adopted child could fall within the meaning of ‘a child of both of these parties’. The reason 
for this submission is because the Adoption Act 1976 (as referred to above) clearly states that 
once an adoption order is made, the adopted parent or parents take on the parental 
responsibility and the child is to be treated as though he or she is born during their lawful 
wedlock. 
Finally, reference could be made to the Child Support Act 199156  which focuses on child 
support. Referring to section 55 on the meaning of ‘child’, it could be noted that the definition 
does not expressly include an adopted child. However, aid may be obtained from section 26 
of the same Act, which states that where there is a dispute concerning the parentage of a 
child, i.e. the person who is alleged to be the parent of a child denies that he is one of the 
child’s parents, the Secretary of State shall not make a maintenance calculation unless the 
case falls under any of the ‘cases’ mentioned thereunder. One of the ‘cases’ mentioned under 
the same section is “where the alleged parent is a parent of the child in question by virtue of 
having adopted ’him’. Further thereto, subsection (3) of section 26 defines ‘adopted’ as 
‘adopted within the meaning of Part IV of the Adoption Act 1976’. Therefore, it is submitted 
that an adopted child’s right to maintenance is safeguarded by the Child Support Act 1991. 
In conclusion, the writer submits that the right to maintenance of an adopted child in 
England and Wales is adequately protected by the relevant laws as discussed above. 
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(c) Australia 
Australia too has its own set of laws pertaining to adoption, for example, the Adoption 
Act 2000,57 which is a Federal legislation. Section 7, in stating the objects of the said Act, 
provides, inter alia, in paragraphs (a) and (i) as follows: 
(a) to emphasise that the best interests of the child concerned, both in childhood and 
later life, must be the paramount consideration in adoption law and practice; and 
(i) to provide for the giving in certain circumstances of post-adoption financial 
and other assistance to adopted children and their birth and adoptive parents.' 
It could be noted that paragraph (a) above emphasises the principle of the best interests 
of a child which should be the paramount consideration, as is the position in Malaysia as 
well. 
In addition to the above objectives in section 7, section 8 of the Act lists down the 
principles that are to be applied by a decision-maker regarding the adoption of a child. 
Section 8(1)(a) reiterates that the decision maker should consider the best interests of the 
child as the paramount consideration. Subsection (2) of section 8 further elaborates what 
comprises ‘the best interests of the child’. The writer would like to highlight two paragraphs 
therein, which are paragraphs (c) and (i): 
(2) In determining the best interests of the child, the decision maker is to have regard 
to the following: 
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(c) the child's physical, emotional and educational needs, including the child's 
sense of personal, family and cultural identity, 
(i)  the suitability and capacity of each proposed adoptive parent, or any other 
person, to provide for the needs of the child, including the emotional and 
intellectual needs of the child.' 
The two paragraphs highlighted above indicate that the decision maker will look into the 
needs of the child as well as the suitability and capacity of the adoptive parent or any other 
person for the needs of the child. At this juncture, the writer submits that ‘the needs of the 
child’ would no doubt refer to the basic needs of the child and hence, the capacity of the 
adoptive parent or any other person to provide maintenance to the child would be examined 
by the decision maker. 
The writer would next examine the effect of an adoption order in order to see if it is 
similar with the Malaysian Adoption Act 1952. Section 95 of the Australian Adoption Act 
provides for the effect of the adoption order as follows: 
(1) An adoption order made by the Court gives sole parental responsibility for a child 
to the person or persons named in the order.' 
 
Subsection (2) of section 95 focuses on the law of New South Wales58, which states that 
'...if an adoption order is made: 
(a) the adopted child has the same rights in relation to the adoptive parent or adoptive 
parents, as a child born to the adoptive parent or adoptive parents, 
                                                          
58 It is to be noted here that although the Australian Adoptions Act 2000 is a Federal Legislation, section 95(2) specifically applies only to 
the state of New South Wales. This is something peculiar to the Australian legislation. 
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(b) the adopted parent or adoptive parents have the same parental responsibility as 
the parent or parents of a child born to the adoptive parent or adoptive parents, 
(c) the adopted child is regarded in law as the child of the adoptive parent or adoptive 
parents and the adoptive parent or adoptive parents are regarded in law as the 
parents of the adopted child, 
(d) the adopted child ceases to be regarded in law as the child of the birth parents and 
the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child.' 
In essence, the effect of the above provision could be said to be similar to section 9 of the 
Malaysian Adoption Act 1952, which basically states that once an adoption order is made by 
the court, the natural parents no longer have any rights or responsibilities towards the child. 
These rights and responsibilities are transferred to adoptive parent or parents. Hence, in this 
respect, this would include the duty to maintain the child on the part of the adoptive parents. 
Having perused the Adoption Act 2000, the writer would next refer to the Family Law 
Act 1975 in order to see if child support stated therein includes the duty to maintain an 
adopted child. ‘Child’ is defined in section 4 as follows: 
 ' "child": 
(a) in Part VII includes an adopted child ...; and 
(b) in Subdivision E of Division 6 of that Part, means a person who is under 18 
(including a person who is an adopted child)' 
Cross-referring to Part VII of the Act, it could be noted that Division 7 of Part VII 
provides for Child Maintenance Orders. Hence, it is clear that the child maintenance 
provisions in Division 7, Part VII of the Family Law Act, which confers the right on a child 
to claim maintenance from his or her parents, no doubt includes adopted children. 
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the right of an adopted child to claim for maintenance 
from his or her adoptive parents in Australia is similar to that in Malaysia. This is due to the 
fact that once an adoption order is made by the respective Courts in both these countries, the 
adoptive parent or parents step into the shoes of the natural parents and assume all their rights, 
duties and obligations towards the adopted child, which would include the duty to maintain 
the said child.  
 
4.4.2.6 Discussion 
Having examined the position in Malaysia as to whether an adopted child has a right to 
claim maintenance from his or her adoptive parents, the following observations could be 
made. 
The 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah are silent on this issue. The LRA 
refers to an adopted child in the definition of ‘child’ in section 2 where it states, ‘includes an 
illegitimate child of, and an adopted child’. However, it is not clear if an adopted child here 
refers to an illegitimate child per se. This dilemma was put to rest in the case of T v O59 where 
the court took a disjunctive view.  
Looking at the position in the other jurisdictions, it could be observed that the Singapore 
Women’s Charter is also silent as to whether an adopted child could claim maintenance from 
his or her adoptive parents. Nevertheless, academic writers in Singapore, for example, 
Professor Leong Wai Kum in her book entitled Elements of Family Law in Singapore (as has 
been discussed earlier in pages in 130 and 131 of this thesis) have strongly suggested that an 
adopted child should be able to do so. In England and Wales, the FLRA 1987 clearly provides 
that adopted children have a right to claim maintenance, whereas the MCA is silent on this 
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issue. The CSA refers to an adopted child in the context of where there is a dispute concerning 
parentage on the issue of maintenance. Finally, in Australia, the FLA clearly states that a 
‘child’ includes an adopted child. 
Hence, it is submitted that rather than always having to cross refer to the Adoption Act 
1952 in order to see whether an adoptive child has a right to claim maintenance under 
maintenance laws in Malaysia, it would be better for the legislature to amend all the three 
statutes on maintenance in Malaysia, and expressly include adopted children in the category 
of children who have a right to claim maintenance from their parents.  
 
4.4.3 Step-children 
The issue as to whether step-children have a right to claim maintenance from their step- 
parents needs to be clarified in the event they (the step-children) stay with the step-parents. 
As the statutory provisions on maintenance confer a child the right to claim maintenance 
from his or her natural parents, it is submitted that the child should not be given two bites at 
a cherry as it would then amount to abusing the provisions of the law.  Nevertheless, the 
writer intends to examine the three maintenance laws in order to see whether these 
legislations do indeed allow step-children to claim maintenance from their step-parents. 
 
4.4.3.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
As has been discussed in depth above, section 2 of the 1950 Act does not define the 
meaning of ‘child’. Therefore, reference could be made to the case of Kulasingam v 
Rasammah60 where the court defines a ‘child’ as a person below the age of eighteen according 
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to the Age of Majority Act 1971. Further thereto, section 3(1) and (2) of the 1950 Act, when 
providing that the court has the power to order a person to maintain his legitimate or 
illegitimate child respectively, uses the phrase ‘child of his’. The question that arises is 
whether ‘child of his’ is limited to a biological child or whether it could be extended to 
include a step-child of his who is staying with him? 
There are no cases decided on this issue yet under the 1950 Act. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to find out the judiciary's decision if such an issue arises in the future. 
 
4.4.3.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
The position as to the right of a step-child to claim maintenance from his or her step-
parent could be said to be more certain under the LRA when compared to the 1950 Act. 
Reference could be made to section 87 of the LRA which explains ‘child’ to mean a ‘child 
of a marriage’ as defined in section 2 and who is below the age of eighteen years. Section 2 
of the LRA defines ‘child of marriage’ as follows: 
"Child of marriage" means a child of both parties to the marriage in question or a child 
of one party to the marriage accepted as one of the family by the other party; and 
"child" in this context includes an illegitimate child of, and a child adopted by, either 
of the parties to the marriage in pursuance of an adoption order made under any written 
law relating to adoption. (emphasis added) 
‘A child to one of the parties to the marriage’ here refers to a step-child who has been 
accepted as one of the family by the other party. Therefore, ‘child’ under the LRA includes 
step-children as well.  
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The next issue that arises is whether a man who has accepted his step-child as a member 
of his family has a duty to maintain the said child? Reference needs to be made to section 87 
of the LRA as it explains that ‘child’ under Part VIII of the LRA refers to a ‘child of 
marriage’. Thus, the duty to maintain a child imposed generally in section 93(1) of the LRA 
may also apply to step-children. The duty to maintain under the LRA therefore is wider than 
the duty under the 1950 Act, as was stated by Professor Mimi Kamariah Majid in her book 
entitled Family Law in Malaysia61 that it not only includes a legitimate child of the person, 
but also his or her illegitimate child as well as a step-child:62 
It would appear, therefore that a man has to maintain a lot more than his "children" 
under the LRA than under the 1950 Act. It is no wonder then that section 93 uses the 
term 'man' and 'woman', instead of 'father' and 'mother'. 
However, the question that arises if whether a child, who is supported by his or her 
biological father but stays with his or her step-parent, has a right to claim maintenance from 
the step-parent too under section 93(1)?  This issue has not been raised or addressed in any 
judicial decisions. It is therefore submitted that it would not be fair to the step-parent for the 
court to order the him to maintain the child concerned if the biological father is already 
maintaining him or her. 
Reference at this juncture could be made to section 99 of the LRA which provides as 
follows: 
(1) Where a man has accepted a child, who is not his child as a member of his family, 
it shall be his duty to maintain such child while he or she remains a child so far 
                                                          
61Supra n11 
62Ibid at 335. 
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as the father and the mother of the child fail to do so, and the court may make 
such orders as may be necessary to ensure the welfare of the child: 
 Provided that the duty imposed by this subsection shall cease if the child is 
taken away by his or her father or mother. 
The above provision does not clearly state that ‘a man has accepted a child of his wife 
from a former marriage’. This issue was addressed by the court in 2002 in the case of Cheah 
Yen Pin (P) lwn Tan Chuan Ou.63 The respondent in the present case appealed to the High 
Court against an interim order, ordering him to pay a monthly maintenance to the petitioner 
and her four children. He (the respondent) appealed for a variation of the said order based on 
sections 83 and 96 of the LRA, on the ground that he is not under a duty to maintain the 
petitioner's three children from her previous marriage. 
The High Court referred to section 99 of the LRA and stated that this section is clear and 
that it should be read with section 2 of the LRA. The court further held that the above 
provision clearly imposes a duty on the father to maintain a child of the marriage without 
taking into account the fact that the child is born from a former marriage. Thus, the 
respondent's duty to maintain the three children from a former marriage should continue. In 
fact, the respondent himself admitted that he had accepted the children as members of his 
family when he marries the petitioner. Therefore, it is not fair for him to now try to evade 
such a responsibility. 
Hence, the above case has put to rest the issue of whether section 99 refers to the duty of 
a man to maintain his step-child whom he has accepted as a member of his family. In fact, in 
                                                          
63 [2002] 6 MLJ 129. 
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the writer's opinion, section 99 is more relevant to maintenance of a step-child compared to 
section 93 as the former is more specific as follows: 
(1) Section 99 clearly states where a man has accepted a child who is not his as a 
member of his family - denoting that a man has accepted his step-child into his 
family, whereas section 93 merely states that ‘the court may ... order a man to pay 
maintenance for the benefit of his child’. 
(2) The duty of a step-father to maintain under section 99 only arises when the natural 
father or mother of the child has failed to do so. The court may order the step-
father to maintain such child. On the other hand, section 93 lists down the four 
situations when a court may order a man to pay maintenance to his child. 
 
It is respectfully submitted that in order to avoid any confusion in the future, it should be 
expressly provided for in section 93 of the LRA that the duty to maintain stated therein 
applies to the person’s biological child or adopted child, whereas the duty to maintain under 
section 99 would include step-children. Hence, the duty to maintain a step-child under section 
99 only arises when the natural parents have failed to do so under section 93(1) or (2). In 
such a situation, the welfare of a child is protected, as the natural parents have the primary 
duty to maintain the child, failing which, if the child stays with his step-parent who has 
accepted him as a member of his family, the duty to maintain the child is then transferred to 
the step-parent.  
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4.4.3.3 Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah 
The issue as to whether a step-child has a right to claim maintenance from his step-parent 
under the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah could be examined as follows: 
First, an examination of the word ‘child’ needs to be made. According to section 2 of 
the 1959 Ordinance: 
"child' includes legitimate or illegitimate child who is unable to maintain itself. 
The above definition is very general as it merely refers to a legitimate or illegitimate child 
who is unable to maintain itself. However, it is possible for a court to give a broad definition 
to the phrase ‘legitimate or illegitimate child’, i.e. it could refer to a legitimate step-child and 
also an illegitimate step-child. As there are no decided cases on this issue, it is respectfully 
submitted that the above definition be revisited by the Sabah State Legislative Assembly in 
order to see whether it includes, inter alia, step-children to avoid any confusion that may 
arise in the future  
Secondly, an examination of section 3(1) of the Ordinance could be made to see if the 
Court could order a person to maintain his step-child. Section 3(1) of the 199 Ordinance reads 
as follows: 
(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain or contribute 
to the maintenance of his wife or any legitimate child unable to maintain itself, a 
Court upon due proof thereof may order such person to make a monthly allowance 
to any person named therein for the maintenance of his wife or such child as 
aforesaid in proportion to the means of such person as to the Court seems 
reasonable. 
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Although the above provision does not specifically refer to a step-child, an interesting 
observation could be made. Reference is made to the phrase ‘... neglects or refuses to 
maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his wife or any legitimate child’ (emphasis 
added). In this phrase, it could be noted that ‘his wife’ is stated, but not ‘his legitimate child’. 
On the other hand, the phrase ‘any legitimate child’ is mentioned therein, thereby implying 
that ‘child’ in this provision is not limited to his child. It is submitted that there is a possibility 
that it may also include his step-child so long as the child is legitimate. In support of this 
submission, the writer would like to make a comparison between the above section and 
section 3(1) of the 1950 Act which is similar. Section 3(1) of the 1950 Act states as follows: 
(1) If a person neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or a legitimate child of his 
which is unable to maintain itself. (emphasis added) 
Hence, section 3(1) of the 1950 Act clearly refers to a legitimate child of his thereby 
leaving less room to include step-children within this provision. Therefore, it is submitted 
that compared to the 1950 Act, a legitimate step-child has a better opportunity to claim for 
maintenance under the1959 Ordinance due to the generality of the words therein. 
At the same time, however, an illegitimate step-child would not be able to raise the same 
argument as section 3(2) of the 1959 Ordinance states as follows: 
(2) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain or contribute 
to maintain his illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, a Court upon due proof 
thereof may order such person to make such monthly allowance not exceeding 
fifty ringgit on the whole as to the Court  seems reasonable (emphasis added). 
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The above provision clearly states ‘his illegitimate child’, thereby limiting the duty to 
maintain ‘his illegitimate child’ only. At this juncture, it is respectfully submitted that in the 
best interest of an illegitimate child there should not be any discrimination between a 
legitimate child and illegitimate child. It does not matter whether a child is legitimate or 
illegitimate, so long as it (the child) is unable to maintain itself, the court should have the 
power to order the person concerned to maintain such child. 
 
4.4.3.4. Comparison with other jurisdictions 
As was done earlier, the writer would compare the positions in Singapore, England and 
Wales and Australia on the issue of a right of a step-child to claim maintenance. 
 
(a) Singapore 
As mentioned earlier under sub-topic 4.4.2 Adopted children, there are two groups of 
persons liable to be ordered by the court to maintain a dependent child under the Singapore's 
Women's Charter, i.e. the parent and non-parent. The issue that arises in this connection is 
whether a step-parent would fall under the category of a parent’ (who owes a primary 
responsibility to maintain the child under section 69 of the Women's Charter) or a non-parent 
(who has voluntarily assumed the responsibility to maintain the child under section 70 of the 
Women's Charter)? 
According to the Halsbury Laws of Singapore, it would be more logical for a step-parent 
to fall under the category of non-parent. The reason for these suggestions was explained as 
below:64 
                                                          
64Please see footnote 6, para [130.646] in Halsbury Laws of Singapore, Vol. 11, Family Laws of Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths 
Asia, 2001). 
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This is particularly appropriate as the stepparent can become liable on the other basis 
by voluntarily assuming such responsibility. If such a stepparent were included 'parent', 
there would be two bases for his or her responsibility, thereby rendering one of them 
superfluous. 
The above view is shared by Professor Leong Wai Kum, as stated in her book, Elements 
of Family Law in Singapore.65 
In the landmark case of EB v EC (divorce: maintenance of stepchildren),66 Woo Bih Li J 
stated that the liability of a step-father arises only as any other non-parent, it is under section 
70(1) of the Women's Charter on the basis of his having voluntarily accepted the children as 
members of his family. 
The legal duty of a non-parent to maintain a child accepted as a member of the family 
was created vide the Women's Charter (Amendment) Act 1980. As stated above, the main 
provision concerning this duty is section 70 of the Women's Charter which provides as 
follows: 
Duty to maintain child accepted as member of family 
 
70.(1) Where a person has accepted a child who is not his child as a member of his 
family, it shall be his duty to maintain that child while he remains a child, so 
far as the father or the mother of the child fails to do so, and the court may 
make such orders as may be necessary to ensure the welfare of the child. 
(2) The duty imposed by subsection (1) shall cease if the child is taken away by his 
father or mother. 
                                                          
65 Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Lexis-Nexis, 2007) at 439. 
66 [2006] 2 SLR 475. 
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(3) Any sums expended by a person maintaining that child shall be recovered as a 
debt from the father or mother of the child. 
(4) An application for an order under subsection (1) may be made by- 
(a) any person who is a guardian or has the actual custody of the child; 
(b) where the child has attained the age of twenty one years, the child himself; 
(c) where the child is below the age of twenty one years, any of his siblings who 
has attained the age of twenty one years; or 
 any person appointed by the Minister. 
(5) Subsections (4) to (9) of section 69 shall apply, with the necessary modifications, 
to the making of an order under this section. 
 
As the basis of this responsibility rests on the assumption that the non-parent had 
voluntarily assumed the responsibility to maintain the child, there may not be any biological 
link between the child and the non-parent. On the other hand, a factual link is sought as the 
non-parent had brought the child home and has begun assimilating the child as a member of 
his family. However, in order for this link to be established, the non-parent needs to have a 
family first. In the case M v M (child of the Family),67 the court held that the man who had 
not formed a family yet cannot be said to have accepted his wife's child as his own.68 
Professor Leong Wai Kum in her book Principles of Family Law in Singapore 
commented on the above case as follows:69 
                                                          
67 [1981] 2 FLR 39, CA (England) 
68 Supra n.44 at [130.649] 
69Supra n.45 at 860-86 
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The decision implied that in a more normal family where family members live together, 
a child living there, whether of one spouse or not, may come within the phrase and both 
adults have accepted the child as a member of their family. 
As there is no biological link between the child and the non-parent, the non-parent stated 
in section 70 could mean the child's grandparent, uncle, aunt, stepparent, sibling, foster parent 
or any other relatives.70 
The duty of a parent to maintain the child constitutes a primary responsibility whereas 
the duty of a non-parent is subordinated to a parent's duty. This could be observed by dividing 
section 70 into three provisions:71 
(a) the duty to maintain is imposed on the non-parent only when the father or mother 
of the child has failed to do so.72 
(b) the duty to maintain on a non-parent ceases when the child is taken away by the 
father or mother.73 Once the child is taken away by either the father or mother, he 
or she would then have to take on the duty to maintain the child. 
(c) the non-parent would be able to recover any sums spent on maintaining the child 
as a debt from the father or mother of the child.74 
The next issue that has been discussed by academics is whether the non-parent could 
relinquish the duty to maintain the child whom he has accepted as a member of his family. 
Professor Leong Wai Kum has discussed this issue in her books on Family Law. In her book 
                                                          
70Supra n.44 at [130.649]. 
71Ibid at [130.651] 
72 Section 70(1) 
73 Section 70(2) 
74 Section 70(3) 
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entitled Principles of Family Law in Singapore,75 she states that in principle, a non-parent 
who has indicated that he or she does not wish to accept the responsibility to maintain the 
child cannot be forced to discharge the responsibility for a long time. 
In her book entitled Elements of Family Law in Singapore76 she discusses this issue in 
depth. She states that non-parents have a choice to relinquish their duty to maintain. She 
further contrasts this from a parent's duty to maintain where she states that ‘the responsibility 
owed by a parent is one thread of parental responsibility that flows naturally from parenthood 
which lasts in theory, for life.’77 
However, she qualifies the above view by stating that for practical reasons, it is not 
advisable to allow a non-parent to avoid responsibility on the initial protest that he or she has 
relinquished his or her responsibility to maintain the child concerned. It is up to the court to 
find whether the relinquishment has been proven up to its satisfaction. In the case of EB v 
EC (divorce: maintenance of stepchildren), Woo Bih Li J states as follows:78 
I am of the view that once a person has accepted a child as a member of his family 
and hence has accepted the responsibility under section 70(1), he cannot abandon the 
responsibility simply by changing his mind. 
Professor Leong Wai Kum further states that although the non-parent protests and states 
that he no longer wishes to maintain the child, the court can still impose the liability on him 
or her as he had once voluntarily assumed the responsibility. However, the question that has 
                                                          
75Supra n. 45 at 861 
76Supra n.65 
77Ibid at 446. 
78Ibid. 
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not been answered is for how long the liability could be imposed on such a parent who does 
not wish to maintain the child anymore. 
The next issue that arises is whether the duty to maintain on the non-parent who has 
voluntarily assumed the responsibility to maintain arises only when both the biological 
parents fail to maintain or is it sufficient to state that such a duty arises when either one parent 
fails to maintain? Section 70(1) provides that a person who has accepted a child, who is not 
his as a member of his family, has the duty to maintain the child ‘so far as the father or the 
mother of the child fails to do so’ (emphasis added). This issue was discussed in EB v EC 
where Woo Bih Li J stated as follows: 
First, the use of the conjunction "or" suggests that so long as either one of the biological 
parents fails to maintain the children, the [stepfather] is under a duty to maintain since 
he had accepted A and B as members of his family. If that is correct, another anomaly 
arises. For example, if the biological father maintains A and B but the [mother] does 
not, the [stepfather] is still under a duty to maintain them as well, so long as the 
[mother] does not do so. The [stepfather's] duty to maintain remains. This cannot be 
right. In my view, what section 70(1) means is that so long as neither biological parent 
maintains A and B, then the [stepfather's] duty to maintain arises. In other words, the 
conjunction "or" therein should be read as "and" and the clause should be read as "so far 
as the father and the mother of the child fail to do so". 
What then does a failure to maintain mean? For example, if the [mother] can provide 
some but not full maintenance, is there a failure to maintain? I think so. The failure to 
maintain does not mean a total failure. 
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From the discussion above on the responsibility of a step-parent to maintain a child, the 
following principles could be summarised: 
(1) A step parent would not fall under the category of a ‘parent’. On the other hand, 
by the voluntarily assuming the responsibility to maintain the child, he or she 
would fall under the category of non-parent, who then would be governed by 
section 70 of the Women's Charter. 
 
(2) In order for section 70(1) to be applicable to the step parent, he or she needs to 
have a family of his own first, as the opening words of section 70(1) states ‘where 
a person has accepted a child who is not his child as a member of his 
family’(emphasis added). 
 
(3) The duty to maintain arises on the non-parent only when the father or mother of 
the child has failed in his or her duty to do so. This principle was further explained 
by the court in EB v EC [2006] 2 SLR 475 by stating that ‘where the father or 
mother of the child’ should be amended to ‘where father and mother of the child’ 
thereby suggesting that neither of the biological parent maintains the child. 
 
(4) The duty to maintain by the step parent ceases when the child is taken away by 
his or her biological parent. 
 
(5) Any sums spent on the child by the step-parent could be recovered as a debt from 
the biological parent of the child. 
 
(6) The general principle is that the non-parent has a choice to relinquish his or her 
duty to maintain the child. However, the courts are cautious in permitting such 
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relinquishment as the court, taking into account the best interest of the child, feel 
that it is not fair to the child to allow the non-parent to simply change his or her 
mind. 
The writer submits that the above principles on the duty of a step parent to maintain a 
child in Singapore under section 70 of the Women's Charter could also be applied in Malaysia 
as there is a similar provision in the LRA on this issue, i.e. section 99 (as discussed above). 
 
(b) England and Wales 
Reference could be made to two specific statutes in England and Wales on whether a step 
child has a right to claim maintenance from his step parent, i.e. the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 (‘MCA’) and the Children Act 1989 (‘CA’).  
Section 52(1) of the MCA defines ‘child’ as ‘in relation to one of both of the parties to a 
marriage, includes an illegitimate child of that party or, as the case may be, of both parties’. 
‘Child of the family’ is defined as ‘in relation to the parties to a marriage, means - 
(a) a child of both of those parties; and 
(b) any other child, not being a child who is placed with those parties as foster parents 
by a local authority or voluntary organisation, who has been treated by both of 
those parties as a child of their family.’ 
The above definition does not indicate expressly if a step child is included. However, it 
is submitted that as the definition of ‘child’ relates to, inter alia, an illegitimate child of ‘that 
party’, it may refer to a step child.  At this juncture, reference could be made to judicial 
decisions in order to see the interpretation given by the courts. In the case of Re M (A 
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Minor),79 the Court of Appeal had to interpret the meaning of a ‘child of family’ in section 
52 of the MCA. The court held that it has to broadly examine the meaning of this phrase and 
subsequently ask objectively if the parties to the marriage have treated the child as a child of 
their family. This was later followed in the case of Hodgkiss v Hodgkiss and Walker80 where 
the husband had accepted the two children born out of the wife’s adultery as children of the 
marriage. The court thus held that as the husband had accepted the two children, he was under 
the obligation to continue to maintain the children. 
Hence, from the above decisions, it could be noted that the courts have basically 
examined if the child concerned has been accepted as a member of the family by the step 
parent and if the answer is in the affirmative, he will be under an obligation to continue to 
maintain. 
In addition to section 52 and the judicial decisions above, reference could also be made 
to section 25 of the MCA which provides for the matters to which the court is to have regard 
in deciding how to exercise its powers in granting financial provision orders in matrimonial 
proceedings. In particular section 25(4) provides that in exercising its powers in granting the 
said financial provision orders ‘against a party to a marriage in favour of a child of the family 
who is not the child of that party (emphasis added) the court shall have regard: 
(a) to whether that party assumed any responsibility for the child’s maintenance, and 
if so, to the extent to which, and the basis upon which, that party assumed such 
responsibility and to the length of time for which that party discharged such 
responsibility; 
                                                          
79 (1980) 10 Fam Law 184, CA. 
80 (1984)148 J.P. 417, C.A. 
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(b) to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that party did so 
knowing that the child was not his or her own; 
(c) to the liability of any other person to maintain to that child’. 
Hence, perusing the above sections (sections 25(4) and 52) it could be safely said that the 
MCA does provide the right to a step child to claim for maintenance from his step parent. 
However, a pre-requisite to this right is either that the step parent has accepted the child as a 
member of his family or has voluntarily ‘assumed any responsibility for the child’s 
maintenance’. At this juncture, it could be noted that the above pre-requisite could be equated 
with section 99 of the Malaysian LRA which provides that it is the duty of a parent to 
maintain a child who has been accepted as a member of his family. 
A similar provision as in section 25(4) of the MCA could be found in Schedule 1, para 
4(2) of the Children Act 1989, which provides as follows: 
(1) In deciding whether to exercise its powers … against a person who is not the 
mother or father of the child, and if so in what manner, the court shall in addition 
have regard to- 
(a) whether that person had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the 
child and, if so, the extent to which and basis on which he assumed that 
responsibility and the length of the period during which he met that 
responsibility; 
(b) whether he did so knowing that the child was not his child; 
(c) the liability of any other person to maintain the child. 
 
The above provision gives the court power to order a step parent to maintain his step child 
if any of the three conditions stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) are fulfilled. 
156 
 
An interesting issue that arises here is whether a step parent refers to only a stepfather or 
does it include a stepmother as well? In the case of J v J (property transfer application)81 the 
court held that there is no provision for a court to order a female who is not the child's natural 
mother to pay maintenance to the child concerned, notwithstanding the fact that he lived with 
the female for a long time. 
In conclusion, it could be said that both the MCA and the Children's Act 1989 empower 
the court to order a step parent to maintain his step child if the relevant pre-requisites (as 
discussed earlier) are fulfilled. In addition, this duty could only be imposed on a stepfather 
and not a stepmother. 
 
(c)  Australia 
It is interesting to note that the Family Law Act 1975 (FLA) in Australia has express 
provisions that provide for the maintenance of a step-child, contrary to the position in 
Malaysia or England and Wales. However, the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 is silent 
as to whether the Act applies to step children. Hence, the focus in this sub-topic will be on 
the provisions in the FLA. 
Compared to the position in Malaysia which does not define who a step child or step 
parent is, section 4 of the FLA defines the meaning of ‘step parent’. ‘Step parent’ means ‘a 
person who: 
(a) is not a parent of the child; and 
(b) is, or has been, married to or a de facto partner ... of, a parent of the child; and, 
                                                          
81 [1993] 1 FCR 471; [1993] 2 FLR 56. 
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(c) treats, or at any time while married to, or a de facto partner of, the parent treated, 
the child as a member of the family formed with the parent.' 
Section 66D(1) of the FLA provides that a step parent has a duty to maintain a step child 
only if the court determines that it is proper to do so and it makes such an order under section 
66M. In addition section 66D(2) provides that the duty of a step-parent to maintain a step 
child is a secondary  duty subject to the primary duty of the child's parents. It further states 
that the step parent's duty to maintain the step child 'does not derogate from the primary duty 
of the parents to maintain the child.' Perusing section 66D(2), it could be noted that the child's 
parents still have the primary duty to maintain and the court may order the step parent to 
maintain if it (the court) is satisfied under section 66M. Hence, the question that arises at this 
juncture is whether the child could claim maintenance from both her parents as well as the 
step parent? 
In order to answer the question above, it is pertinent to next refer to sections 66M and 
66N which deal exclusively with a step parent's duty to maintain. Section 66M(3) states the 
matters82 that court should have regard to when making an order as follows: 
 
(a) the matters referred to in sections 60F, 66B and 66C; and 
(b) the length and circumstances of the marriage to, relationship with, the relevant 
parent of the child; and 
(c) the relationship that has existed between the step-parent and the child; and 
(d) the arrangements that have existed for the maintenance of the child; and 
                                                          
82  It is to be noted that the subsection expressly states that only the matters stated therein should be taken into account by the court and 
no other matters, thereby making the list exhaustive. 
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(e) any special circumstances which, if not taken into account in the particular case, 
would result in injustice or undue hardship to any person. 
Perusing the above provision, it is interesting to note that none of the statutes on 
maintenance that the writer has examined so far, be it Malaysia, or the other jurisdictions, 
have any provisions on the principles to be determined by the court when making a 
maintenance order in favour of a step child. As stated above, matters to be considered by the 
court include the length and circumstances of the marriage between the parent and the step 
parent, the relationship between the step parent and the child, arrangements pertaining to 
maintenance that are in existence. Paragraph (e) could be described as wide as it refers to 
‘any special circumstances’ which would result in injustice or undue hardship if not taken 
into account. This denotes that the provision is quite liberal. 
The writer would next refer to section 66N in order to answer the question raised earlier, 
i.e. whether the court could order a step parent to pay maintenance to a step child, in addition 
to ordering the parent of the said child to do the same? Section 66N(b) provides that in 
determining the financial contribution towards the child by the step parent, the court will, 
inter alia, take into account ‘the extent to which the primary duty of the parents to maintain 
the child is being, and can be fulfilled.’ 
Therefore, examining the above provision, it is submitted that it means that the court 
would first examine the extent of maintenance by the parents and if it could be fulfilled by 
them. If the court finds that the parents are unable to fulfil their duty to maintain their child 
properly, the court may then order the step parent to maintain the child. This provision could 
be described as unique and could be said to be bending backwards in favour of a child where 
the natural parents are not able to fulfil their duty to maintain in a satisfactory manner. 
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This issue was indirectly discussed in the case of Keltie & Keltie & Bradford.83 The issue 
in this case was whether the Family Law Act empowers the court to make a maintenance 
order to order that a step parent to pay maintenance to a step child who has attained the age 
of 18 years. The petitioner here is the child who has attained the age of eighteen years. The 
first respondent is his natural father. He has already obtained a consent order in 2001 that the 
natural father pay him a maintenance in the sum of $50 per week. The second respondent is 
the petitioner's step father. The petitioner is claiming maintenance from the step father as 
well. The step father contends that that section 66L of the Family Law Act which gives the 
court the power to order maintenance for a child who has attained the age of eighteen years, 
does not include a step child. 
The court referred to an earlier case, i.e. Carpenter and Carpenter84 which held that the 
terms ‘child’ and ‘children’ used in Division 7 of Part VII of the Family Law Act refer to a 
relationship rather than an age. Hence, the court eventually held that section 66L that allows 
a court to extend a maintenance order beyond the day in which the child will turn eighteen 
under special circumstances applied as well to a child maintenance order made under section 
66M and 66N. This means that a maintenance order made in favour of a step child could, 
under special circumstances, extend beyond the day in which the said child reaches the age 
of eighteen. 
In conclusion, it could be seen that step child in Australia has an added advantage when 
compared to a step child in Malaysia, as not only can he claim from his natural parents, but 
also from his step parent if the court finds it reasonable so to order.  
 
                                                          
83 [2002] Fam CA 421 
84 [1994] Fam CA 89; (1995) FLC 92-583. 
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4.4.3.5 Discussion 
Having looked at the three pieces of legislations concerning the right of a child to claim 
maintenance from his step father in Malaysia, it is observed that save for the LRA, the other 
two statutes do not specifically provide for this right. The LRA has taken into account the 
welfare of such children, who are staying with their step father, and has indeed provided in 
section 99 that a person (who may include a step father) who has accepted a child as a member 
of his family has a duty to maintain the said child. However, two conditions need to be 
fulfilled in order for a child to claim maintenance from his or her step father under section 
99: 
(1) the step father should have accepted the child as a member of his family; and 
(2) the child's biological father or mother has failed in his or her duty to maintain the 
child. 
It is submitted that although the primary duty to maintain a child is with the natural 
parents as primary caregivers, it is indeed heartening to note that at the same time, there is a 
right of recourse for these children where their own parents have failed in their duty to 
maintain them. 
In addition to the local statutes, when comparison was made with the position of step 
children in Singapore, England and Wales and Australia, the following observations were 
made: 
Section 70 of the Singapore Women's Charter is similar to section 99 of the LRA. The 
authors who have written books on the Family Law in Singapore have discussed the issue of 
the duty of a step parent to maintain a child in depth and there are also judicial decisions on 
this issue which have taken into account the welfare of these step children and decided in 
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their favour. As mentioned earlier, the same principles that apply to the right of a step child 
to be maintained by his or her step parent in Singapore would be applicable in Malaysia as 
well on the basis that section 99 of the LRA is similar to section 70 of the Singapore Women's 
Charter. 
In England and Wales, the relevant provisions could be noted in the Matrimonial Causes 
Act and the Children's Act where the court is empowered to order a step parent to maintain 
his step child on condition one of the pre-requisites stated in the relevant provisions is 
fulfilled. Further thereto, case law85 in England and Wales has also laid down the rule that 
this duty could only be imposed on a stepfather and not a stepmother. 
As discussed earlier, a step child in Australia is conferred a right to claim maintenance 
from his step parent under the Family Law Act. However, this right is subject to the discretion 
of the court. Hence, it could be observed that not only the Australian legislature, but even the 
judiciary plays a pro-active role in protecting the right to maintenance of a step child, even 
when he or she has reached the age of eighteen years. 
After examining the three jurisdictions above, the writer submits that although section 99 
of the LRA could be referred to by step children wanting to claim maintenance from their 
step-parents, it is not expressly mentioned therein that it applies to step children. Therefore, 
as stated earlier under this sub-topic, the writer proposes that all the three Malaysian statutes 
should incorporate a provision that a step child has a right to be maintained by his step parent 
where the latter has accepted him as a member of his family. However, this duty to maintain 
is secondary to that of a natural parent. In addition, the duty to maintain by a step parent only 
arises if the court feels that the natural parents are not able to fulfil their duty to maintain 
                                                          
85J v J (property transfer application) [1993] 1 FCR 471; [1993] 2 FLR 56. 
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(following the Australian model). In this respect, it is argued that it is a win-win situation for 
the child, as where the natural parents fail to maintain him, he could claim from his step 
parent (if any) if the child stays with the step parent and the step parent has accepted the child 
as a member of his family. 
 
4.4.4 Illegitimate Children 
In an article entitled ‘Statistics of Unwanted Babies’, the writer of the article states that 
the National Registration Department has recorded that from the year 2000 to July 2008, 
more than 257,000 birth certificates were issued to babies without their father’s names being 
recorded.86 From the statistics stated above, this means that an average of 2,500 illegitimate 
children was born every month. 
The abovementioned article also provides that the total number of illegitimates from the 
year 1999 to 2003 is about 70,430. It also provides the data from the year 1999 to 2003 which 
shows the distribution of illegitimates among states, ethnically and among the various 
religions as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 Abdul Ghani Nasir, Statistics of Unwanted Babies, UKM News Portal, Wednesday 9 June 2010, published in 
pkukmweb.ukm.my/news/index.php/en/typography/346.html accessed on 15 December 2015. 
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Table 4.1: Distribution of illegitimate children among states from 1999-2003 
States Number of illegitimates 
Selangor 12,836 
Perak 9,788 
Kuala Lumpur 9,439 
Sarawak 617 
Terengganu 574 
Others 37,176 
Total 70,430 
Source:  Abdul Ghani Nasir, Statistics of Unwanted Babies, UKM News Portal, Wednesday 9 June 
2010. 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of illegitimate children among ethnics from 1999-2003 
Ethnic Number of illegitimates 
Malays, Sabah and Sarawak Bumiputeras 20,949 
Indians 19,581 
Chinese 18,111 
Others 11,789 
Total 70,430 
 
Source:  Abdul Ghani Nasir, Statistics of Unwanted Babies, UKM News Portal, Wednesday 9 June 
2010. 
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Table 4.3: Distribution of illegitimate children among religions from 1999-2003 
 
Religion Number of illegitimates 
Muslims 20,949 
Hindus 18,085 
Buddhists 17,236 
Christians 3,395 
Others 10,765 
Total 70,430 
 
Source:  Abdul Ghani Nasir, Statistics of Unwanted Babies, UKM News Portal, Wednesday 9 June 
2010. 
 
 
 
The total number above increased two-fold as could be seen recently, where it was 
reported in the press that the National Registration Department (NRD) has issued a statement 
that a total number of 159,725 children have been born out of wedlock in Malaysia between 
2013 to 2015.87 Unfortunately, the NRD did not give a breakdown according to the races. It 
merely gave a breakdown of this number according to the years as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87NRD: Not all 159,725 illegitimate children born since 2013 are Muslims, The Malay Mail, 14 September 2016. 
165 
 
 
Table 4.4: Number of illegitimate children for the years 2013 to 2015 
Years Number of illegitimates 
2013 53,492 
2014 54,614 
2015 51,169 
Total 159,725 
 
Source:  NRD statistics show 159,725 illegitimate children born since 2013, The Malay Mail, 13 
September 2016. 
 
Examining the statistics above, it is worrying to note that the population of illegitimate 
children in Malaysia is increasing at an alarming rate. The number of illegitimate children as 
could be seen above raises concern as to the plight of single mothers who have to raise their 
illegitimate children, especially those living in big cities. Life in big cities has become a rat 
race. These single mothers may face difficulties in getting support from their family 
members, who may shun them for causing disgrace to their family reputation. As a result of 
finding it difficult to maintain their children, these single mothers would ultimately resort to 
abandoning their children. This would the cause problems for the State as the number of 
abandoned children and babies would then increase, which is exactly what is happening in 
our country currently. 
It is disheartening to note that society generally does not ‘treat’ illegitimate children in 
the same way it ‘treats’ legitimate children. Thus, these children are embarrassed to say that 
they are illegitimates for the fear of being shunned by the society they live in. Howsoever, it 
is the duty of the State to ensure that the rights of these unfortunate children are protected 
and they should not be penalised for the sins of their parents. One of the basic rights that 
166 
 
should be protected is the right of an illegitimate child to claim maintenance from his or her 
parents for the basic necessities in life. Hence, it is pertinent to look at our non-Muslim laws 
in order to see whether it enables an illegitimate child to claim maintenance from his or her 
parents. The three statutes on child maintenance would be critically examined: 
 
4.4.4.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
Section 3 of the 1950 Act spells out the power of a court to order a man to pay 
maintenance to his wife and child. Reference could be made specifically to section 3(2) of 
this Act which provides as follows: 
If any person neglects or refuses to maintain an illegitimate child of his which is unable 
to maintain itself, a court upon due proof thereof, may order such person to make such 
monthly allowance as to the court seems reasonable. 
At this juncture, it is to be noted that prior to 1 March 1982, i.e. the coming into force of 
the LRA, section 3(2) of the 1950 Act imposed a ceiling of fifty ringgit concerning 
maintenance to an illegitimate child. With the coming into operation of the LRA on 1 March 
1982, this limit was repealed by the LRA.88 
Tracing back to history, in 1872, with the enactment of the Straits Settlements Summary 
Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance 1872,89 it could be noted that the Ordinance had imposed 
limited liability to an illegitimate child when compared to a legitimate child. There was no 
monetary limit for a legitimate child.90 Whereas, for an illegitimate child, section 45(2) of 
the Ordinance read as follows: 
                                                          
88 PU(B) 73/82. 
89 Straits Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance No. XIII of 1872. 
90Ibid, section 45(1). 
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If any person neglects or refuses to maintain his illegitimate child unable to maintain 
itself, it shall be lawful for the court of Quarter Sessions, or for a Magistrate on due 
proof thereof, to order such person to make monthly allowance not exceeding ten 
dollars, as to the court or Magistrate may seem reasonable. 
The maximum limit was raised from ten dollars to forty dollars by the Straits Settlements 
Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Ordinance 1949.91 
Another issue which arises in relation to section 3(2) is whether ‘any person’ stated 
therein refers only to one parent or both the parents. The provision refers to a person who has 
neglected or refused to maintain an illegitimate child of ‘his’. Hence, prima facie, this means 
that this section particularly imposes a duty on a male to maintain his illegitimate child. 
However, as was rightly pointed out by Professor Mimi Kamariah Majid, in her book Family 
Law in Malaysia,92 reference in this connection could be made to the Interpretation Acts 1948 
and 196793 which provide that words and expressions importing the masculine gender include 
females. Thus, from the above extended interpretation of the word ‘any person’ to include 
the mother as well, this means that an illegitimate child who wants to claim maintenance 
under the 1950 Act may claim maintenance from both his father as well as his mother. The 
writer submits that the above interpretation is in the interest of the child concerned as in an 
instance where the father of the child is dead, the child can enforce his right to maintain 
against his mother. Hence, it is reiterated that the above interpretation takes into account the 
welfare of the child. 
                                                          
91 Straits Settlements Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Ordinance No. 26 of 1949, section 2(2). 
92Supra n 11 at 312. 
93 Act 388. 
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4.4.4.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
Part VIII of the LRA generally contains provisions on the ‘Protection of Children’. 
Provisions on custody and maintenance of children could be found in this Part. The duty to 
maintain a child is expressly provided for in section 92 of the LRA.  
In addition, section 93(1) of the LRA empowers a court to order a man to pay 
maintenance to his child in any of the following situations: 
(a) if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child; 
(b) if he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge; 
(c) during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or 
(d) when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the 
custody of any other person. 
Apart from a man, the court may also order a woman to pay or contribute towards the 
maintenance of her child if the court is satisfied that having regard to her means, it is 
reasonable so to order.94 
However, unlike the 1950 Act which clearly provides that the court may order a person 
who has neglected or refused to pay maintenance to his illegitimate child to do so, the LRA 
is silent on whether the duty to maintain referred to in sections 92 and 93 as mentioned above 
includes an illegitimate child. Reference needs to be made to section 87 of the LRA regarding 
the meaning of ‘child’ in sections 92 and 93. Section 87 provides that ‘child’ has the meaning 
of ‘child of the marriage’ as defined in section 2 who is under the age of eighteen years. 
‘Child of the marriage’ under section 2 is defined as ‘a child of both parties to the marriage 
                                                          
94 Section 93(2). 
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in question or a child of one party to the marriage accepted as one of the family by the other 
party; and “child” in this context includes an illegitimate child of, and a child adopted by 
either of the parties to the marriage in pursuance of an adoption order made under any written 
law relating to adoption.’ 
The question that arises at this juncture is whether the phrase ‘an illegitimate child of, 
and a child adopted by either of the parties to the marriage’ should be interpreted 
conjunctively or disjunctively? If a conjunctive interpretation is given, this means that to 
qualify as a ‘child of the marriage’ under the LRA, the illegitimate child must be adopted by 
either of the parties to the marriage pursuant to an adoption order made under the Adoption 
Act. It is to be noted here that when an illegitimate child is adopted according to the 
requirements in the Adoption Act 195295, it is a method of legitimization where the child is 
treated a legitimate after the adoption order is issued. 
On the other hand, if a disjunctive interpretation is given, this would mean that to qualify 
as a ‘child of marriage’ the illegitimate child need not be adopted under the relevant adoption 
laws. 
As there is no direct authority on the interpretation of this section, it is submitted it would 
be in the best interest of an illegitimate child if a disjunctive interpretation is given to the 
above definition as he or she would not have to wait to be adopted in order to claim 
maintenance under the LRA. 
 
                                                          
95 Act 257. 
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4.4.4.3 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
Section 3(2) of the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah is similar to section 3(2) of the 1950 
Act (as discussed earlier). However, there are two differences between this Ordinance and 
the 1950 Act. The first difference is that section 3(2) of the 1959 Ordinance still provides 
that the court may order a person to make monthly allowance not exceeding fifty ringgit to 
his illegitimate child. This limit has been repealed in section 3(2) of the 1950 Act (as has 
been discussed earlier) with the enforcement of the LRA on 1 March 1982. It is submitted 
that the Sabah Legislative Assembly should amend section 3(2) of the 1959 Ordinance by 
repealing the maximum limit so that there is no difference between the right of a legitimate 
child and an illegitimate child to claim maintenance in Sabah. 
The second difference is as to the definition of ‘child’. The 1959 Ordinance provides for 
the definition of a ‘child’, whereas the 1950 Act is silent on the meaning of child. Section 2 
of the Ordinance provides that ‘child’ includes a legitimate or illegitimate child who is unable 
to maintain itself. This is the only piece of legislation that clearly includes an illegitimate 
child in the definition of child. It is submitted that the other statutes concerning maintenance 
should also include illegitimate child within the meaning of ‘child’.  
 
4.4.4.4 Cases decided concerning an illegitimate child’s right to claim maintenance 
Having examined the statutes that are in force currently on the maintenance of illegitimate 
children, it is only proper to next find out the judicial approach in deciding cases concerning 
illegitimate children who wish to claim maintenance from their parents. Basically, upon 
perusing the facts of the cases which would be discussed below, actions to claim maintenance 
are brought by the mothers on behalf of their illegitimate children (who are mostly infants) 
from the putative father of the child. 
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One of the earliest cases decided concerning maintenance of an illegitimate child is the 
case of Che Wan v Mohamed Yassin.96 However, the issue in this case was pertaining to the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the matter. A similar issue arose thirty-five years later 
in the case of Goh Koon Suan v Heng Gek Kiau.97 
The factors that need to be proven in order to claim maintenance for an illegitimate child 
under section 3(2) of the 1950 Act was laid down in the case of T v O.98The learned judge, 
Mahadev Shankar J (as his Lordship then was), held that in order to succeed for an application 
under section 3(2) of the 1950 Act, two factors need to be proven. First, is that due proof is 
required to show that the person sued is the father and secondly, that the illegitimate child is 
unable to maintain itself, before the court will order maintenance. The learned judge also 
stated the even though the two factors stated above are proven, the maximum limit that may 
be claimed under section 3(2) is RM50. At this juncture, it is respectfully submitted that the 
learned judge had erred when he stated that an illegitimate child is only entitled to a maximum 
sum of RM50 per month. As mentioned earlier, this maximum limit was repealed by section 
109 of the LRA on 1 March 1982. 
As stated by his Lordship above, the applicant would have to prove two factors in order 
to claim maintenance for an illegitimate child under section 3(2). The first factor as stated 
above is that due proof is required to prove that the person sued is the father. The second 
factor is that the child is unable to maintain itself. Between these two factors, the writer 
submits that the first factor poses a problem for the illegitimate child as the putative father 
may deny paternity of the said child. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, the writer would 
                                                          
96 [1957] 23 MLJ 39. 
97 [1992] 1 MLJ 279. The court held that the 1950 Act, in section 2, clearly stipulates that the applicant should bring the action in a 
subordinate court. Hence, the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear the case as a court of first instance, unless as provided in 
section 8, where the subordinate court is of the opinion that the High Court is more suitable to hear the matter. 
98 [1993] 1 MLJ 168. 
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focus on the first factor. One of the methods to prove paternity is through the 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid test (DNA test). Tremendous progress has taken place in the field of 
DNA profiling analysis. 
Resorting to DNA profiling to prove paternity could be seen in two cases. First, is the 
case of Othman bin Haji Abdul Halim v Hamisah bt Awang.99 The appellant denied and 
disclaimed paternity of the child. Both parties agreed to undergo a DNA test to determine the 
paternity of the child. A DNA test was carried out. However, the High Court held that the 
DNA Profiling Analysis Report was inadmissible as it was not unqualified. In order for the 
DNA profiling to be carried out properly all the four specified parties need to be present and 
tested. The four parties are, the purported father, the mother of the child, the child and another 
family member of the purported father, preferably an uncle on the paternal side. As this was 
not done, the court held that the test was inconclusive and therefore inadmissible. 
Secondly, in the case of Ng Chiam Perng (sued by her mother and next friend Wong Nyet 
Yoon) v Ng Ho Peng,100 the respondent denied that he was the father of the child. The 
respondent further stated that the child was the legitimate child of the appellant and that his 
name was used as the child’s father in the birth certificate without his consent. At the trial, 
the appellant’s counsel requested for the respondent to subject himself to a DNA test which 
the respondent refused. The counsel also urged the court to observe and compare the 
similarity in features between the child and the respondent. The learned magistrate denied 
both requests. His Lordship referred to the presumption of legitimacy under section 112 of 
the Evidence Act 1950101  as she was a legally married woman. The onus is on the appellant 
                                                          
99 [1994] 3 CLJ 78. 
100 [1998] 2 MLJ 686. 
101Section 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides as follows: ‘The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage 
between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be 
conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other 
at any time when he could have been begotten.’ 
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to prove that the respondent was the father of her child and in order to rebut the presumption 
under section 112 of the Evidence Act, she has to show that she and her husband did not have 
access to one another at or about the time the child was conceived. The court also drew an 
adverse inference against the appellant for failing to call her husband as a witness. In the 
court’s opinion, the evidence of the husband is crucial in proving the status of the child by 
stating whether he and the appellant had access to one another at the time the child was 
conceived. The appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court agreed with the learned 
magistrate’s reasoning and dismissed the appeal. The court also held that the evidence of 
similarity in features to prove paternity has very little value and is not safe. 
The High Court in the case of Lee Lai Ching v Lim Hooi Teck102 exercised its judicial 
discretion and stated that as there is no specific statute to order DNA testing, reference could 
be made to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Federal 
Constitution. The court gave regard to Article 3 of the CRC which emphasises on the interest 
of the minor. The court also held that the child is entitled to equal protection under Article 8 
of the Federal Constitution (which guarantees equal protection of all before the law). 
Therefore, the child had the right to know who is biological father is. This could only be 
confirmed if the defendant underwent a DNA test to confirm the paternity. The High Court 
thus ordered the defendant to undergo DNA testing. However, this decision was overruled 
by the Court of Appeal in the same case103 where the court held that before the court could 
order a paternity testing, the plaintiff must prove the relationship between the plaintiff and 
the defendant. Here, as the plaintiff did not prove such a relationship, hence the court set 
aside the High Court’s decision. 
                                                          
102Civil Suit No.22-587-2004 
103Civil Appeal No: P-02-134-01/2013. 
174 
 
Judges deciding cases so far on maintenance of illegitimate children (as could be seen 
from the cases discussed above) have basically focussed on two issues, first, the jurisdiction 
of the High Court as a court of first instance in hearing such matters, and secondly, using the 
DNA test to prove paternity. The first issue is settled, i.e. that it is clearly stated in section 2 
of the 1950 Act that the subordinate court has the jurisdiction to hear the matter as the court 
of first instance, unless it (the subordinate court) is of the opinion that the High Court should 
hear the matter (as provided for in section 8 of the 1950 Act).  
Pertaining to the second issue, in the writer’s opinion, single mothers who intend to claim 
maintenance for their illegitimate children may face difficulties when it comes to conducting 
the DNA test as the burden of proving the paternity of their child is on them. The challenges 
that they may face include getting the father of their child to agree to undergo the DNA test 
and the costs involved in conducting the test. Unless and until the relevant laws such as the 
Evidence Act 1950 or the Legitimacy Act 1961 or the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) 
Identification Act 2009104 are amended to empower the court to order for the testing of the 
DNA sampling for purposes of proving the paternity of a child, this problem would not be 
solved. 
 
4.4.4.5 Perception of social workers and single mothers on the laws pertaining to the right 
to maintenance of illegitimate children 
Reference so far has been made to the statutes that provide for maintenance of illegitimate 
children and case law to show the bench’s attitude towards granting a maintenance order in 
favour of the illegitimate children. 
                                                          
104The DNA Act 2009 currently empowers the court to order the testing of DNA sampling for forensic purposes only. 
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The real question that arises at this juncture is two-fold: First, does the existence of laws, 
as discussed earlier, actually protect the rights of illegitimate children to claim maintenance 
from their parents, especially their fathers and thereby easing the financial burden of their 
single mothers when it comes to raising them (these children)? 
If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, the second question that arises is do the 
single mothers know that the law protects the right of their children to claim maintenance 
from their fathers? In order to answer these questions, the writer conducted interviews with 
a total of eleven persons comprising of social workers who run shelter homes for single 
mothers and single mothers themselves.105 It is to be noted that all the single mothers who 
were interviewed were non-Muslims and the writer informed them that they are free to 
abstain from answering any questions that they felt was sensitive. The writer also obtained 
verbal consent from these single mothers before the interviews were conducted. The 
interviews were conducted in two shelter homes, one in Ipoh and one in Kota Kinabalu. The 
reason why the writer chose to conduct the interviews in Kota Kinabalu was to observe if the 
single mothers in Sabah were aware of the provisions in the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah 
pertaining to the right of an illegitimate child to claim maintenance, whereas Ipoh was chosen 
due to the fact that Table 4.1 (discussed above) shows that the number of illegitimate children 
were second highest in Malaysia. Due to their request for anonymity, the writer would not 
disclose the names of the social workers, the single mothers as well as the two shelter homes. 
The writer would first analyse the interviews conducted with the social workers, one of 
whom runs the shelter home in Ipoh and the other two, in Kota Kinabalu, followed by the 
interviews conducted with the single mothers at both these homes. 
                                                          
105Refer to Appendix C for the interview questions that were asked to the social workers and Appendix D for the questions to the single 
mothers. 
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A. Social workers 
When asked the question as to why the single mothers leave their homes and come to the 
shelter, the common reasons that were stated were that pregnancy out-of-wedlock is not 
accepted in the present society or any culture and it would cause embarrassment to the family, 
especially those from the villages. Hence, these girls are either thrown out of their house by 
their parents or sent by their parents to these Centres. In addition, in Sabah, if the girl is from 
a village, her family has to pay a penalty called ‘Sogit’ as the girl is pregnant and not married. 
This is prevalent in the natives from the Kadazandusun ethnic group in Sabah. The parents 
have to pay the penalty in the form of an animal, either a buffalo, cow or a pig, where they 
have to slaughter the said animal and distribute it to the whole village. The belief in the 
villages is that if this penance is not performed, it would cause hardship to the said village. 
These animals cost between RM2000 to RM3000. Some parents cannot afford to buy the 
animals as aforesaid. Hence, in order to avoid embarrassment and performing the penance 
which is beyond their means, they send their unmarries pregnant daughters to the homes. 
As to the question if the single mothers have attempted to ask the putative fathers for 
maintenance of their child, the general answer was no. However, the writer was informed 
that in such a situation the girl’s family would agree to look after the family, but will ask the 
boy’s family for maintenance to maintain the child. 
The writer then asked a pertinent question as to whether the single mothers knew that 
their child has a right to claim for maintenance from their fathers. The answer was also 
generally no. Even if they (the single mothers) knew that the child has a right, they would 
not claim for such maintenance on behalf of their child as they do not want to have anything 
to do with a man who runs away from his responsibility. On the question as to how do we 
educate them of this right, the reply was that such awareness should be created among the 
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people at the grass root level through publicity and outreach programmes. The problems that 
may be faced by these single mothers if they proceed to claim for their child’s maintenance 
are as follows: (a) they lack the knowledge of how to go about it;(b) the legal cost and time 
involved;(c) the putative father or his family may want to take the child away;(d) no support 
from family members; and (e) as a result they believe that it is not worth the trouble to claim 
for such maintenance. 
Finally, when the writer asked the social workers their opinion on what are the measures 
that could be taken by the relevant authorities like the Government, NGOs and the Social 
Welfare Department, the answers that were given could be summarised as follows: 
 
(a) Educate the single mothers on the laws that are available to protect their child’s 
welfare by conducting legal clinics, especially in secondary schools; 
 
(b) However, they felt that sometimes the existence of the laws alone is not sufficient. 
Community should not discriminate these mothers. When these mothers are 
admitted in hospitals for the delivery of their babies, the hospital staff should not 
be rude to them. In addition, when these mothers go to the National Registration 
Department to apply for their child’s birth certificate, the staff there should also 
not be rude to them; 
 
(c) The community should also stop discriminating the children as illegitimate 
children and give them the same treatment as legitimate children; 
 
(d) The Government could implement a social security programme where financial 
assistance could be given to these single mothers for the first two years after they 
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deliver their children. This assistance is specifically given to those single mothers 
who are in dire financial need; 
 
(e) For the single mothers who are not supported by their respective families, the 
Government may also be able to help by giving them housing support by 
allocating low cost flats to them for the first two years. Perhaps two single mothers 
could be asked to share one flat. After two years, the single mothers would have 
to rent their own place.  
 
(f) A specific NGO could be set up as a one-stop centre for these single mothers and 
to assist the Government to carry out the above tasks. Currently, although there 
are several NGOs that exist to help single mothers,  they hardly work together 
with the Government. In addition, a day care centre could also be established so 
that the mothers, who do not have their family support, could leave their children 
when they go to work.  
 
It is submitted that some of the opinions and recommendations put forward by these 
social workers are idealistic and not realistic, for example on changing the attitude of the 
community and the relevant authorities when it comes treating the single mother and their 
illegitimate children. It is very difficult to change the perception of the community which has 
always looked at illegitimate children in a negative manner. In addition, the 
recommendations put forward by the social workers as stated above are in the interest of the 
single mothers. Nevertheless, in the long run, if the above recommendations are 
implemented, they would also indirectly benefit the illegitimate children. 
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B.  Single mothers 
A total of eight single mothers were interviewed, five in the shelter home in Ipoh and 
three in Kota Kinabalu. Unfortunately, out of the nine single mothers in the Kota Kinabalu 
shelter home, only three agreed to be interviewed.  There was one Chinese, four Indians and 
three Kadazans. All the eight were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. All eight 
had studied up to Form 5. There were only two of them who were employed whereas the rest 
of them were unemployed.  
The questions that were put to the single mothers were more or less similar to those that 
were asked to the social workers. On the first issue, as to why they left their homes and came 
to the Centre, the answers that were given were similar to the answers given by the social 
workers. Two additional reasons given by two of the single mothers. First was that she had 
not decided whether she wanted to look after the child once it is born or give it up for 
adoption. Secondly, the single mother faced financial difficulty when it came to ante-natal 
medical expenses. 
The writer then asked who would be financially support their child. Three of them 
answered that her parents and herself would do so, three of them answered that they 
themselves, one of them said that she would be giving the child for adoption and finally one 
of them was not sure who would be supporting. 
When asked whether they had tried to ask the putative father for child support, out of the 
eight, four of them replied no, saying that they knew that they would not be able to get the 
maintenance as their boyfriends would definitely refuse to provide so; two of them did indeed 
ask but was refused; one of them asked and the boyfriend was willing to support once he 
started earning as he was unemployed at that point of time and the last person tried to ask but 
the boyfriend could not be traced. 
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The writer then asked the single mothers whether they knew that their child has a right 
under the law to claim for maintenance from his putative father. All of them answered in the 
negative. This was followed by the question as to whether they would pursue the matter in 
court now that they are aware of such a right, four of them answered no, three answered yes 
and one answered maybe. 
As to the question as to the problems that they may face if they initiate a legal proceeding, 
the replies that were obtained were as follows: a) court proceedings are a hassle b) 
emotionally involved c) putative father is a violent person and may injure herself and the 
child; d) asking the father to undergo a DNA test, and e) as the father is still schooling, he 
would not be able to pay the maintenance sum. 
It is noteworthy to mention here that when the writer asked them whether the putative 
father denied paternity of the child, five of them answered that yes indeed. This shows that 
denial of paternity is common among putative fathers as they do not want to take on the 
responsibility of maintaining their children. 
Finally, when asked as to what measures could be taken to protect the rights of 
illegitimate children, the following replies were obtained: 
 
(a) The community’s perception of illegitimate children should change. Illegitimate 
children should not be thought of as a social stigma. 
 
(b) Authorities such as the Government could assist the single mothers, who are 
facing financial difficulties, in providing employment, loans to single mothers 
who intend to set up businesses or pursue their education and educate their child. 
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(c) The government and NGOs could assist them in getting birth certificates for their 
child.  
 
(d) The Social Welfare Department could help set up child care centres to look after 
the children of working mothers. 
 
From the suggestions recommended by the single mothers, as stated above, the writer 
would reiterate that some of the suggestions are idealistic, for example, the community’s 
perception of illegitimate children. It is very difficult to change society’s perception 
overnight. The suggestion as to seeking the Government’s help, would only be possible if the 
single mothers register with the relevant government authorities, for example, the Social 
Welfare Department. The problem is, living in an Asian society deeply rooted in traditional 
values, would these single mothers be courageous enough to register themselves with the 
Social Welfare Department, bearing in mind that they may not want anyone to know that 
they have an illegitimate child? 
Many issues could be noted from the interviews that were carried out with the social 
workers and single mothers. Basically, it could be noted that the mere existence of a law that 
states that a person could be ordered by the court to pay maintenance to his illegitimate child 
is not sufficient. In fact, many single mothers are not even aware of such a law in order for 
them to pursue the matter. This is due to the fact that these single mothers could be divided 
into two groups, the educated ones (who know their rights) and those who are not educated 
(who are unaware of their rights). Even if they pursued the matter in court, the problems that 
they may face would deter them from going to court, which then makes the said legal 
provision redundant. One major problem that they may encounter is the denial of paternity 
by the putative father. There are no laws in Malaysia that could order a person to undergo a 
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DNA test to prove paternity. It is submitted that taking into consideration the welfare of the 
child, the legislature should amend the existing laws in order to empower the courts to order 
for a DNA test to prove paternity, so that the putative fathers do not was their hands off their 
responsibility towards their child. 
Hence, the writer would next look at the position on this issue in Singapore, England and 
Wales and Australia in order to see whether the single mothers there too face similar issues 
as those in Malaysia, especially when the putative father denies paternity. 
 
4.4.4.6 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
(a) Singapore 
The Singapore Women’s Charter provides that a parent has a duty to maintain his or her 
children, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate (section 68). Hence, it could be seen that 
the word ‘illegitimate’ is expressly provided for in section 68, unlike section 92 of the 
Malaysian LRA, which merely states that it is the duty of a parent to maintain his or her 
children, without stating whether they are legitimate or illegitimate. Thus, it could be stated 
that the legitimate status of child is irrelevant in Singapore when it concerns claiming 
maintenance from his or her parents.106 
The predecessor to the Women’s Charter concerning maintenance was the Straits 
Settlements Summary Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance 1872, where section 45 (II) fixed a 
maximum amount of 10 dollars that may be awarded to an illegitimate child.107 However, 
when the Women’s Charter was enacted in 1961, it removed the ceiling and thus, the position 
of an illegitimate child was equalised with a legitimate child.108 
                                                          
106Leong Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths, Asia,1997) at  860. 
107Note that this Ordinance was also applicable in Malaysia then. 
108Supra n 106 at 855. 
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As discussed above, under the Malaysian position, the main problem faced by an 
illegitimate child in claiming maintenance is if the putative father denies paternity. The courts 
in Malaysia generally refer to the presumption of legitimacy in section 112 of the Evidence 
Act 1950 when this issue arises. Singapore too has a similar provision in section 114 of the 
Singapore Evidence Act which provides as follows: 
The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between 
his mother and any man, or within 280 days after its dissolution, the mother remaining 
unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it 
can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time 
when he could have been begotten. 
According to Professor Leong Wai Kum in her book Elements of Family Law in 
Singapore109, it is easier to prove biological maternity rather than biological paternity. 
Biological maternity could be established from ‘the official records as every birth in 
Singapore for a long time now is performed with medical assistance in hospitals. It is only 
proof of biological paternity that resulted from sexual intercourse between the parents, then, 
that can require the child to resort to the means of proof which the law makes available.’110 
The presumption of legitimacy in section 114 of the Singapore Evidence Act was 
examined in the case of WX v WW111 where the High Court had to decide whether both proof 
of legitimacy as well as proof of paternity fall within section 114. The issue in this case was 
whether the Appellant was the biological father of the child concerned. The Respondent had 
sexual relationships with the Appellant and another man, H. When the Respondent became 
pregnant, H, thinking that the child was his, married the Respondent. After the child was 
                                                          
109Leong Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Lexis-Nexis, 2007 at 439. 
110Ibid at 439. 
111[2009] 3 S.L.R. 573 (HC) 
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born, H conducted a DNA test and found that he was not the biological father of the child 
and nullified his marriage with the Respondent. The Respondent claimed maintenance from 
the Appellant for her child. The Appellant raised the presumption of legitimacy under section 
114 of the Evidence Act and argued that as the child was born during the subsistence of the 
wedding between the Respondent and H, the child is deemed to be the legitimate child of H. 
As such, the Appellant contended that it should be H who should pay maintenance to the 
child, notwithstanding the DNA test report. 
The High Court refused to accept the Appellant’s contention and stated that his argument 
‘offend(ed) both justice and common sense’.112 If the court upheld the Appellant’s position, 
this would mean that ‘the law would hold that H is the father of the child even though the 
science has shown otherwise.’113 The learned judge provided two reasons for his judgment. 
First, after examining section 114 of the Evidence Act, the court distinguished proving 
legitimacy and proving paternity and held that ‘section 114 only applies to confer legitimacy 
in circumstances set out in the provision, and not to rebut or invalidate evidence that a man 
is a biological father of the child’114 
Secondly, the court also referred to section 68 and 69(2) of the Women’s Charter and 
held that it was not the intention of the legislature, when drafting these two sections, that the 
biological father of an illegitimate child is relieved of his duty to maintain his child if the 
mother has married another man at the time of the child’s birth. The court eventually held 
that the Appellant cannot rely on section 114 of the Evidence Act to invalidate the evidence 
that he is the biological father of the child and that the Appellant has to abide by the duty to 
maintain laid down in sections 68 and 69(2) of the Women’s Charter. 
                                                          
112Ibid at para 6. 
113Ibid. 
114Ibid at para 14.  
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The above decision received mixed responses from the academics in Singapore. For 
example, Ng Jun Yi, in his article entitled ‘Making Sense of Section 114 of the Evidence 
Act’115 stated that when the High Court distinguished legitimacy from actual paternity in 
section 114, the learned judge was construing the section in accordance with the framer’s 
intent. This would then mean that as the child would have two fathers, H (his legitimate 
father) and the Respondent (his biological father), the child would potentially claim 
maintenance from both H and the Respondent. The author also went on to state that as the 
Singapore statutes still discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate children, this 
decision would be a ‘welcomed development’, especially to those who believe that 
illegitimate children should not be ‘legally disadvantaged in any way.’116 
On the contrary, Goh Yihan in his article ‘Two Contrasting Approaches In the 
Interpretation of Outdated Statutory Provisions’117 opined that the presumption of paternity 
should not be separated from the presumption of legitimacy under section 114 of the 
Evidence Act. The learned author examined the historical background to section 114 (which 
is similar to the Malaysian section 112 of the Evidence Act 1950) and stated that the rationale 
of section 114 ‘seems to be that it is undesirable to enquire into the paternity of a child whose 
parents have access to each other.’118 Therefore, ‘the presumption of legitimacy presupposes 
paternity, and so a presumption of paternity likewise arises from section 114 of the Evidence 
Act, if its requirements are met.’119 The learned author appreciated the effort taken by the 
court in the instant case to do justice. However, he also stated that ‘it may be necessary to 
accept this outdated evidential rule.’120 
                                                          
115Ng Jun Yi, ‘Making Sense of Section 114 of the Evidence Act’, [2010] Singapore Law Review accessed at 
http://www.singaporelawreview.org/2010/03/making-sense-of-section-114-of-the-evidence... accessed on 4 May 2012. 
116Ibid. 
117Goh Yihan, “Two Contrasting Approaches In the Interpretation of Outdated Statutory Provisions”, [2010] Sing J. Legal Studies 530.  
118Ibid at 535. 
119Ibid at 536. 
120Ibid. 
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Having examined both the opinions by the learned authors, it is respectfully submitted 
that the writer agrees with the opinion expressed by Ng Jun Yi, the reason being, that when 
section 114 of the Evidence Act was enacted (same as our section 112), medical science had 
not advanced where DNA testing could be carried out to prove paternity. Hence, at that time 
the law had no option but to presume that when a child is born during the lawful marriage 
between his mother and a man and they had access to each other at the time when he was 
conceived, that he is a legitimate child of that man. With the advancement in medical science 
where paternity could be proven through DNA testing, it is high time the Legislatures (both 
in Singapore and Malaysia121) amend their respective provisions on the presumption of 
legitimacy which could be described as archaic. 
The second issue that was raised in the Singapore courts recently was as to the meaning 
of the word ‘parent’ in sections 68 and 69(2) of the Women’s Charter.122The issue was 
whether ‘parent’ includes the putative father of an illegitimate child or does it merely refer 
to the mother of the child. The respondent referred to Lord Denning’s decision in RRM, An 
Infant123 where his Lordship stated that ‘parent’ merely refers to the mother of the child and 
not the putative father. 
The respondent also referred to certain provisions in the Women’s Charter, the Adoption 
of Children Act,124 the Republic of Singapore Constitution and the Legitimacy Act125 which 
provide that the parent of an illegitimate child refers to the mother and not the putative father. 
The High Court held that it is not proper to refer to the other legal provisions which provide 
for other legal issues concerning illegitimate children. Reference should be made to section 
                                                          
121 As discussed under the Malaysia position, section 112 of the Malaysia Evidence Act 1959, which provides for the presumption of 
legitimacy, is similar to section 114 of the Singapore Evidence Act. 
122In the case of TBC v TBD [2015] SGHC 130. 
123[1955] 2 QB 479 
124Cap 4, 2012, Rev. Ed. 
125Cap 162, 1988. 
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68 of the Women’s Charter which focusses on child maintenance. The court then examined 
the predecessors to section 68, i.e. section 45(II) of the Straits Settlements Summary 
Jurisdiction Ordinance126 and section 62(2) of the Women’s Charter which clearly state that 
a ‘person who is the father of an illegitimate child has the duty to maintain it’127 Although 
the word ‘person’ has been changed to ‘parent’, the duty to maintain remains. Therefore, the 
respondent has a duty to maintain his illegitimate child in this case as provided for under 
section 68 of the Women’s Charter. 
Having examined the position in Singapore, it could be noted that although the laws in 
Singapore are more or less similar to the Malaysian laws concerning maintenance for 
illegitimate children, the judicial approach in Singapore could be seen to be in favour of the 
child concerned. 
 
(b) England and Wales 
Before the writer examines the current maintenance laws in England and Wales 
pertaining to illegitimate children, the writer is of the opinion that it is important to first trace 
the history of maintenance laws concerning illegitimate children. This is due to the fact that 
both the Malaysian and Singaporean laws on maintenance were drafted during the British 
rule. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the roots of the maintenance laws in 
Britain. 
The initial laws, or referred to as the ‘Poor Laws' were passed in the 16th century.  These 
laws often concerned ‘bastard children’. During those days, it was the parishes that would 
rescue destitute persons including illegitimate children. Thereafter, upon passing of the 
                                                          
126Straits Settlements Ordinance No. XIII of 1872 
127Supra n122 at para 9. 
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National Assistance Act 1948, the state took over the duty of maintaining these children. 
Hence, when the parish or the state maintained an illegitimate child, the father was required 
to reimburse the community initially. Following that, he could be required to pay the mother 
of the child (or third parties) directly.128 
The first Act that formed the basis of English bastardy law is the Act for Setting of the 
Poor on Work, and for the Avoiding of Idleness 1576.129 This Act was passed to ‘punish the 
mother and the reputed father of a bastard child, and also provide for the better relief of every 
parish’.130 Following the above Act, numerous statutes were passed for the next few 
centuries. 
In 1844 and 1845, the Poor Law Amendment Act 1844 and Bastardy Act 1845 were 
passed respectively. Both these Acts turned bastardy proceedings into a civil matter between 
the parents. This enabled a single mother to apply to the Petty Sessions for a maintenance 
order against the father of her child for maintenance of herself and the child.131 
In 1857, the Matrimonial Causes Act was passed. The Act could be described as a major 
development in the history of child support as it introduced a court for Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes which stepped into the shoes of the church courts in order to deal with 
child custody, maintenance and alimony matters. Appeals from this court was heard by the 
House of Lords. Nevertheless, the poor law legislation still played an active role in providing 
for other obligations regarding maintenance of a child.132 
                                                          
128History of child support in the United Kingdom, Child Support Analysis accessed at www.childsupportanalysis.co.uk on 10 November 
2016. 
12918 Elizabeth I, c,3. 
130Supra n128 
131Ibid. 
132Ibid 
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Finally, with the passing of the National Assistance Act 1948, it repealed the Poor Laws 
(section 29 of the National Assistance Act 1948).133 Section 42 of this Act states that: 
(a) a man shall be liable to maintain his wife and his children, and 
(b) a woman shall be liable to maintain her husband and her children. 
The section goes on to elaborate that ‘a woman’s children included her illegitimate 
children and a man’s children included any children of whom he had been adjudged to be the 
putative father’. 
During the late 1980s, the British government felt that welfare was to be out of control. 
It felt that the father should pay more and the state pay less. However, the court still held on 
to the traditional view that the state would support the unmarried mothers. As a result, they 
were awarded relatively small amounts. The Government wanting to take control of this 
situation, passed the Child Support Act 1991which established the Child Support Agency in 
1991.134 
Having traced the history of maintenance of illegitimate children, the writer would next 
examine the existing laws in England and Wales, which are as follows: 
(a) Family Law Reform Act 1969 
(b) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
(c) Family Law Reform Act 1987 
(d) Children Act 1989 
(e) Child Support Act 1991. 
(f) Social Security Administration Act 1992 
                                                          
133Nevertheless, mothers who were divorced, deserted or unmarried were still dependent on the Poor Laws if the they do not receive any 
support from their husbands. 
134This Act would be discussed later in this sub-topic. 
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(a) Family Law Reform Act 1969 
One of the main weaknesses that exist in the Malaysian maintenance laws concerning 
illegitimate children is that there are no provisions in any laws that empower the courts to 
order a paternity test. In this context, the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (FLRA) of the United 
Kingdom contains Provisions For Use of Blood Tests in Determining Paternity in Part III of 
the Act. Section 20(1) of the Act provides that where paternity of a person falls to be 
determined by the court in any civil proceedings, ‘the court may, on the application by any 
party to the proceedings, give a direction for the use of blood tests to ascertain whether such 
tests show that a party to the proceedings is or is not excluded from being a father of that 
person. Section 21 further provides that before a blood sample is taken from any person under 
section 20(1), the person should consent to it. Section 23(1) provides that if any person fails 
to take any step in compliance with a direction issued by the court under section 20(1), ‘as 
appear proper in the circumstances’. In an instance, where the person who is directed section 
20(1) fails to consent to it, ‘he shall be deemed … to have failed to take a step required of 
him for the purpose giving effect to the direction’.135 
Refusal to consent under section 23(3) was in fact examined in the case of Re A.136 In this 
case, a woman (H) had sex with three men, including A. She later gave birth to a child and 
claimed maintenance from A. A denied that he was the child’s father. The court ordered a 
DNA test to be done. A refused to undergo the test unless the other two men too were ordered 
to do so. The court agreed with A. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed H’s appeal. The 
court held that it could legitimately infer from A’s refusal that he is in fact the father of the 
                                                          
135Section 23(3) of the FLRA. 
136 [1994] 2 FLR 463, CA. 
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child. When a man refuses to cooperate, such an inference is inescapable, unless there were 
clear and cogent reasons as to why he refused. 
In addition to the above provisions, the FLRA also provides that the standard of proof to 
rebut the presumption of legitimacy is on a balance of probability and not beyond reasonable 
doubt (section 26).  
At this juncture, it to be observed that Malaysia is in dire need of the above provisions in 
order to establish the paternity of an illegitimate child in the event the putative father denies 
paternity of the child concerned.137  
(b) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA) in section 27(1) provides that a ‘husband or 
wife may apply to the court where the other party has wilfully neglected to provide reasonable 
maintenance, inter alia, to any child of the family’. In order to examine whether ‘child’ here 
includes an illegitimate child, reference could be made to section 52 of the MCA. Section 52 
defines ‘child’ as follows: 
‘ “child’ in relation to one or both of the parties to a marriage includes an illegitimate 
or adopted child of that party or, as the case may be, of both parties.’ 
At this juncture, it could be noted that the above definition is similar to the definition of 
‘child’ in section 2 of the Malaysian LRA 1976.  However, one difference is that section 2 
of the MCA 1973 clearly states ‘illegitimate or adopted child’, which means that the child is 
either illegitimate or adopted, whereas, the confusion that arises in the definition of ‘child’ 
                                                          
137As was noted in the Malaysian cases of Othman bin Haji Abdul Halim v Hamisah bt Awang[1994] 3 CLJ 78 and Ng Chiam Perng (sued 
by her mother and next friend Wong Nyet Yoon) v Ng Ho Peng[1998] 2 MLJ 686. This issue was also highlighted by the respondents during 
the interviews conducted as was discussed in sub-topic 4.4.4.5 above. 
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in section 2 of the LRA (as discussed earlier in this sub-topic) is whether the phrase 
‘illegitimate child of, and a child adopted by’ should be read conjunctively or disjunctively. 
In the case of Edwards v Edwards138 the father applied for leave to appeal out of time 
against, inter alia, a maintenance order issued against him on the ground that he is not the 
father of the child. The court took into account that there was an inexcusable delay in this 
case and as such it would be wrong to grant leave to appeal out of time as it would cause 
injustice to the child here, as the medical evidence, which might be an issue, was not tested, 
and the court had considered the risk to the child, due to the inexcusable delay, in losing his 
legitimacy. 
Having examined the relevant provisions in the MCA it is submitted that they are similar 
to the provisions in the Malaysian LRA, save for the definition of ‘child’ (as discussed 
above). 
(c) Family Law Reform Act 1987 
The British Parliament passed the Family Law Reform Act 1987 (FLRA 1987), mainly 
for the benefit of the children born outside marriage. This could be seen in the Act’s Long 
Title which reads as follows: 
 
An Act to reform the law relating to the consequences of birth outside marriage; to 
make further provision with respect to the rights and duties of parents and the 
determination of parentage; and for connected purposes. 
 
From the above Long Title, it could be noted that this Act not only covers maintenance, 
but a broad range of rights and duties of parents of children born outside marriage. In 
                                                          
138 (1980) 10 Fam Law 188, CA. 
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particular, the right to maintenance of such children is provided for in section 12 which states 
that the ‘court may on the application of either parent make a financial relief order for the 
benefit of the child’. 
 
It is submitted that the move by the British Parliament in introducing this Act is to be 
applauded as it mainly concerns the rights and duties of parents towards their children who 
are born outside marriage. In Malaysia, the only Act that deals exclusively with illegitimate 
children is the Legitimacy Act 1961. However, there are no provisions on the right to 
maintenance of an illegitimate child therein and it also does not cover a broad range of rights 
and duties as provided for in the FLRA 1987. 
 
(d) Children Act 1989 
 
The Children Act 1989 focuses on the phrase ‘parental responsibility’. Section 3(1) of 
the Act explains ‘parental responsibility’ as follows: 
 
(1) … “parental responsibility” means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities 
and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his 
property. 
The above explanation prima facie seems to indicate that a person having ‘parental 
responsibility’ would also have the duty to maintain his or her child. However, section 3(4) 
states otherwise, as follows: 
(4) The fact that a person has, or does not have, parental responsibility for a child shall 
not affect – 
(a) Any obligation which he may have in relation to a child (such as the statutory 
duty to maintain the child) 
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Hence, this means that parental responsibility does not necessarily refer to parental 
obligation as the latter may exist without the former. Section 4(1) of the Children Act 1989 
in particular states that the father of an illegitimate child shall acquire parental responsibility 
for the child in three situations: 
(a) he becomes registered as the child’s father under any one of the enactments 
specified in subsection 1(A); 
(b) he and the child’s mother make an agreement (“a parental responsibility 
agreement”) providing for him to have parental responsibility for the child; or 
(c) the court, on his application orders that he shall have parental responsibility for 
the child. 
 
The question that arises is, if the father of an illegitimate child does not take any steps to 
acquire parental responsibility over the child under section 4(1), is he absolved from his 
obligation to maintain the child? The writer submits that the answer to this question could be 
found in section 3(4) of the Children Act (as discussed above), which provides that whether 
a person has a parental responsibility or not, it shall not affect his obligation in relation to the 
child. Hence, the putative father still has the obligation to maintain his child. 
 
Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 provides that the court has the power to order either 
or both parents of a child to make payments whether periodical or by way of a lump sum for 
the benefit of the child. 
 
Thus, when comparing the Children Act 1989 to the Malaysian laws, it could be observed 
that when it comes to maintenance of illegitimate children, the Children Act 1989 empowers 
the court to order either one parent or both the parents to make payments to the child 
concerned. 
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(e) Social Security Administration Act 1992 
The duty to maintain as provided for in the Acts as discussed above is reiterated in the 
Social Security Administration Act 1992 (SSAA), specifically, in section 78(6), which 
provides as follows: 
(a) a man shall be liable to maintain his wife and any children of whom he is the 
father; 
(b) a woman shall be liable to maintain her husband and any children of whom she is 
the mother. 
The phrase ‘any children whom he is the father’ or ‘she is the mother’ denotes that the 
provisions include illegitimate children. Section 105(1) provides for the penalty in the event 
a person persistently refuses or neglects to maintain any person whom he is liable to 
maintain.139 
 
(f) Child Support Act 1991 
In discussing the history of the child support laws in England and Wales in this sub-topic, 
it was noted that the final step taken by the Government was the passing of the Child Support 
Act 1991 which established the Child Support Agency (CSA). The CSA began operation in 
1993 and most of its cases came from long term cohabitation or marriages and still do. 
 
Section 1 of the Child Support Act 1991 provides the duty to maintain of each parent of 
a qualifying child. Section 3(1) defines who a ‘qualifying child’ is. However, it does not state 
anywhere in the definition as to whether it includes an illegitimate child. The meaning of 
                                                          
139 The penalty provided in section 105(1) is either an imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to a fine. 
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‘child’ is defined in section 5(1) of this Act. However, even this definition does not refer to 
an illegitimate child. 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that it is arguable whether an illegitimate child’s right to claim 
maintenance from his parents fall under section 1 of this Act. 
 
At this juncture, the writer submits that even though it is doubtful if an illegitimate child 
falls within the ambit of the Child Support Act 1991, it is not an issue as there are ample 
statutes in England and Wales (as stated above) that safeguard the rights of illegitimate 
children, which includes the right to claim maintenance from their parents. 
 
(c) Australia 
Australia inherited ancient English laws. Hence, a child who was not born to a married 
couple was known as an ex-nuptial child and was deemed to be illegitimate. As a 
consequence, these illegitimate children were denied rights in important matters, for 
example, inheritance. However, fortunately, in the early 1970s, all Australian states and 
territories abolished the status of illegitimacy and as such, banned discrimination against 
illegitimate children. 
Before examining the Family Law Act 1975 and the Child Support (Assessment) Act 
1989, the writer would like to examine a particular piece of legislation in New South Wales, 
i.e. the Status of Children Act 1996 (‘the NSW Act’)140, which contains provisions on 
removing legal disabilities of ex-nuptial children. The Long Title to this Act provides that 
this Act was passed ‘to re-enact without any substantive changes provisions contained in the 
Children (Equality of Status) Act 1976 concerning removal of legal disabilities of ex-nuptial 
                                                          
140The writer chose to refer to this Act although it is only applicable to New South Wales and not to the whole of Australia to show the 
existence of such law which removes legal disabilities of illegitimate children and also establishing parentage. This could not be found in 
any of the Federal legislation. Thus, this law could be described as giving prominence to the welfare of illegitimate children in New South 
Wales.  
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children...’. The Act also provides that the rights conferred on ex-nuptial children here take 
effect on or after the appointed date, i.e. 1 July 1977.   
Section 5 of the NSW Act states that ‘all children are of equal status’. Section 5(1) 
provides that ‘the relationship between the person and another person is to be determined 
regardless of whether the person's parents are or have been married to each other’ (emphasis 
added). Thus, it could be observed that this provision clearly states that the legitimate status 
of a child is no longer an issue as all children are of equal status. This would, in turn, lay to 
rest many inequalities that arise as a result of a child being labelled as illegitimate. 
To substantiate the above point, section 8 provides, in subsection (1), that when a child's 
relative (which includes the parents) dies intestate, the child has the right to inherit the 
deceased's estate as though his parents were married when the child was born. The same 
position applies vice versa, where the child dies intestate.141 This could be distinguished with 
the position in Malaysia, where the Distribution Act 1958 expressly states that ‘child’ refers 
to a legitimate child and a child adopted under the Adoption Act 1952. 
Another interesting point to note in this Act is regarding establishing parentage. As 
mentioned earlier under this subtopic, the Malaysian Married Women and Children 
(Maintenance) Act 1950 provides that a Court may order a person to maintain his illegitimate 
child.142 However, if the said person denies paternity over the said child, there are no laws in 
Malaysia that enable to court to order the putative father to undergo a paternity test. This 
would not be an issue in New South Wales as the NSW Act in Part 3 contains provisions on 
                                                          
141 Section 8(2) of the NSW Act. 
142 Section 3(2) of the Malaysian Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
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Establishing Parentage. The writer would focus on three sections in this Part, i.e. sections 26, 
27 and 29. 
Section 26(1) empowers the Supreme Court of Australia to order ‘a parentage testing 
procedure to be carried out on any of the following persons, for the purpose of obtaining 
information to assist in determining the parentage of the child: 
(a)  the child; 
(b) a person known to be a parent of the child; or 
(c)  any other person, if the Court is of the opinion that the information that could be 
obtained if the parentage testing procedure were to be carried out in relation to 
the person might assist in determining the parentage of the child.’ 
Although section 26(1) empowers the court to order a person to undergo a parentage 
testing procedure, the section at the same time, in subsection (4) states that before the court 
makes such order, it must: 
(a)  consider and determine any objection made by a party to the proceedings on 
account of medical, religious or other grounds, and 
(b) if it determines that an objection is valid, take the objection into account in 
deciding whether to make the order. 
In short, section 26 could be described as fair as not only does it empower the court to 
order a person to undergo a parentage testing procedure, but it also requires the court to give 
such person a right to raise any objections that he may have. 
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Section 27 further provides that the court may issue an ‘order requiring a person to submit 
to a medical procedure or to provide a bodily sample’. ‘Bodily sample’ is defined in section 
3 to ‘include one or more of the following: 
(a) a blood sample 
(b) a tissue sample 
(c) a sperm sample  
(d) any other sample of material obtained from a human body.’ 
 Finally, section 29 provides for the effect of non-compliance with a parentage testing 
order. Section 29(1) states that if a person contravenes a parentage testing order, he is not 
liable to a penalty. However, subsection (2) provides that ‘the court may draw such inferences 
as appear just in the circumstances.’ 
The above provisions are basically what is needed to fill in the lacuna that exists in 
Malaysia concerning establishing parentage. It is submitted that the Malaysian Parliament 
should either emulate the NSW Act143 and come up with a new law that abolishes 
discrimination against illegitimate children and provides a procedure that helps them 
establish their parentage, or incorporate such amendments in the existing Legitimacy Act 
1961. Establishing parentage is especially important to a child who intends to claim for 
maintenance under section 3(2) of the Malaysian 1950 Act where the putative father denies 
paternity. 
Having examined the relevant provisions in the NSW Act, the writer would next examine 
whether the two Acts on maintenance in Australia, i.e. the Family Law Act 1975 and the 
                                                          
143In fact, it is submitted that even the other states and territories in Australia should also follow this Act. 
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Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 contain provisions on whether an ex-nuptial child has 
a right to claim maintenance. 
Section 4 of the Family Law Act 1975, in defining child, states that: 
‘Subdivision D of Division 1 of Part VII affects the situations in which a child is a child 
of a person or is a child of marriage or other relationship’. 
Two observations could be made from the above provision. First, it refers to the meaning 
of a ‘child’ in Subdivision D of Division 1 of Part VII of the said Act, which basically 
contains provisions on child maintenance. Secondly, the provision explains that the situations 
provided for in Subdivision D of Division 1 of Part VII, i.e. situations regarding child 
maintenance, refers to ‘a child of a marriage or other relationship’.  Therefore, it could be 
safely concluded that the phrase ‘other relationship’ clearly refers to an ex-nuptial child. In 
short, the Family Law Act 1975 applies to ex-nuptial children as well concerning child 
support, although the Act does not expressly state illegitimate or ex-nuptial children. 
The second Act is the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989. In order to answer the 
question as to whether an ex-nuptial child is eligible to claim maintenance from his parents, 
reference could be made to section 20. Section 20(1) specifically states that children born of 
parents, who have cohabited before the commencement of the Act but have separated on or 
after the commencement date, are eligible children. Subsection (2) further explains that 
subsection (1) applies whether the parents ‘were legally married or not, or have separated on 
an earlier occasion or have resumed cohabitation’. Therefore, the above section clearly 
includes a child born of parents who have cohabited, whether legally married or not, as 
eligible to claim for child support. 
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An interesting observation that could be made after analysing the two Acts above is that 
both these Acts confer the right to illegitimate children to claim for child support without 
expressly referring to them as either ex-nuptial children or illegitimate. This could, perhaps 
be, as a result of the stigma against illegitimate children being removed in Australia. In 
addition, the NSW Act too states that all children of equal status. It is submitted that section 
3(2) of the Malaysian 1950 Act could be amended by deleting the word ‘illegitimate child’ 
and incorporate the following phrase ‘children born of parents who were not legally married 
at the time of the child’s birth’. 
 
4.4.4.7 Discussion 
Having examined the position in Malaysia as well as the three jurisdictions on the right 
of an illegitimate child to claim maintenance in Malaysia, the following observations could 
be made: 
(a) There are Acts in Malaysia such as the 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance 
of Sabah that expressly provide that a person could be ordered by the court to 
maintain his illegitimate child. Although the ceiling amount of RM50 was repealed 
in the 1950 Act, it still remains in the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah. Hence, it 
is submitted that it is long overdue for the Sabah State Legislature to repeal the 
maximum amount taking into account high cost of living these days when 
compared to about sixty years ago when the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah was 
enacted. 
(b) Despite the existence of the above statutes, not all single mothers are aware of such 
provisions. When asked, during the interview sessions held with them, if they 
would pursue the matter in court to claim maintenance for their child if they are 
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aware of their child’s right to claim maintenance, they were reluctant to do so. The 
main reason for their reluctance is that they do not want to be in contact with their 
child’s putative father. The other reason which most of the single mothers cited 
was that the putative father denied paternity of the child. 
(c) Following from the last sentence above, it is to be observed that there are no laws 
in Malaysia which empowers the court to order a man to undergo a DNA test to 
determine paternity of a child. The only law we have as to decide the paternity of 
a child is section 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides for the presumption 
of legitimacy. However, as argued earlier in this sub-topic when the writer 
examined the position in Singapore, proof of legitimacy cannot be a pre-condition 
to proof of paternity. The paternity test is mainly to decide whether the male is the 
father of the child concerned. It does not necessarily always relate to seeing if the 
child is legitimate, though in some cases, it may. 
(d) As a result of the above lacuna in our laws, it is respectfully submitted that the 
Malaysian Legislature should perhaps amend the DNA Act or the Legitimacy Act 
to incorporate provisions concerning paternity testing procedures which could be 
found in the British Family Law Reform Act 1969 or the Australian Status of 
Children Act 1996 (New South Wales). This measure would alleviate the fear of 
single mothers in situations where the putative father of the child denies paternity 
of the child. 
Previous research done shows that in the age of scientific technology where 
DNA testing of paternity is the most celebrated achievement in the field of forensic 
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technology to solve litigations on paternity, resort to conventional method of 
traceability of male partners in a sexual act no longer holds water.144 
(e) Finally, as was opined by the social workers who were interviewed, mere existence 
of the law is insufficient in protecting the rights and welfare of the illegitimate 
children. The main reason for the alarming rate of babies being dumped in our 
nation is due to the fact that the single mothers want to avoid embarrassment to 
them and their families by the birth of their illegitimate child. In addition, being 
very young and some 1even still schooling, they would not be able to raise their 
child. Hence, the relevant authorities such as the government, the Social Welfare 
Department and NGOs or even the community at large could play a part in 
reducing the sufferings of these single mothers in raising their children. The writer 
hereby submits that there is a possibility of the rate of baby dumping reducing 
when society stops treating an illegitimate child as a product of his mother’s sin 
and considering him as a social stigma. 
Previous research work done shows that the rate of baby dumping cases in Malaysia is 
disturbing. There are two main reasons why most of the perpetrators of this heinous crime 
dump the babies in any place, i.e. for fear of arrest and attempt to conceal their identity. 
Therefore, the researchers have suggested that the relevant authorities need to take immediate 
measures to tackle this phenomenon.145 
                                                          
144Haneef Sayed Sikandar Shah, “The Status of an Illegitimate Children in Islamic Law: A Critical Analysis of DNA Paternity Test”, Global 
Jurist, Vol.16, Issue 2, 1 July 2016, 159-173, Haneef Sayed Sikandar Shah, “DNA Test of Paternity in Islamic law implications for 
illegitimate children born less than minimum gestation period in Malaysia”, Handard Islamicus, Vol. 39, Issue 2, April – June 2016, 7-35. 
145Nurhafizah Mohd Shukor, Rezki Perdani Sawai, et al, “Management of Baby Dumping in Malaysia: A Qualitative Study”, Al-Abqari 
Journal, Vol. 6, (2015, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia Press) 35-52,; Azizah Mohd and Alhaji Umar Alkali, “Crime of Baby Dumping: 
A Review of Islamic, Malaysian and Nigerian Laws”, Pertanika J.Soc. Sci and Hum., 23(5): 67-82 (2015) accessed at 
www.pertanika.upm.edu.my on 4 February 2017; Mazbah Termizi, Azizah Abdul Majid et al, “Towards solving baby dumping in Malaysia 
by using an alternative: baby hatch”, Ulum Islamiyya: The Malaysian Journal of Islamic Sciences (2016) 17, pp 103-120. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it could be observed that the maintenance laws on the whole in Malaysia 
do not safeguard the welfare of the children. This could be seen from the discussions above 
pertaining to the age of the child, adopted children, step-children and illegitimate children. 
There is a lacuna in the laws as some of the laws do not state whether certain categories of 
children are governed by them (the laws). Secondly, there is no consistency among the 
statutes in certain issues, for example on the maximum sum that could be claimed by 
illegitimate children. Thirdly, from the fieldwork conducted, it was observed that despite the 
existence of the laws, the stakeholders are not aware of such laws, which then defeats the 
purpose of such laws.  Fourthly, when compared to the laws in other jurisdictions such as 
Singapore, England and Wales and Australia, the Malaysian laws are still lagging far behind. 
As was observed from the discussion, it could be seen that the Malaysian legislature could 
incorporate some of the developments that have taken place in these jurisdictions when it 
comes to the right of a child to maintenance. The write would list down the amendments that 
could be made to the local laws based on the laws in these jurisdictions in Chapter 8 under 
‘Recommendations’. 
Finally, it could be concluded that despite the existence of the three statutes on 
maintenance in Malaysia, it is not possible to say that the welfare of our children is adequately 
protected by these statutes. On the other hand, much needs to be done in order to ensure that 
the best interest of the children is not compromised and these recommendations, as 
mentioned above, would be discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE OF NON-MUSLIM 
YOUNG VULNERABLE ADULTS IN MALAYSIA   
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The existing maintenance laws concerning non-Muslims safeguard the rights of children 
to claim maintenance from their parents until they reach the age of eighteen, which is the age 
of majority according to the Age of Majority Act 1971. The question that arises is what 
happens when children reach the age of eighteen? Are the parents relieved of their duty to 
maintain their children who are eighteen years and above? Do these young vulnerable adults 
then have to fend for themselves and take care of their basic necessities? 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the maintenance laws in Malaysia in order 
to see whether non-Muslim young vulnerable adults have the right to continue being 
maintained by their parents even though they have reached the age of eighteen years. 
Children who attain the age of eighteen would be referred to as young vulnerable adults in 
this thesis. In the writer’s opinion, this is an important issue that needs to be addressed as 
most of the young vulnerable adults these days do not start to fend for themselves once they 
reach eighteen years of age. They still rely on their parents to financially support them.  
The writer has so far emphasised on the fact that the laws need to safeguard the welfare 
of children (who are generally below the age of eighteen). Nevertheless, it should not be 
forgotten that once these children attain the age of eighteen and are considered to be a major 
by the Age of Majority Act 1971, they are still dependent on their parents, especially the 
disabled who fall within this category. The attachment theory as discussed in Chapter 3 of 
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this thesis would still apply to these young vulnerable adults until they are in a position to 
fend for themselves and do not have to depend on their parents anymore. 
The more important issue concerning maintaining these young vulnerable adults is when 
it comes to financing their cost of higher education. More and more children are keen on 
pursuing their tertiary education now when compared to thirty to forty years ago, when most 
children, once they have completed their Malaysian Certificate of Education (MCE) or Sijil 
Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) would prefer to commence employment. 
However, the situation now is far different, with the number of students passing with 
flying colours in their SPM and Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia (STPM)1 examinations. 
Entry into public universities has become extremely competitive with the number of 
applicants escalating every year and the problem of limited places in these universities. At 
the same time, the number of private institutions of higher learning has also escalated over 
the past decade in Malaysia. The number of institutions of higher learning (both public and 
private) could be seen below. 
  
                                                          
1 Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia (STPM) or the Malaysian Higher Schooling Certificate  (HSC) is one of the entry requirements into 
universities. 
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Table 5.1: Number of institutions of higher learning in Malaysia as in 2016 
Institutions of higher learning Number 
Public Universities 20 
Private Universities 37 
Public-University colleges 1 
Private-University colleges 10 
Private colleges 414 
Foreign University branch campus 10 
Total  492 
Source:  Ministry of Higher Education, Malaysia 
 
Table 5.1 above shows that there are more institutions of private institutions of higher 
learning than public institutions. In addition, it is also observed that the total number of 
institutions of higher learning is about 490, which is quite a big number. This shows that 
there is a large population of students who are pursuing their tertiary education. 
The issue that the writer intends to discuss in this chapter is whether the parents of a child 
who has reached the age of eighteen years are still under a duty to maintain the latter, 
especially in relation to financing the cost of their tertiary education? The reason for this is 
because the existing non-Muslim maintenance laws in Malaysia (as will be discussed below) 
have basically stated that a maintenance order ceases once the child reaches the age of 
eighteen unless the child is either physically or mentally disabled.2  
                                                          
2 Section 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. 
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Before examining the relevant laws on this issue, it is important to look at the cost of 
tertiary education now, in order to realize the seriousness of the issue to be discussed.  
The tables below show the cost of tertiary education in Malaysia, in both public universities 
and private institutions of higher learning. Table 5.2 shows the estimated cost for pre-
university studies at private institutions. This applies to students who do not want to proceed 
to Form 6 after their Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) exams. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Estimated Tuition Fees for University Foundation or Pre-University  for 
the entire duration of study in 2016 
 
 Foundation or Pre-University Studies (External Qualifications) (in RM) 
GCE ‘A’, Level, United Kingdom 15,000 - 25,000  
Western Australian Matriculation (Ausmat) Australia 11,000 - 21,000  
South Australian Matriculation (SAM) Australia 21,000 - 25,000  
Canadian Pre-U, Canada 19,000 - 29,000  
University of New South Wales (UNSW) Foundation Year  14,000 - 23,000  
International Baccalaureate 79,000 
Source: Study Malaysia Research Team & Study in Malaysia Handbook (7th International 
edition)3  
 
 
                                                          
3  Data above obtained from the handbook of Study Malaysia who had conducted research on the Cost of Study in Malaysia. This 
information was posted on Study Malaysia's website at http://www.studymalaysia.com/education/art_m'sia.php?id=affordable   accessed  
on 3 December 2016. 
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Table 5.3 shows the estimated tuition fees for undergraduate courses at public institutes 
of higher learning. The writer chose the programmes offered in the University of Malaya 
and the estimated tuition fees of such programmes as an example. The tuition fees in other 
public universities are more or less similar to that of University of Malaya. 
 
Table 5.3: Estimated Tuition Fees for Undergraduates for the entire duration of study 
for Academic Session 2016/2017 for University of Malaya4 
 Programme Estimated Tuition Fees (RM) 
Arts and Social Sciences 7,330 - 7,450 
Business and Accounting 7,390 - 9,870 
Dentistry 15,300 
Economics and Administration 7,950 
Engineering 8,860 - 9,530 
Law 8,370 
Medicine  9,240 - 13,750 
Science 8,070 - 8,260 
Computer Science and Information Technology 9,240 - 9,340 
Source: www.um.edu.my accessed on 3 December 2016 
 
Table 5.4 below shows the estimated tuition fees at Private Institutions of Higher 
Learning.  
  
                                                          
4 Note that the writer chose the most popular courses chosen by the undergraduates to reflect the cost of these programmes. 
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Table 5.4: Estimated Tuition Fees at Private Institutions of Higher Learning in 2016 
(RM) 
 
 
 
Area of Study 
 
 
 
3+0 Degree 
Programmes 
Bachelor's 
Degree at 
Foreign 
University 
Branch 
Campus located 
in Malaysia 
 
 
 
Bachelor's 
 Degree at Private 
Universities 
 
 
Twinning 
Degree 
Programmes 
Business 43,000-75000 50,000-85,000 33,000-45,000 - 
Engineering 46,000-65,000 69,000-115,000 50,000-60,000 - 
Information 
Technology 
45,000-65,000 - 35,000-50,000 - 
Hospitality and 
Tourism 
73,000 183,000 35,000-60,000 - 
Medicine 300,000 - - - 
Pharmacy 100,000 - 100,000-140,000 70,000-92,000 
+£18,000-
£25,716 (2 
years in the 
United 
Kingdom) 
Law - - - 42,188-53,070 
(2 years in 
Malaysia) + 
£8,000-
£15,400 (1 
year in the 
United 
Kingdom) 
Source: StudyMalaysia Research Team & Study in Malaysia Handbook (7th International edition) 
2016 
 
Having looked at the cost of tertiary education in Malaysia above, the question that arises is 
whether an eighteen-year-old who has completed his or her SPM is able to pay for the tuition 
fees as stated above if his or her parents refuse to provide financial support, especially in 
cases where the parents have divorced or are living separately? In order to answer this 
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question, the writer intends to first look at the statutory provisions applicable to non-Muslims 
on this issue, judicial decisions, views or comments expressed by academics, conduct 
fieldwork to get a feedback from the affected parties such as the undergraduates in 
universities, compare the position in other jurisdictions and finally suggest reforms to 
overcome this problem. 
 
5.2 LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutes that need to be examined here are as follows: 
(a) Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950; 
(b) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976; 
(c) Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah; and  
 
5.2.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
As discussed in Chapter 4, under sub-topic 4.4.1 on the Age of a child, the Married Women 
and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (‘the 1950 Act’) is silent on the definition of a ‘child’. 
The High Court in Kulasingam v Rasammah5 had to decide whether the youngest daughter 
of the petitioner and the respondent was a child within the Married Women and Children 
(Maintenance) Act 1950. The learned judge referred to sections 2 and 4 of the Age of 
Majority Act 1971 and held that since the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) 
Ordinance 1950 is silent on the meaning of ‘child’, the Age of Majority Act 1971 should 
apply.6 His Lordship also referred to the Children Act 1975 in England which defines ‘child’ 
                                                          
5 [1981] 2 MLJ 36.  
6 Section 2 of the Age of Majority Act 1971 states that a minor is a person below the age of eighteen. 
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as ‘except where used to express a relationship, means a person who has not attained the age 
of eighteen’. 
Further thereto, the 1950 Act merely states that a Court may order a person who has 
neglected or refused to maintain his legitimate child, without providing when the 
maintenance order ceases. The High Court in Kulasingam v Rasammah however has held 
that as the ‘child’ in that case was already twenty years of age, she did not qualify to receive 
maintenance under the 1950 Act. Thus, a child intending to pursue his or her tertiary 
education definitely would not be able to apply under this Act as long as the decision in 
Kulasingam is not overruled. 
 
5.2.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
On the other hand, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (‘the LRA’) 
expressly provides as follows: 
Except where any such order has been rescinded, it shall expire on the attainment of 
eighteen years or where the child is under physical or mental disability, on the ceasing 
of such disability, whichever is the later.7 
The above provision was discussed in several cases (as would be discussed later in this 
Chapter), where the main issue was whether the Court could apply the exception in this 
provision, i.e. physical or mental disability, to order a parent to maintain his or her child until 
he or she completes her tertiary education. 
                                                          
7 Section 95 of the LRA. 
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5.2.3 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
 The Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah contains similar provisions as the 1950 Act. 
Section 2 of this Ordinance merely defines ‘child’ to include ‘legitimate or illegitimate child 
who is unable to maintain itself’. There is no mention of the age limit of a child nor does it 
state when a maintenance order in favour of a child ceases.  
 
5.3 JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The issue of whether a child could claim maintenance from his parents upon reaching the 
age of eighteen years for the purposes of pursuing his tertiary education has been discussed 
in several cases. The courts were referred to section 95 of the LRA, especially to the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘physical or mental disability’ in order to see whether an eighteen-
year-old who intends to pursue his tertiary education falls within the meaning of ‘physically 
or mentally disabled’.  
One of the first cases which discussed this issue is the case of Ching Seng Woah v Lim 
Shook Lin,8 the Court of Appeal interpreted the exception of physical or mental disability in 
section 95 of the LRA to include the involuntary financial dependence of a child of the 
marriage as the child has to depend on his parents to pursue and complete his tertiary or 
vocational education. Hence, the duty to maintain could extend beyond the child's eighteenth 
birthday. The learned judge, Mahadev Shankar JCA gave a broad interpretation to the phrase 
‘physical disability’ in section 95 so as to bring involuntary financial dependence within its 
                                                          
8 [1997] 1 MLJ 109. 
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meaning. In considering the effect of not being maintained beyond the age of eighteen years, 
his Lordship stated as follows:9  
When parents divorce, the children suffer the most ... Not only can they not look at 
their parents thereafter for money but also by inference for shelter in the matrimonial 
home. Section 95 could thus become the bohsia’s charter.10  
The above statement indicates that if section 95 is interpreted narrowly, this would result 
in children aged eighteen years and above not being able to look to their parents for money 
and thereby producing negative results. 
A landmark decision on the issue of a child’s right to claim maintenance from his parents 
for the purposes of pursuing his tertiary education is the case of Karunairajah a/l Rasiah v 
Punithambigai a/p Ponniah.11 Upon dissolution of his marriage to the petitioner and pursuant 
to a consent order, the respondent made maintenance payments to all his three children. 
However, in the following year, he stopped making maintenance payment to his eldest child 
as she had reached the age of eighteen years. On the basis that the consent order was silent 
as to when the maintenance payments should cease, the petitioner applied to the court for an 
order to compel the respondent to continue paying maintenance to their eldest child and by 
implication the other two children, until all of them complete their tertiary education. 
The petitioner cited section 95 of the LRA and relied on the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Ching Seng Woah where the court had brought involuntary financial dependence under the 
exception in section 95. The respondent argued that the exception in section 95 should be 
given a literal interpretation and that the Court of Appeal's decision in Ching Seng Woah with 
                                                          
9 Ibid at p. 120 
10 ‘Bohsia’s charter’ here refers to a situation where section 95 of the LRA endorses the churning of promiscuous youth. 
11 [2004] 2 MLJ 401. 
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regard to involuntary financial dependence was merely obiter. The respondent also referred 
to section 87 of the LRA where ‘child’ is defined, inter alia, as a person below eighteen 
years. As such, this definition should equally apply to a ‘child’ under section 95. 
The learned High Court judge, Low Hop Bing J. referred to Mahadev Shankar JCA’s 
decision in Ching Seng Woah where his Lordship stated that as the issue in that case was 
pertaining to the interpretation of ‘physical disability’ in section 95, which was the same 
issue in the present case too, the High Court was bound to follow the Court of Appeal’s 
decision. 
Prior to making this decision, his Lordship referred to the following observation made by 
Mahadev Shankar JCA: 
A 19-year-old computer whiz-kid who is a wheel chair case and therefore well able to 
earn a living at that age could here be contrasted with another 18 year old who is 
physically and mentally fit but otherwise totally unable to fend for himself on the job 
market … However, we must take note that unlike the United Kingdom and many other 
European countries, Malaysia is not a welfare state. Whilst married women’s claim to 
a share of the matrimonial assets is now entrenched in our laws, the rights of the 
dependent young persons in these assets is yet to receive proper articulation … we are 
inclined to view that in appropriate cases, involuntary financial dependence is a 
physical disability under Section 95 of the Act.12 
Thus, the High Court held that as involuntary financial dependence for the purpose of 
pursuing their tertiary education constituted a physical disability under section 95, it was fair 
                                                          
12 Supra n 8 
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and reasonable for the respondent to continue maintain his children until they completed their 
first degree. 
Upon the appeal to the Court of Appeal by the husband, the appeal was dismissed and the 
decision of the High Court was upheld. The court agreed with the decision in Ching Seng 
Woah on the broad interpretation given to the term ‘physical disability’ in section 95. In fact, 
the Court of Appeal in the present case went one step further and stated that as a person has 
to have an able body and mind to pursue his tertiary education, involuntary financial 
dependence could also be taken as a mental disability under section 95.  
The learned Court of Appeal judge also construed the intention of the Parliament in 
drafting section 95 and stated that if the marriage in the present case had not suffered a 
breakdown, the father would not have hesitated to maintain his children even though they 
had attained the age of eighteen. Hence, it is definitely not the intention of the Parliament in 
enacting section 95 of the LRA ‘to make the children worst off in the event of a breakup of 
the marriage of their parents compared to children living together with their parents under 
the same roof’.13 
At this juncture, it is to be noted that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, in 
interpreting section 95 in a broad manner, have infused new life to the exception therein in 
order to protect the welfare of the young vulnerable adults, especially those from broken 
homes who intend to pursue their tertiary education or vocational training. Both these 
decisions are much welcomed in the interest of these unfortunate young vulnerable adults.  
The husband appealed to the Federal Court. The issue before the Federal Court was 
whether involuntary financial dependence for the purposes of pursuing their tertiary 
                                                          
13 [2003] 2 MLJ 529 at 537. 
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education fell within the meaning of ‘physical or mental disability’ in section 95. The phrase 
‘in order to obtain their first degree’ after the words tertiary education were omitted here. 
The Federal Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ching Seng Woah. The 
Federal Court gave several reasons for its decision. The writer would be focusing on three 
main reasons given by the learned judge. 
First, the court stated that a judge should only focus on the law that is applicable to the 
case before him and should disregard moral obligations on the part of the parents towards 
their child.  Moral obligation cannot take precedence over the law. In addition, the legislature 
has the right to decide what the law should be. At this juncture, it is respectfully submitted 
that the writer begs to differ from the learned judge. The writer agrees that the legislature 
should decide what the law is. However, a judge, in interpreting a law passed by Parliament 
may consider factors which include the intention of the Parliament and moral obligations, if 
applicable, as was done by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the present case.  
Secondly, the Federal Court stated that ‘disability’ in section 95 strictly refers to ‘physical 
and mental disability’. It does not cover involuntary financial dependence. In addition, the 
court also referred to section 87 of the LRA which defines ‘child’ as, inter alia, a person 
below the age of eighteen years. Hence, according to the court, this definition should also 
apply to a ‘child’ within the meaning of section 95. 
Thirdly, the court looked at the position of Islamic law in Malaysia on this issue as well 
as the position in other jurisdictions such as Singapore and Australia. Pertaining to the Islamic 
position in Malaysia, the court looked at section 79 of the Islamic Family Act 198414 which 
provides: 
                                                          
14 Act 303. 
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Except- 
(a) where an order for maintenance of a child is expressed to be for any shorter 
period; or 
(b) where any such order has been rescinded; or 
(c) where any such order is made in favour of – 
(i) a daughter who has not been married or who is, by reason of some 
mental or physical disability, incapable of maintaining herself; 
(ii) a son who is, by reason of some mental or physical disability, incapable 
of maintaining himself, 
the order for maintenance shall expire on the attainment by the child of the age of 
eighteen years, but the Court may, on application by the child or any other person, 
extend the order for maintenance to cover such further period as it thinks reasonable, 
to enable the child to pursue further or higher education or training.15 
 
The Federal Court held that the Islamic Family Law Act 1984 is more advanced than its 
civil counterpart. The court further stated that the respondent in this case wanted the court to 
legislate as an amendment to section 95 of the LRA, a similar provision as in section 79 of 
the Islamic Family Law Act 1984. The learned judge refused to do so stating that it would 
amount to usurping the Parliament’s power to pass laws, which would eventually defeat the 
doctrine of separation of powers. In addition to referring to the Islamic law, the court also 
referred to the positions in Singapore and Australia, where there has been development in 
                                                          
15 Emphasis added. 
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their respective laws. Both these positions would be examined be under sub-topic 5.6 where 
the writer refers to the position in other jurisdictions. 
Thus, the Federal Court allowed the appeal and held that as it has to strictly interpret 
section 95 of the LRA, it cannot order the parent concerned to continue providing 
maintenance to his child so as to enable him to complete his tertiary education. It is 
respectfully submitted that the Federal Court decision in Karunairajah shattered the hopes 
of many young vulnerable adults, especially those from broken homes and who want to 
pursue their tertiary education. The writer is of the opinion that the court was more focused 
on giving a proper interpretation to the statutory provision rather than considering the welfare 
of the affected young vulnerable adults. 
The Federal Court’s decision in Punithambigai was followed in a recent case, Uma 
Sundari a/p Muthusamy v Kanniappan a/l Thiruvengadam.16 In this case, a similar issue as 
in the case of Punithambigai arose where the mother wanted the father to provide 
maintenance to support the child’s higher education costs. Although the learned judge agreed 
with the Federal Court in Punithambigai, he stated that there is no basis for the court to grant 
maintenance sum to cover the child’s educational needs as the petitioner (the child’s mother) 
had failed to provide any evidence to prove that the child is pursuing his education at any 
higher learning institution. The above ruling seems to imply that the court was willing to 
grant a maintenance order directing the father to support the child’s higher educational needs 
if the mother had been able to adduce proof such as the letter of admission or the receipts of 
the fees chargeable or the student’s card. Thus, it could be stated that the court in this case 
was willing to be flexible in granting a maintenance order in favour of a child who has 
                                                          
16 [2009] 5 MLJ 853. 
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reached the age of eighteen years if only the petitioner had provided proof of the child 
pursuing his higher education. 
In the case of Teo Ai Teng v Yeo Khee Hong,17 the plaintiff (mother) applied to the court 
to order the defendant (father) to pay maintenance of RM1,000.00 a month for each of her 
children and the cost of education and medical expenses until they reach the age of twenty-
one. The court ordered the defendant to pay RM2,000 a month as interim maintenance for 
the two children to cover the cost of education and medical expenses. However, the court did 
not specifically state as to whether this duty to pay maintenance continued until the children 
attain the age of twenty-one years (as prayed for by the plaintiff). Further thereto, the learned 
judge here also did not refer to any statutory provisions concerning maintenance. Reference 
was only made to case law.  
 
5.4 VIEWS BY ACADEMICS 
Several views and comments have been expressed by academics regarding section 95 of 
the LRA as well as the case of Karunairajah v Punithambigai through their articles. For 
example, Professor Mimi Kamariah Majid has expressed her dissatisfaction with section 95 
of the LRA, where she states as follows in her book, Family Law in Malaysia:18 
Although this provision is an improvement over the 1950 Act, it is still lacking as it 
assumes that all children, other than the disabled, aged 18 and above are able to fend 
for themselves and therefore do not need maintenance. At a time when tertiary 
education or higher studies is the aim of many youngsters, the law should provide the 
                                                          
17 [2009] 9 MLJ 721. 
18 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1999) at 336. 
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support by requiring the mother or father to provide maintenance in suitable cases even 
though the child may have reached 18 years. 
In an article entitled Karunairajah a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Ponniah: The Need To 
Amend Section 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976?19  one of the 
comments made by the writer is that the strict interpretation given to section 95 by the Federal 
Court in Karunairajah’s case would have a drastic effect on young vulnerable adults, 
especially those who intend to pursue their tertiary education. Section 95 would then end up 
being labelled as a ‘bohsia’s charter’, as was stated by his Lordship Mahadev Shankar JCA 
in the case of Ching Seng Woah (as discussed earlier in this Chapter). 
The Federal Court’s ruling in Karunairajah v Punithambigai that the principles of 
morality should be set aside when determining the maintenance of the child concerned was 
commented upon by Nuraisyah Chua Abdullah in her article entitled Parent’s Obligation 
Towards Maintenance of Children in Tertiary Education: An Overview of the Islamic Law 
and Family Laws in Malaysia in Comparison With UK, where she states as follows:20 
Although the learned judge in the case of Gisela Getrude Abe ruled that principles of 
morality should be set aside in ascertaining the maintenance of children above 18 years, 
however, the view of Lord Devlin should be taken into consideration. In his idea of 
morality, Lord Devlin states that there is public morality which provides the cement of 
any human society and that the law, must regard it as primary function to maintain this 
public morality. With reference of Lord Devlin’s idea on morality, it is stressed that 
morality does play a role in the legal enforcement. Thus, this idea can be supported by 
                                                          
19 Sridevi Thambapillay, “Karunairajah a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Ponniah: The Need To Amend Section 95 of the Law Reform 
(Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976?”, (2005) 32 JMCL. 109-128   
20 Nuraisyah Chua Abdullah, “Parent’s Obligation Towards Maintenance of Children in Tertiary Education: An Overview of the Islamic 
Law and Family Laws in Malaysia in Comparison With UK,” [2006] 5 MLJ cvi; [2006] 5 MLJA 106 at pp. 118-119. 
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a quotation by contemporary perfectionist thinker, George R in Making Men Moral, 
where he argues that who has good reasons to believe that a certain act is immoral may 
support the legal prohibition of that act for the sake of protecting public morals without 
necessarily violating a norm of justice or political morality. Therefore, it is clear that 
the principle of morality may be considered in consideration to the issue of 
maintenance of children above 18. 
This had been upheld by P. Dev Anand Pillai, where he commented that obligations of 
parents are moral obligations that should be entrenched in every parent. Divorce 
situation that is the one that mars the moral obligation and this should not occur if the 
parents put themselves to have moral obligations and morally felt obliged to 
maintenance their children. Hence, government should create an awareness of moral 
obligation to maintain their children in order to reduce the dispute in this issue. 
Thus, the abovementioned author seems to disagree with the learned judge that the 
principles of morality are not relevant when considering the maintenance of an eighteen -
year old child. She submits that the burden is on the government to create an awareness 
among parents that they have a moral obligation to maintain their children so that disputes 
such as those that arose in the case of Punithambigai does not arise in the future. It is 
submitted that the view expressed by the author is laudable, as when every parent considers 
that it is his or her moral obligation to maintain their child, he or she would, either directly 
or indirectly, be guilt-ridden if he or she fails or neglects to maintain his or her child. 
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5.5 UNDERGRADUATES’ PERCEPTION AS TO THE RIGHT OF NON-MUSLIM 
YOUNG VULNERABLE ADULTS TO MAINTENANCE IN MALAYSIA 
Questionnaires were distributed to undergraduates in public universities with the aim of 
exploring their knowledge and attitude pertaining to the laws as well as the duty to maintain 
young vulnerable adults. 
 
5.5.1 Materials and methods 
The survey was conducted between September and October 2016.  Four public 
universities were selected to participate. Two of the universities are in West Malaysia 
(University of Malaya, representing the West Coast and University Sultan Zainal Abidin, 
representing the East Coast) and the other two are in East Malaysia (University Malaysia 
Sabah and University Malaysia Sarawak). Permission was obtained from the Deans of the 
respective faculties.  
A total of four hundred (400) questionnaires were distributed (100 per university) to 
randomly selected undergraduates. A standardized questionnaire in English was used.21 Items 
in the questionnaire assessed knowledge, attitude and demographic characteristics related to 
the duty to maintain young vulnerable adults. Informed consent was obtained verbally from 
the respondents. The respondents were assured the confidentiality of their responses and were 
also reminded that their participation is entirely voluntary. Prior to the distribution of 
questionnaires, the respondents were informed about the objectives of the study. 
There are four parts in the questionnaire. Part A comprises the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents (13-items). Part B (8-items) and Part C (9-items) assess the 
                                                          
21 Please refer to Appendix B for a sample of the questionnaire 
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respondent’s attitude towards the duty to maintain young vulnerable adults, where the 
respondents were requested indicate their level of agreement on a five-point Likert-type scale 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Not Sure, Agree and Strongly Agree). Part D (9-items) assesses 
their general knowledge about the duty to maintain with questions posed in which the answer 
is either yes or no. In addition to answering yes or no, participants were asked to give reasons 
for their answers in Questions 5, 7, 8 and 9. The questionnaire was pilot-tested among the 
students in the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya before commencing the study. Data was 
analysed using SPSS 22 for Windows. Data is presented in a descriptive manner in order to 
observe the frequency of the respondents' answers. 
5.5.2 Results 
5.5.2.1 Part A- Socio-demographic characteristics 
 
Table 5.5: Distribution of respondent by socio demographic characteristics (N=400) 
Socio demographic characteristic N(%) 
Gender   
  Male 108 (27) 
  Female 292 (73) 
 
Age (years old) 
 
  18-20 56 (14) 
  21-23 334(83.5) 
  24-26 10 (2.5) 
 
Race 
 
  Malay 218 (54.5) 
  Chinese 88 (22) 
  Indian 12 (3) 
  Sikh 3 (0.7) 
  Bumiputera Sabah/Sarawak 73 (18.3) 
  Others 6 (1.5) 
 
Nationality 
 
  Malaysian 397 (99.3) 
  Non-Malaysian 3 (0.7) 
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Table 5.5: Distribution of respondent by socio demographic characteristics (N=400) 
(Continued) 
Socio demographic characteristic N(%) 
 
Number of silblings 
 
  No siblings 5 (1.2) 
  1-2 66 (16.5) 
  3-4 154 (38.5) 
  5-6 116 (29) 
  7-8 41 (10.3) 
  9-10 17 (4.3) 
  >10 1 (0.2) 
 
Current place of residence 
 
  With parents 68 (17) 
  With relatives 3 (0.7) 
  Residential college/hostel 295 (73.8) 
  Renting a room/house 34 (8.5) 
 
Location of parent’s house 
 
  Urban  245 (61.3) 
  Rural  155 (38.7) 
 
Mother’s employment 
 
  Government employee 83 (20.8) 
  Private sector employee 41 (10.2) 
  Self employed 35 (8.8) 
  Unemployed 241 (60.2) 
 
Father’s employment 
 
  Government employee 107 (26.8) 
  Private sector employee 101 (25.2) 
  Self employed 131 (32.8) 
  Unemployed 61 (15.2) 
 
Mother’s monthly income 
 
  No income 232 (58) 
  RM1000 and below 46 (11.5) 
  RM1001-2000 43 (10. 8)  
  RM2001-3000 30 (7.5) 
  RM3001-4000 26 (6.5) 
  RM4001-5000 14 (3.5) 
  >RM5000 9 (2.2) 
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Table 5.5:  Distribution of respondent by socio demographic characteristics (N=400) 
(Continued) 
 
Socio demographic characteristic N(%) 
 
Father’s monthly income 
 
  No income 53 (13.2) 
  RM1000 and below 90 (22.5) 
  RM1001-2000 91 (22.8) 
  RM2001-3000 55 (13.8) 
  RM3001-4000 43 (10.7) 
  RM4001-5000 27 (6.7) 
  >RM5000 41 (10.3) 
 
Funding of studies 
 
  Parents 46 (11.5) 
  Relatives 4 (1) 
  PTPTN 203 (50.7) 
  Scholarship  90 (22.5) 
  Loan 8 (2) 
  Others 4 (1) 
  >1 funding 45 (11.3) 
  
Monthly expenses 
 
  <RM300 159 (39.8) 
  RM301-600 181 (45.2) 
  RM601-900 40 (10) 
  RM901-1200 9 (2.3) 
  RM1201-1500 6 (1.5) 
  >RM1500 5 (1.2) 
 
A summary of the respondents’ characteristics is listed in Table 5.5. A total of 400 
respondents participated (n=400) in the survey. The respondents were aged between 18 and 
26, with the majority (83.5%) within the range of 21-23 years. The majority of the 
respondents were Malay (54.5%), followed by Chinese (22%), Bumiputera Sabah and 
Sarawak (18.3%), Indian (3%), Others (1.5%) and Sikh (0.7%). The majority of the 
respondents were staying in residential colleges or hostels (73.8%), while only 17% were 
living with their parents. 
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More than half of the respondents’ mothers were unemployed (60.2%) with no monthly 
income (58%), whereas 32.8% of their fathers were self-employed, 26.8% government 
employees, 25.2% private sector employees and only 15.2% were unemployed. 22.8% of the 
fathers’ monthly income was between RM1001-RM2000, 22.5% were earning RM1000 and 
below, 13.8% were earning between RM2001-RM3000, 13.2% did not have any income, 
10.7% were earning between RM3001-RM4000, 10.3% were earning more than RM5000 
and 6.7% were earning between RM 4,001-RM5000. 
About half of the respondents’ (50.7%) cost of studies was funded by PTPTN22, while 
22.5% were scholarship holders. Only about11.5% of the respondents’ cost of studies was 
funded by their parents. The majority of the respondents’ monthly expenses spanned between 
RM301-RM600 (45.2%). 
 
            Figure 5.1 Proportion (%) of respondents’ monthly expenses (N=400)  
                                                          
22 PTPTN, which is the abbreviation for Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Nasional or National Higher Education Fund Corporation was 
established under the National Higher Education Fund Corporation 1997 (Act 566) which came into force on 1 July 1997. PTPTN began 
operations on 1 November 1997. The functions of PTPTN are as follows: (a) To manage loans for higher education purposes and to collect 
loan repayments; (b) To prepare and manage deposit savings scheme for higher education; and (c) To perform any other functions assigned 
to PTPTN by any written law. Information obtained from PTPTN website at http://www.ptptn.gov.my/web/guest/korporat accessed on 6 
February 2017. 
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Figure 5.1 above provides the proportion of the respondents’ monthly expenses. It could 
be noted that 99.8% spend on food, followed by hand phones (67.3%), books (60.3%), 
entertainment (52.8%), clothes (49.8%), travelling (32.5%), rent/accommodation (31.25), 
others (29%), bills (24%) and tuition (5.25%). Hence, it could be observed that the top three 
items that the respondents spend on are food, hand phones and books. 
 
5.5.2.2 Part B – Parents’ duty to maintain their children 
Table 5.6: Distribution of five responses on parents’ duty to maintain their children 
(N=400) 
 
Question 
Strongly 
disagree 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Not Sure 
(%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Strongly 
agree 
(%) 
1. Parents have a duty to support or 
maintain their children 
 
2.2 2.5 5.5 47.8 42 
2. The duty of parents to maintain 
their child is a moral duty. 
 
1.5 3.8 5.7 51 38 
3. The duty of parents to maintain 
their children is a legal duty. 
2.8 7.2 21.5 42.8 25.7 
4. The duty of parents to support 
their children ends when the 
child reaches the age of 18 years 
or completes his or her SPM. 
 
22.8 33 19.2 16.5 8.5 
5. The parents’ duty to support their 
children ends when he or she 
completes his or her STPM/A-
Levels/Matriculation/Diploma 
 
16 34.5 18.2 21 10.3 
6. The parents’ duty to support their 
children ends when he or she 
obtains his or her first degree 
 
8.2 25.5 21 33.3 12 
7. The parents’ duty to support their 
children ends when he or she gets 
a job. 
 
9.5 12.8 12.7 37 28 
8. The parents’ duty to support their 
children ends when he or she gets 
married. 
15.2 15.3 11.2 21.8 36.5 
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Table 5.6 shows the respondents’ level of agreement on a five-point Likert-type scale on 
the parents’ duty to maintain their children. The majority of the respondents agree (47.8%) 
and strongly agree (42%) that parents have a duty to support their children. More than half 
the respondents (51%) agree and 38% strongly agree that the duty of parents to maintain their 
child is a moral duty, whereas 42.8% agree and 25.7% strongly agree that the duty to maintain 
is a legal duty.  Items 4-8 question the respondents on when does the parents’ duty to maintain 
end. 33% disagree and 22.8% strongly disagree that it ends when the child reaches the age 
of 18 years or completes his or her SPM (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia). 34.5% disagree that it 
ends when the child completed his or her STPM (Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia) or A-
Levels or Matriculation or Diploma. 33.3% agree that it ends when the child obtains his or 
her first degree, 37% agree that it ends when he or she gets a job and finally 36.5% strongly 
agree that it ends when he or she gets married. Hence, from the above statistics it could be 
observed that the majority of the respondents agree that the parents’ duty to maintain their 
child ends when he or she gets a job (37%).  
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5.5.2.3 Part C – Involvement of parents in their studies 
 
Table 5.7: Distribution of five responses on involvement of your parents in your 
studies (N=400) 
 
Question 
Strongly 
disagree 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Not 
Sure 
(%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Strongly 
agree 
(%) 
1.  Advise me frequently about my 
studies. 
2.5 6.2 7 42.3 42 
2.  Advise me to study hard. 1.2 3.5 4.3 36 55 
3.  Provide the necessary facilities   
for me to study. 
1.5 1.7 8.8 44.8 43.2 
4. Monitor my progress in my 
studies. 
2.5 10 19.2 43.3 25 
5.  Make sure that I do not 
unnecessarily spend money. 
2.5 8.8 22 42.2 24.5 
6.  Make sure that I inform them 
about my results in my exams or 
assignments. 
3.2 13.3 15.5 40.5 27.5 
7.  Give me money for my daily 
expenses when I ask them. 
3.5 10.2 11.8 43.2 31.3 
8.  Control my expenditure. 9.5 31 22.5 27.2 9.8 
9.  Advise me to reduce my expenses 
on my handphone bills 
11.7 26.3 18.2 29.8 14 
 
Table 5.7 shows the level of agreement of the respondents on a five point Likert-type of 
scale on the involvement of their parents in their studies. 42.3% of the respondents agree that 
their parents advise them frequently about their studies, 55% strongly agree that the parents 
advise them to study hard, 44.8% agree that their parents provide the necessary facilities for 
them to study, 43.3% agree that their parents monitor their progress in their studies, 42.2% 
agree that their parents make sure that they do not unnecessarily spend money, 40.5% agree 
that their parents make sure that they inform them about their results in their exams or 
assignments, 43.2% agree that the parents give them money for their daily expenses when 
they ask them, 31% disagree that their parents control their expenditure and finally, 29.8% 
agree that their parents advise them to reduce their expenses on their hand phone bills. 
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5.5.2.4 Part D – Knowledge on non-Muslim Maintenance Laws in Malaysia 
 
Table 5.8: Proportion of Agree response for non-Muslim Maintenance Laws in 
Malaysia 
Non-Muslim Maintenance Laws in 
Malaysia 
 
Agree response 
n (%) 
 
Do you know that a person reaches the age of 
majority when he or she is 18 years old? 
(N=393) 
296 (75.3) 
Do you agree that parents should stop 
maintaining their children once they reach 
the age of 18? (N=392) 
71 (18.1) 
Do you think that an average 18-year-old in 
Malaysia without any disabilities has the 
capacity to earn a living for himself or 
herself?  (N=392) 
171 (43.6) 
Do you think that an 18-year-old in Malaysia 
has the same capacity to earn a living as an 
18 year old in a Western country? (N=392) 
84 (21.4) 
Do you think that the Government should 
create an awareness among the parents about 
their duty to continue maintaining their 
children although they have reached the age 
of 18 years? (N=391) 
308 (78.8) 
 
Are you aware that parents who are earning 
and have to pay income tax to the 
Government are given a tax deduction for the 
cost of their children's tertiary education? 
(N=291) 
231 (79.4) 
In your opinion, should Parliament amend or 
change the law as stated above? (N=342) 
185 (54.1) 
If Parliament does not change the law, do 
you think that the Government should then 
provide free tertiary education in public 
universities in the event certain parents do 
not want to finance the cost of their children's 
education? (N=386) 
221 (57.3) 
If your answer to the above question is yes, 
do you think that the Malaysian Government 
would be able to finance the cost of tertiary 
education in public universities bearing in 
mind that Malaysia is still a developing 
nation? (N=215)* 
154 (71.6) 
*Total is not 221 due to non-response 
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Table 5.8 assesses the respondents’ general knowledge about the duty to maintain with 
questions posed in which the answer is either yes or not. In addition, the respondents were 
asked to state the reasons for their answers in items 5,7,8 and 9. 
Most of the respondents (75.3%, n=296) know that a person reaches the age of majority 
when he or she is 18 years old. Only 18.1% (n=71) agree that the parents should stop 
maintaining their children once they reach the age of 18. Less than half (43.6%, n=171) agree 
that an average 18-year-old in Malaysia without any disabilities has the capacity to earn a 
living for himself or herself. Most of the respondents (78.6%, n=308) disagreed that an 18-
year-old in Malaysia has the same earning capacity to earn a living as an 18-year-old in a 
Western country. 78.8% (n=308) agree that the Government should create an awareness 
among the parents about their duty to continue maintaining their children although they have 
reached the age of 18 years. The top four reasons given by the respondents for this item are 
as follows: (a) at the age of 18, young vulnerable adults should focus on their studies rather 
than working; (b) children aged 18 years are not matured enough to make decisions and face 
the real world; (c) a transition in life occurs at the age of 18 where a person wants to try 
everything, hence the guidance and support from parents are really needed to help make a 
right decision and prevent them from social problems; and (d) an 18 year old Malaysian youth 
is not as matured or independent as a Western youth, hence they need guidance, support and 
supervision from their parents. 
Most of the respondents (79.4%, n=231) are aware that parents who are earning and have 
to pay income tax to the Government are given a tax deduction for the cost of their children’s 
tertiary education. More than half the respondents (54.1%, n=185) were of the opinion that 
the Parliament should amend or change the law. The four top reasons given for this item are 
as follows: (a) both Muslim and non-Muslim children need to be treated fairly; (b) it is good 
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if parents keep maintaining even if the child reaches the age of majority as the child needs to 
continue to study and graduate with flying colours; (c) laws need to be updated to keep 
abreast with the current situation; and (d) to ensure that the child’s necessities are protected 
and fulfilled. 
More than half of the respondents (57.3%, n=221) agree that if Parliament does not change 
the law, the Government should then provide free tertiary education in public universities in 
the event certain parents do not want to finance the cost of their children’s education. The 
top five reasons given for this item  are as follows: (a) the youth have a right to education 
right up to the tertiary level as they are the future leaders and education is essential to them; 
(b) education fees is very expensive and many youth who cannot afford it would seek 
employment rather than studying; (c) the tax paid by the parents can be used to cover the 
education fees; (d) only give free education to children with excellent results who come from 
poor families; and (e) it is the government’s duty to provide free education to all citizens. 
Majority of the respondents (71.6%, n=154) who answered yes for item 8, agree in item 9 
that the Malaysian government would be able to finance the cost of tertiary education in 
public universities bearing in mind that Malaysia is still a developing nation. Two top reasons 
given for this item are: (a) Malaysia has sufficient income from resources such as trading and 
taxes; and (b) the Malaysian Government should plan for a better education scheme.  
 
5.5.3 Discussion 
From the survey conducted above, it is indeed heartening to note that it yielded results in 
tandem with the writer’s suggestions. Majority of the undergraduates are of the view that the 
laws should be amended to extend the parents’ duty to maintain their children even though 
they had reached the age of majority. It should be noted here that although the cost of study 
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of the majority of the respondents who participated in the survey was funded by PTPTN, 
these are the fortunate students who have succeeded in obtaining a place in public 
universities. Seats are limited in public universities and not all students who apply would be 
successful. Therefore, the plight of the students who do not get a place in the public 
universities should be considered, bearing in mind the high cost of education in private 
institutions of higher learning. Besides university fees, these students also have to bear the 
cost of living, which increases annually, especially those living in Kuala Lumpur and big 
cities in Malaysia. Until and unless the relevant laws are amended to extend the parents’ duty 
to maintain young vulnerable adults, the plight of these youngsters, especially those from 
broken homes remain doubtful and may result in social problems. 
 
5.6 COMPARING THE POSITION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
5.6.1 Singapore 
Prior to one of the major amendments to the Women’s Charter in 1996, a child 
maintenance order ceased to be in effect in Singapore once the child attained the age of 
twenty-one years (the former section 125).23 However, no exception was provided for in this 
section in the event the child wanted to extend the maintenance order beyond his twenty-first 
birthday. 
This issue in fact was raised in the landmark decision in PQR (mw) v STR,24 which could 
be described as the case that triggered the amendment to section 69 of the Women’s Charter.  
The court held that as the daughter had passed her twenty-first birthday, she could no longer 
claim maintenance. In addition, the court stated that if it is felt that section 125 is 
                                                          
23 Note that the Women’s Charter considers the age of majority of a child as twenty-one years. This could be distinguished from the position 
in Malaysia as under section 95 of the LRA, the maintenance order ceases when the child attains the age of eighteen. 
24 [1993] 1 SLR 574. 
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unsatisfactory, it is up to the Parliament and not the courts to take measures to solve this 
problem.  
Section 125 was also criticised by scholars. For example, Professor Leong Wai Kum, in 
her article entitled The duty to maintain spouse and children,25 in criticizing section 125 
stated as follows: 
‘… it fails to create an exception in the case of children beyond the age of twenty-one 
who are still receiving education. Should not their parents still be liable to maintain 
them? It is anomalous that there ought not be a legal liability in a society as committed 
to education and training in Singapore.’  
As a result of the weakness in section 125, the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 199626 
repealed section 125 and amended section 69 accordingly. The present section 69(2) states 
that a District Court or a Magistrate’s Court is empowered to order a parent, who has 
neglected or refused to provide maintenance to his child, pay a monthly allowance or a lump 
sum to the child. Section 69(6) provides that a maintenance order ‘ceases to be in force on 
the day on which the child attains the age of 21 years unless the order is expressed to continue 
in force for a period ending after that day’. Hence, it could be seen here that the court is 
empowered to extend the maintenance order beyond the child’s twenty-first birthday. 
In the writer’s opinion, section 69(6) is an improvement over the former section 125, 
which did not provide for any form of exception. The exceptions that are applicable are laid 
down in section 69(5) as follows: 
                                                          
25 (1987) 29 Mal LR 56, at 77-78. 
26 Act No.30/96 
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The court shall not make an order under subsection (2) for the benefit of a child who 
has attained the age of 21 years or for a period that extends beyond the day on which 
the child will attain that age unless the court is satisfied that the provision of the 
maintenance is necessary because- 
(a) of a mental or physical disability of the child; 
(b) the child is or will be serving full-time national service; 
(c) the child is or will be or (if an order were made under subsection (2)) would be 
receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a 
trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment; or 
(d) special circumstances, other than those stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), exist 
which justify the making of the order. 
The above provisions have raised the hopes of the young vulnerable adults in Singapore 
who intend to pursue their tertiary education or training. Subsection (5) could be said to have 
liberated the duration of maintenance order from the tight clutches of the former section 125, 
which did not provide for any exception at all.  
Four exceptions are laid down in section 69(5). The first exception in paragraph (a) 
pertaining to a mental or physical disability of a child is similar to the exception in our section 
95 of the LRA. The second exception, in paragraph (b) refers to children who are or would 
be ‘serving full-time national service’. In the writer’s opinion, this exception should also be 
applicable in Malaysia, as most of the eighteen-year old children here have to serve national 
service. 
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The third exception in paragraph (c),27 which the writer feels is the most pertinent 
exception, provides that if the child is either ‘receiving instruction at an educational 
establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation’, he is entitled to be 
maintained by his parents. In addition, paragraph (c) further states ‘whether or not while in 
gainful employment’. This means that even though the child is in gainful employment while 
pursuing his tertiary education or undergoing training, he is still entitled to be maintained by 
his parents. This paragraph could be described as the provision that is most favourable to 
young vulnerable adults in Singapore. 
Finally, paragraph (d) states that if there are special circumstances that exist, other than 
the three circumstances provided for in paragraphs (a) – (c), which justify the court in 
extending the maintenance or the court would extend the order. This too in the writer’s 
opinion gives the court ample room to extend the duration of a maintenance order if it feels 
that special circumstances and it feels that these circumstances justify the extension. 
However, what amounts to ‘special circumstances’ is entirely up to the court’s interpretation.  
Although the amendment to section 69 as discussed above has promoted and safeguarded 
the welfare of the young vulnerable adults in Singapore, it still came under scrutiny by 
Professor Leong Wai Kum, in her book entitled Principles of Family Law in Singapore. 28 
The learned author stated that although this amendment is much welcomed, there is still a 
slight defect as section 69(6) states that the maintenance order ceases when the child attains 
the age of twenty-one years ‘unless the order is expressed to continue in force for a period 
ending after that day.'” The adult child then must reapply on the basis of any of the grounds 
mentioned in section 69(5).  This, according to the learned author causes inconvenience for 
                                                          
27 Note that the Singapore High Court in the case of Wong Ser Yen v Ng Cheong Ling [2006] 1 SLR 416 held that as the oldest child here 
was twenty-eight years old and was receiving medical treatment and studies abroad, he has satisfied the exception in section 69(5). In 
addition, the middle child was also awarded maintenance as she was still receiving tertiary education. 
28 Leong, Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore:  Butterworths, Asia, 1997,) at 865.  
238 
 
the child or his care-giver. It would be better if the maintenance order continues beyond the 
child’s twenty-first birthday. The payer would then have to apply for an order from the court 
to rescind the maintenance order if he can prove that the adult child is no longer financially 
dependent.  
The writer submits that where the Malaysian position on this issue is concerned, it would 
be greatly appreciated if the Malaysian legislature follows the footsteps of its Singapore 
counterpart and amend section 95 of the LRA in order to safeguard the welfare of the young 
vulnerable adults who intend to pursue their tertiary education or vocational training.  
 
5.6.2 England and Wales 
As to the position in England and Wales on the right of young vulnerable adults to 
continue receiving maintenance from their parents, the writer would be referring to two 
statutes:  Children Act 1989 and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
 
The definition of a ‘child ' in the Children Act 1989 is provided under section 105(1) of 
the Act. This provision defines ‘child’ as ‘a person under the age of eighteen’. The section 
goes on to provide that this definition is subject to Schedule 1, paragraph 16. 
Schedule 1 of this Act provides for ‘Financial Provision for Children’. Paragraph 16 
Schedule 1 states that ‘child’ in this schedule, includes a person who has attained 18 years, 
if an application is made under paragraph 2 or 6. Hence, this means that a young vulnerable 
adult’s right to maintenance is protected under this Act. This specifically could be seen in 
paragraph 2, which provides for ‘Orders for financial relief for persons over eighteen’. 
Paragraph 2(1) provides as follows: 
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(1) If, on the application by a person who has reached the age of eighteen, it appears 
to the court – 
(a) that the applicant is or will be or (if an order …) would be receiving instruction 
at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession 
or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment; or 
(b) that there are special circumstances which justify the making of an order under 
this paragraph, 
the court may make one or both of the orders mentioned in sub-paragraph (2). 
Hence, it could be seen above that the statutory provision expressly provides that if a 
young vulnerable adult intends to pursue his tertiary education or undergo training for a trade, 
profession or vocation, whether or not in gainful employment, he could ask for maintenance 
from his parents. This is similar to the exception in section 69(5) of the Singapore Women’s 
Charter. The second exception too is similar to section 69(5) of the Women’s Charter i.e. if 
the court finds that ‘there are special circumstances that justify the court in making such a 
maintenance order in favour of the young vulnerable adult’. However, it is to be noted that 
this provision is silent on whether a disabled young vulnerable adult could continue to be 
maintained by his parents, as is provided for in the exception to section 95 of the Malaysian 
LRA as well as section 69(5) of the Singapore Women’s Charter. 
The second statute that provides a right to be maintained to young vulnerable adults in the 
England and Wales  is the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Section 29(1) of this Act provides 
that subject to subsection (3), the court will not grant a financial provision order in favour of 
a child who has reached the age of eighteen years. Subsection (3), however, provides for two 
exceptions to the general rule in subsection (1) as follows: 
240 
 
(a) The child is, or will be, … receiving instruction at an educational establishment or 
undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not he is also, 
or will also be in gainful employment; or 
(b) There are special circumstances which justify the making of an order … 
It could be observed here that the two exceptions provided in section 29(3) of the 
Matrimonial Causes 1973 is similar to Schedule 1 paragraph 2 of the Children Act 1989. 
Once again, there is no mention of disabled young vulnerable adults in the above provision. 
However, this issue was raised two cases, C v F (Disabled Child: Maintenance Orders)29 and 
T v S (Financial Provision for Children).30 The courts in these cases have held that the phrase 
‘special circumstances in section 29(3)(b) may refer to physical disability or any other 
disability’. 
Thus, it could be observed that young vulnerable adults in England and Wales who intend 
to pursue their tertiary education or undergo for a trade, profession or vocation have a right 
to claim maintenance from their parents, even though they may already be earning an income. 
Hence, it could be observed that the laws in England and Wales too protect the welfare of 
their young vulnerable adults. 
 
5.6.3 Australia 
The Family Law Act 1975 in Australia generally provides that a child maintenance order 
ceases when the child attains the age of eighteen (section 66T). However, section 66L creates 
two exceptions in two situations. The first situation is where an application is made to the 
court for a maintenance order in relation to a child who is 18 years or above (section 66L(1)). 
                                                          
29 [1998] 2 FLR 1, CA 
30 [1994] 2 FLR 883. 
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In such a situation, the court may award the order if it feels that the provision of maintenance 
is necessary (emphasis added) either to: 
(a) enable the child to complete his or her education; or 
(b) because of mental or physical disability of the child. 
The second situation is where an application is made to the court for a child maintenance 
order in relation to a child who is still below the age of eighteen. However, the issue is 
whether the court could extend the order beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday. The court is 
allowed to do so if it is satisfied that it is necessary (emphasis added) (section 66L(2)): 
(a) to enable the child to complete his or her education; or 
(b) because of a mental or physical disability of the child. 
At this juncture, the writer would like to highlight that section 66L is unique and is not 
found in its counterparts in Singapore or England and Wales. It provides for two situations 
when an application could be made, first when the child has already attained the age of 
eighteen or above, and secondly, when the child is still below the age of eighteen. The 
exceptions provided in both these situations are however the same. 
Before examining the two exceptions provided in section 66L, the writer would first 
examine the meaning of the word ‘necessary’ that appears in both section 66L(1) and (2). 
Section 66L’s predecessor, section 76(3), had a similar provision. The Australian courts 
initially gave a strict interpretation to the word ‘necessary’ and held that it meant that the 
financial support was essential to enable the child to complete his or her education or where 
he or she is mentally or physically disabled and not merely because it was desirable or 
242 
 
reasonable.31 However, in the case of In the Marriage of Tuck,32 the Full Court of the Family 
Court adopted a liberal approach of the word ‘necessary’ and held that the financial support 
was needed by the child for one of the reasons mentioned therein and that it was reasonable 
for the parents to contribute towards the maintenance of the child. Hence, the court held that 
‘necessary’ meant reasonably necessary rather than absolutely necessary. 
As could be observed above, there are two exceptions laid down in section 66L(1) and 
(2). One of the exceptions mentioned therein, i.e. where the child is physically or mentally 
disabled, is similar to the section 95 of the LRA.  The second exception is ‘to enable the child 
to complete his or her education’. When compared to the provisions in Singapore and 
England and Wales, it could be observed that this exception is termed very generally as it 
does not specify the nature of the education and whether it includes training in any field as 
well. 
However, section 4 of the Act defines ‘education’ to include ‘apprenticeship or vocational 
training’. In addition, judicial decisions have also interpreted ‘education’ to mean that ‘it 
extends beyond just scholastic apprenticeship or vocational matters and includes any form of 
training for a skill.’33 It also includes to study for a basic degree34 and a study to complete a 
combined degree.35 This may include pupillage or chambering, attachment and 
apprenticeship. 
The judicial attitude in giving a very wide interpretation to the exception in section 66L 
could be noticed in the case of Keltie & Keltie & Bradford36 (this case was discussed in 
                                                          
31 In the Marriage of Oliver [1977] FLC 90-033, at 76,202; In the Marriage of Gamble (1978) 32 FLR 198 at 207; In the Marriage of 
Mercer [1976] FLC 90-033 at 71.130. 
32 [1981] FLC 91-021. 
33 In the Marriage of O’Dempsey (1990) 1 FLR 158 at 161. 
34 In the Marriage of Tuck [1981] FLC 91-021. 
35 In the Marriage of Campbell (1987) 92 FLR 130, at 151. 
36 [2002] Fam CA 421  
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Chapter 4 in subtopic 4.4.3 concerning Step-children). In this case the issue was whether 
section 66L extends to maintaining a step-child who has attained the age of eighteen years. 
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia held that as section 66L also applies to 
maintenance orders made under sections 66M and 66N (both relate to the duty of step-parent 
to maintain), hence, a step-parent too could be ordered to continue paying maintenance to his 
step-child although the latter has attained the age of eighteen.  
Secondly, the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 lists down in section 12 the events 
that terminate a child support. Section 12(1)(c) provides for a situation where ‘the child turns 
18’. However, a Note to section 12(1)(c) states that paragraph (c) may be subject to section 
151C.37 Section 151C could be described as a lengthy and complicated provision. 
Nevertheless, having perused the provision, two exceptions may be considered by the 
Registrar when an application is made to continue an administrative assessment or child 
support agreement in relation to a child: 
(a) the child is likely to be in full-time secondary education on the child’s 18th 
birthday;38 and 
(b) there are, in the Registrar’s opinion, exceptional circumstances justifying the 
making of the application after the child’s 18th birthday.39 
Perusing the two exceptions above, it could be observed that the second exception 
concerning ‘exceptional circumstances’ gives a wide discretion to the Registrar to decide 
whether he wants to continue the administration or child support agreement. However, the 
first exception creates some confusion as it specifically refers to ‘full-time secondary 
                                                          
37 Section 151C concerns Continuing administrative assessments and child support agreements beyond a child’s 18th birthday in certain 
situations. 
38 Section 151C(2)(c). 
39 Section 151C(2)(e)(ii). 
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education’. This differs from the exceptions as provided in the Singapore and UK statutes 
which clearly state tertiary education or vocational training. However, the issue that arises 
here is whether ‘full-time secondary education’ refers to secondary school or does it extend 
to tertiary education? 
Reference could be made to section 5 of this Act which defines ‘full-time secondary 
education’ to mean ‘education that is determined by the secondary school at which the child 
is receiving education to be full-time secondary education’. Section 5 also defines ‘secondary 
school’ to mean ‘technical and further educational institution or any other educational 
institution at which full-time secondary education is provided.’ Hence, it is observed that a 
child who is eighteen years of age could only apply to extend the assessment or child support 
agreement beyond his eighteenth birthday if he wants to complete his secondary school 
education. There is no mention in the above section about tertiary education. However, the 
writer submits that it is arguable if an eighteen year old wanting to pursue his or her tertiary 
education or vocational training could apply under the second exception in section 151C(2), 
i.e. where in the Registrar’s opinion there are exceptional circumstances justifying the 
extension of the assessment or the child support agreement beyond the child’s eighteenth 
birthday. It is yet to be seen if the judiciary in Australia would bring the above situation under 
the second exception. 
 
5.7 DISCUSSION 
On the whole, it could be said that the young vulnerable adults in Malaysia, especially 
those from broken homes and intend to pursue their tertiary education are in a deplorable 
state. The 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah are of no assistance at all 
as both these Acts are silent on this issue. The LRA, on the other hand, restricts the right to 
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continue claiming for maintenance to disabled young vulnerable adults (section 95). The 
hopes raised by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the case of Karunairajah was 
shattered by the Federal Court decision in the same case where the court gave a strict 
interpretation to the phrase ‘physically or mentally disabled’ in section 95 of the LRA. The 
two decisions discussed after the Federal Court’s decision, i.e. the case of Uma Sundari and 
Teo Ai Teng are of minimal assistance as it has not altered the position laid down by the 
Federal Court in Karunairajah. 
The writer respectfully submits that in deciding the case, the learned Federal Court judge 
failed to refer to the welfare principle. The welfare of a child has always been considered as 
the paramount consideration by the courts.40 In addition, the writer submits that when a child 
attains the age of eighteen, it is the most critical point in his life as that is the age at which he 
comes to cross-roads and has to make a decision regarding his future. Already in a vulnerable 
position, section 95 of the LRA aggravates the situation by stating that the parents do not 
have to maintain the child anymore as he is a major now. Children from broken homes who 
intend to pursue their tertiary education suffer the most as their parents may not want to 
finance their education, trying to pass the buck to their spouse.  They may even be literally 
thrown out of their homes by their parents due to section 95 of the LRA. 
Previous research shows that even though a child has reached the age of majority, be it 
eighteen or twenty-one, he may still need to be supported by his parents until he finds an 
employment and is able to fend for himself. The welfare principle still plays an important 
                                                          
40 Re Satpal Singh, An Infant [1958] MLJ 283, Allen v Allen [1951] 1 AllER 724, In re Thain [1926] Ch 676, Masam  v Salina Saropa & 
Anor [1974] 2 MLJ 59, Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234. 
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role in safeguarding the right to maintenance of these young vulnerable adults even though 
they are literally no longer children.41 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, cost of tertiary education is not cheap. Although 
scholarships are available, not everyone who applies for it would be successful. In addition, 
although the cost of education in public universities is more affordable than private 
institutions, there are only limited seats available in the public universities.  It should also be 
borne in mind that Malaysia is not a welfare state.  
The writer would also like to highlight here that at the time when section 95 was drafted 
in 1976, there were only a handful higher learning institutions available in Malaysia. In 
addition, not all young vulnerable adults were keen on pursuing their tertiary education. Most 
of them starting earning after completing their SPM examination. For example, the number 
of undergraduates enrolled in the public institutions of higher learning in Malaysia in 2002 
was 184,190 and private institutions of higher learning was 67,062.42 However this number 
escalated nearly five times in the year 2015 to 540,638 undergraduates in public institutions 
of higher learning and about seven times to 493,926 undergraduates in private institutions of 
higher learning.43 
At the same the Government too could be said to indirectly encourage the parents to 
maintain the cost of their child’s tertiary education. This could be seen in section 48(2) of the 
                                                          
41 Nuraisyah Chua Abdullah, “Parent’s Obligation Towards Maintenance of Children in Tertiary Education: An Overview of the Islamic 
Law and Family Laws in Malaysia in Comparison With UK,” [2006] 5 MLJ cvi; [2006] 5 MLJA 106, Sridevi Thambapillay, “Karunairajah 
a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Ponniah: The Need To Amend Section 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976?”, (2005) 
32 JMCL, 109-128, Kalmijn Matthijs , “How Childhood Circumstances Moderate the Long-Term Impact of Divorce on Father-Child 
Relationships”, (Aug 2015) 77, Journal of Family and Marriage  Issue 4, 921-938, Gilligan, Megan, Suitor, J. Jill, Pillemer, 
Karl, “Estrangement Between Mothers and Adult Children: The Role of Norms and Values”, (Aug 2015), 77 Journal of Marriage & 
Family. Issue 4, 908-920, Martín-Lagos López, María, “The Type of Support that Adult Children Solicit from Their Mothers in European 
Welfare Systems”, (May2014) 117 Social Indicators Research.  Issue 1, 209-233. 
42 Information obtained from the Ministry of Higher Education’s website at www.mohe.gov.my accessed on 11 January 2017. 
43 Ibid 
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Malaysian Income Tax 1967 which provides that tax deduction would be given to parents 
who pay for their child’s tertiary education. 
Hence, the effect of section 95 of the LRA is that it would lead to drastic consequences as 
envisaged by his Lordship Mahadev Shankar JCA in the case of Ching Seng Woah where he 
stated that section 95 would then become a bohsia’s charter, which means that it (the section) 
would create a generation of youths who roam the streets, without a roof above their heads. 
It would also increase the crime rate in Malaysia, as these young vulnerable adults may 
indulge in illegal activities. 
The position in the other jurisdictions such as Singapore, England and Wales and Australia 
is far advanced. In Australia, for example, in addition to the laws, the judiciary too bends 
backwards to help the young vulnerable adults, as was seen in the case of Keltie & Keltie & 
Bradford. The court here was willing to order a step-parent to continue maintaining his 
eighteen-year old step-child. Whereas in Malaysia, the courts are not willing to even order 
the natural parent to pay maintenance as section 95 of the LRA expressly states that the 
maintenance order ceases when the child reaches as the age of eighteen. The writer would 
suggest some recommendations to overcome this problem in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
On the whole, it could be stated that the current maintenance laws in Malaysia, be it the 
1950 Act, the LRA or the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah do not promote the welfare of 
young vulnerable adults. Only the disabled benefit by the exception in section 95 of the LRA 
which states that their parents have to continue maintaining them even though they have 
attained the age of eighteen. As for the rest of the young vulnerable adults, especially those 
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from broken homes, it could be said that their whole future is at stake due to their financial 
instability. 
The survey conducted among the undergraduates to obtain their perception on the current 
laws produced results in in the interest of the young vulnerable adults. Majority of the 
undergraduate were strongly of the opinion that the current laws should be amended to enable 
a young vulnerable adult to be continued to be maintained by his parents if he intends to 
pursue his tertiary education. 
The position in the three jurisdictions are far advanced when compared to the position in 
Malaysia. In fact, the Muslim young vulnerable adults are in a better position in Malaysia 
when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts as under the Islamic Family Law Statutes, 
the court could order their parents to continue maintaining them if they want to pursue their 
tertiary education.  
Therefore, in conclusion, unless the current laws are amended, the welfare of these young 
vulnerable adults would not be safeguarded. As mentioned earlier, the consequences of the 
current laws could also be drastic and lead to social problems. We should never forget that 
these young vulnerable adults are the very persons who may be the future leaders of our 
nation.  
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CHAPTER 6: ARREARS AND VARIATION OF MAINTENANCE  
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this Chapter, the writer would be discussing two further issues concerning child 
maintenance, which are pertinent in safeguarding the welfare of the child. The two issues 
are arrears of maintenance and variation or rescission of maintenance orders. Both these 
issues affect the welfare of the child, as the parent who has the duty to maintain would 
not have paid maintenance for a certain period of time prior to the filing of the petition or 
the parent who is ordered by the court to pay maintenance, may apply to court later to 
either reduce the maintenance sum or rescind the order altogether. In both these situations, 
the person adversely affected is the child. 
The writer would first examine the statutes and judicial decisions in Malaysia 
pertaining to the two issues, after which a comparison would be made with the positions 
in Singapore, England and Wales and Australia. 
 
6.2 ARREARS OF MAINTENANCE 
The first issue that would be examined in this Chapter is concerning the right of a child 
to claim arrears of maintenance where his or her parent has not maintained him or her for 
a considerable period of time prior to the filing of the maintenance petition. Parents who 
face marital problems sometimes start neglecting to maintain their children because they 
feel that they do not have any responsibility of maintaining their children anymore as their 
marriage is on the verge of a breakdown or has already irretrievably broken down. These 
parents do not care if their child suffers as a result of their neglect. The feeling of ‘why  
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should I maintain my children when my spouse could do so?’ arises. The welfare of the 
child concerned is totally ignored in such a situation. 
Thus, when a petition claiming for maintenance against these parents who have 
neglected or refused to maintain the children is filed, one question that arises is whether 
the arrears of maintenance could be claimed? If the answer to this question is yes, the 
second question that arises is whether there is a time limit to claim the arrears? The writer 
would next examine the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act (‘the 1950 
Act’), Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (‘the LRA’) and the Maintenance 
Ordinance 1959 of Sabah (‘the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah’) in order to see the 
provisions on arrears of maintenance. 
 
6.2.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
The 1950 Act, in section 3(3) provides for the right to claim arrears of maintenance. 
This section provides as follows: 
(3) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of such neglect or refusal or 
from such later date as may be specified in the order. 
Upon reading the provision, prima facie it seems that the court is empowered to order 
the parent to pay the monthly allowance from the date he neglected or refused to pay the 
child his or her maintenance or from such later date as to the court seems reasonable. In 
the writer's opinion, this seems to be a fair provision as it emphasises the fact that parents 
should think twice before they neglect or refuse to maintain their child. 
Nevertheless, it is equally important to examine judicial decisions that have been 
decided on the issue of arrears of maintenance under section 3(3) the 1950 Act.1 One of 
                                                          
1It is to be noted here that although the cases discussed above refer to spousal maintenance, the same statutory provision on arrears 
of maintenance is applicable to child maintenance as well. 
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the earliest cases that discussed this issue is Amrick Lall v Sombaiavati.2 The judgment 
in Amrick Lall was followed in the case of Gangagharan v Sathiabama.3 One of the 
grounds raised in this case was that the Sessions Court President had failed to consider 
the principle in Pilcher v Pilcher4 that arrears, as a matter of practice, are allowable only 
for one year. In this case, the learned President of the Sessions Court had allowed it for 
nearly ten years, i.e. from August 1968 to March 1978. 
The High Court agreed with the decision in Amrick Lall and Pilcher (which followed 
the principle laid down in an earlier case of Kerr v Kerr,5 that it had been the practice of 
the Divorce Division to allow payment of arrears of maintenance for not more than one 
year unless there are special circumstances). The rationale for this principle is that the 
"court treats the payment as a fund of maintenance and not as property".6 Thus, the 
appellant's appeal was allowed. 
At this juncture, it is respectfully submitted that the learned counsels in both Amrick 
Lall and Gangagharan did not refer to the 1950 Act which was in force at that point of 
time. If reference had been made to this statute, the court would have had the opportunity 
to refer to section 3(3) which expressly states that maintenance shall be payable from the 
date of neglect or refusal to pay or such later date as the court may order. The court then 
would not have any need to refer to the practice concerning claiming arrears of 
maintenance in England. It would have been interesting to note what the court's stance 
would have been, i.e. whether it would have given prominence to the practice of the 
Divorce Division in England. 
                                                          
2 [1973] 2 MLJ 191. The High Court in this case referred to and agreed with Ormrod LJ’s decision in Luscombe v Luscombe [1962] 
1 WLR 313, where his Lordship held that although a wife may be entitled to the whole of the arrears available, as a matter of practice 
the court will not allow the arrears for more than twelve months. In stating this, Ormrod LJ referred to the referred to the decision of 
Lord Merriman P in Pilcher v Pilcher [1956] 1 WLR 289. 
3 [1979] 2 MLJ 77. 
4Supra n.2. 
5 [1897] 2 QB 439. 
6Supra n 3 at 78. 
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Notwithstanding the two decisions discussed above, the High Court in the case of Lee 
Yu Lan v Lim Thain Chye7 referred specifically to the 1950 Act concerning arrears of 
maintenance (which was referred to as ‘past maintenance’ in this case). The peculiarity 
of this case was that the application for maintenance was made under section 77(1) of the 
LRA.8 However, the court went on to say that the court, in the absence of any express 
provision, is not precluded from referring to the 1950 Act which expressly states that the 
court may order maintenance to be payable from the date of neglect or refusal to maintain. 
Two observations may be made from the above decision. First, the application for 
maintenance was made under section 77(1) of the LRA. As such, when dealing with the 
issue of past maintenance or arrears of maintenance, the court should have referred to 
section 86(3) of the LRA which specifically provides that a time limit to claim arrears of 
maintenance for a spouse should not exceed three years.9 
Secondly, the court was not referred to the 1950 Act by the counsels. The court's 
judgment as to the issue of maintenance was based solely on the provisions in the LRA. 
However, towards the end of the judgment, it was surprising to note that the learned judge, 
when deciding on the issue of past maintenance suddenly referred to the 1950 Act. Further 
thereto, the learned judge also did not refer to the two cases discussed above, i.e. Amrick 
Lall and Gangagharan, which state that the arrears of maintenance should not be more 
than one year. 
Taking into account the above observations, it is submitted that the case of Lee Yu Lan 
seemed to break away from the time limit to claim the arrears of maintenance under the 
1950 Act as laid down by Amrick Lall and Gangagharan (following the practice in the 
English Divorce Division).This case could be described as a step forward in the protection 
                                                          
7 [1984] 1 MLJ 56. 
8Section 77(1) of the LRA provides that the court may order maintenance of a spouse generally during the course of a matrimonial 
proceeding or when granting or subsequent to the granting of a decree of divorce or judicial separation or when a wife or former wife 
is found to be alive after a decree presuming her to be dead. 
9 A similar provision is found in section 98 of the LRA for the maintenance of child. 
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of the right of a child in claiming  arrears of maintenance from the defaulting parent (or 
the respondent), thereby ensuring that future respondents do not think that they could hide 
behind the ruling in Amrick Lall and Gangagharan which limits the claim for arrears of 
maintenance to not more than one year.  
 
6.2.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
The LRA provides for the recovery of arrears of maintenance for a child in section 98. 
This section provides that section 86 shall apply mutatis mutandis to orders for the 
payment of maintenance for the benefit of any child. Section 86(3) provides for the 
recovery of the arrears of maintenance for a spouse as follows: 
(3) No time amount owing as maintenance shall be recoverable in any suit if it 
accrued due more than three years before the institution of the suit. 
The three-year limit laid down for the payment of maintenance of a spouse equally 
applies to the maintenance of a child (section 98 of the LRA). In the writer's opinion, this 
provision, prima facie seems unfair to a child, especially where the parent has failed to 
maintain the child concerned for a considerable length of time. His or her liability is 
limited to a mere three years prior to the filing of the petition. 
Having looked at section 98 of the LRA, it is next pertinent to examine judicial 
decisions on this issue. One of the earliest decisions on this matter is the case of Leow 
Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor.10 In this case, the court held that the maintenance 
to be paid by the respondent should be backdated to November 1998, which was actually 
more than three-year limit set under section 86(3) and 98 of the LRA.  
                                                          
10 [1997] 3 MLJ 133. 
254 
 
The above decision is much welcomed as it allows backdated maintenance to the date 
of the neglect or refusal to pay maintenance by the respondent, without imposing any time 
limit. Further thereto, the learned judge himself had stated that the petitioner and her 
children ‘have been disgracefully neglected by the respondent’,11 thereby not condoning 
the respondent's behaviour in neglecting to pay maintenance for all these years.  
The above case was referred to in the case of Sivajothi a/p K. Suppiah v Kunathasan 
a/l Chelliah.12 In this case, the issue was whether the petitioner wife could claim the 
arrears of maintenance from March 1997 to March 1998. The learned judge in this case 
referred to a Singapore case, Gomez Nee David v Gomez Nee David13 where the court 
agreed with the decision in Ross v Pearson.14 In the case of Ross, Baker P referred to 
Pilcher v Pilcher (No.2)15 and Luscombe v Luscombe16 and held that the one year 
limitation was merely a matter of practice. Therefore, Latey J, in Gomez Nee David's case 
agreed with Baker P and stated that there was no universal absolute rule that a claim for 
arrears of maintenance should be limited to one year. His Lordship added that the decision 
in Pilcher and Luscombe should not be followed in Singapore on this issue. His Lordship 
in the present case next referred to Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng and agreed with 
the judgment that the claim or arrears of maintenance could be backdated. Thus, the court 
decided in the present case held that the wife is entitled to claim arrears of maintenance 
from 3rd March 1997 till the court makes the order for maintenance. The court in the 
present case seems to agree that backdated maintenance is allowed and did not impose 
any time limit on this issue. 
                                                          
11Ibid at 145-146 
12 [2000] 6 MLJ 48. 
13 [1985] 1 MLJ 27. 
14[1976] 1 WLR 224. 
15 [1956] 1 WLR 298. 
16 [1962] 1 WLR 313. 
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In the case of Diana Clarice Chan Ching Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo17 from Sarawak, 
the issue as to the arrears of maintenance was raised as the husband had failed to pay 
maintenance for one year preceding the date of the petition. The court ordered the husband 
to pay all arrears due for that one year. In this case, the court made reference to the 
provisions in the 1950 Act and the LRA concerning maintenance, but no reference was 
made to section 3(3) of the 1950 Act nor to sections 86(3) or 98 of the LRA concerning 
arrears of maintenance. Further thereto, the court did not discuss in detail on the issue of 
arrears of maintenance. 
The above case was referred to in Parkunan A/L Achulingam v Kalaiyarasi A/P 
Periyasamy18 regarding the arrears of maintenance. His Lordship Faiza Tamby Chik J 
referred to sections 86(3) and 98 of the LRA and further stated that the Court of Appeal 
in the case of Diana Clarice (discussed above) had exercised such power when the court 
ordered the husband to pay the arrears. 
Three observations could be made from the above. First, this case could be said to be 
the first case to specifically refer to sections 86(3) and 98 of the LRA concerning the 
arrears of maintenance.19 Secondly, although the court in the case of Diana Clarice did 
not specifically refer to the above two sections in the LRA, the court in Parkunan stated 
that the Court of Appeal in Diana Clarice had exercised the power as stated in these two 
LRA provisions. Thirdly, the decision in Parkunan is not clear as to whether the court is 
bound by the three-year limitation period as provided for in sections 86(3) and 98 of the 
LRA. 
                                                          
17 [2002] 1 CLJ 721 
18 [2004] 6 MLJ 240. 
19It is to be noted here that the respective courts in all the cases referred to earlier on arrears of maintenance, Leow Kooi Wah v Philip 
Ng Kok Seng & Anor, Sivajothi a/p K. Suppiah v Kunathasan a/l Chelliah and Diana Clarice Chan Ching Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo, 
did not refer to either section 86(3) nor section 98 of the LRA.  
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In another case from Sarawak, Lim Siaw Ying v Wong Seng & Datin Anak Lee,20 the 
court referred to the decision in Diana Clarice, where the court had ordered the husband 
to pay arrears of maintenance for a period of one year preceding the date of the 
maintenance order. In the present case, the High Court in fact went one step further and 
ordered the husband to pay the arrears from the date of the petition (14th January 2005) 
until the date of the maintenance order (15th January 2009), which totals to four years. 
This exceed the three-year limitation period imposed by the LRA. The court in the present 
case did not make any reference to the two relevant provisions in the LRA concerning 
arrears of maintenance. Nevertheless, the court did make reference to the other provisions 
in the LRA concerning the duty to maintain. Therefore, it is submitted that it is not clear 
whether this case should be described as departing from the time limit imposed by the 
LRA on the arrears of maintenance. 
However, the High Court in Sundaramoorthy a/l Marimuthu v Silvarani a/l 
Muniandy21 held that the wife could only claim for arrears of maintenance for three years 
before the cross petition dated 9th December 2010. However, as all the children had 
attained the age of eighteen as at 9th December 2007, they were not entitled to any arrears 
of maintenance. 
Hence the above case could be described as the first case to give a literal interpretation 
to the three- year limitation period imposed by sections 86(3) and 98 of the LRA, thereby 
limiting the liability of the husband or father in facing the consequences of not 
maintaining his wife and children to merely three years before the date of the petition 
claiming for arrears of maintenance. The question that arises is whether these provisions, 
especially section 98 is in the best interest of the child? For example, in the above case of 
Sundaramoorthy a/l Marimuthu, the father had not paid maintenance to the children from 
                                                          
20(2009) 4 MLJ 409 
21 [2011] MLJU 1193. 
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1996. However, as the court had limited the payment of arrears of maintenance to three 
years as stated, in section 98, the father at the end of the day would not have to pay a 
single cent to the children as backdated maintenance as all the children had reached the 
age of eighteen. Is this fair to these children, who, for the past fifteen years were not 
maintained by their father? In the writer’s view the decision in Sundaramoorthy a/l 
Marimuthu should be limited to the facts of the case and should not apply to other cases. 
Further thereto, it is a High Court decision and therefore does not bind the other cases. 
 
6.2.3 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
The provision as to the arrears of maintenance that may be claimed in Sabah is 
provided for in the proviso to section 3(3) of the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah. The 
proviso to section 3(3) of the 1959 Ordinance provides as follows: 
Provided that the Court may, for special reasons which shall be recorded and 
having regard to the means of the parties, order the payment of a lump sum by 
way of arrears in respect of any prior period but not exceeding twelve times the 
amount of any allowance ordered under subsection (1) or (2).22 
Observing the above provision, it could be noted that it differs from both the 1950 Act 
and the LRA in the following respects: 
1. This provision expressly states that the court could order the arrears of 
maintenance to be paid ‘in respect of any period’. This prima facie gives the 
court wide powers to order backdated maintenance for any period of time; and 
2. However, the same provision qualifies the phrase ‘any prior period’ by stating 
that ‘but not exceeding twelve times the amount of any allowance ordered under 
                                                          
22 Subsections (1) and (2) refer to the court's power to order a person to pay maintenance to his wife or legitimate child and 
illegitimate child respectively. 
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subsection (1) or (2)’. This phrase thus limits the backdated maintenance to not 
more than twelve times the amount of monthly maintenance ordered; which 
basically means that the arrears of maintenance that could be ordered should not 
be more than one year. This differs from the 1950 Act as in that Act, section 3(3) 
merely states from the date of neglect or refusal to pay maintenance without 
imposing any limitation, whereas the LRA as discussed earlier, also lays down 
a three-year time limit. 
There are no cases that have been decided on the claim for arrears of maintenance 
under the 1959 Ordinance. Hence, we would have to wait and see what the judicial 
approach to this provision would be in Sabah. It is respectfully submitted that by imposing 
a limitation on the backdated maintenance that could be ordered to merely one year, the 
law is tying the hands of the judiciary in awarding backdated maintenance to a child who 
has not been maintained for more than one year. It is respectfully submitted that this is 
acting against the welfare of the child as the parent, as the primary caregiver, does not 
have to worry about paying backdated maintenance where he has failed to maintain the 
child for more than one year. 
Before proceeding further with the discussion on this issue on arrears of maintenance, 
the writer would next compare the position in other jurisdictions such as Singapore, 
England and Wales and Australia. 
 
6.2.4 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
6.2.4.1 Singapore 
The position as to the arrears of maintenance in Singapore could be discussed by 
comparing two time frames, i.e. pre-1996 amendment to the Women's Charter and post-
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1996 amendment. In the first era, the former section 60(3) of the Women's Charter 
provided the following as to the arrears of maintenance that could be ordered by the court: 
 Such allowance shall be payable from such date as the court directs. 
The above provision seems to indicate two things: First, there is no time limit laid 
down concerning the arrears of maintenance. Secondly, an absolute discretion is given to 
the court to decide the date from which the maintenance order should commence. 
According to O.S. Khoo in his book, Parent-Child Law in Singapore:23 
In most cases, the date of hearing of maintenance proceedings is one or two 
months after the date of the application. The court therefore can make the 
maintenance order with effect from the date of hearing or from the date the 
application was made. The court can even make the order effective from the date 
of neglect or refusal to maintain. 
Therefore, the court is given wide powers to decide the date from which the 
maintenance order should be made. However, before the court makes a retrospective 
maintenance order, it generally considers two factors, i.e. a) whether the respondent 
would be able to pay the arrears and b) the necessity for making such an order.24 
After the 1996 amendment to the Women's Charter, the provision as to retrospective 
maintenance orders is silent in Part VIII of the Charter (Part VIII deals with child 
maintenance). This implies that the court is given a discretion to decide from which date 
a retrospective maintenance order should be made.  
However, Professor Leong Wai Kum in her book, Elements of Family Law in 
Singapore states as follows:25 
                                                          
23Khoo,, O.S., Parent-Child Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths, 1984) at 55 at f.n. 74. 
24Giam, Chin Toon, Maintenance Under the Women's Charter, 1971, at p.76, referred to in Khoo O.S, ibid at 55. 
25 Leong, Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Lexis-Nexis, 2007), at 459. 
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Given that the provision of a reasonable maintenance is for the purpose of 
assisting the wife or child to get over an immediate financial crisis, it may be 
surmised that the court is unlikely to order that maintenance be paid from too far 
back in time even where the failure to provide reasonable maintenance may be 
shown to have begun long ago. 
Nevertheless, section 74 of the Women's Charter provides that ‘Section 121 shall 
apply with the necessary modifications, to any order for the payment of maintenance 
under this Part.’ Section 121 provides for the ‘Recovery of arrears of maintenance’ 
concerning a wife. Section 121(3), in particular, provides as follows: 
No amount owing as maintenance shall be recoverable in any suit if it accrued due 
more than three years before the institution of the suit unless the court under 
special circumstances  otherwise allows.  
Hence, as section 74 specifically states that section 121 shall apply to maintenance of 
a child, the courts are likely to order maintenance to begin from no longer that three years 
before the institution of the suit, unless the court allows it under special circumstances. 
In Gomez nee David v Gomez,26 (as was discussed earlier under this sub-topic), His 
Lordship Coomaraswamy J, while disagreeing that recovery of arrears should be limited 
to one year before the date of the complaint following the position under the common 
law, stated however that the time limit may be more than three years as provided for under 
section 121(3). 
Therefore, the issue as to whether the court could backdate the maintenance order to 
more than three years was not answered by the learned judge above as that was not an 
issue raised before him. It is thus yet to be decided if this could be done. Section 121 was 
                                                          
26 [1985] 1 MLJ 27. 
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amended in 1996 after the above case, where the following phrase was inserted: ‘... unless 
the court under special circumstances otherwise allows’. On this note two observations 
could be made in relation to sections 74 and 121(3) of the Women's Charter. First, section 
74 states that ‘Section 121(3) shall apply, with the necessary modifications’ (emphasis 
added), thereby raising the issue whether the court has the power to modify the three-year 
time limit as stated in section 121(3) if it thinks that it is appropriate in a given situation 
that requires it? Secondly, as stated above, section 121(3) provides that ‘unless the court 
under special circumstances otherwise allows’. Therefore, the law allows the court to 
make a maintenance order retrospectively to more than three years under special 
circumstances. At this juncture, a comparison could be made between section 121(3) of 
the Women's Charter and section 86(3) of the Malaysian LRA. Section 86(3) of the 
Malaysian LRA expressly states that no maintenance amount shall be recoverable if it 
accrued due more than three year before the institution of the suit. There is no mention, 
as in the Singapore Women's Charter, of any special circumstances under which the court 
may decide otherwise. Therefore, it is submitted that there is more flexibility in the 
Singapore law as to the arrears of maintenance when compared to the Malaysian law. 
 
6.2.4.2 England and Wales 
As to the position in the United Kingdom, reference could be made to the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 (MCA). Section 32(1) of the MCA clearly states that the arrears of 
maintenance that could be claimed shall not be more than twelve months or one year, 
without the leave of the court. When comparing this section to the provision in the 
Malaysian LRA 1976, two differences could be observed. First, the LRA provides for a 
maximum period of three years, whereas the English MCA provides basically for one 
year. Secondly, the English MCA allows a beneficiary to apply to the court for leave if 
he or she intends to claim arrears for more than one year, whereas, the Malaysian LRA 
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has no such provision. Section 32(2) of the MCA grants the court a discretion whether to 
grant or refuse such leave. This subsection further states that if the court grants leave, it 
may impose 'such restrictions and conditions (including conditions as to the allowing of 
time for payment or making of payment by instalments)'. 
Thus, it could be observed that although section 32(1) of the English MCA restricts 
the claim for arrears to one year when compared to the three-year period in the Malaysian 
LRA, the applicant however has an opportunity to apply to the court for leave if he or she 
intends to claim arrears for more than one year under the English MCA.  It is respectfully 
submitted that such a discretion should be granted to the Malaysian courts as well, be it 
under the Malaysian LRA, the 1950 Act or the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah, in cases 
where the facts justify the extension of the maximum period to claim for arrears of 
maintenance. 
 
6.2.4.3 Australia 
Referring to the two statutes in Australia, the Family Law Act 1975 (FLA 1975) and 
the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (CSAA 1989), it could be noted that both these 
Acts do not contain provisions on whether a child may claim arrears of maintenance from 
his parents if the latter have failed or neglected to maintain him for a considerable period 
of time. 
The closest one could get on this issue is by referring to section 66W of the FLA 1975, 
which states ‘Recovery of arrears’. However, upon perusing the section, it does not relate 
to a situation where the child wants to apply to the court for arrears of maintenance as his 
parents have not been maintaining him for some time. On the other hand, section 66W 
provides for a situation where the child maintenance order has ceased to be in force but 
there are arrears due under such order.  
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In addition to the FLA 1975 and the CSAA 1989, which are of no assistance in 
examining the issue in hand, reference was also made to the Child Support (Registration 
and Collection) Act 1988 (CSRCA 1988) which provides for the payments and recovery 
of child support debts in Part V of the Act. However, upon perusal of the sections in Part 
V of this Act,27 it is to be noted that it does not refer to the arrears of maintenance as 
discussed in this sub-topic.  
Thus, having examined the three statutes above, it is submitted that in Australia 
recovery of arrears of maintenance could only be made by a child in situations where a 
maintenance order has already been made, or a maintenance agreement has already been 
entered into by the child’s parents or where an administrative assessment of child support 
has been made and the parent who is under a duty to pay fails to adhere to such an order, 
agreement or assessment.  
 
6.2.5 Discussion 
Having examined the Malaysian position on the recovery of arrears of maintenance, it 
could be observed that there is no uniformity in the time limit. The 1950 Act provides 
that it could be recovered from the date of neglect or refusal to pay, the LRA limits it to 
three years and the Sabah Maintenance Ordinance seems to imply that it is limited to 
twelve months. The writer submits that out of the three statutes, the 1950 Act is definitely 
in favour of a child’s welfare as it ensures that parents do not neglect or refuse to pay 
maintenance to their children as they could be ordered to pay from the date of such neglect 
or refusal. In the interest of the children concerned, it is submitted that the legislature 
should standardise the time limit allowed for the recovery of arrears in all the three 
statutes. In addition to imposing a time limit, the provision should also mention that the 
                                                          
27For example, section 4 of the Act defines ‘child support debt’ as ‘an amount that is a debt due to the Commonwealth under section 
30’. Section 66(1) provides when a child support debt is due for an initial period and a payment period. 
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parties may apply to the court for an extension under special circumstances as has been 
provided for in the Singapore Women’s Charter and the English MCA.  
 
6.3 VARIATION OR RESCISSION OF MAINTENANCE ORDERS 
The second issue which the writer intends to examine in this Chapter is concerning the 
variation or rescission of maintenance orders by the court. In certain jurisdictions, such 
as Australia, rescission of a maintenance order is referred to as a discharge of the said 
order and a variation or rescission order is referred to as a departure order. The laws allow 
the petitioner or respondent to apply to the court to either vary or rescind a maintenance 
order. Generally, the court is given the discretion to grant or reject the order prayed for. 
The factors that have to be taken into account by the courts before making a decision are 
stated in the relevant laws. An examination of these provisions as well as the actual factors 
that have been considered by the courts so far (via judicial decisions) would be done 
below in order to see if the variation or rescission of the maintenance orders have any 
effect on the welfare of children. 
However, before examining the relevant laws, it is pertinent to first understand the 
meaning of ‘vary’ and ‘rescind’ as provided for by such laws. The Supreme Court in the 
case of Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee Kiat28 had the opportunity of explaining the words 
‘vary’ and ‘rescind’. The Supreme Court explained that ‘rescind’ means ‘to abrogate, 
annul, revoke, cancel, discharge or to put to an end to altogether’.29 Therefore, when a 
maintenance order is rescinded by a court, it ceases to exist henceforth.30 On the other 
hand the court gave a wide meaning to the term ‘vary’, where his Lordship Seah SCJ 
                                                          
28 [1986] 2 MLJ 297. 
29Ibid at.298. 
30Ibid. 
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stated that it should also include the power to ‘suspend’ the order temporarily as well as 
revive the order which has been suspended.31 
 
6.3.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
Section 6 of the 1950 Act provides for the power of the court to either vary or rescind 
a maintenance order. Section 6(1) provides as follows: 
 (1) On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly 
allowance under this Act, and on proof of a change in the circumstances of such 
person, his wife or child, or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction 
of the court, the court by which such order was made, may rescind the order or 
may vary it as it seems reasonable. 
Observing the above provision, it could be noted that in order for the court to arrive at 
a decision, the person applying for the variation or rescission of order has to prove one of 
the following conditions: 
(1) that there is a change in the circumstances of such person, his wife or child; or 
(2) for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court. 
The two conditions stated above are quite wide, i.e. a change in the circumstances and 
for any other good cause. In addition to the above provision, section 6(2) provides a third 
condition, which is, that the court in exercising its discretion under section 6(1) may look 
at any change in the general cost of living between the date the maintenance order was 
made and the date of the hearing of the application.  
Pertaining to the first condition, i.e. a change in the circumstances, the applicant 
merely needs to prove a change, not a material change, as is provided for under the 
                                                          
31Ibid. 
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relevant provision in the LRA (which will be discussed shortly). This issue was discussed 
in one of the earlier cases, Lee Swee Peng (f) v Koon Kum Keng.32 The learned magistrate 
held that the respondent needs to 'exercise strict economy of his expenditure’ in order to 
pay maintenance to his child. It is respectfully submitted that the learned magistrate has 
overlooked the fact that as a ‘father of a child’, the respondent's primary obligation is to 
maintain his child. The learned magistrate seems to be of the opinion that it is not fair to 
tax the respondent to pay $50 per month to maintain his child, and hence reduced it to 
$30 per month. 
However, when this matter went on appeal to the High Court, the learned judge 
Bellamy J looked at the judgment of the Magistrate's Court and held that before the court 
rescinds or varies a maintenance order under the 1950 Ordinance (as it was then),’there 
must be evidence before the Court either of a change in the circumstances of the person 
applying for rescission or variation of the order, or of some other good cause’.33 In the 
present case, there was proof of ‘any change in circumstances’. As to the alternative 
requirement, the learned judge quoted the Magistrate as stating that the respondent ‘must 
exercise strict economy in his expenditure ‘is a good cause’. However, the learned judge 
disagreed that this amounted to a good cause and it was entirely irrelevant. Hence, the 
Magistrate's order to vary the maintenance sum was set aside. 
The judgment by the High Court as examined above is welcomed as the learned judge 
considered the fact that the respondent had to ‘exercise strict economy in his expenditure’ 
as totally irrelevant. However, it is submitted that it would have been better if the learned 
judge had explained as to why this was not a good cause and what would amount to a 
good cause. 
                                                          
32 [1954] 20 MLJ 260. 
33Ibid at 260-261. 
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In another case reported in 1993, Ng Lean Huat v Lim Joo Khim,34 the trial judge had 
ordered the appellant or husband to pay his wife and their son RM600 per month as 
maintenance from 14th April 1992. The appellant appealed to the High Court against this 
decision. The High Court examined the facts of this case, the husband’s ability to pay and 
the potential earning capacity of the wife in the near future. Eventually, the High Court 
allowed the appeal and varied the maintenance amount to RM500 a month for the 
maintenance of the wife and their son. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision above is not satisfactory for the following 
reasons. First, the learned judge referred to section 3(1) of the 1950 Act when discussing 
the duty of a husband to maintain his wife and child. However, his Lordship failed to refer 
to section 6(1) of the same Act in discussing the issue of varying the maintenance order. 
This is because section 3(1) merely deals with the power of a court to order a man to pay 
maintenance to his wife and child if he has neglected or refused to do so. The crux of this 
case is concerning varying the maintenance amount, which would then mean that 
reference would have to be made to section 6(1) of the 1950 Act which specifically deals 
with varying or rescinding a maintenance order. 
Secondly, since the learned judge did not refer to section 6(1) of the 1950 Act, the two 
grounds mentioned in this section for purposes of varying or rescinding a maintenance 
order were not discussed here. Hence, it is not clear on what ground the learned judge in 
this case agreed to vary the maintenance amount. Reading the case, prima facie, tends to 
show that the judge merely looked at the facts of the case and decided that the 
maintenance sum should be reduced to RM500 per month. Therefore, it is submitted that 
the decision in this case has failed to consider an important provision in the law concerned 
regarding varying a maintenance order.  
                                                          
34 [1993] 3 CLJ 647. 
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6.3.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
Section 96 of the LRA provides that the court has the power to vary or rescind 
maintenance orders. In addition, section 97 provides that the court has the power to vary 
the terms of a maintenance agreement. The writer would first examine section 96 of the 
LRA and compare it with section 6(1) of the 1950 Act and then examine section 97, as 
the latter solely focuses on variation of the terms of a maintenance agreement, which is 
not provided for in the 1950 Act. Section 96 provides as follows: 
The court may at any time and from time to time vary, or may rescind, any order 
for the custody or maintenance if a child on the application of any interested 
person, where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or 
mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances. 
The provision above not only states variation or rescission of maintenance orders, but 
it also includes custody orders. However, for the purpose of this thesis, reference would 
be made solely to maintenance orders. Section 96 of the LRA differs from section 6(1) of 
the 1950 Act in the following matters: 
(a) The person who may apply for the variation or rescission order; and 
(b) The grounds of such an application. 
 
a.  The person who may apply 
The wordings in section 96 of the LRA states ‘on the application of any person’, 
whereas section 6(1) of the 1950 Act provides ‘on the application of any person receiving 
or ordered to pay a monthly allowance’. Section 6(1) of the 1950 Act is more restrictive 
as it limits the person who may apply to either the child (the person receiving a monthly 
allowance) OR the parent (the person ordered to pay a monthly allowance). On the other 
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hand, section 96 of the LRA is wider as it states ‘any interested person’ thereby not 
limiting it to the child concerned and the parent ordered to pay. 
 
b. The grounds of an application to vary or rescind a maintenance order 
Section 96 of the LRA clearly states that the grounds which the applicant has to prove 
to the satisfaction of the court as follows: 
(a) misrepresentation; 
(b) mistake of fact; and 
(c) material change in the circumstances. 
Comparing section 96 of the LRA to section 6 of the 1950 Act, it could be noted that 
the grounds stated in the former provision are more specific. Section 6 of the 1950 Act, 
as stated earlier provides that the applicant has to prove either that there is a change in the 
circumstances or for other good cause. ‘For other good cause’ is very vague as it is 
entirely up to the discretion of the court to decide what amounts to a good cause. 
 
Having looked at the differences in the grounds for an application to vary or rescind a 
maintenance order, it is next pertinent to examine the cases that have been decided on this 
issue in order to look at the judicial attitude pertaining to this matter. The cases, discussed 
below, are instances where applications have been made to court on the three grounds 
stated in section in section 96 of the LRA, i.e. misrepresentation, mistake of fact and 
material change in circumstances. 
 
It is pertinent to first refer to the advice given by the Supreme Court when examining 
whether a maintenance order should be varied or not in the case of Gisela Gertrud Abe v 
Tan Wee Kiat35 as follows: 
In our opinion, when an application is made to the Court to vary an existing order 
for maintenance, the proper approach is to start from the original order and see 
                                                          
35 [1986] CLJ 133. 
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what changes financial or otherwise have taken place since that date including any 
changes which the Court is required to have regard to have regard to under section 
78 of the Act as well as any increase or decrease in the means of either of the 
parties to the marriage and make adjustments roughly in proportion to the 
changes, if that is possible.36 
At this juncture, it is submitted that the court in the above case referred to the approach 
the court must take in an application to vary a maintenance order under section 78 of the 
LRA (concerning wife maintenance). As for child maintenance, the court should be more 
stringent in allowing an application to vary a maintenance order. 
As regards to the first two grounds in section 96 of the LRA, i.e. misrepresentation 
and/or mistake of fact, the relevant case is the case of Geh Thuan Hooi (h) v Serene Lim 
Paik Yan (w),37 The petitioner applied for the reduction of the current monthly 
maintenance payment on the ground that the decree nisi was ambiguous and that it was 
recorded based on misrepresentation of facts and/or mistake of fact. He blamed his 
previous solicitors for not advising him properly.  The High Court held that on a balance 
of probabilities there is no misrepresentation or mistake of fact on the petitioner's part. 
The learned judge, Yeoh Wee Siam JC stated that as an educated person and a general 
manager of human resources in his company, the petitioner cannot be allowed to 
approbate and reprobate after agreeing to pay the maintenance sum to his children.38 The 
court observed that the husband has been duly paying RM14,000 monthly as maintenance 
to his two children since the decree nisi was granted. The present application was made 
twelve months after the date of the decree nisi, which goes to show that the plea of 
misrepresentation or mistake of fact is a mere after thought. 
 
                                                          
36 Followed in Santha Devi Thuraisingam v A. Shanmuganathan [1990] 1 CLJ 988 
37 [2010] 4 MLJ 673. 
38 The learned judge referred to the case of Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lim [1997] 1 MLJ 109 on this point. 
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Having looked at the stringent approach taken by the court above in not allowing the 
respondent father or husband to vary the maintenance order on the ground of mistake or 
misrepresentation of fact, the writer will next look at the cases which discuss the third 
ground stated in section 96 of the LRA, i.e. a material change in the circumstances. When 
comparing the number of cases reported on the ground of misrepresentation or mistake 
of fact and material change in the circumstances, it is to be noted that the majority of the 
cases are concerning a material change in the circumstances. 
One of the earliest cases concerning a material change in the circumstances is the case 
of Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee Kiat.39 In this case, the respondent applied to the High 
Court for a variation of the maintenance order as a result of a change in his financial 
circumstances and was successful. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against 
this decision on the ground that the court did not have the power to rescind a maintenance 
order and that the learned judge had erred when varying the maintenance sum. 
The Supreme Court referred to sections 83 and 96 of the LRA and stated that these 
sections give the court a general power to vary or rescind the maintenance order in favour 
of the wife or children respectively. The Supreme Court then referred to material changes 
of the circumstances relied upon by the respondent for the variation of the maintenance 
order. The Supreme Court then proceeded to examine the considerations a court should 
consider in a controversial matter concerning the maintenance amount to be ordered or 
reduced in an application to vary a subsisting order due to material change in 
circumstances and commented as follows: first, when a husband and wife divorce, they 
are legally entitled to remarry. When the husband remarries, he has a new family to 
support. In addition, he may also undertake a moral obligation to look after his step 
children of his second wife. Hence, the means of the husband will decrease. Secondly, 
                                                          
39 [1986] 2 CLJ 202. 
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the maintenance order of a normal child will cease when he or she attains the age of 
eighteen years (section 95 of the LRA). 
In the present case, as both the daughter had reached the age of eighteen, the learned 
Supreme Court judge held that the trial judge was right to vary the maintenance amount. 
At this juncture, it is respectfully submitted that the comment made by the learned 
Supreme Court judge as stated above should only be applicable to a matter concerning 
wife maintenance. When a husband and wife divorce, the LRA clearly states that the 
marriage is dissolved40 and they are no longer husband and wife in law. They are free to 
remarry third parties. However, it is not the same for children. Even though their parents 
have divorced, the fact remains that they (the parents) are still their biological parents. 
They are not ‘divorced’ from their parents. It then follows that the parents still have a 
duty to maintain their children. It does not matter if the parents remarry third parties and 
assume new responsibilities. The learned judge in the above case, by stating, inter alia, 
that the husband has undertaken a moral obligation to maintain his step children, has given 
recognition to the fact that the husband has a moral obligation to maintain his step children 
at the expense of varying the maintenance amount to be paid to his biological children. 
It is respectfully submitted that the above judgment is not fair to the biological 
children. No doubt, in the present case, the court held that as both the children had reached 
the age of eighteen, the respondent is no longer under a duty to maintain them as provided 
for under section 95 of the LRA. The question that arises next is whether the decision of 
the court would be different if the children in the present case were below eighteen years 
of age? Would the court still have proceeded to agree with the learned trial judge that the 
maintenance amount be varied? It is reiterated that it is not fair, with regards to the welfare 
of the children, to vary their maintenance amount as the respondent had to support a new 
                                                          
40 See s.8 of the LRA 
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family. The fact remains that he is still their natural father and as a primary caregiver, he 
still owes a duty to maintain them. 
In the case of Santha Devi Thuraisingam v A. Shanmuganathan,41 the husband applied 
to suspend the maintenance order on the ground that there had been a material change in 
the circumstances. The learned judge stated that before he scrutinised the case further, he 
has to remind himself of the advice given by the Supreme Court in Gisela Gertrud Abe v 
Tan Wee Kiat.42 
As a result of the reluctance by the husband to make full and frank disclosures, the 
court had no choice but to draw an adverse inference against the husband. His Lordship, 
Lim Beng Choon J., held that there is a change of circumstances in the husband’s position 
since he was dismissed from his employment. However, the facts do not show that he was 
totally unable to pay maintenance to his wife and children. On the other hand, he was 
deliberately refusing to pay maintenance as he was under the impression that the wife had 
resources of her own to maintain herself and the children. Therefore, the court held that 
the husband’s application to suspend the maintenance order in so far as it applies to an 
interim maintenance of his children was dismissed. 
A similar situation arose in the case of Sivajothi a/p K.Suppiah v Kunathasan a/l 
Chelliah.43 The defendant applied to the High Court, inter alia, to vary the maintenance 
order issued by the High Court to RM400 per month payable to his two children with 
effect from 24th August 2001, since from this date, the eldest daughter has been in his 
custody, care and control. Hence, the plaintiff has one child less to look after. The High 
Court referred to section 96 of the LRA, specifically to the term ‘a material change in the 
circumstances’ in order for the court to vary or rescind a maintenance order. His Lordship 
                                                          
41 [1990] 1 CLJ 988. 
42Supra n 39. 
43 [2006] 3 MLJ 184. 
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Azahar Mohamed JC stated that the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove on a 
balance of probabilities that there had been a material change in the circumstances. 
Examining the facts of the case, the court held that the defendant had failed to make a full 
and frank disclosure of his financial standing and obligation. Hence there has been no 
material change in his income. In addition, the defendant’s arguments were frivolous and 
untenable. The court looked at the fact that as the children are no longer in kindergarten 
but in primary school now, naturally there will be expenses incurred. The children would 
need new clothes and other necessities an as their father, the defendant has a ‘duty to 
provide the children better education, medical care, tuition and extra-curricular activities 
for their overall development, welfare and advancement.’44 Therefore, the High Court 
varied the amount to RM5682 per month. 
The above decision could be described as a decision which has taken into account the 
welfare of the children concerned, as the court, instead of reducing the maintenance sum 
(as prayed for by the defendant), increased the sum that needs to be paid by the defendant. 
It could be said that the defendant's plans to reduce the maintenance sum backfired as he 
would not have expected to be ordered to pay a higher sum as maintenance. 
In the case of Ng Say Chuan (h) v Lim Szu Ling (w) and anor application45 the plaintiff 
(husband) applied, inter alia, for an order that he stops paying an interim maintenance of 
RM4,500 per month commencing April 2009. The High Court, after examining the 
arguments and evidence forwarded by the husband and wife stated that the husband's 
application to stop paying the maintenance sum is dismissed. The court referring to 
sections 93(1) and (2) of the LRA stated that ‘it is trite law that the husband has the 
                                                          
44 Ibid at 192. 
45 [2010] 4 MLJ 796 
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primary responsibility, whereas the wife has a secondary responsibility to maintain the 
children.’46 
In reprimanding the husband for attempting to brush-off his duty to maintain his 
children, the learned judge stated as follows:47 
It is morally and legally wrong for a father not to maintain his three children, ages 
ten, eight and six, when he is using his income, savings and resources to take care 
of himself solely, without any regard to his paternal and statutory duty to maintain 
his children. He does not appear to have made any efforts to cut down on his 
expenses or his lifestyle or to tighten his belt. He could have liquidated some of 
his moveable or immoveable assets but he did not do so. Out of the husband's total 
expenses of RM19,192.51 per month, only RM4,158 is for the children's Sri 
Cempaka school fees, but the balance of RM15,034.51 is for the husband's 
personal expenditure or commitments. 
The court did not accept his contention about his constructive dismissal. The learned 
judge stated that as constructive dismissal is a situation where the employee leaves his 
job claiming that the employer has breached the contract of employment in a fundamental 
manner, the husband should have thought twice before initiating his constructive 
dismissal. He should have known that he had a duty, morally and legally, to maintain his 
children. He cannot simply walk out on his job, not take any effort to look for a job 
elsewhere in the past ten months and then apply to the court to stop his payment of 
maintenance.  
The judgment above could be described as a lesson for parents who wish to ‘escape 
from the duty to maintain their children’ quoting unemployment and various other 
                                                          
46Ibid at 803. 
47Ibid at 805. 
276 
 
unacceptable reasons under the ground of a ‘material change in the circumstances’ under 
section 96 of the LRA. 
The last case the writer wishes to examine under this ground is the case of Geh Thuan 
Hooi (h) v Serene Lim Paik Yan (w),48 discussed earlier under the ground of ‘Mistake or 
Misrepresentation of Facts’. In addition to the ground of mistake or misrepresentation of 
facts, the husband applied to reduce the maintenance sum from RM14,000 to RM2,500 
per month on the ground of a material change in the circumstances. In reiterating section 
92 of the LRA and the principle of safeguarding the welfare of the children, the learned 
High Court judge stated as follows:49 
It is trite that the welfare of the children is paramount and it shall be the duty of a 
parent, including the petitioner husband in this case, to maintain or contribute to 
the maintenance of the children, whether they are in his or her custody or the 
custody of any other person, either by providing them with such accommodation, 
clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her 
means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. 
The present case could be said to be one of the few cases that has referred to the 
principle of welfare of the child in maintenance cases. The majority of the cases 
concerning the welfare of the child are pertaining to adoption and custody matters.  
As stated earlier, the LRA contains two provisions concerning variation, i.e. sections 
96 and 97. Section 97 specifically refers to variation of agreement for custody or 
maintenance. This section provides as follows: 
The court may at any time and from time to time vary the terms of any agreement 
relating to the custody or maintenance of a child, whether made before or after the 
                                                          
48 [2010] 4 MLJ 673. 
49Ibid at 685 
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appointed date, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any such 
agreement, where it is satisfied that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child 
so to do.  
Section 97 differs from section 96 in two respects: 1) Section 97 does not state ‘on the 
application of any person’. This means that the court takes the initiative to vary the terms 
of a maintenance agreement notwithstanding any provision to the contrary. 2) The 
grounds mentioned in section 97 are reasonable and for the welfare of the child.  
In this respect, it could be noted that this section is pro-welfare of the child concerned 
as it states that the court will only vary the agreement if it feels that it is reasonable and 
for the welfare of the child so to do. There are hardly any cases that have been decided 
directly on the variation of a maintenance agreement under section 97. In fact, the High 
Court in W v H50, a case concerning a custody dispute, inter alia referred to section 97, in 
obiter, and stated that sections 88,89, 92 and 97 of the LRA make it very clear that the 
court has protective jurisdiction over children in matters of custody and maintenance, 
which cannot be ousted by the parents. 
In the case of Lim Thian Kiat v Teresa Haesook Lim & Anor,51 the court, in obiter, 
referred to the separation deed between the parties and held that the deed was subject to 
variation by the court as provided for under sections 80, 84 and 97 of the LRA. Therefore, 
in the cases above, it could be noted that the courts have, in obiter, stated that section 97 
provides that the courts have an absolute discretion to vary the maintenance agreement if 
it feels that it is for the welfare of the child concerned, thus, exerting its protective 
jurisdiction. 
                                                          
50 [1987] 2 MLJ 235. 
51 [1998] 2 MLJ 102. 
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At this juncture, it is respectfully submitted that section 97 is a pro-child welfare 
provision. The writer is of the opinion that there should not be a distinction between the 
variation under sections 96 and 97. Section 96 allows the variation of a maintenance order 
made by the court on the grounds of mistake, misrepresentation of fact and a material 
change in the circumstances on the application of any interested person, whereas the 
variation of a maintenance agreement under section 97 is done at the court's own 
initiative. The issue as to why should there be a difference between the variation of a 
maintenance order and variation of a maintenance agreement arises. It is submitted that it 
is in the welfare of the child to delete section 96 and incorporate the variation of a 
maintenance order under the current section 97, so that the said provision would read as 
follows: the court may vary a maintenance order or a maintenance agreement if the court 
thinks that it is reasonable and that it is for the welfare of the child. 
In fact, the majority of the cases discussed so far in this sub-topic seem to have decided 
in favour of the welfare of the child concerned and have dismissed the applications by the 
respective fathers to either vary or rescind the maintenance orders. Thus, it is submitted 
that the benchmark set by these judicial decisions is that the welfare of the child is the 
paramount consideration that has to be taken into account by the court when deciding an 
application by the parents to either vary or rescind a maintenance order. 
 
6.3.3 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
Section 7 of the Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah provides for the recession and 
variation of the order. It provides as follows: 
On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly allowance 
under the provisions of section 3 and on proof of a change in the circumstances of 
the parties or any of them or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction 
of the Court, the Court may rescind  the said order or may vary it as it deems fit. 
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The above provision is similar to section 6 of the 1950 Act. The grounds for rescission 
is on proof of a change in the circumstance of the parties and for other good cause being 
shown to the satisfaction of the court. The above provision applies both to variation of 
maintenance order in favour of a wife and in favour of a child.  
 
6.3.4 Comparison with other jurisdictions 
Having looked at the provisions in the Malaysian statutes, the writer intends to look at 
similar provisions on variation or rescission of maintenance orders in Singapore, England 
and Wales and Australia in order to see whether the positions in these jurisdictions are 
similar to Malaysia or different. 
 
6.3.4.1 Singapore 
The position in Singapore as to variation or rescission of maintenance order is the 
same, before and after the 1996 amendment to the Women's Charter.  The only difference 
is that before the amendment, the law on this issue was stated in section 62 of the 
Women's Charter, whereas currently it is provided for in section 72. Section 72 provides 
as follows: 
  
Rescission and variation of order 
72. (1) On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly 
allowance under this act and on proof of a change in the circumstances of that 
person, his wife or child, or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction 
of the court, the court by which the order was made may rescind the order or may 
vary it as it thinks fit. 
(2) Without prejudice to the extent of the discretion conferred upon the court by 
subsection (1), the court may, in considering any application made under this 
section, take into consideration any change in the general cost of living which may 
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have occurred between the date of the making of the order sought to be varied and 
the date of the hearing of the application. 
 
At this juncture, it is to be noted that the above provision is similar to section 6 of the 
Malaysian 1950 Act, where the court is empowered to either vary or rescind the 
maintenance order on proof of a change in the circumstances of the person, applying for 
such variation or rescission, his wife or child OR for any other good cause shown to the 
satisfaction of the court. In addition, subsection (2) provides that in considering the 
application under subsection (1) the court may take into consideration the change in the 
general cost of living between the date of the making of the order sought to be varied and 
the date of the hearing of the application. 
The court considers the following principles when deciding on an application to either 
vary or rescind:52 
1. The first principle is that the court examines the original maintenance order as the 
starting point. In doing so, the court proceeds on the basis that the original 
maintenance order was made without any flaws, especially if there was no appeal 
against it. 
In the case of Wilkins v Wilkins,53 the court held that as a general rule the original 
maintenance order must be considered by the court as a starting point. If the court finds 
that there is no good cause or any change in the circumstances of that person, then it (the 
court) should dismiss the application to vary or rescind the said order. 
2. The second principle is that a change in the circumstances or good cause shown is 
basically a question of fact. In the case of Lee Swee Peng (F) v Koon Kum Keng54 
(discussed earlier) the court did not agree with the petitioner that his ‘strict economy 
                                                          
52Khoo, O.S. Parent-Child Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths, 1984), at 57 
53  [1969] 2 All ER 463. 
54 [1954] MLJ 260. 
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expenditure’ since the original maintenance order was made amounted to a ‘good 
cause’ and therefore dismissed the application. 
In the case of Shirin Carmel Marie Jacob v Allomootin Benjamin John,55 when the 
parents divorced in 1995, the father was ordered to pay $1,000 as maintenance per month. 
The child was 9 years old then and the sum was half of the child's expenses at that time. 
Four years later, the mother applied to increase the sum to $3,000 per month as the 
daughter's expenses had increased. The father argued that the increase was not justified 
as there was no material change in the circumstances. The court agreed to increase the 
sum, but instead of the $3,000 to $1,450. In arriving at its decision, the court stated that 
the mother of the child was successful in proving that there was an obvious increase in 
the child’s schooling. 
 As stated in section 72(2) of the Women's Charter, in addition to the grounds stated 
in section 72(1), the court could also consider the change in the cost of living. The issue 
that arises is whether any change in the cost of living would suffice to constitute a ground 
to vary or rescind a maintenance order? According to O.S. Khoo in his book, Parent-
Child Law in Singapore,56: 
Any change in the general cost of living cannot be considered as a relevant factor 
to vary or rescind a maintenance order. To consider a change in the general cost 
of living, it must be reasonably significant.   
Thus, according to O.S. Khoo, the court should exercise caution when considering a 
change in the general cost of living under section 72(2).  
                                                          
55 [1999] SGHC 136 
56 Khoo, O.S. Parent-Child Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Butterworths, 1984), at 57 
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6.3.4.2 England and Wales 
In discussing the issue as to variation or rescission of a maintenance order or 
maintenance calculation in England and Wales, reference could be made to three statutes, 
the Child Support Acts 1991 and 1995, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Children 
Act 1989. 
First, the Child Support Acts 1991 and 1995 (CSA), in section 28, allows the person 
with care57 or the non-resident parent (NRP)58 or the child concerned to apply to the 
Secretary of State to vary a maintenance calculation. In deciding whether to agree to the 
variation, the Secretary of State shall have regard to the general principles provided for 
in section 28E(2) and any other consideration as may be prescribed (section 28E(1)). The 
two general principles prescribed in section 28E(2) are as follows: 
(a) parents should be responsible for maintaining their children whenever they 
can afford to do so; 
(b) where a parent has more than one child, his obligation to maintain any one of 
them should be no less of an obligation to maintain any one of them. 
At this juncture, it is to be noted that there is no similar provision as the above in 
Malaysia. The relevant Acts in Malaysia, i.e. the 1950 Act and the LRA merely provide 
the grounds of variation or rescission of a maintenance order. In Malaysia, usually the 
parent who had been ordered to pay maintenance to his child applies for a variation of the 
order on the ground that there has been a material change in the circumstances, especially 
if he has remarried and has children from his second marriage. By stating that he has 
additional children now to maintain he would request the court to reduce the sum stated 
in the maintenance order. The writer submits that if we incorporate the two principles as 
                                                          
57‘A person with care’ is defined in section 3(3) of the CSA as basically the person with whom the child has his home and who 
provides the day to day care for the child. 
58‘A non-resident parent’ is defined in section 3(2) of the CSA as ‘the parent not living in the same household with the child’. 
283 
 
stated above in section 28E(2), it would definitely safeguard the welfare of the children 
here as no matter how many children a parent has, the duty to maintain any one of them 
should be not less of a duty to maintain any one of them.  
The grounds on which a NRP may apply to vary the child support amount are provided 
for in Part 1 of Schedule 4B to the CSA. The grounds stated therein are as follows: 
(a) the NRP has high costs relating to maintaining the child or in relation to 
employment; 
(b) the NRP has made a large capital transfer pre-1993 to the parent with care 
with the intention to reduce child support.  
Nevertheless, section 28F(1) further states that the Secretary of State would have to 
decide whether it would be just and equitable to agree with a variation. Subsection (2)(a) 
provides that in considering whether it would be just and equitable, the Secretary of State  
(a) must have regard, in particular, to the welfare of any child likely to be affected 
if he did agree to the variation. 
The above provision is sadly lacking in the Malaysian counterparts. This is exactly 
what the writer has discussed earlier when examining the Malaysia position on variation 
or rescission. The relevant Acts in Malaysia do not state that the court has to consider the 
welfare of the child concerned before deciding whether to agree to the variation or not. It 
is submitted that the welfare factor should be incorporated into the relevant Acts in 
Malaysia to be considered by the courts before making a decision. 
Secondly, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA), in section 31, provides that a 
court has the power to vary or discharge a maintenance order (in relation to both spouse 
and child). In particular, reference could be made to section 31(7) which provides that: 
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In exercising the power conferred …, the court shall have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while 
a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen, 
and the circumstances of the case shall include any change in any of the matters 
to which the court was required to have regard when making the order, which the 
application relates … (emphasis added). 
From the above provision, it could be noted that it emphases on the court’s duty to first 
have regard to the welfare of the child concerned in exercising its power to vary or 
discharge a maintenance order. In the case of Delaney v Delaney,59 a father was ordered 
to pay £30 per week towards the upkeep of his children by his former wife despite his 
claim that he did not have enough money to pay such maintenance after deducting his 
mortgage payments and other outgoings on a house that he was buying. He appealed. On 
appeal, the court emphasised the fact that a father should not avoid his responsibility to 
his family. Nevertheless, the judge in this case held that the father’s expenditure was 
reasonably incurred as he required a sufficient accommodation to put up his children 
when staying with him. Moreover, the court also stated that the wife is entitled to social 
security payments. Hence, the learned judge allowed the husband’s appeal on the ground 
that he could not reasonable be expected to contribute anything to the maintenance of the 
family.  
Thirdly, referring to the Children Act 1989 (CA), Schedule 1, paragraphs 5 and 6 of 
this Act provides for the power of a court to vary or discharge an order. Paragraph 5(6) 
provides that the court may vary a maintenance order for the payment of a lumpsum by 
instalments, whereas paragraph 5(3) provides for varying or discharging orders for 
periodical payment. Paragraph 6(1) further states that in deciding whether to vary or 
                                                          
59(1990) Times, 4 June CA 
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discharge an order for periodical payment, ‘the court shall have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court 
was required to have regard when making the order’. 
When comparing the above provision in the CA to the provisions in the CSA and the 
MCA (discussed above), it could be noted that the provision in the CA is very general as 
it does not state anywhere therein the duty of the court to take into consideration the 
welfare of the child concerned. Nevertheless, the writer submits that reference could be 
made to section 1 of the CA. Section 1(1) states that when a court decides on the 
upbringing of a child or the administration of a child’s property or the application of any 
income arising from it, the court shall consider the child’s welfare as the paramount 
consideration. Further thereto, section 1(5) states that a court, in deciding whether a 
particular order should be made or not under this Act, should not make the order unless 
the court considers that doing so would be better for the child thank making no order at 
all. 
Hence, the writer submits that although paragraphs 5 and 6 in Schedule 1 are silent as 
to the consideration of the child’s welfare before an order to vary or discharge is made, 
section 1(5) emphasises the duty of the court to generally examine the welfare of a child 
before deciding or making any order or orders under this Act. As such, it would also 
include making an order to vary or discharge in paragraphs 5 and 6 in Schedule 1. 
Having examined all the three statutes in England and Wales pertaining to variation or 
discharge of a maintenance order, it could be noted that the United Kingdom Parliament 
has imposed, either directly or indirectly, a duty on the court to take into consideration 
the welfare of the child, before it makes an order so that the child’s interest is safeguarded. 
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6.3.4.3 Australia 
In Australia, variation or rescission of a maintenance order is termed as a departure 
order, for instance, in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)(CSAA 1989) and 
the Family Law Act 1975 (FLA 1975). The departure order (DO) here refers to a 
departure from the child assessment formula determined by the Child Support Registrar. 
This is because the main idea of the Child Support Scheme in Australia was to remove 
the court's discretion from the area of maintenance. The power to decide the formula is 
now conferred on the Child Support Registrar.60 However, the CSAA 1989 empowers the 
court to review certain decisions of the Child Support Registrar under Part 7 of the Act. 
Division 4, Part 7 empowers the court to make orders for departure from administrative 
assessment in special circumstances.61 
The key section under Division 4, Part 7 is section 117 which lays down the matters 
the court needs to be satisfied before making a DO. Subsection (1) states that the court 
has to be satisfied of three matters. First, that a DO must exist. Secondly, in order to make 
a DO, it must be just and equitable and thirdly, that it must be otherwise proper to make 
the DO. 
The first stage, i.e. the grounds for departure are laid down in section 117(2) which are 
as follows: 
(a) In special circumstances, that the financial capacity to support the child is 
significantly reduced because of: 
(i) the duty of the parent to maintain any other child or another person; or 
                                                          
60 Stephen Parker, Patrick Parkinson & Juliet Behrens, Australian Family Law in Context, Commentary and Materials, The Law Book 
Company, 1994, at 483.  
61 Note that Part 6A was inserted through an amendment to the CSAA 1988 on 1 July 1992 which gave the Child Support Registrar 
the power to determine the formula be departed from. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the writer will focus on the power 
given to the court to issue a departure order under Part 7. 
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(ii) special needs of any other child or another person that the parent has a 
duty to maintain; or 
(iii) commitments of the parent necessary to enable the parent to support: 
(A) himself or herself; or 
(B) any other child or another person that the parent has a duty to 
maintain; 
(iv) high costs involved in enabling a parent to have access to any other 
child or another person that the parent has a duty to maintain. 
(b) In special circumstances, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly 
affected: 
(i)  because of: 
(A) high costs involved in enabling a parent to have access to the child; 
or 
(B) special needs of the child; or  
(ii) because the child is being cared for, educated or trained in the manner 
that was expected by his or her parents; 
(c) In special circumstances, an administrative assessment of child support would 
result in an unjust or inequitable determination of the level of financial 
support to be provided by the liable parent for the child due to the financial 
resources, income, earning capacity and property of either parent or the child; 
or because of any payment to or transfer of property to the child or the 
custodian by the liable parent under any Act. 
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From the above, it could be observed that paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to the cost factor 
in applying for a DO. 
The second ground, i.e. in determining 'whether it would be just and equitable as 
regards the child', is provided for under section 117(4), which states that the court must 
have regard to the following matters: 
(a)  the nature of the duty of a parent to maintain a child; and 
(b)  the proper needs of the child; and 
(c)  the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the child; 
and 
(d)  the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of each parent 
who is a party to the proceeding; and 
(e) the commitments of each parent who is a party to the proceedings; 
(f)  the direct and indirect costs incurred by the custodian entitled to child support; 
and 
(g)  any hardship that would be caused to the child or custodian or the liable parent 
or any other child or person if the court makes or refuses to make the order. 
The third ground, i.e.  'whether it would be otherwise proper to make a particular order' 
is provided for under section 117(5), where the court should have regard to the following 
matters: (a) nature of the duty to maintain the child by the parent, taking into consideration 
that the parents themselves have the primary duty to maintain the child; and (b) the effect 
of a DO on the child's or custodian's entitlement to an income tested pension, allowance 
or benefit or to the rate of the such matters. 
In the case of Gyselman And Gyselman,62 the court had made a DO under section 117 
of the CSAA 1989 reducing the child support assessment made against the Respondent 
                                                          
62 (1992) F.L.C. 92-279 at 79,061-81 (Full Court). 
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husband. The applicant wife appealed to the Full Court63 against that decree. The major 
submission on the applicant's behalf was that the trial judge did not refer to the grounds 
under section 117(4) and (5) at all when making the DO. The Full Court examined section 
117 in detail and stated that they agree that the learned trial judge's treatment of subsection 
(4) was rather sparse and that he did not refer to section 117(5) at all. Therefore, the DO 
was set aside by the Full Court and the case was remitted to the Hobart Registry for 
rehearing before a single judge. 
The writer submits that the Australian Parliament has painstakingly listed down in 
minute detail the matters that should be considered by the court when deciding to make a 
DO. This is a complete contrast to the Malaysian position, where the grounds stated 
therein are not elaborated in the relevant provisions. It is submitted that by elaborating on 
the grounds provided in the relevant provisions, it may serve as a useful guideline to the 
courts before deciding whether to issue a variation or rescission order. These guidelines 
are not even found in the Singapore or English and Wales statutes that were examined in 
this sub-topic. 
Secondly, the FLA 1975 too contains a provision on the variation or discharge of a 
maintenance order, which is referred to as the 'modification of child maintenance orders'. 
However, prior to examining section 66S of the Act, it should be noted that section 66E 
provides that a maintenance order cannot be revived or varied under the FLA if the party 
to the proceeding is able to apply for an administrative assessment of child support under 
the CSAA 1989. 
Section 66S provides six grounds for the court to vary a maintenance order. Vary here 
refers to either increase or decrease the maintenance sum. The first three grounds are 
                                                          
63A Full Court is where three judges hear an appeal together from a decision of a Family Court judge. A Full Court, in some cases, 
may hear appeals from a Federal Circuit Court judge. Information obtained from the Family Court of Australia’s website at 
www.familycourt.gov.au accessed on 6 February 2017. 
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stated in section 66S(3)(a)(i),(ii) and (iii), which are a change in the circumstances of the 
child, a change in the circumstances of the person liable to make the maintenance 
payments, and a change in the circumstances of a person entitled to receive payments. 
'Circumstances' here refer to and are restricted to financial circumstances.64 
The fourth ground is provided in section 66S(3)(d) where at the time the court made 
the order, the material facts were withheld from the court or false material evidence was 
given. The fifth ground is where the order was made by consent and the amount ordered 
to be paid is now proper or adequate (section 66S(3)(c)). In deciding what is proper or 
adequate, section 66S(6) explains that the court must take into account any payments and 
any transfer or settlement of property previously made to the child or to any person for 
the child's benefit, by the person against whom the order was made. 
Finally, the sixth ground is the change of the cost of living since the order was made. 
Subsection (4) further provides that for the purpose of deciding whether the cost of living 
has changed, the court must have regard to any changes that have occurred in the 
Consumer Price Index. Subsection (5) limits the power of the court to vary a child 
maintenance order on the basis of a change in the cost of living to only once a year. 
It is submitted that when compared to the CSAA 1989, the FLA's grounds pertaining 
to variation or discharge of a maintenance order are more or less similar to the Malaysian 
provisions. However, it could be observed that the grounds mentioned in the FLA were 
further elaborated in the same Act so as to give a clearer picture to the court when making 
a decision on varying or discharging a maintenance order. This is sadly lacking in the 
Malaysian laws as there are no statutory guidelines for the courts to follow in deciding on 
a similar issue. 
                                                          
64Dickney, Anthony QC, Family Law, 3rd ed, (Australia, LBC Information Services 1997) at 573 
291 
 
 
6.3.5 Discussion 
Having looked at the statutory provisions and judicial decisions concerning rescission 
and variation of maintenance orders and agreements in Malaysia, it is to be noted that 
these provisions confer a wide discretion to the courts to vary or rescind a maintenance 
order or agreement. Upon examination of the judicial decisions, it could be observed that 
in most of the cases, the judges have been cautious in deciding whether the maintenance 
order or agreement should be varied or rescinded so as to ensure that the welfare of the 
child is safeguarded. 
Although the majority of the judges in the judicial decisions discussed earlier are extra 
cautious and take into account the welfare of the child before deciding to vary or rescind 
the maintenance order or agreement, it is respectfully submitted that the Malaysian 
legislature should revisit the provisions in the legislature concerning variation or 
rescission of maintenance orders or agreements in favour of children. Presently, the 
provision as to variation and rescission of maintenance orders or agreements in favour of 
a wife is the same as an order or agreement in favour of a child. The writer is of the 
opinion that this situation is not favourable to a child as when a maintenance order or 
agreement is varied (i.e. reduced) or rescinded, it is going to drastically affect the child 
concerned. 
When a maintenance order or agreement in favour of a wife is varied or rescinded, no 
doubt it would affect her monthly income. However, it should not be forgotten that the 
‘wife’ is an adult and would be able to earn a living and therefore is in a capacity to earn 
extra income in the event the court agrees to reduce or rescind her maintenance sum. 
However, the same cannot be said for a child. If the court agrees to vary or rescind a 
maintenance order or agreement in favour of a child, the child concerned is definitely 
going to suffer a loss of his or her monthly income as he or she is not able to earn a living. 
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The only way to overcome this problem would be if the mother of the child could find a 
way to compensate for the loss of the said monthly allowance, failing which, would 
drastically affect the welfare of the child. It is submitted that in such a situation, if the 
child is in the care of the mother, she (the mother) would then step into the shoes of a 
primary caregiver. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the legislature should amend the current provisions 
regarding variation or rescission of a maintenance order or agreement in favour of a child. 
The reason is because maintenance is usually prayed for as an ancillary relief in 
matrimonial proceedings between a husband and a wife. When the court grants a decree 
of divorce, for example, the couple is no longer husband and wife under the law. 
However, it is not the same for the relationship between the parents and the child. 
Although the parents of the child are no longer husband and wife under the law, they still 
remain the parents of the child. As parents of the child, they still owe an obligation to 
maintain their child as primary caregivers. They are not ‘divorced’ from their child when 
the court grants a decree of divorce. As discussed earlier, many of the cases have stated 
that the father of a child has the primary obligation to maintain his child, whereas the 
mother, a secondary obligation. Thus, it is not fair to allow an application from these 
caregivers to ‘reduce’ or ‘rescind’ their obligation to maintain their child. The child's 
welfare would definitely be affected if the court grants their application. 
A similar view as the writer's view has been expressed by Professor Leong Wai Kum 
in her article The Duty to Maintain Spouse and Children During Marriage:65 
The duty to maintain may neatly be divided into two: the duty between spouses 
inter se and the duty of the spouses as parents to maintain their children. There is 
an obvious difference between these two relationship which is worthwhile 
                                                          
65 Leong, Wai Kum, The Duty to Maintain Spouse and Children During Marriage, (1987) 29 Mal LR 56. 
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repeating because it is often forgotten and neglected. It is simply that the spousal 
relationship is much easier to terminate than that between parents and children. 
The frequency of divorce and annulment surely far outweighs that of adoption. It 
bears remembering that while divorce and annulment permanently sever the 
spousal relationship they have minimal effect in law on the continuing 
relationship between the divorced parties and their children. We would thus 
expect the law regarding the duty of parent to maintain their children to be more 
or less the same whether the question raised during the continuance of a marriage 
or after its termination pursuant to a court order. While there may be persuasive 
reasons to limit the duty of former spouses to maintain each other after they have 
had their relationship terminated by the court, this fact should not alter the 
continuous of their duty towards their children... 
In England and Wales too, as discussed earlier, the relevant laws such as the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the Child Support Acts 1991 and 1995 and the Children 
Act 1989 have stated that before a court decides to vary or discharge a maintenance order, 
it should take into consideration the child's welfare as the first or paramount 
consideration. 
Although the above sentiment is not expressly provided for in the Australian 
counterparts, it could be observed that by laying down the guidelines for the grounds in 
minute detail for the court to observe before making a variation or discharge order, 
denotes that the Australian of discharge a maintenance order. It has to consider whether 
the case before it falls within any of the grounds mentioned therein, before it decides on 
this issue. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that having examined the two pertinent 
issues concerning child maintenance, i.e. arrears of maintenance and the variation or 
rescission of a maintenance order, the statutory framework in Malaysia is not in favour 
of the safeguarding the welfare of the child. As was discussed in sub-topic 6.3.5 
Discussion above, there is no consistency among the statutes, for instance, on the time-
limit when it comes to arrears of maintenance and the grounds on which an applicant can 
apply to the court for variation or rescission of a maintenance order. 
Be that as it may, the writer submits that taking into account the welfare principle, it 
is pertinent that the statutory provisions on these two issues (arrears and variation) be 
revisited by the legislature. This is due to the fact that if the issues that were discussed 
under sub-topic 6.3.5 are not resolved, it would amount to the legislature providing an 
opportunity to the parents, as primary caregivers, to wash their hand off their 
responsibility of maintaining their child to an extent, or if not wholly. In addition, the 
relevant statutory provisions should also be amended to incorporate the condition that the 
court, before deciding any issue concerning arrears or variation or rescission of 
maintenance, should take into consideration the welfare of the child, as has been done in 
other provisions in the Family Law statutes pertaining to guardianship and custody as 
well as adoption. At the end of the day, it is submitted, the child should not be made the 
scapegoat in the tussle between the parents.  
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CHAPTER 7: ENFORCEMENT OF MAINTENANCE ORDERS IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the writer intends to examine the laws concerning enforcement of 
maintenance orders (including the penal provisions where the paying parent has defaulted in 
the payment of maintenance) in order to see if they (the laws) are effective. In doing so, 
reference would be made to reported judicial decisions (if any) to examine the courts’ attitude 
in handling enforcement or committal cases in order to observe if the welfare of the child is 
taken into account when deciding. In addition, a comparison with the enforcement laws 
concerning the Muslims in Malaysia as well as the laws in Singapore, England and Wales 
and Australia would be made to note the developments that have taken place therein 
concerning enforcement. Finally, based on the above comparisons, the writer would attempt 
to suggest reforms to rectify the weaknesses that exist in the enforcement laws concerning 
non-Muslims.  
 
7.1.1 The need for effective enforcement laws 
Having looked at the laws concerning maintenance of non-Muslim children in Malaysia 
and the weaknesses that exist in these laws, it is pertinent to next look at the laws concerning 
enforcement of maintenance orders. The reason for examining the enforcement laws is 
obvious, i.e. it is of no use taking steps to rectify the weaknesses that exist in our laws in 
order to strengthen the rights of children to claim maintenance from their parents, if the 
enforcement laws are not effective. It is important to have effective enforcement laws so that  
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the paying parent, against whom the maintenance order is made, would think twice before 
defaulting in his payment of maintenance to his child. In fact, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1989 (CRC) has taken cognisance of this fact and has placed the burden on the 
State Parties to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child in Article 27(4).1  
Hence, it is submitted that the enforcement of maintenance laws should play an important 
role in safeguarding the welfare of children. This is in order to ensure that these children are 
not denied of their right to being properly maintained by their parents. Having effective 
maintenance laws without proper enforcement measures amounts to these laws being akin to 
toothless tigers. 
In deciding the maintenance amount, the court would  have regard to the income, earning 
capacity, property and other financial resources of the paying parent, both currently and in 
the future, as well as the financial needs and the obligations of the paying parent currently 
and in the future.2 Thus, the financial standing of the paying parent is taken into account by 
the court.3 Therefore, the paying parent would not be able to argue that the maintenance 
amount is beyond his means, which would then justify him defaulting in his payment of 
maintenance to his child. 
                                                          
1 Article 27(4) provides as follows: ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child 
from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad. In particular, 
where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote 
the accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements.’ 
2Rasamani Kandiah, (Advisory Editor), Child Handbook, MLJ Book Series, Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 2004 at 125. 
3 In fact, in the English case of Re G [1996] 2 FLR 171, the court took a bold stand in awarding a lump sum payment for a child 
notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the paying father. 
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7.2 ENFORCEMENT LAWS 
In this Chapter, the following laws would be examined: a) penal provisions in the event 
the paying parent defaults in paying the maintenance to his child; and b) laws on the 
enforcement of maintenance orders. 
 
7.2.1 Penal provisions 
7.2.1.1 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 
Section 4 of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (‘the 1950 Act’) 
provides the penalty in the event the paying parent neglects to comply with the maintenance 
order issued by the court. If the paying parent wilfully defaults in complying with the 
maintenance order, the court has a discretion concerning the punishment to be imposed: it 
could either levy the amount due or sentence him to imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to one month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid. It is respectfully 
submitted that the imposition of a levy or imprisonment for merely a month for every month’s 
allowance remaining unpaid is too lenient. These punishments may not be effective enough 
to deter the paying parents from defaulting in their payments of the maintenance amounts. 
The above-mentioned provision was drafted way back in 1950. It is more than sixty years 
since it was drafted. Thus, it is submitted that the Legislature ought to, without any further 
delay, revisit this provision in order to revise the sentences stated therein. 
As regards judicial decisions on the above provision, so far, there have not been many 
reported cases. In the case of Yap Ki Swee v Phua Thiam Lai,4 the court ordered the 
respondent to pay $350 a month to the appellant (his wife) and their children as maintenance. 
                                                          
4 [1975] 1 MLJ 39 
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The respondent defaulted payments for three months. The appellant brought an application 
requesting the court to issue an order that the respondent be sentenced to imprisonment under 
section 4 of the 1950 Ordinance (as the 1950 Act then was). The learned Sessions Court 
President refused to make the order as he felt that the respondent should be given a chance 
to pay up the arrears as well as be given a right to be heard before an order sentencing him 
to imprisonment is made. The appellant appealed against the Sessions Court’s decision. 
Before the High Court’s appeal was decided, the respondent had paid up the arrears. The 
learned High Court judge, Syed Othman J. (as His Lordship then was), agreed with the 
Sessions Court President that the respondent should be given a right to be heard before an 
order is made under section 4 of the 1950 Ordinance. Further thereto, the learned High Court 
judge proceeded to state that the onus is on the wife to prove that the husband had wilfully 
neglected to pay the maintenance as provided for under section 4 of the 1950 Ordinance. In 
stating the above, the learned judge referred to a similar provision in India on this issue, 
which can be found in Sohoni’s ‘The Code of Criminal Procedure.’5  When a wife applies 
for an enforcement of maintenance order, a notice is issued to the husband. The court would 
then hold an inquiry in the husband’s presence, unless he fails or refuses to attend the inquiry. 
During the inquiry, the wife has the burden of proving the following: 
(a) The husband was ordered by the court to pay maintenance; 
(b) He has neglected to comply with the court order; and 
(c) The neglect was wilful. 
                                                          
5Sohoni’s “The Code of Criminal Procedure”, 12th edition 1962, Volume III at 2712. 
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Although the court in the above case refers to a wife enforcing a maintenance order 
against her husband, the same principles could be applied in enforcing a maintenance order 
against a parent who has failed to comply with the same. The court in the decision above has 
imposed the burden of proof on the person applying for the enforcement order to prove that 
the paying parent has wilfully neglected to pay. The keywords here are ‘wilfully neglected’. 
The learned judge referred to a similar provision in section 488(3) of the Indian Criminal 
Procedure Code and stated that the words ‘wilfully neglected’ as stated in our section 4 of 
the 1950 Ordinance have been replaced with the words ‘fails without sufficient case’ in the 
Indian counterpart. He further added that perhaps our legislature should amend section 4 by 
deleting ‘wilfully neglected’ and replacing it with ‘fails without sufficient cause’.  
It is submitted that the above suggestion by the learned judge is welcomed as it would 
lighten the burden on the person applying for the enforcement of a maintenance order (for 
the purposes of this thesis, ‘person’ here would refer to a child). The difference is that under 
the present law, the petitioner has to prove that the respondent has ‘wilfully neglected’, 
thereby bearing the heavy onus of proving the mens rea of ‘wilfully’ on the respondent’s 
part. On the other hand, if the relevant section is amended by replacing ‘wilfully neglects’ 
with ‘fails without sufficient cause’, this would ease the burden on the petitioner as he or she 
merely has to prove that the respondent has failed to pay the maintenance sum without any 
sufficient reason or cause. 
Nevertheless, it is disheartening to note that although the learned judge in the above case 
made the recommendations for the Legislature to amend section 4 of the 1950 Ordinance, no 
such amendments have been made so far, bearing in mind that it is nearly forty years since 
the case was decided. 
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7.2.1.2 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
Part VIII of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (‘the LRA’) as mentioned 
in the earlier Chapters, has provisions on the duty of the parents to maintain their child6 and 
the court’s power to order them (the parents) to do so if they have either refused or neglected 
to do so or deserted their child7. However, upon perusing the remaining provisions in Part 
VIII, it is to be noted that there are no express provisions concerning the enforcement of 
maintenance orders or the penalty in the event they (the parents) default in complying with 
the maintenance order. It is rather surprising that the drafters of the LRA did not enact any 
penalty provision in the event the paying parent defaults in his or her payment of maintenance 
to his or her child. 
However, the drafters have inserted a provision, in section 94, where the court is 
empowered to order security for maintenance.8 It is to be noted that this section gives the 
court discretion to order the paying parent to secure the whole or any part of his or her 
property by vesting any property in trustees upon trust to pay the maintenance or part thereof 
out of the income from that property to the child concerned. It is submitted that section 94 is 
effective as it would secure the monthly maintenance payment to the child as he or she would 
be assured of getting their monthly allowance. However, as the section states, it is completely 
at the court’s discretion to order the security. In addition, the question of whether the paying 
parent has any property to be secured arises. Not all paying parents could be said to own 
properties, thereby rendering the section redundant in such cases. 
                                                          
6Section 92 of the LRA. 
7Section 93 of the LRA. 
8 Section 94 of the LRA provides as follows: ’The Court may, in its discretion, when ordering the payment of maintenance for the benefit 
of any child, order the person liable to pay such maintenance to secure the whole or any part of it by vesting any property in trustees upon 
trust to pay such maintenance or part thereof out of the income from such property, and subject thereto, in trust for the settlor.’ 
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The only so-called ‘penal provision’ as far as defaulting in paying maintenance in the 
LRA is section 102 which empowers the court to set aside and prevent dispositions intended 
to defeat claims to maintenance.9 This provision is applicable in only one situation, i.e. where 
the respondent or the paying parent has disposed or is planning to dispose of property with 
the intention of reducing his or her means to pay maintenance. This section, although is 
beneficial to the child concerned as it prevents the paying parent from reducing his means to 
pay maintenance, is only applicable where there is a disposition of property. What happens 
if the paying parent defaults in his payment of maintenance without disposing of his 
property? Will he or she be penalised under the LRA, as is provided for in the 1950 Act? As 
mentioned earlier, there is no penalty clause in the LRA that punishes such parents. Perhaps 
the only solution to this problem is that if there is a default in complying with the maintenance 
order, it could be stated that it amounts to a contempt of court and the necessary proceedings 
prescribed for contempt could be initiated against the paying parent. 
Although the LRA is silent on this matter, the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Rules 1980 (a subsidiary legislation made under the LRA10) contains provisions on the 
enforcement of maintenance orders. This could be observed in Rules 72, 73, 74 and 75.11 
                                                          
9 Section 102 provides as follows: (1) Where –(a) any matrimonial proceeding is pending; or (b) an order for maintenance has been made 
under section 76 and has not been complied with; (c) an order for maintenance has been made under section 77 or 93 and has not been 
rescinded; or (d) maintenance is payable under any agreement to or for the benefit of a spouse or former spouse or child, the court shall 
have power on application – (i) if it is satisfied that any disposition of property has been made by the spouse or former spouse or parent of 
the person by or on whose behalf the application is made, within the preceding three years, with the object on the part of the person making 
the disposition of reducing his or her means to pay maintenance or of depriving his or her spouse of any rights in relation to that property, 
to set aside the disposition; and (ii) if it is satisfied that any disposition of property is intended to be made with any such object, to grant an 
injunction preventing that disposition. 
10 Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 108(1) of the LRA on the Rules Committee. 
11 Rule 72 provides as follows: (1) Before any process is issued for the enforcement of an order made in matrimonial proceedings for the 
payment of money to any person, an affidavit shall be filed verifying the amount due under the order and showing how that amount is 
arrived at. (2) Except with the leave of the registrar, no writ of fieri facias or warrant of execution shall be issued to enforce payment of 
any sum due under an order for ancillary relief where an application for a variation order is pending. (3) For the purpose of the Rules of the 
High Court Order 46 (issue of a writ of execution), the divorce registry shall be the appropriate office for the issue of a writ of execution 
to enforce an order made in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court which are proceedings in that registry. Rules 73, 74 and 75 provide 
the procedure to be followed when applying for an order of committal in matrimonial proceedings. 
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The above are provisions concerning enforcement of maintenance orders in the Rules (a 
subsidiary legislation). These rules are merely regulatory. It is submitted that the courts 
should be empowered to enforce the maintenance orders by the parent Act, i.e. the LRA, 
which would be more effective when compared to the provisions in a subsidiary legislation. 
 
7.2.1.3 Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah 
The Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah (‘the Maintenance Ordinance’) contains a 
similar provision as the 1950 Act concerning the penalty if there is a default in paying the 
maintenance amount. This can be observed in section 5 of the Maintenance Ordinance which 
is similar to section 4 of the 1950 Act. It provides that the court may, if the respondent 
breaches the maintenance order, impose a levy and may sentence him to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding one month for every month’s allowance that remains unpaid. As 
mentioned earlier, when looking at section 5 of the Maintenance Ordinance, this penalty 
provision needs to be amended by the Sabah State Legislative Assembly in order to increase 
the punishment so that paying parents who default in complying with the maintenance order 
would think twice before doing so.  
 
7.2.1.4 Child Act 2001 
The Child Act 2001 underwent major amendments in 2016, vide the Child (Amendment) 
Act 2016 (Act A1511). The amendments came into force on 25 July 2016. Unlike the statutes 
mentioned above, does not provide for the consequences in the event of a breach of a 
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maintenance order. This Act merely provides for the penalties that could be imposed if a 
person fails to maintain his or her child. This could be seen in section 31 of the Act.12  
The issue that arises at this juncture is whether maintenance of a child falls under section 
31(1), as this subsection covers various situations such as abuse, neglect, abandon and expose 
the child in a manner likely to cause him physical or emotional injury and sexual abuse. The 
answer to this question could be found in section 31(4) which states as follows: 
A parent or guardian or other person legally liable to maintain a child shall be deemed 
to have neglected him in a manner likely to cause him physical or emotional injury 
if, being able to so provide from his own resources, he fails to provide adequate food, 
clothing, medical or dental treatment, lodging or care for the child. 
Thus, according to the provision above, ‘neglecting a child’ as stated in section 31(1) 
could be the result of a parent failing to maintain his child. As stated earlier, section 31 does 
not mention anywhere about any maintenance order. It merely provides for the penalties that 
would be imposed on parents or guardians who fail to maintain their children. Hence, it is 
not a provision under which the child could apply to the court for a maintenance order. In 
this respect, this Act differs from the 1950 Act and the LRA. 
 Apart from the above stated difference, it also differs from the 1950 Act with respect to 
the punishment. Section 31(1) states that the punishment imposed would either be a fine not 
exceeding twenty thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or 
to both. Hence, there is a vast difference between the punishment stated in the Child Act and 
                                                          
12 Section 31(1) provides as follows: ‘Any person who, being a person having the care of a child – (a) abuses, neglects, abandons or exposes 
the child or acts negligently in a manner likely to cause him physical or emotional injury or cause or permits him to be so abused, neglected, 
abandoned or exposed; or (b) sexually abused the child or causes or permits him to be so abused, commits an offence and shall on conviction 
be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years or to both’. 
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the punishment stated in the 1950 Act. In fact, the punishment prescribed in the Child Act is 
for failing in their (the parents’) duty to maintain a child, whereas the punishment provided 
for in the 1950 Act is merely when the paying parent does not comply with a maintenance 
order. 
 In addition to section 31(1), the Child Act imposes additional punishments in 
subsections (2) and (3). The recent amendment to the Child Act 2001 in 2016 has amended 
subsection (2) and (3) and has incorporated a new subsection (3A). Subsection (2) states that 
the Court may order the person convicted: 
(a) to execute a bond with sureties to be of good behaviour for such period as the 
Court thinks fit; and  
(b) to perform community service.  
 Subsection (3) provides that if a person ordered to execute a bond to be of good 
behaviour under subsection (2) fails to comply with any of the conditions of such bond, he 
shall be liable to a further fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit or to a further imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years or to both. As to the community service, subsection (3A) 
states that the community service: 
(a) shall not be less than thirty-six hours and not more than two hundred forty hours 
in aggregate;  
(b) shall be performed within the period not exceeding six months from the date of 
the order; and  
(c) shall be subject to such conditions as may be specified by the Court.  
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Subsection (3B) provides that any person who fails to comply with the community service 
order shall be committing an offence and on conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 
ten thousand ringgit.  
The punishments stated above shows how serious the Legislature considers abuse and 
neglect of a child is. It is submitted that it is high time that the Legislature revisits the 1950 
Act as well as the LRA to impose similar penalties therein so that the paying parents are 
aware that they would be punished severely if they do not comply with the maintenance 
order. In addition, they should be made aware that all the legislations concerning maintenance 
provide the same penalty so that the defaulting parents are prevented from ‘hiding behind’ 
statutes which provide for lenient sentencing. 
 
7.2.2 Laws on Enforcement of Maintenance Orders 
Having looked at the penal provisions in the relevant statutes concerning the penalty that 
may be imposed when the paying parent defaults in his payment, it is next pertinent to also 
look at the methods in which the child may enforce the maintenance orders. Currently, there 
are two statutes that deal with the enforcement of maintenance orders: one for the 
enforcement within Malaysia and the other for the enforcement outside Malaysia. 
 
7.2.2.1 Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968 
The Married Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968 (‘the 1968 
Act’) which was passed to provide for the enforcement of maintenance orders came into 
effect on 21 March 1968. However, according to section 2, this Act shall apply to the States 
of West Malaysia only. Thus, this Act is not applicable to the States of Sabah and Sarawak. 
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It is submitted that this Act should be extended to East Malaysia as well as there is no specific 
legislation such as this Act in East Malaysia concerning enforcement of maintenance orders. 
‘Maintenance orders’ is defined in section 3 of the 1968 Act as follows: 
Maintenance orders means – 
(a) an order made under section 3 of the Married Women and Children 
(Maintenance) Act 1950; 
(b) an order for the payment of periodical sums by way of maintenance or 
alimony to a wife or for the benefit of any child under the Law Reform 
(Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976; 
(c) a maintenance order confirmed by the court under the Maintenance Orders 
(Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949; and 
(d) where this Act is made applicable by virtue of an authorization under section 
14 to or in respect of a maintenance order made by a Syariah Court shall 
include such order. 
An issue that arises at this juncture is with reference to paragraphs (a) and (b) in the above 
provision. As stated earlier, this Act is only applicable to the States of West Malaysia. 
However, paragraphs (a) and (b) state that maintenance orders that may be enforced under 
this Act include maintenance orders issued under the 1950 Act as well as the LRA.  The 1950 
Act applies to West Malaysia and Sarawak whereas the LRA applies throughout Malaysia. 
Hence, as submitted earlier, the Legislature should extend the application of this Act to East 
Malaysia as well in order to safeguard the welfare of the children in Sabah and Sarawak, 
failing which, the children therein may face hardship when it comes to the enforcement of a 
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maintenance order. In addition, previous research13 also shows that as the rate of divorce in 
Sabah and Sarawak is continuously increasing annually14, there is a dire need for the 1968 
Act be extended to East Malaysia.  
The power of the court to make an attachment of earnings order (‘attachment order’) in 
favour of the person for whose maintenance the order is made or the guardian of such person 
is provided for in section 4(1). Section 4(2) provides that an application for an attachment 
order may be made in the same proceeding when a maintenance order is applied for or in any 
subsequent proceeding. It is submitted at this juncture that it would be better for the applicant 
to apply for the attachment order in the same proceeding when a maintenance order is applied 
for as it would save time and cost for the applicant, rather than applying for it later, when the 
respondent defaults in payment.  
The nature of an attachment order is explained in section 5(1), which provides that the 
said order shall require the defendant’s employer to make out of the earnings falling to be 
paid to the defendant payments in satisfaction of the order. According to section 5(2), the 
court has a discretion to prescribe the amount to be stated in the attachment order, after 
considering the resources and the needs of the defendant and the needs of persons for whom 
he must or reasonably should provide. The officer to whom the employer has to make 
payments to shall be designated in the attachment order.15 An attachment order or any 
variation thereof shall only come into force after seven days from the date a copy of the order 
is served to the defendant’s employer. 
                                                          
13Haema Latha Nair, Saroja Dhanapal, Jenita Kanapathy, “A Review of Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 and Married 
Women and Children (Enforcement of Maintenance) Act 1968” (July 2014), Vol. 3, European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 
257-272 accessed at http://www.ejbss.com/recent,aspx on 8 February 2017. 
14Ibid. Statistics revealed that in Sarawak, the number of divorce cases were as follows 1,724 cases in 2007, 2725 cases in 2008, 2,063 in 
2009, 2,559 in 2010, 2,806 in 2011 and more than 3,000 cases in 2012. 
15Section 5(5). 
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Section 6 of the 1968 Act provides for the effect of an attachment order. Once an 
attachment order is made, all other proceedings for the enforcement of the said maintenance 
order which were commenced before the attachment order was made shall be suspended.16 
Section 6(2) gives the court discretion to make an order discharging or varying the attachment 
order on the application by the defendant or the person entitled to receive payments under 
the maintenance order. An attachment order ceases to have effect when any of the following 
circumstances take place:17 
(a) when a warrant is issued to levy the amount stated in the maintenance order in the 
manner provided by law for levying fines; 
(b) when an order is made to sentence the defendant to imprisonment for failing to 
comply with the maintenance order; and 
(c) when the maintenance order is rescinded. 
When the attachment order ceases to have effect on the occurring of any one of the above 
circumstances, the court which made such order shall give notice of the cessation to the 
defendant’s employer.18 
Section 7(1) imposes a duty on the defendant’s employer to comply with the attachment 
order, notwithstanding anything in any other written law. In a situation where there are two 
or more attachment orders in force against the defendant, the employer shall deal with the 
earlier attachment orders first before dealing with a later order.19 Once the defendant’s 
employer had made a payment pursuant to attachment order, he shall give to the defendant a 
statement in writing specifying the amount that had been paid.20 It is submitted, at this 
                                                          
16Section 6(1). 
17Section 6(3). 
18Ibid. 
19 Section 7(2) 
20 Section 7(3) 
309 
 
juncture that the legislature has taken the effort to draft section 7 meticulously so that no 
doubt arises on the part of the employer when he is ordered by the court to attach the 
defendant’s earnings. 
When the defendant’s employer pays the sum stated in the attachment order to the court, 
the court shall pay the said money to the person entitled to receive the payment under the 
related maintenance order.21 In relation to situations where the defendant is a Government 
servant, section 11(1) provides that if the earnings are paid by the Government or out of the 
Consolidated Fund,22 the earnings shall be treated as falling to be paid by the Chief Officer 
for the time being of the department, office or other body concerned.23 
The penalties for non-compliance with an attachment order and for giving a false notice 
or statement are provided for in section 12. Section 12(1) states that in the event of any person 
who does not comply with an attachment order or gives a false notice or statement, shall be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to a fine not exceeding one 
thousand ringgit or to both. 
At this juncture, an interesting observation can be made between the penalty imposed by 
section 12 of this Act for non-compliance with an attachment order and section 4 of the 1950 
Act for non-compliance with a maintenance order. Section 4 of the 1950 Act merely states 
that the penalty for non-compliance with a maintenance order is a levy for the amount due to 
be levied or imprisonment for a month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid, 
whereas section 12 of the 1968 Act imposes a higher penalty on the defendant’s employer 
for non-compliance with an attachment order, i.e. imprisonment for not more than one year 
                                                          
21Section 10(1). 
22 ‘Consolidated ‘Fund’ here refers to the Federal Consolidated Fund or the State Consolidated Fund (as the case may be). Article 97(1) 
and (2) of the Federal Constitution provide that ‘All revenues and moneys howsoever raised or received by the Federation or State shall, 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of federal law or state law, be paid into and form one fund, to be known as the Federal 
Consolidated Fund or Consolidated Fund of the State. 
23Section 11(1). 
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or to a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit or to both. It does not make sense to impose 
a higher penalty on a third party (the defendant’s employer), who has no obligation or legal 
duty to maintain the defendant’s child, for failing to comply with an attachment order, 
whereas the defendant, who is under a legal duty to maintain his child is subject to a lenient 
sentence when he does not comply with a maintenance order. Thus, the writer would like to 
reiterate what was mentioned earlier in this Chapter that the penalty in section 4 of the 1950 
should be revised so that it is fair to the defendant’s employer as stated in the above instance. 
However, to be fair to the defendant’s employer, section 12 provides for a defence in 
section 12(2) where it states that it would be a defence to the person who has failed to comply 
with the attachment order if he can prove that he took all reasonable steps to comply with the 
attachment order.  
Finally, section 13 of the 1968 Act provides for situations where the defendant’s income 
is derived from sources other than earnings.24  Thus, situations covered under section 13 refer 
to where the defendant is not working for an employer, i.e. where for instance he is self-
employed. In such a case, section 13(1) provides that the court will then order the 
maintenance sum to be paid direct to the court on a date determined by it (the court). Upon 
receipt of the maintenance sum, the court will then pay the amount to the person in whose 
favour the maintenance order is made or to his or her guardian. If the defendant neglects or 
fails to comply with the court’s order, the court will then call upon the defendant to show 
cause why he neglected or failed to comply with the said order.25 If the defendant does not 
                                                          
24 ‘Earnings’ is defined in section 3 of the 1968 Act as follows: (a) by way of wages or salary, including – any fees, bonus, commission, 
overtime pay or other emoluments payable in addition to wages or salary by the person paying the wages or salary or payable under a 
contract of service; (b) by way of pension, including gratuity and an annuity in respect of past services, whether or not the services were 
rendered to the person paying the annuity, and including periodical payments by way of compensation for the loss, abolition or 
relinquishment, or any diminution in the emoluments, of any office or employment. 
25Section 13(2). 
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show sufficient cause and does not pay the maintenance sum, the Court may issue a warrant 
for the attachment and sale of the defendant’s property.26 
The penal provision in section 13(3) is an additional penalty clause where the defendant’s 
property would be attached and seized. However, the question that arises is what happens if 
the defendant does not have any properties? Reference can be made to section 13(5) which 
states that if the maintenance sum cannot be recovered by the attachment and sale of the 
defendant’s property, the Court may direct that the defendant be imprisoned for a term not 
exceeding one month for every such neglect or failure to comply with the court order made 
under section 13(1). Once again, it is to be noted that the punishment to be meted out to the 
defendant for non-compliance with a court order here is merely one month for every neglect 
or failure to comply with the court’s order, when compared to the punishment imposed on 
the defendant’s employer in the event of non-compliance (as stated in section 12(1)). There 
is a big difference between the penalties imposed on the defendant and his employer. Thus, 
it is submitted that the Legislature ought to take immediate steps to rectify this difference in 
the punishments in order to be fair to the defendant’s employer.  
Another issue that arises here is with regard to a defendant who has retired from the 
private sector. Section 3 defines ‘earnings’ to include pensions, gratuity and annuities. This 
would be applicable mainly to government servants, especially as they would be receiving 
monthly pensions.  Prior to the enactment of the 1968 Act, there was a judicial decision 
reported in 1965, the case of Central Electricity Board v Govindamal,27 where the issue was 
whether pensions could be attached. In this case, the respondent obtained a maintenance order 
against her husband. The husband was an employer of the appellant. Subsequently, at the 
                                                          
26Section 13(3). 
27[1965] 2 MLJ 153. 
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instance of the respondent, the court made another order directing the appellant's board 
manager to attach the husband's salary every month and pay the maintenance amount to the 
wife's solicitors. In 1963, the husband retired and returned to India and wanted to draw his 
pension there. Once the husband retired, the appellant stopped paying the wife the 
maintenance amount every month. The wife applied and obtained an order for a warrant of 
distress and sale to be issued against the husband's gratuity and pension in the hands of the 
appellant. The appellant filed an objection which was dismissed by the magistrate. Following 
the dismissal, the appellant appealed to the High Court. 
The appellant relied on section 22 of the Electricity Ordinance 1949 (repealed by section 
56 of the Electricity Supply Act 199028).29 The High Court agreed with the appellant's 
argument and held that the husband's pension is not liable to be attached under section 22 of 
the Electricity Ordinance 1949. If a similar case arose in the present time, it is submitted that 
the decision of the court would not be the same for two reasons. First, the above Electricity 
Ordinance has been repealed by the Electricity Supply Act which does not have a similar 
provision. Secondly, section 3 of the 1968 Act clearly states ‘earnings’ include pensions, 
gratuity and annuities. 
At this juncture, an issue that arises is, what about retirees from the private sector? How 
will the child concerned be able to attach the earnings of his or her father when the latter has 
retired? 
 
                                                          
28Act 447. 
29 Section 22 of the Electricity Ordinance 1949 read as follows: ‘22.(1) Subject to the approval of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the board 
shall establish a scheme or schemes for the payment of super-annuation allowances, pensions or gratuities to officers and servants of the 
board, or otherwise cease to hold office, by reason of age, or of infirmity of body or mind, or of abolition of office. (2) The following 
provisions shall apply to any scheme established under this section -(a) ... (b) no donation or contribution to a fund established under any 
such scheme or interest thereon shall be assignable or transferable or liable to be attached, sequestered or levied upon for or in respect of 
any debt or claim whatsoever other than a debt due to the board or to the Federal Government or a State or Settlement Government. 
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7.2.2.2 Married Women and Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 
The Married Women and Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 (‘the Facilities 
for Enforcement Act’), which was passed to facilitate the enforcement in Malaysia of 
maintenance orders made in reciprocating countries and vice versa came into effect on 1 
January 1971 vide P.U.(A) 460/70. 
Before looking at the provisions in this Act, it is pertinent to look at the Schedule to the 
Act which contains a list of the reciprocating countries (see Appendix E). It is disheartening 
to note that the list of reciprocating countries is limited to only about sixteen countries, which 
would restrict the ability to enforce a maintenance order in countries which are not listed in 
the Schedule. Section 11 of the Facilities for Enforcement Act gives the power to the Yang 
di Pertuan Agong to issue an order to extend this Act to any country and amend the Schedule 
if His Majesty is satisfied that reciprocal provisions have been or will be made by the 
legislature of any country or territory for the enforcement within that country or territory of 
maintenance orders made by courts in Malaysia. Howsoever, it is sad to note that to date, the 
most recent exercise of power was done in 2004 when the Yang di Pertuan Agong extended 
the Facilities for Enforcement Act to Hong Kong Special Administrative of the People’s 
Republic of China.30 Apart from this, there has been no other extension of this Act to any 
other countries. There is no mention of many countries for example the European Union 
(apart from England, Wales and Northern Ireland), the United States of America, the Middle 
Eastern countries, Scotland and Indonesia, to name a few. It is submitted that unless the 
authorities concerned in the countries not listed in the Schedule in this Act make reciprocal 
provisions for the enforcement of the maintenance orders made in Malaysia, it would be very 
difficult for the petitioner to enforce the said orders in these countries, thereby rendering the 
                                                          
30Vide P.U.(A) 33/04 which came into effect on 23 January 2004. 
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maintenance order redundant. The necessity to extend this Act to other countries is pertinent 
in this current age where more and more persons are marrying foreigners. Hence, if the 
foreign spouse’s country is not stated as reciprocating country, the Malaysian spouse may 
find it difficult to enforce a maintenance order there. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Facilities for Enforcement Act is to facilitate the enforcement 
of maintenance orders made in reciprocating countries in Malaysia and vice versa. Section 3 
of the Facilities for Enforcement Act deals with the enforcement in Malaysian of maintenance 
orders made in reciprocating countries whereas section 4 deals with the transmission of 
maintenance orders made in Malaysia.31 For the purposes of this thesis, emphasis will be 
made on enforcing maintenance orders made in Malaysia in reciprocating countries.  
Section 5 deals with the power of a local Court to make provisional orders of maintenance 
against persons resident in reciprocating countries. Section 5(1) deals with a situation where 
an application is made in a local Court for a maintenance order against a person residing in 
a reciprocating country. The subsection gives the Court the discretionary power to make an 
order, in the absence of such a person and if after hearing the evidence it is satisfied of the 
justice of the application. This order is made by the Court as though a summons had been 
duly served on that person and he had failed to appear at the hearing. Howsoever, the order 
is provisional only and shall have no effect unless and until confirmed by a competent court 
in that reciprocating country. 
                                                          
31 Section 4 of the Facilities for Enforcement Act provides as follows: ‘Where a local Court has, whether before or after the commencement 
of this Act made a maintenance order against any person, and it is proved to the Court that the person against whom the order was made is 
resident in a reciprocating country, the Court shall send to the Minister charged with the responsibility for foreign affairs for transmission 
to the appropriate authority in the reciprocating country a certified copy of the order.’ 
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Section 5(3) further states the manner in which the maintenance order would be 
forwarded to the appropriate authority in the reciprocating country. The Court making the 
order shall send to the Minister in charge of foreign affairs to transmit to the appropriate 
authority in the reciprocating country the following documents: 
(a) the depositions taken; 
(b) a certified copy of the maintenance order; 
(c) a certificate stating the grounds on which the respondent might have opposed if 
he had been served with a summons and he had appeared at the hearing; and 
(d) information in the possession of the court for facilitating the identification of and 
ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondent. 
Section 5(4) provides that the provisional order may be either rescinded or varied. If an 
order is varied, the order shall not have any effect unless and until confirmed in the same 
manner as the original order.32 Section 5(6) confers the right of appeal to the applicant in the 
event there is a refusal to make a provisional order. 
Although the procedure is laid down in detail in the Facilities for Enforcement Act, it is 
submitted that so long as the list of reciprocating countries remains the same, cases where 
the respondents reside in non-reciprocating countries would not be subjected to this Act. 
Hence, the applicant is left with a maintenance order in hand without being able to enforce 
it. 
There are very few cases decided on the issue of enforcing maintenance in foreign 
jurisdictions. One of the earliest cases decided on the issue of reciprocal enforcement of 
                                                          
32Section 5(5). 
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maintenance was the case of Woosey v Woosey.33  This case was decided during the Straits 
Settlements era, when the Reciprocal of Maintenance Orders Ordinance34 was in force. In 
this case, the respondent was the ordered by the English High Court of Justice to pay to the 
appellant £10 per month for the appellant and a further £10 as maintenance for their two 
children of the marriage. The said order was registered in the Singapore District Court under 
section 3 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Ordinance. The respondent 
defaulted in the payment of a sum of £100. A summons was issued for the respondent to 
appear before the Criminal District Court, Singapore to show cause as to why no action 
should be taken against him under section 37(4) of the Minor Offences Ordinance. The 
defendant showed cause and the District Court judge decided that as there was nothing to 
show why the High Court judge ordered the defendant to pay £20 as maintenance, he would 
not enforce the maintenance order against the defendant. 
The appellant appealed and stated that the District Court Judge had no jurisdiction to 
enquire as to why the High Court judge had ordered the respondent to pay £20 as 
maintenance. The District Court judge also did not have jurisdiction to enquire the 
defendant's means and finally, the District Court judge was bound to make an order under 
one or other of the alternatives set out in section 37(4). The High Court agreed with the 
appellant's argument and stated that the District Court is not concerned with the grounds upon 
which the English High Court issued the maintenance order. The proprietary of the order 
cannot be questioned by the District Court Judge. The maintenance order which was 
registered has the same force and effect as if it were an order made by the District Court 
Judge himself. Further thereto, the District Court Judge, in expressing disapproval of the 
                                                          
33(1938) 7 MLJ (SSR). 
34Cap 47 
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English order, had erred in law. The High Court thus directed that the case be remitted to the 
District Court Judge for further hearing.  
Although the above case was not based on the Facilities for Enforcement Act, but on its 
Singaporean counterpart35, the principles decided in this case could be applied in future cases. 
When an application is made to enforce a maintenance order, especially if it concerns an 
order made in another jurisdiction, the said court cannot question the order. Further thereto, 
the judge concerned must either enforce the order as a whole or not at all.  
 
7.3 COMPARISON WITH THE POSITION CONCERNING THE MUSLIMS 
IN MALAYSIA 
The writer would be examining the measures pertaining to the enforcement of 
maintenance orders concerning the Muslims in Malaysia with an intention of comparing their 
position with the non-Muslims. 
The Muslims, as was stated in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, are governed by the Syariah 
principles or Hukum Syara'. Nevertheless, each state in Malaysia (save for the Federal 
Territories), has its own State Enactments on Muslim family law matters. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the writer would focus on the Muslim family law legislation in the Federal 
Territories as well as the Family Support Division which was formed to manage the 
enforcement and implementation of Syariah Court maintenance orders effectively. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35The current law in Singapore on reciprocal enforcement of judgment is the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Cap 169, 
1985 Ed. 
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7.3.1 Muslim Family Law Legislation 
The main legislation on family law matters in the Federal Territories is the Islamic Family 
Law (Federal Territories) Act 198436 (‘IFLA’). The provisions concerning child maintenance 
in this Act are more or less similar to the provisions in the non-Muslim laws as discussed 
earlier, save for certain matters. Upon perusal of this Act, it could be noted that there are 
three enforcement of maintenance measures stated therein in the event the paying parent 
defaults in complying with the maintenance order. The three enforcement measures are as 
follows: 
1.  The court orders the payment of maintenance for the benefit of a child and orders 
the paying parent to secure the whole or any part of it by vesting any property upon 
trust to pay the maintenance to the child. In the event the paying parent fails to comply 
with the court order as above, this shall be punishable as a contempt of court.37 At 
this juncture, it is to be noted that the LRA has a similar provision as section 74 (1) 
of the IFLA concerning the court's power to order the paying parent to secure the 
whole or any part of the payment by vesting any property upon trust.38 However, the 
LRA stops there. There is no penal provision in the event the paying parent fails in 
complying with the said order. Therefore, it could be noted that this is a loophole in 
the LRA as non-Muslim parents who fail to secure the payment of maintenance to 
their child as ordered by the court are not liable to any penalty, when compared to 
their Muslim counterparts, thereby clearly rendering the LRA a toothless tiger. 
                                                          
36Act 303. 
37Sections 74(1) and (2). The provision, however, does not state what is the punishment for a contempt of court. 
38Section 94 of the LRA which provides as follows: ‘The court may, in its discretion, when ordering the payment of maintenance for the 
benefit of any child, order the person liable to pay such maintenance to secure the whole or any part of it by vesting any property in trustees 
upon trust to pay such maintenance or part thereof out of the income from such property, and subject thereto, in trust for the settlor’ 
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2.  Where the person is liable to pay maintenance and the person concerned has 
disposed of any property within the preceding three years with the object of reducing 
his or her means to pay maintenance, the court, if satisfied that the intention of the 
paying parent is proven, shall revoke the disposition.39 At the same time, if the paying 
parent intends to dispose of the property, the court will grant an injunction preventing 
the disposition.40 Section 106(3) goes on to say that if the court's order made under 
this section is not complied with, it shall be punishable as a contempt of court. Section 
106 of the IFLA is similar to section 102 (1) of the LRA41 save for the penalty clause 
as provided for in section 106(3) of the IFLA. Hence, it is to be noted that there is a 
lacuna in the LRA concerning the penalty to be imposed in the event of non-
compliance. 
3. In addition to the above measures, section 132(1) is a general provision stating 
that the penalty in the event of failure to comply with any order made by a court. If 
the court orders for the payment of any amount, and the person concerned has failed 
to make such payment, the court may ‘direct the amount due to be levied in the 
manner by law providing for levying fines imposed by the court or may sentence  the 
person wilfully failing to comply therewith to imprisonment if the order or each 
month's payment remaining unpaid.’42 Section 132(2)(a) further states that the court 
                                                          
39Section 106(1)(i) of IFLA 
40Section 106(1)(ii) of IFLA 
41Section 102 provides as follows: ‘(1) Where— (c) an order for maintenance has been made under section 77 or 93 and has not been 
rescinded; or (d) maintenance is payable under any agreement to or for the benefit of a spouse or former spouse or child, the court shall 
have power on application— (i) if it is satisfied that any disposition of property has been made by the spouse or former spouse or parent of 
the person by or on whose behalf the application is made, within the preceding three years, with the object on the part of the person making 
the disposition of reducing his or her means to pay maintenance or of depriving his or her spouse of any rights in relation to that property, 
to set aside the disposition; and (ii) if it is satisfied that any disposition of property is intended to be made with any such object, to grant an 
injunction preventing that disposition’.  
42Section 132(1). 
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may sentence the defaulter to imprisonment not exceeding one month for each 
month's payment remaining unpaid. 
Apart from the IFLA, which specifically provides for the enforcement of maintenance 
orders, enforcement for payment of money generally is provided for under the Syariah Court 
Civil Procedure (Federal Territories) Act 1998 (‘SCCPA’). This Act provides for the 
payment of money either by instalments or in a lump sum.43 The methods of enforcement 
provided for under the SCCPA are as follows: 
(a) Writ of Seizure and Sale 
The first method of enforcement is by way of seizure and sale. According to this method, 
the court may order the bailiff to ‘recover any sum payable by seizing and selling the movable 
property of the judgment debtor.’44 This measure is provided for under section 159(1)(a) of 
the SCCPA. However, seizure and sale is only applicable in case of claims for movable 
properties. Movable properties here refer to money, shares, stocks, debentures, bonds and 
jewellery.45 The seizure and sale method may be applied to paying parents who default in 
payment on the child maintenance. 
(b) Garnishee Proceedings 
The second method of enforcement of a court order is by way of a garnishee proceeding.46 
According to section 161(d)(i) of the SCCPA, a garnishee proceeding could only be carried 
out with the leave of the court as well as a written consent from the Treasury. 
                                                          
43Sections 133-134 of the SCCPA. 
44Section 159(1)(a). 
45Muslihah Hasbullah and Najibah Mohd. Zin, “How Divorced Women Can Effectively Enforce the Financial Support Orders: The Legal 
and Administrative Actions,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 2 No13, July 2012 at 142. 
46 Garnishee Proceedings refers to a ‘Court order made so that a person who is owed money (creditor) can obtain full or part payment from 
a third party whom in fact owes or holds money for the debtor’. Information obtained from English Encyclopedia website at 
http://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-Garnishee%20Proceedings accessed on 7 February 2017. 
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(c) Committal order 
The third method of enforcement under the SCCPA is by way of an order of committal.47 
It is an offence if the respondent defaults in payment of iddah maintenance, mut'ah, arrears 
of maintenance and chid maintenance. This is provided for in section 148(1)(c) of the SCCPA 
read together with section 151 (1)(a). This provision could also be read alongside with section 
132 of the IFLA (which was discussed earlier) where the court is empowered to either impose 
a fine or to convict the defaulter to imprisonment. 
 
(d) Judgment Debtor Summons 
The fourth method of enforcement is by way of a Judgment Debtor Summons.48 
According to section 176(1) of the SCCPA, a judgment debtor may be summoned to the court 
in order to be examined whether he is financially able to settle the judgment debt. The 
financial standing of the judgment debtor will be examined by the court in an inquisitorial 
manner. The factors that the court will take into account are such as his salary, expenses and 
his physical appearance.49 Section 179 of the SCCPA provides that in the event the judgment 
debtor fails to comply with the judgment summons, the judgment creditor may apply for a 
judgment notice asking the judgment debtor to appear in court and to show cause as to why 
he should not be imprisonment.50 Section 181 provides the punishment for the refusal to 
comply with the summons, i.e. a judgment debtor may be imprisoned for a maximum period 
of thirty days. 
  
                                                          
47Committal order refers to ‘the document that commits someone to prison’. Information obtained from the Collins dictionary website at 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/committal-order accessed on 7 February 2017.  
48Judgment debtor summons refers to ‘a summons issued by a court requiring a judgment debtor to appear and show cause why he should 
not be imprisoned’. Information obtained from the Merriam Webster dictionary website at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/judgment%20summons accessed on 7 February 2017. 
49Supra n47 at 144. 
50Ibid. 
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(e) Contempt proceedings 
The fifth method of enforcement is where the failure to pay child maintenance amounts 
to a contempt of court.51 This is provided for under section 229(1) of the SCCPA, where the 
defaulter could be imprisoned for a period not more than six months or imposed a fine not 
more than RM2,000. Nevertheless, the defaulter is given an opportunity to show cause as to 
why he failed to obey the court's order.52 
Apart from the IFLA and the SCCPA, an additional enforcement method is also available 
under the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997.53 Section 10 of this Act 
provides that any person who defies, disobeys, disputes, degrades, brings into contempt any 
order of a Judge or Court is guilty of an offence and can be either liable to a fine not exceeding 
RM3,000 or be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both. 
In addition to the above legislations, in June 2013, certain amendments were proposed to 
the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act, where new powers would be 
conferred on the Syariah Courts. One of the amendments proposed is sections 64(1)-(4), 
which would be welcomed by wives whose husbands ‘run to any of the Federal Territories 
to avoid a warrant of arrest or summons, for example, for non-payment of maintenance issued 
in the State where the wife had filed her petition.’54  Under the new amendment, the Federal 
Territories (Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya) Syariah judges are empowered to endorse 
orders or judgments issued by the state Syariah Court judges so that these orders or judgments 
could be enforced in the Federal Territories, on condition that they (the Federal Territories 
                                                          
51Contempt of court refers to ‘the crime of refusing to obey an order made by a court; not showing respect for a court or judge’. Information 
obtained from the Oxford learner dictionaries website at 
 http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/contempt-of-court accessed on 7 February 2017. 
52Supra n49. 
53Act 559. 
54Retrieved from New powers for Syariah Court with proposed amendments, reported in The Star online on 27 June 2013 accessed from 
http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2013/06/27/New-powers-for-Syariah-court-with-proposed-amendments.aspx on 14 August 
2013. 
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court judges) are satisfied that the orders are valid. The same is applicable vice versa. At this 
juncture, it is to be noted that such an issue would not arise for the non-Muslims as the 
relevant Acts concerning maintenance are Federal statutes, save for some statutes that are 
only applicable to either West Malaysia or Sabah (the Sabah Maintenance Ordinance 1959). 
Nevertheless, the writer submits that it is indeed commendable to note that the Islamic 
authorities are aware of the issues concerning maintenance that arise and the swift actions 
that are taken by them to resolve such issues. Unfortunately, this is sadly lacking where the 
non-Muslims are concerned. 
Apart from the above enforcement measures stated in the legislations applicable to the 
Muslims, it is reiterated here that the attachment of earnings order provided for under the 
1968 Act (discussed earlier in this Chapter) applies to the maintenance orders issued by the 
Syariah Court as well.55 
Previous research shows that one of the main factors for failure to adhere to the order of 
the Court is the attitude of the payor. For instance, the payor may wilfully disappear. From 
studies conducted, the situation is worse off due to the weakness that exist in enforcement of 
the existing legal provisions, in addition to response from third parties who are sought to 
assist. For example, counsels for the applicants often choose certain types of actions and 
leave out other actions on the ground that they are less effective. Certain statutory provisions 
are thought to be not practical as it cannot be enforced either due to the reluctance of the 
courts themselves or lack of confidence on the part of the parties who need to follow up with 
the course of action.56 
                                                          
55Ismadi v Zainab (2005) JH 20(1) 87 
56Zaini Nasohah, “Cabaran Penguatkuasaan Dan Pelaksanaan Perintah Nafkah Di Mahkamah Syariah Negeri Selangor Dari Perspektif 
Peguam Sya’rie” (“Challenges to the Enforcement and Implementation of Maintenance Orders in the Selangor Syariah Court from the Sya’ 
rie Lawyyer’s Perspective) (2007) Jurnal Undang-Undang, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
324 
 
7.3.2 Family Support Division 
The issue of non-compliance with the maintenance orders granted by the Syariah Court 
attracted the attention of the nation’s leaders.  At the 47th Meeting of the National Council 
for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia chaired by the former Prime Minister on 7 June 2007, 
it was decided that the Department of Syariah Judiciary Malaysia (JKSM) should take 
immediate steps to resolve the issue of wife and child maintenance. As a result, the Family 
Support Division was established as a division of the Department of Syariah Judiciary 
Malaysia in October 2008.57 The mission, functions and objectives of the Family Support 
Division (BSK) are as follows:58 
Mission of BSK: 
(a) Manage the enforcement and implementation of the Syariah Court maintenance 
order effectively and efficiently. 
(b) Improving case management system in the Syariah Court states. 
Functions of BSK: 
(a) Provide legal advice to Muslims about their rights and claim in the Syariah 
Court, especially on the issue of alimony; 
(b) Enforcement of the judgment or maintenance orders issued by the Syariah 
Courts; 
(c) Provide living assistance to the wife or wives and children who struggle with the 
maintenance of the party obliged to pay alimony; 
(d) Become an agent to collect from the party ordered to pay alimony; 
(e) Distribute maintenance to a party entitled to maintenance; 
                                                          
57Information obtained from the Department of Syariah Judiciary Malaysia's website at 
http://www.jksm.gov.my/jksmv2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=243&lang=en 
58Ibid. 
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(f) Finding and collecting funds for the payment of maintenance requirements 
which is not enough. 
Objectives of BSK 
(a) Enforce maintenance orders that have been ordered by the Syariah Courts; 
 
(b) Ensure no wife or children faced alimony problems; 
 
(c) Ensure that the Syariah Court orders are respected and implemented; 
 
(d) Provide support services to Muslim families in all matters involving the Syariah 
Court. 
About one and a half years later, in January 2010, the former Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department, Datuk Jamil Khir Baharom, in a press statement announced that the 
Government had approved RM 15 million as allocation to help Muslim women who were 
going through divorce to help maintain their children.59 However, the financial assistance is 
only for six months. In addition to the above assistance, the women concerned are also 
eligible to financial aid from the Welfare Department and the zakat collection centre.60 
However, the errant father or husband would have to repay the money disbursed as the fund 
does not mean that these defaulters can shirk their responsibilities and leave it to the 
Government to financially support their families.61 In the event the errant fathers or husbands 
fail to repay the funds, BSK would then resort to the enforcement measures discussed above 
such as seizure and sale of property, garnishee order and committal to prison.62 
In an interview to The Edge, published on 17 July 2013, the then Director of BSK Dr 
Mohd Naim Mokhtar stated that since the BSK was established, it had gone all out to ensure 
                                                          
59Single mums to get aid for six months only, The Star, reported on Thursday January 21 2010. 
60Ibid. 
61Ibid. 
62Ibid. 
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that the ex-husbands or fathers complied with the maintenance orders issued by the Syariah 
Courts.63 He explained that the BSK, as soon as it was formed, tried to contact the 
respondents who were ordered to pay maintenance. Some of them could not be traced as they 
had either shifted or changed their contact numbers. However, as the BSK has an extensive 
network with agencies such as the Road Transport Department, the Prime Minister's 
Department and the Employees Provident Fund, they managed to contact the respondents.64 
The BSK calls both the respondents and the single mothers or ex-wives and tries to 
mediate. It advises both the parties and asks them to give in, in the interests of the children. 
This is actually an advantage to the parties as the mediation is done free of charge and the 
judgment creditor does not have to return to court to enforce the maintenance order, which 
would involve high legal costs and time. In the said interview, Dr Mohd Naim cited that the 
success rate was high when the BSK mediated as thousands of ringgit was paid up by the 
judgment debtors.65 
In addition, he also stated that as of January 2012, there is an e-filing system or e-
maintenance system for all judgment orders by the Syariah Courts which BSK has access 
to.66 Hence, once a judgment order for the payment of maintenance is made, BSK would 
immediately know. It takes upon itself to call the judgment creditor to find out if he or she 
has received the money.67 
Previous research shows that the BSK is akin to the Child Support Agency that exists in 
countries like Australia and the United Kingdom. However, the main difference is that the 
Child Support Agency is independent of the courts. Despite the fact that it (the BSK) may 
                                                          
63Helping Muslim women to get their dues, The Edge Malaysia, reported on 17 July 2013. 
64Ibid. 
65Ibid. 
66Ibid. It is to be noted that this system is the only system of its kind available in the Muslim countries. 
67Ibid. 
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have certain weaknesses, studies show that in the year 2010, 58% of 852 cases were 
successfully resolved through mediation.68 
Therefore, from the discussion above, it could be noted that the Government has taken 
the necessary steps to ensure that the enforcement measures concerning payment of 
maintenance to Muslim children are indeed effective. So many developments have taken 
place in the past few years concerning the enforcement measures where the Muslim children 
are concerned. It is thus heartening to note that the welfare of the Muslim children in 
Malaysia is safeguarded, where payment of maintenance is concerned, as the relevant 
authorities are playing an active role in ensuring that the best interests of these children are 
protected. 
 
7.4 COMPARISON WITH THE LAWS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Based on the discussion concerning the enforcement of maintenance orders in Malaysia, 
it is disheartening to note that there is no alternative method in enforcing maintenance orders 
for non-Muslim children, other than relying on the relevant statutory provisions. Thus, the 
writer would next refer to the laws in Singapore, England and Wales and Australia in order 
to examine the enforcement measures that are available in these jurisdictions. 
 
7.4.1 Singapore 
In Singapore, provisions as to the enforcement of a maintenance order issued by the 
Singapore Courts are found in the Women's Charter. Enforcement of a maintenance order 
issued by a Singapore court in a foreign country (on condition it is a reciprocating country) 
                                                          
68Nora Abdul Hak, “Helping sustain single parent family in Malaysia: will the Family Support Division established under the Shariah Court 
deliver?” in 8th ASLI Conference: Law in a Sustainable Asia, 26th-27th May 2011, Faculty of Law, Kyuahu University, Japan (Unpublished); 
Nora Abdul Hak, Roslina Che Soh @ Yusoff, et. Al, “E-maintenance at the Syariah Court: Its Effectiveness in helping Single Mothers in 
Malaysia”, in International Research, Invention and Innovation Exhibition: Socio-digital Transformation for the Ummah, 11th-13th June 
2014, Cultural Activity Centre (CAC), International Islamic University Malaysia (Unpublished). 
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and vice versa is found in the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act69 and 
Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act70. The writer would first look at the 
provisions concerning enforcement of maintenance orders issued by a Singapore court in 
Singapore before looking at the enforcement of a maintenance order in a foreign country. 
 
7.4.1.1 Enforcement of Maintenance Orders made by Singapore Courts in Singapore 
The Women's Charter, as stated above, provides for the enforcement of maintenance 
orders in Singapore. Prior to the amendment in 1996 to the Women's Charter, the provisions 
concerning enforcement could be found in sections 6171 and 6972.  The former section 61 is 
similar to the current section 4 of the Malaysian 1950 Act, as it states that the punishment for 
the breach of a maintenance order is either a levy or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
one month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid. Both the former sections 61 and 
69 of the Women’s Charter provided for the following methods of enforcing a maintenance 
order: 
(a) by way of a levy; or 
(b) sentencing a defaulting parent to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one 
month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid; or 
(c) by way of applying for an order attaching the earnings of the respondent. 
These enforcement measures are similar to the measures available in Malaysia currently. 
However, in 1996, there were major amendments made to the Women’s Charter.73 One of 
                                                          
69No.23 of 1975. 
70Cap 168, Singapore Statutes, Rev. Ed. 1985. 
71 The former section 61 provided as follows: If any person neglects to comply with any such order made under this Part, the court which 
made such order may for every breach of the order by warrant direct the amount to be levied in the manner by law provided by levying 
fines imposed by a Magistrate’s Court, or may sentence him to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month for each month’s 
allowance remaining unpaid. 
72 The former section 69 provides as follows: If any person neglects to comply with any maintenance order the court which made such 
order may for every breach of the order make an attachment of earnings order. 
73Vide the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 1996. 
329 
 
the amendments was concerning the provisions on enforcement of a maintenance order. The 
provision in the former section 61 was amended to become the new section 7174. 
The addition made by the 1996 amendment was pertaining to the court making a 
garnishee order (section 71(1)(c)) as a mode of enforcement of a judgment debt which results 
from civil litigation.75 The Singapore Women’s Charter (Garnishee Proceedings) Rules 1997 
contains the relevant rules pertaining to the use of this measure as enforcement. If the 
respondent has debts owing to him or her, the Court may order the debtor to pay the debt to 
the person or beneficiary who is entitled to receive the maintenance.76 This measure is not 
available in any of the family law statutes in Malaysia as a mode of enforcement. 
In addition to the above, the 1996 amendment has also inserted section 71(2) which 
clearly states that if the Court sentences the defaulter to imprisonment, it would not affect or 
diminish his obligation to pay maintenance under the maintenance order which he or she has 
failed to make, unless the court may, if it thinks fit, reduce the amount of any such payments. 
This method however would not be expected to be the enforcement method of choice as a 
‘stubborn defaulter will still leave the beneficiary without maintenance’.77 
Apart from section 61, the former section 69, concerning attachment orders, was also 
amended. The new provisions concerning attachment orders could be found in Part IX of the 
Women’s Charter78 entitled ‘Enforcement of Maintenance Orders’ The 1996 amendment has 
strengthened the provision concerning an attachment order. Prior to 1996, an attachment 
                                                          
74 The new section 71 of the Women’s Charter reads as follows: (1) If any person fails to make one or more payments required to be made 
under a maintenance order, the court which made the order may do all or any of the following: (a) for every breach of the order by warrant 
direct the amount due to be levied in the manner by law provided for levying fines imposed by a Magistrate’s Court; (b) sentence him to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month for each month’s allowance remaining unpaid; and (c) make a garnishee order in 
accordance with the rules made under this Act. (2) A sentence of imprisonment ordered under subsection (1)(b) shall not affect or diminish 
the obligation of the person against whom the maintenance order is made to make the payment or payments under the maintenance order 
which he has failed to make except that the court may, if it thinks fit, reduce the amount of any such payments. 
75Leong, Wai Kum, Cases and Materials of Family Law in Singapore, Singapore Butterworths Asia, 1999 at 681. 
76Leong Wai Kum, Principles of Family Law in Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1997 at 874. 
77Ibid at 873-874. 
78 Part IX contains section 80-91. 
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order could not be made unless there was a failure to pay due to ‘wilful refusal or culpable 
neglect’. However, with the amendment, the court may make an attachment order 
simultaneously with a maintenance order. Section 82(1)79 of the Women’s Charter provides 
for the nature of the attachment order. 
Section 84(1) imposes a duty on the defendant and the employer to comply with the 
attachment of earnings order. Once an employer pays the sum stated in the attachment of 
earnings order to the court, the court shall pay that money to the beneficiary stated in the 
maintenance order as specified in the attachment of earnings order.80 If the defendant is self-
employed, his payments received from self-employment could be attached. This is provided 
for in section 80 under the interpretation of ‘earnings’ in para (c). At this juncture, it is to be 
noted that there is no similar definition in the Malaysian 1968 Act.  
In addition to the above provisions, the 1996 amendment also introduced section 86 
which imposes an obligation on the defendant and his or her employer to notify the court 
which made the order of any change in the employment status or earnings of the defendant. 
This provision cannot be found in the Malaysian counterpart. Thus, the Malaysian 1968 Act 
does not expressly state that the defendant or his employer has an obligation to inform the 
court of any change in the former's employment status or earnings. 
Finally, section 91 provides for the penalties for non-compliance with an attachment 
order and for giving false notice or statement. The penalty for these offences is either a fine 
not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or both. This 
                                                          
79  Section 82(1) of the Women’s Charter provides as follows: ‘An attachment of earnings order shall require the person to whom the order 
in question is directed, being a person appearing to the Court to be the defendant’s employer, to make out of the earnings falling to be paid 
to the defendant payments in satisfaction of the order.’’ 
80 Section 88(1). 
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provision is similar to the penal provision in the Malaysian 1968 Act, save that in Malaysia, 
the fine is not exceeding RM1,000. 
In 2011, fifteen years later, the Singapore legislature passed sweeping changes to the 
Women's Charter. The main reason for this amendment is to ensure that divorced men pay 
up maintenance to their children and ex-wives.81 The 2011 amendments added enforcement 
measures to enhance the enforcement of maintenance orders. These amendments took effect 
from 1 June 2011. The new measures introduced by the 2011 amendments are as follows: 
(a) ordering the person to furnish security against any future default in maintenance 
payments by means of a banker's guarantee;82 
(b) if the court considers it in the interests of the parties to the maintenance 
proceedings or their children to do so, ordering the person to undergo financial 
counselling or such other similar or related programme as the court may direct;83 
(c) ordering the person to perform any unpaid community service up to forty hours 
under the supervision of a community service officer;84 
(The orders in paras (a), (b) and (c) may be made by the court notwithstanding that 
any arrears of maintenance which gave rise to the petitioner applying for the 
maintenance order have been paid up in part or in whole by the time the order is 
made.85) 
                                                          
81 Imelda Saad, Parliament passes changes to Women's Charter, Singapore News, accessed on 15 December 2016 at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1103781/1/.html 
82Section 71(1)(d). 
83Section 71(1)(e). 
84Section 71(1)(f). 
85Section 71(2A). 
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(d) the court could also direct the Central Provident Fund Board to disclose the 
employment information of a defaulter for attachment of earnings order.86 
In addition to the new measures stated above, section 70(2B) provides that the 
complainants may lodge a report to a designated credit bureau regarding the unpaid arrears. 
‘Designated credit bureau’ is explained in section 70(2D) to mean an entity that: 
(a) collects and maintains information about the credit payment history of a person 
and provides such information to its members for the purpose of enabling its 
members to assess the creditworthiness of a person; and 
(b) has been designated by the Minister as a credit bureau for the purposes of 
receiving a report lodged under subsection (2B). 
Therefore, any report made to the credit bureau would affect the person's 
creditworthiness. Apart from the above measures, in order to protect the children, the 
Singapore Government has also implemented an enforcement measure where the court can 
transfer matrimonial assets which have been divided between the parents to a Children's 
Development Account.87 Finally, the Government also requires those who re-marry to 
declare their maintenance debts.88 
Looking at the above developments in Singapore concerning the enforcement of 
maintenance orders, it could be noted that the Singaporean Government is taking all the 
necessary steps to protect the welfare of the beneficiaries of a maintenance order and to 
reduce the number of defaulters. At the same time, it is disheartening to note that Malaysia 
is lagging far behind in this aspect as no amendments have been made to our enforcement 
                                                          
86Section 85(2). 
87Supra n.81 
88Ibid. 
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laws since its enactment about fifty years ago, which makes one ponder whether the 
Malaysian legislature has any intention at all to introduce new measures to ensure that the 
paying parents do not ‘take the law lightly’ and do pay their children maintenance as ordered 
by the court. 
 
7.4.1.2 Enforcement of Foreign Maintenance Orders in Singapore and Vice Versa 
Having looked at the enforcement of maintenance orders made by the Singapore courts 
in Singapore, the writer would next examine the laws concerning enforcing foreign 
maintenance orders in Singapore and vice versa. 
There are currently two statutes that operate concurrently on the enforcement of 
maintenance orders made in selected foreign jurisdictions in Singapore and vice versa. The 
first and older statute is the Maintenance Order (Facilities for Enforcement) Act.89  This Act 
which was enacted in 1921 as the Straits Settlement Maintenance Orders (Facilities for 
Enforcement) Ordinance90  was to ‘facilitate the enforcement in the Colony of maintenance 
orders made in England or Ireland or vice versa’. In 1970, this Act became Cap 26 by the 
1970 revision. Maintenance orders made in the United Kingdom may be registered in 
Singapore. By notification91this Act has been extended to include maintenance orders made 
in Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong and all the states of India except Jammu and 
Kashmir, Canadian provinces and territories such as Alberta, Saskatchewan, North West 
Territories, Yukon Territory, New Brunswick, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia, Australian territories such as the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory of 
Australia, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, 
                                                          
89Cap 168, Singapore Statute, Rev. Ed. 1985. 
90No.8 of 1921. 
91 Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act (Extension) (Consolidation) Notification (Cap 168) 
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New Zealand, Sri Lanka, the states of Jersey and Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the 
Cook Islands including Niue, Western Samoa, Saint Vincent, Malawi and Zambia. 
At this juncture, it could be observed that the reciprocating countries listed in the above 
Act are more or less similar to the list in the Malaysian Maintenance Orders (Facilities for 
Enforcement) Act 1949 save as following: 
(i) The states mentioned in the Malaysian Act which are not in the Singapore Act are 
the Australian Territories of Norfolk Island, Papua and Cocos (Keeling Island), 
South Africa and Pakistan. 
(ii) The states mentioned in the Singapore Act which are not found in the Malaysian 
Act are the Canadian Territories and the Bailwick of Guernsey. 
A second statute was enacted in 1975, i.e. the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act ("the 1975 Act").92 This Act was enacted with the intention of replacing 
the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act. This could be seen in section 19 of 
the 1975 which states that the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act is hereby 
repealed. However, the footnote to the same provision states that section 19(1) has yet to be 
brought into operation. Therefore, both the abovementioned statutes operate concurrently at 
the moment. The 1975 Act provides that Singapore and the reciprocating country will register 
and treat as local the maintenance order issued by the other country. In this respect, the 
countries which are reciprocating countries under 1975 Act are as follows:93 
(a) United Kingdom 
(b) New Zealand 
(c) Hong Kong 
                                                          
92No.23 of 1975. 
93Maintenance (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Designation of Reciprocating Countries) Notification (Cap 169, N1); Maintenance Orders 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) (Designation of Reciprocating Countries)(No.2) Notification (Cap 169, N2); Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal 
Enforcement)(Designation of Reciprocating Countries)(No.3) Notification (Cap 169 N3) 
335 
 
(d) the Territory of Christmas Island; and 
(e) the Canadian province of Manitoba. 
There are very few cases reported on enforcing a foreign judgment in Singapore. Two 
very old cases which have been reported on this issue are El Woosey v SAJ Woosey94 and 
Humphrey v Humphrey.95 The courts in both these cases held that the beneficiary of a 
maintenance order made in a reciprocating country may apply to register the order in 
Singapore. Once registration of the order has been made, the Singapore courts may treat the 
order as a local order and proceed to enforce the said order. The courts may even vary or 
rescind the foreign order subject to the confirmation by the foreign court that made the 
order.96 
 
7.4.2 England and Wales 
The writer would next look at the position in England and Wales concerning enforcement 
of maintenance orders. As was discussed above, the writer would discuss the position in 
England and Wales in two parts, i.e. first, enforcement of maintenance orders made by the 
British courts and secondly, enforcement of maintenance orders made by the British courts 
in foreign jurisdictions and vice versa. 
 
7.4.2.1 Enforcement of Maintenance Orders made by the British Courts in England and 
 Wales 
In England and Wales, the courts play a limited role in matters concerning enforcement 
of maintenance in favour of a child. The body that played a crucial role in enforcement of 
                                                          
94[1938] MLJ Rep 95. 
95[1956] MLJ 201.  
96Leong, Wai Kum, Elements of Family Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Lexis-Nexis, 2007), at.465. 
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child maintenance until 2008 was the Child Support Agency (‘CSA’). The law relating to the 
enforcement of child maintenance orders could be found in the Child Support Act 1991 
(‘1991 Act’) which was later replaced by the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 
2008.Before examining the enforcement provisions in the Child Support Act, the writer 
would first examine the relevant provisions in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the 
Children Act 1989 as both these Acts were passed prior to the Child Support Act. 
  
a. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
Section 23(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (‘MCA’) provides that on granting a 
decree of divorce, nullity of marriage or a decree of judicial separation, the court may, inter 
alia, make the following orders in favour of the child of the family: 
(a) periodical payments;97 
(b) secured periodical payments;98 
(c) lump sum payments.99 
 The above orders could also be made under section 27(6) when an application is made 
by either party to a marriage to the court to apply for an order under section 27(1) on the 
ground that the other party to the marriage has failed to provide reasonable maintenance for 
the applicant or any child of the family. 
Enforcement of the maintenance orders mentioned above could be made by way of an 
attachment of earnings order as provided for under para 3 of Schedule 1 to the Attachment 
of Earnings Act 1971 of England (c.32). Para 3 of the Schedule provides that the Attachment 
                                                          
97Section 23(1)(d). 
98Section 23(1)(e). 
99Section 23(1)(f) 
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of Earnings Act 1971 applies to ‘an order for periodical or other payments made or having 
effect as if made under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.’ 
 Hence, it could be noted that the MCA lacks provisions on enforcement measures 
concerning maintenance orders issued by the court. The attachment of earnings order 
mentioned above is not provided for in the MCA, but the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971. 
 
b. Children Act 1989 
Section 15(1) of the Children Act 1989 (‘CA’) states that Schedule 1 makes provisions 
in relation to financial relief for children. Schedule 1 para 1(2) provides for the various 
maintenance orders that may be made by a court in favour of a child as follows: 
(a) order requiring either or both parents to make periodical payments; 
(b) order requiring either or both parents to secure such periodical payments; 
(c) order requiring either or both parents to pay a lump sum; 
(d) order requiring a settlement to be made for the child's benefit of property to which 
either parent is entitled to and which is specified in the order. 
(e) order requiring either or both parents of the child to transfer such property to which 
the parent is, or the parents are, entitled to as may be specified in the order.  
Thus, when comparing the CA to the CSA, it could be observed that the court is 
empowered to make more maintenance orders under the former when compared to the court’s 
power on the same under the latter. However, when it comes to enforcement of maintenance 
orders, para 12 of Schedule 1 to the CA provides that a person who is under an obligation to 
pay maintenance in pursuance of any order made by a Magistrate's order, shall give notice of 
any change of address to such person specified in the order. Failure to do so without any 
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reasonable excuse shall attract a fine. At this juncture, it is to be noted that this is the only 
enforcement measure concerning maintenance orders made by the court available in this Act.  
 
c.  Child Support Act and Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008 
Having looked at the MCA and the CA, which lack effective enforcement measures, the 
writer would next look at the Child Support Act (‘CSA’) and the Child Maintenance and 
Other Payments Act 2008 (‘2008 Act’). The Child Support Act 1991 (as originally enacted) 
established the Child Support Agency for the purposes of enforcing and collecting child 
support. However, the Child Support Agency was encountering difficulties in in discharging 
its duties.100 
In 2006, the Department of Work and Pensions published a Consultation White Paper101  
which sets out a proposal for further reforms in child support matters. One of the reforms 
suggested is the establishment of a new body to be known as the Child Maintenance and 
Enforcement Commission (C-MEC) to replace the Child Support Agency. It will be non-
departmental and will be managed by an independent board.102 The new scheme proposes 
stronger enforcement measures such as requiring defaulting parents to surrender their 
passports and taking monies directly from sources such as the bank accounts. The scheme 
also aims to make the enforcement process hassle free by restricting the court's involvement 
in the enforcement regime.103 
As a result of the above proposal, in 2008, the Child Maintenance and Other Payments 
Act 2008 was passed. The C-MEC was established and has replaced the Child Support 
                                                          
100 Davis, G., Wikeley, N, Young, R. et al, Child Support in Action (Oxford: Hart, 1988) cited in Gilmore, Stephen, & Glennon, Lisa, Hayes 
and Williams’ Family Law, 5th ed  (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press) at 321. 
101A New System of Child Maintenance (December 2006; cm6979) 
102Ibid at paras 3.8, 3.13. 
103Supra n 101 at paras 5.1-5.5. 
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Agency. Section 2 of the 2008 Act provides that the main objective of the Commission is to 
‘maximise the number of those children who live apart from one or both of their parents for 
whom effective maintenance arrangements are in place.’ 
The 2008 Act has introduced changes to the existing provisions on enforcement as well 
as introduced several new enforcement measures in the CSA 1991. The changes made by the 
2008 Act are as follows: 
(a) Pertaining to the regulations concerning deduction from earnings order, sections 
29(4) and (5) were introduced into the CSA to provide that such regulations 
include deduction from earnings orders as an initial method of collection. 
However, this method should not be used when there is a good reason not to do 
so (section 29(4)). 
(b) The meaning of ‘earnings’ in section 31(8) was replaced with a new definition 
which include the following as ‘earnings’: 
• wages or salary; 
• payments by way of pensions including any annuity payable for the purpose 
of providing a pension; 
• periodical payments which are compensation for loss of employment or 
reduced remuneration; and 
• statutory sick pay. 
(c) A new subsection (9) was also inserted in section 31 which states that any person 
paying the sum mentioned in subsection (8) to a liable person should be treated 
as their ‘employer’. 
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(d) The next change introduced by the 2008 Act is that the liability orders issued will 
be administrative. There is no longer a need to apply to the courts for a liability 
order. The C-MEC is empowered to make an administrative liability order against 
a non-resident parent (sections 32M and 32N). This includes amending section 
36, thereby removing the need to apply to the county court for an order before an 
application for a charging order or a third-party debt can be made. Presently, an 
application can be made when an administrative liability order has been made. 
C-MEC has been empowered by the 2008 Act as follows: 
(a) The C-MEC is empowered to deduct child support maintenance from the non-
resident parent's account regularly. This would include a joint account (sections 
32A, 32B, 32C and 32D). 
(b) Pertaining to lump sum deduction orders, the C-MEC can collect payments from 
an non-resident parent's account held with a deposit-taker or a third party such as 
a conveyance. However, lump sum deductions may only be used to collect arrears 
and not ongoing maintenance (sections 32E, 32F, 32G, 32H, 32I, 32J and 32K). 
(c) The C-MEC can apply to the court to prevent a non-resident parent from disposing 
of or transferring property, if it is being done to avoid paying child maintenance 
(section 32L). 
(d) The C-MEC may also apply to the court to disqualify a non-resident parent from 
holding or obtaining a travel authorisation. Travel authorisation here refers to a 
United Kingdom passport and/or an Identity Card issued under the Identity Cards 
Act 2006 that records that the person to whom it is issued is a British citizen 
(sections 39B, 39C, 39D, 39E, 39F and 39G). 
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(e) The C-MEC may apply to a court for a curfew order against a non-resident parent, 
which will be monitored (sections 39H - 39Q) 
Nevertheless, on 1 August 2012, the C-MEC was abolished. A new body called the Child 
Maintenance Service (CMS) replaced it via the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 104 The Welfare 
Act 2012 encourages the parents to make their own arrangements for child support and only 
resort to the CMS when an agreement cannot be reached.105 Thus, a significant shift towards 
private maintenance arrangements could be noted in the new legislation and has reduced the 
number of applications under the CSA 1991. 106 
Hence, from the above discussion, it could clearly be seen that the laws in England and 
Wales have undergone several amendments, with the aim of ensuring that the enforcement 
measures should be made more stringent and effective in order to deter the paying parents 
from defaulting and to ensure that the welfare of the child concerned is safeguarded. 
 
7.4.2.2 Enforcement of Foreign Maintenance Orders in England and Wales and Vice Versa 
Having looked at the enforcement of maintenance orders in England and Wales (E&W), 
the writer would need to examine the enforcement of foreign maintenance orders in E & W 
and vice versa. 
The relevant Act would be the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1992 
(c.56).107 This is the primary legislation under which the reciprocal enforcement of 
maintenance orders process operates in E & W. 
                                                          
104 Sections 136-142 
105 Section 136 Welfare Reform Act 2012, section 9A Child Support Act 1991 
106 Gilmore, Stephen, & Glennon, Lisa, Hayes and Williams’ Family Law, 5thed (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press) at 322. 
107Amending the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972 (‘1972 Act’). 
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Since the 1972 Act was enacted, there have been several statutory instruments which 
allowed extra jurisdictions to be incorporated into the list of reciprocating countries as well 
as to adjust the precise arrangements between the United Kingdom and the reciprocating 
countries. The list of reciprocating countries shows that the United Kingdom has entered into 
enforcement agreements with more than hundred countries.108 In addition to the above Act, 
the United Kingdom has also entered into several international conventions on maintenance 
obligations such as: 
(a) the 1956 United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance; 
(b) the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters; 
(c) the 1973 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions 
Relating to Maintenance Obligations. 
The statement of facts above shows that the British Government has given serious 
attention to the issue that there are many parents or spouses who evade paying maintenance 
as ordered by the court. Thus, it could be seen that the United Kingdom has taken effective 
steps (when compared to Malaysia) to ensure that the maintenance orders issued in the British 
courts are enforceable in a larger number of reciprocating countries so as to, inter alia, 
safeguard the welfare of the child and at the same time ensure that the parents do not wash 
their hands-off their responsibility to maintain their child by ‘running away’ to another 
country. 
                                                          
108Refer to Appendix F for the list of reciprocating countries 
343 
 
7.4.3 Australia 
The last jurisdiction that the writer intends to examine before drawing a conclusion on 
the issue of enforcement of maintenance orders is Australia. As was done above, the writer 
would first look at the enforcement measures available when enforcing the maintenance 
orders made by the Australian courts in Australia and then go on to examine enforcement in 
foreign jurisdictions and vice versa. 
 
7.4.3.1 Enforcement of Child Support Orders made by the Australian Courts in Australia 
 In Australia, there was a law reform process concerning the calculation and enforcement 
of child maintenance or child support orders in 1988. The reform was due to two major 
problems that existed: 
1. Majority of the non-custodial parents defaulted in their payment of maintenance; 
and 
2. Even if these parents did make payments, it was generally at low levels. 
The above problems resulted in poverty amongst single parent families and the increase 
in government-expenditure on social security payments. 
(a) Position prior to the 1988 amendments 
Before looking at the 1988 reforms, the writer would first look at the former law on the 
enforcement of child support orders.  The enforcement provisions could be found in the 
Australian Family Law Act 1975 (‘FLA’)109 According to section 88 of the FLA, 
maintenance agreements registered under section 86 or deemed to be registered under section 
                                                          
109Act No.53 of 1975. 
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87 is enforceable as if they were orders from the court. Part XIII of the FLA provides for the 
enforcement of maintenance orders made under the same Act. 
Howsoever, the Family Law Regulations deals with particulars relating to enforcement, 
especially in Part XV of the Regulations. Imprisonment for failure to comply with a 
maintenance order has been abolished under the FLA. Therefore, the enforcement measures 
available under the FLA are as follows: 
(i) Garnishment 
Regulation 134 of the Family Law Regulations provides for a code of procedure that 
needs to be followed in a garnishee proceeding. Generally, the garnishee proceedings are 
used to direct the debtor’s employer to pay periodically. The employer deducts the payment 
from debtor's wages. 
However, the garnishee proceeding applies to any money that is owing to the debtor. This 
could be seen in Regulation 134(4)(a) which provides that money in the hands of a ‘bank, 
building society, credit union, investment fund or corporation that is payable to the 
respondent on call or on notice’ is subject to a garnishment order.110 
 
(ii) Seizure of property 
Regulation 135 of the Family Law Regulations provides that an officer of the court or 
any other person specified by the Regulations is empowered to seize a debtor's personal 
property. However, if the debtor still fails to pay the maintenance amount, the person 
authorised may sell the property either by way of an auction or a private sale. The Regulations 
                                                          
110Finlay, H.A., Family Law in Australia, 3rd ed. (Australia: Butterworth, 1983), at 307.  
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contain a detailed provision on how the property may be sold in a most advantageous manner 
and at the same time to minimize hardship to the owner of the property.111 
(iii) Sequestration of estate 
Provision concerning the sequestration of the debtor's property is provided for under 
Regulation 136 of the Family Law Regulations. This process is where the whole or a part of 
the respondent's estate is seized and administered by a receiver with the object of realizing 
the debt sum from these assets. This could be said to be similar to bankruptcy proceedings.112 
At this juncture, the writer submits that the above enforcement measures are not found in 
the Malaysian family law statutes concerning enforcement of maintenance orders. 
Despite the existence of the above measures, there was a widespread agreement in 
Australia that the child maintenance system was in dire need of reform.113As stated above, 
two major problems arose from the system of child maintenance then, i.e. that the majority 
of the non-custodian parents did not pay maintenance to their children regularly and that even 
if they paid, it was at a low level. 114 
 
(b) The 1988 reforms 
In order to resolve these problems, alternative methods of enforcing child support 
obligations were implemented. The first method was the enactment of the Social Security 
and Veterans' Entitlement (Maintenance Income Test) Amendment Act 1988 
(Commonwealth), which amended the Social Security Act 1947 (Commonwealth). The 
                                                          
111Ibid. 
112Ibid. 
113Ingleby, Richard, Family Law and Society, (Australia: Butterworths, 1993 at  204. 
114Ibid at 204 and 205. 
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amendment imposes an obligation on sole parent pension claimants to bring proceedings 
against the non-custodial parent. The present Social Security Act 1991 (Commonwealth) 
provides as follows:115 
A person is not qualified for a sole parent pension if: 
(a) the person is entitled to maintenance; and 
(b) the Secretary considers that it is reasonable for the person to take action to obtain 
maintenance; and 
(c) the person does not take such action as the Secretary considers reasonable to 
obtain maintenance. 
If the non-custodial parent pays as a result of such proceedings, it will have an impact on 
the level of benefit from the Department of Social Security. This is because when the 
maintenance income test is applied to social security payees ‘every dollar that is paid over 
the income free area will reduce the amount of benefit by 50 cents.’116 
The second method was the amendments made to the FLA 1975 (Commonwealth). The 
FLA 1975 was amended to prevent the parties from: 
(a) evading maintenance obligations by stating that property transfers are capitalised 
maintenance (sections 66L, 77A and 87A); and 
(b) making conclusive determinations of their financial relationship where one of the 
parties was receiving social security (sections 44(4)(b) and 87(4A)) 
                                                          
115Section 252(1) 
116Supra n 113 at 233 
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In addition, section 75(3) of the FLA requires the court to disregard the parties' 
entitlements to income tested pensions, allowances or benefits in calculating their needs. 
The third measure is the enactment of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) 
Act 1988 (Commonwealth). The salient features of this new Act concerning the enforcement 
of a maintenance liability could be summarised as follows:117 
(a) A registrable maintenance liability to be registered with the Child Support 
Registrar. ‘Registrable maintenance liability’ is defined in sections 17 and 18 of 
the above Act. Reading both these sections, it could be stated that a liability is a 
registrable maintenance liability if: 
(a)  it is a liability of: 
(i) a parent of a child to pay a periodic amount for the maintenance of the child 
or a party to a marriage to pay a periodic amount for the maintenance of 
the other party to the marriage; or 
(ii) a step-parent of a child to pay a periodic payment for the maintenance of 
the child; and 
(b)  either of the following subparagraphs applies: 
(i)  it arises under a court order or court registered maintenance agreement; 
(ii) it is a collection agency. 
A liability is a registrable maintenance liability if it arises under a child support 
assessment.118 
                                                          
117Ibid 
118 Ibid at 234. 
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Section 23 of the Act states that the payee is given an option whether or not to register 
the liability with the Child Support Registrar. Section 23(4) further states that ‘if the payee 
is in receipt of an income tested pension, allowance or benefit, he or she then may not make 
an election.’ At this juncture, it could be noted that, when compared to the position in 
Malaysia, there is no Child Support Registrar here. As such, when it comes to the 
enforcement, the payee has to initiate proceedings on his or her own accord. 
(a) The registrable maintenance liability is treated as a debt to the Commonwealth 
rather than the person in whose favour the order was made (section 30). Hence a 
payee is not entitled to enforce payment of the maintenance sum. 
(b) Once the liability has been registered with the Child Support Registrar, section 45 
of the Act provides that the Registrar can enforce the obligation to pay by directing 
the payer’s employer to deduct the maintenance amount from the payer’s salary. 
Section 46 provides that the employer has a duty to make the appropriate 
deductions. When the Child Support Registrar receives the monies, the said monies 
are paid into a Child Support Trust Account under section 74, which is thereafter 
forwarded to the payees under section 75. 
 
(c) The current position 
The child supports scheme is in force currently, administered by the Child Support 
Registrar, to help parents who are separated to take on the responsibility of financially 
maintaining their children. 
Prior to July 2011, the services and payments concerning the above scheme was provided 
by the Child Support Agency, Medicare Australia, Centrelink and the Family Assistance 
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Office. However, from July 2011, the Australian Government Department of Human 
Services has taken on the above functions. 
Provisions on the delivery of services and administration of the child support scheme 
could be found in The Child Support Guide at the following website: 
http://guide.csa.gov.au/.119 The Child Support Guide (‘the Guide’) provides for two methods 
of enforcement of child support, i.e. the administrative enforcement and court enforcement. 
1. Administrative enforcement 
The various collection methods concerning administrative enforcement could be found 
in Chapter 5.2 of the Guide. The Child Support Registrar plays a vital role in these methods 
of collection and as such there is no involvement of the court. The Registrar can either collect 
child support from the payer directly as voluntary payment or by intercepting the money 
payable to the payer by a third party. 
The following methods of enforcement are available under administrative enforcement: 
(i) Payer elects to pay the Department of Human Services directly 
The Child Support Registrar is basically requested to collect child support payments, i.e. 
registered maintenance liabilities (as has been discussed above) by deducting the payer's 
wages or salary, if it is practicable to do so. However, if the payer decides to pay the sum 
concerned directly to the Department of Human Services, the Registrar can accept the 
payment if he is satisfied that the payments would be made on time (sections 43 and 44, Child 
Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. 
                                                          
119The Child Support Guide is produced and edited by the Child Support Policy Advice section. 
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(ii) Deduction from salary or wages of payer 
The Child Support Registrar collects registered maintenance liability by deducting the 
payer's salary or wages. The employer has to withhold the payer's salary or wages (referred 
to as the employer withholding) and send the sum to the Child Registrar (sections 45 to 
65AA, Part IV of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988, Regulation 3 of 
the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Regulations 1988, section 69 of the Paid 
Parental Leave Act 2010). 
In the event the employer does not fulfil his obligations, there are various penalties and 
offences stated in Part IV of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. As 
stated earlier, an amount payable under the child support scheme is treated as a debt to the 
Commonwealth (section 64). 
(iii) Deduction from Social Security Pensions and Benefits 
The payer's child support debt (other than a debt for spouse maintenance) could also be 
collected by the Registrar by deducting from the payer's social security pensions and benefits 
(section 72AA of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988). A written notice 
could be given by the Registrar to Centrelink pertaining to the deduction as stated above 
(section 72AA of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988). Centrelink has 
to comply with the Registrar's notice and forward the amount to the Registrar (section 238 of 
the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999). 
(iv) Deduction from Family Tax Benefit 
The payer's child support debt could also be deducted from the Family Tax Benefit 
payable to the payer by Centrelink. Similar to the deduction from pensions or benefit, the 
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Registrar could give a written notice to Centrelink to make the deduction from the Family 
Tax Benefit (sections 17, 30 and 72AB of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) 
Act 1988). 
Family Tax Benefit is paid to a payer who provides 35%-65% for the support of a child. 
The payer is given an option to either receive the Family Tax Benefit as periodic payments 
or after he or she has lodged their tax return. 
(v) Deduction from veterans' pensions or allowances 
In order to collect the child support debt from the payer, deductions may also be made 
from the payer’s veterans’ pensions or allowances.120 The Registrar could issue a written 
notice to the Repatriation Commission to deduct the child support amount and forward the 
amount to the Registrar.121 
(vi) Intercepting Tax Refund 
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is obliged to refund the excess tax amount to 
taxpayers where tax has been overpaid.122 The Child Support Registrar will be advised by 
the ATO if a refund is available and is about to be repaid to a taxpayer who is a child support 
payer. The Registrar could request the Commissioner of Taxation to pay the amount of the 
refund or the amount owing as a debt (whichever is the lesser) to the Registrar to be used to 
pay the payer’s child support debt. 
 
 
                                                          
120Section 72AC Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. 
121Section 58J(3) Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986. 
122Section 8 AAZLF Taxation Administrative Act 1953. 
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(vii) Collection from third parties 
The Child Support Registrar can issue a written notice to a third party who owes money 
to the payer requiring him or her to pay the sum to him in fulfilment of the child support 
debt.123 Third parties here could refer to the banks where the payer has an account or the 
purchaser who has bought the property of the payer. Section 72A(1) states that the maximum 
notified deduction total is the amount stated in the notice under this subsection that does not 
exceed the child support debt of the payer concerned. 
Further thereto, the section 72A notice would be in force until it is fully complied with 
or the Child Support Registrar withdraws it in writing. 
(viii) Deduction from parental leave payments 
The Child Support Registrar could also collect the child support debts by giving written 
notice to Centrelink to deduct an amount from a parent’s parental leave pay.124 As of January 
2011, natural or adoptive parents who are working and have given birth to a child or adopted 
a child are eligible to receive parental leave payments for eighteen weeks. This payment, 
which is paid at the National Minimum Wage rate, is paid either by Centrelink or the parent’s 
employer. 
Section 69 of the Paid Parental Leave Act 2010 states that Centrelink has to comply with 
the Child Support Registrar’s notice and hence, the amount stated therein would be forwarded 
to the Child Support Registrar. 
 
                                                          
123Section 72A of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 
124Section 72AD Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. 
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(ix) Departure prohibition orders 
The Registrar is empowered under Part VA of the Child Support (Registration and 
Collection) Act 1988 to make a Departure Prohibition Order (DPO) which prohibits a child 
support debtor from leaving Australia.125 
 
2.  Court Enforcement126 
Basically, a Child Support Registrar will use the administrative enforcement methods 
first before resorting to court enforcement to collect child support debts. As discussed earlier, 
when a registrable maintenance liability is registered for collection by the Child Support 
Registrar, the debt amount then becomes a debt due to the Commonwealth. The Registrar is 
empowered under section 113 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 
to enforce the debt. The said debt could be recovered through court proceedings initiated 
either by the Child Support Registrar or the payee. 
Enforcement of the debt by the Child Support Registrar could be made under the Family 
Law Act 1975 or by civil action. 
(i) Civil action 
  Civil actions taken by the Child Support Registrar are as follows: 
a. Service of summons and statement of claim on the debtor. 
b. Applying for a default judgment where the debtor fails to pay up. 
c. Garnishee orders to attach monies due to the debtor from third parties. 
d. Warrant of execution to seize assets belonging to the debtor. 
                                                          
125 Sections 17, 17A, 30 and 72D-72Y (Part VA) Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 read together with section 11.1 
Criminal Code Act 1995. 
126Chapter 5.4 of the Child Support Guide 
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e. Summons for oral examination of debtor before a magistrate or judge to 
provide details about the debtor’s assets and liabilities on oath. 
 
(ii) Enforcement under the Family Law Act 1975 
 Various types of orders could be made by the court under the Family Law Act 
1975 (FLA) in order to enforce the debtor’s obligations, which include:127 
a. garnishing the debtor’s assets or income; 
b. paying the arrears; 
c. either sequestration of the debtor’s estate or appointing a receiver; 
d. seizure and sale of the debtor’s personal property; 
e. sale of real property. 
 
(iii) Bankruptcy 
 The Child Support Registrar, acting in the capacity of a creditor, can take a 
bankruptcy action against a debtor and arrears of child support is provable in 
Bankruptcy.128 
7.4.3.2 Enforcement of Maintenance Orders made by the Australian Courts overseas and  
 vice versa 
The Australian legislations have provided for enforcement of overseas maintenance 
orders in Australia and vice versa. Section 110 of the Family Law Act 1975 provides for the 
regulation making power of enforcing in Australian courts maintenance orders made in 
‘reciprocating countries’ and ‘countries with restricted reciprocity’. 
                                                          
127Rule 20.05 Family Law Rules 2004. 
128Sections 5, 27,40,58(5A),82(1),122(2)(c),153(2)(c) and 153(2A), Parts IX and X Bankruptcy Act 1966. 
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The difference between ‘reciprocating countries’ and ‘countries with restricted 
reciprocity’ is that, in the former, the provisions for maintenance orders in these countries 
are basically similar to the provisions in Australia.129 Whereas ‘countries with restricted 
reciprocity’ refer to countries which have maintenance laws that are similar in certain 
respects, but differ significantly in matters ‘such as providing maintenance of relatives in 
need of support other than children, such as grandparents’.130 
Schedule 2 of the Family Law Regulations 1984 lists the reciprocal countries (Refer to 
Appendix G for the list of countries in Schedule 2).  A quick look at the list shows that the 
number of countries listed therein is definitely more than the list in the Malaysian Married 
Women and Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949. 
 
7.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Having looked at the ineffective enforcement of maintenance orders measures available 
for the non-Muslims in Malaysia as well as having examined the enforcement measures 
available for the Muslims in this country and the measures that are in force in Singapore, 
England and Wales and Australia, it is indeed disheartening to conclude that the plight of 
non-Muslim single mothers and children, especially, are pathetic. The following table sums 
up the enforcement of maintenance measures available to non-Muslims: 
       
 
 
                                                          
129Supra n. 113 at 307. 
130Ibid. 
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Table 7.1: Enforcement of maintenance measures available to non-Muslims in 
Malaysia 
Act Punishment Section 
1950 Act Levying fines 4 
 
 Imprisonment 4 
 
 
 
Power of court to set aside or 
to prevent disposition of 
property intended to defeat 
claims to maintenance 
102 
 
 
 
 
Divorce and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Rules 1980 
Order of committal Rules 72-75 
 
 
Child Act 2001 Fine
131 
Imprisonment132 
Execute a bond of good 
behavior133 
Community Service 
Section 31 
 
 
 
 
 
Married Women and 
Children (Enforcement of 
Maintenance) Act 1968 
Attachment of earnings order Sections 4-13 
 
 
 
 
From the above list, it could be observed that the enforcement measures are basically 
imposition of a fine, imprisonment, execution of a bond of good behaviour, attachment of 
earnings order and community service. Although there about five statutes that provide for the 
enforcement of maintenance orders, it is disheartening to note that the measures are not 
effective as the penalties mentioned in these statutes are more or less the same, i.e. imposition 
of fine or imprisonment. Further thereto, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, there have not 
been any positive steps taken by the Legislature to make amendments to the above statutes 
in order to introduce new measures which would be more effective. Instead of having five 
                                                          
131To be noted herein that the punishment mentioned in this section is for, inter alia, neglecting a child. 
132Ibid 
133Ibid. 
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statutes which provide the same types of enforcement measures, which are ineffective, it is 
better to incorporate various enforcement measures which are effective in one statute, as was 
done by Singapore in its Women’s Charter. In addition, the Legislature should also take steps 
to do a survey in order to see if these enforcement measures are effective. If the answer is no, 
then it (the Legislature) would have to think of other measures, as has been done by the 
relevant authorities in the three jurisdictions discussed in this Chapter. 
Further thereto, the writer submits that the only avenue available to the non-Muslim 
single mothers and children in Malaysia to resort to in the event they want to enforce the 
maintenance orders in their hands is the courts. Unfortunately, there are no agencies or bodies 
which have been established to act as enforcers, such as the Family Support Division for the 
Muslims. As was stated by the former director of the Family Support Division, Dr Mohd 
Naim Mokhtar, in his statement to The Edge on 17th July 2013,134 in civil law, ‘the judge's 
duty ends when he has given a judgment’. Hence, in such a case, the said judgment is 
redundant if the measures available to the enforcement of the said judgment are not effective. 
Dr Mohd Naim further quoted that there is recorded evidence from one of the Caliphs of 
Islam, Omar el-Khattab, that ‘there is no point in issuing judgment unless it is executed.’ 
The fact that the non-Muslim single parents and children were at a disadvantageous 
position when it came to the enforcement of maintenance orders was also highlighted by the 
then Ministry of Women and Family and Community Development's Deputy Minister Heng 
Seai Kie, in her interview to The Star on 24th April 2011, where she stated that ‘the civil court 
is lagging far behind the Syariah court in the enforcement of maintenance orders’.135 She also 
suggested that ‘the civil court put in place a mechanism to ensure that non-Muslim women 
                                                          
134Supra n 63. 
135Heng: Enforcement needed in civil court to ensure maintenance payment, The Star, 24th April 2011. 
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and children were not deprived of maintenance payment as ordered by the court’.136 The same 
press report also stated that a few organisations such as the Wanita MCA political strategy 
bureau, Women's Aid Organisation (WAO), Sisters in Islam, the women's wing of the 
Wilayah and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall ‘have called for the setting up of a task force 
to assist non-Muslim single parents and affected children’.137 
It is more than five years since the above call for the setting up of a task force to assist 
non-Muslim single parents and children was made. However, there has been no action taken 
by any of the authorities to set up such a task force. It is reiterated here that the plight of non-
Muslim single mothers and children when compared to their Muslim counterparts is indeed 
disheartening.  
The above difference in the enforcement measures available to the Muslims and the non-
Muslims brings us to the issue of equality as enshrined in Article 8(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. Article 8(1) clearly states that ‘All persons are equal before the law and entitled 
to equal protection of the law’. Article 8(2) further states that ‘Except as expressly authorised 
by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of 
religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law ....’. Hence, the fact that there is 
inequality in the laws concerning enforcement measures available to the Muslims and the 
non-Muslims clearly shows that there is a serious breach of the fundamental liberty provision 
in Article 8 of the Federal Constitution. 
The writer submits that in order to safeguard the rights of the non-Muslim single mothers 
and the welfare of the affected children concerning enforcement of maintenance orders, the 
first step that needs to be taken is to revisit the ancient laws which have been in force for the 
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past fifty to sixty years. It is time the legislature amend the said provisions (as discussed 
above) to make it more effective. At this juncture, the writer submits that the legislature could 
refer to the legal developments in Singapore on this issue in 2011, where the Singaporean 
legislature had taken necessary steps to enhance the enforcement of maintenance orders. 
Some of the amendments that the Malaysian legislature could adopt are as follows: 
(a) ordering the defaulter to undergo financial counselling or such other similar or 
related programme as the court may direct; 
(b) ordering the defaulter to perform any unpaid community service under the 
supervision of a community service officer; 
(c) ordering the defaulter to furnish security against any future default in maintenance 
payments by means of a banker's guarantee; 
(d) amending the attachment of earnings order provisions as provided for in the 1968 
Act to follow the Singaporean provisions on the same matter (as discussed 
earlier); 
(e) allowing the judgment creditor to bring proceedings to obtain a garnishee order 
against the judgment debtor; and 
(f) compelling a divorced man to declare before his prospective new spouse that he 
had arrears in maintenance. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Singapore has absolutely resolved its problem. As 
was reported in The Straits Times,138 experts were interviewed on their views to the 
amendment in 2011. Although they welcomed the amendment, they said that the law has 
some way to go. The biggest drawback is that the onus is still on the woman to enforce the 
                                                          
138The Maintenance conundrum men who just won’t pay, The Straits Times, 30 June 2011 
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order. Many women would give up if they have to go back to court each time they want to 
enforce the order. 
In addition to amending the existing legislations as stated above, it is also submitted that 
the Government establishes a division such as the Family Support Division for the Muslims, 
for non-Muslims as well under the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development to look into the enforcement of maintenance orders for non-Muslim single 
mothers and affected children. This Family Support Division could play a similar role as its 
Muslim counterpart, where it acts as a mediator between the parties concerned, highlighting 
the best interests of the children. In such a situation, the parties do not have to petition to the 
court to enforce their judgment. Further thereto, an e-filing system to register all judgment 
orders could be implemented to which the Family Support Division could have access to and 
where it could follow it up with the judgment creditor on whether payment of maintenance 
has been made (similar to the Family Support Division for the Muslims). In this respect the 
judgment creditor saves on legal costs and time. 
In the alternative, the writer submits that a body such as the Child Maintenance and 
Enforcement Commission (C-MEC) which was established in the United Kingdom or the 
Child Support Agency as in Australia should be set up here. This body helps to enforce the 
obligation to pay maintenance once the parents who have obtained a maintenance order, 
register the order with this body. Howsoever, the position concerning enforcement of child 
maintenance in the England and Wales and Australia could not be applied wholesale in 
Malaysia, bearing in mind that these countries are welfare states. Thus, once the child support 
order is registered with the relevant Child Support Agencies, it becomes a debt due to the 
State. The same could not be said to the position in Malaysia as we are not a welfare state. In 
addition, though it is very effective, it is also not possible to implement the administrative 
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enforcement measures which are available in Australia such as deductions from social 
security pensions and benefits, Family Tax Benefit, veterans' pensions or allowances and 
parental leave payments as these benefits are not available in Malaysia. 
In addition to enhancing the enforcement measures available within Malaysia, the writer 
also submits that the list of reciprocating countries in the Schedule to the Married Women and 
Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 should be revisited in order to take the 
necessary steps to include more reciprocating countries therein, so that maintenance orders 
made by the Malaysian courts would be enforceable in these countries as well if the defaulter 
resides there.  
It is submitted that it is pertinent that the above measures need to be taken soonest 
possible in order to protect the right to life of the innocent children, which could well be 
described as a fundamental right guaranteed under the Article 5(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that much needs to be done in order to protect the welfare 
of the affected children in Malaysia. It is not sufficient to merely examine the efficacy of the 
maintenance laws in Malaysia without taking a step further and examining the laws 
concerning the enforcement of the maintenance orders. It is of no use having effective laws 
that protect the right of the non-Muslim children to claim maintenance from his or her 
parents, when the laws governing the enforcement of the maintenance orders are weak. In 
such a situation, the maintenance order made by the court could be described as a ‘toothless 
tiger’ as the paying parent would not hesitate to default in paying the maintenance sum to his 
or her child, as he or she would not be subjected to a heavy penalty. 
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Therefore, in order to prevent these paying parents from defaulting in paying maintenance 
to their children, it is high time the Malaysian legislature revisit the current statutes, which 
could be described as archaic, so that the necessary amendments could be made to the 
enforcement provisions therein in order to safeguard and protect the welfare of the affected 
children. 
In addition to amending the relevant statutes, the writer reiterates her stance as stated 
earlier that the relevant authority, i.e. the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development establish a body similar to the Family Support Division or the Child Support 
Agency or the CMS to act as enforcement authorities in order to ensure that the paying 
parents would in the future think twice before defaulting in their payments of maintenance, 
knowing very well that the said body, which acts as a 'watchdog’ for the affected children, 
would not hesitate to impose severe or harsh penalties in the event they default. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this final chapter, the writer proposes to list down the Research Findings, suggest 
recommendations to overcome the issues that were raised in the earlier Chapters and 
finally, to come to a conclusion. This Chapter is divided into two parts, the first part 
comprising the Research Findings and the Recommendations and the second part, the 
conclusion and the way forward. 
 
8.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There were five main issues that were analysed in this thesis. They are as follows: 
1. Meaning of a ‘child’ 
2. Extending the Duty to maintain young vulnerable adults  
3. Arrears of maintenance 
4. Variation or rescission of a maintenance order 
5. Enforcement of maintenance orders 
The research findings based on the above issues would be listed down below, 
followed by the writer’s recommendations. 
 
8.2.1 Meaning of ‘child’ 
In examining this issue in Chapter 4, sub-topic 4.4, the writer divided it into four sub-
issues, i.e. age of child, adopted child, step-child and illegitimate child. The writer would 
first list down the Research Findings for each of this sub-issues, followed by 
recommendations which encompasses all the above sub-issues. 
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 a.  Age of Child 
Two observations were made concerning this sub-issue. The first observation is that 
save for the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 19761(‘the LRA’), there is a lacuna 
in both the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 19502 (‘the 1950 Act’) and 
the Maintenance Ordinance 1959 of Sabah (‘the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah’) as to 
the age limit of a child.   
The second observation made is that there is no uniformity among the family law 
statutes in Malaysia regarding the age limit of a child. Some provide that a child is below 
the age of twenty-one years3 whereas some provide as below eighteen years.4 
 b. Adopted child 
As to whether the present maintenance laws confer an adopted child the right to claim 
for maintenance from his adoptive parents, two observations were made. The first 
observation is that, save for the LRA, there is a lacuna in the 1950 Act and the 
Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah as to whether an adopted child could claim for 
maintenance from his adoptive parents.  
Hence, as was discussed by the writer in sub-topic 4.4.2 in Chapter 4, each time an 
adoptive child tries to claim for maintenance from his adoptive parents either under the 
1950 Act or the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah, the court would have to first decide 
whether an adopted child is entitled to claim maintenance from his parents under either 
of these Acts. As both these statutes are silent, the court will then have to cross refer to 
the Adoption Act 1952 (for Peninsular Malaysia) or the Adoption Ordinance of Sabah 
(for Sabah) which states that once an adoption order is issued, the child adopted is deemed 
                                                          
1 The LRA defines ‘child’ in section 87 as a person below the age of eighteen years. 
2 As far as the 1950 Act is concerned, the decision in Kulasingam v Rasammah [1981] 2 MLJ 36 that a child is a person below the age 
of eighteen still stands, although this decision has come under severe criticism (as discussed under sub-topic 4.4.1 in Chapter 4. 
3 For example, the Adoption Act 1952 and the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (pertaining to non-Muslim children). 
4 For example, the LRA. 
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to be born to the adoptive parent in lawful wedlock. Therefore, the child is deemed to be 
a legitimate child of the adoptive parents and has a right to claim for maintenance. 
The second observation made is that although the LRA refers to an adopted child in 
its definition of a ‘child’ in section 2, there is a dilemma as the said definition provides 
‘an illegitimate child of, and a child adopted’. Thus, the confusion that arises is whether 
this phrase should be read in a conjunctive manner or a disjunctive manner? If it is read 
in a conjunctive manner, then the right to maintenance is restricted to children who were 
born illegitimate and have been adopted. On the other hand, if it is read disjunctively, any 
adopted child could claim for maintenance from his adoptive parents.5 
c. Step child 
Two observations were made by the writer when analysing whether a step child has a 
right to claim maintenance from his step parent under the present maintenance laws. First, 
save for the LRA,6 the 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah are silent on 
whether a step child has a right to claim for maintenance. 
The second observation that was made was that there is a dilemma whether a step 
child has the right to claim for maintenance under section 93 (which generally lays down 
the duty to maintain a child) as well as section 99.7 
d. Illegitimate Child 
In addition to analysing the current maintenance laws, the writer had also conducted 
interviews with social workers and single mothers, as discussed in sub-topic 4.4.4.5 in 
                                                          
5 Note that the court in the case of T v O [1993] 1 MLJ 168 seems to have taken a disjunctive approach. Please refer to sub-topic 4.4.2 
on Adopted Children in Chapter 4. 
6 Section 2 of the LRA defines a ‘child of marriage’, inter alia, as ‘…a child of one party to the marriage accepted as one of the family 
by the other party’. 
7 Section 99 of the LRA provides that if a man has accepted a child as a member of his family, he has a duty to maintain that child. 
The court in Cheah Yen Pin (P) lwn Tan Chuan Ou [2002] 6 MLJ 129 held that section 99 should be read with section 2 and as such, 
it imposes a duty on the father to maintain his step child.  
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Chapter 4. As a result, five observations were made pertaining to whether an illegitimate 
child has a right to claim maintenance. 
The first observation is that the LRA8 and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah9 
include an illegitimate child within its definition of ‘child’, whereas the 1950 Act is silent. 
The second observation is that both the 1950 Act10 and the Maintenance Ordinance 
of Sabah11 have separate provisions on the duty to maintain a legitimate child and an 
illegitimate child. The question that arises is whether there is a need to discriminate the 
illegitimate children by providing their right to maintenance in a separate provision? 
The third observation made is that there is still a ceiling amount of RM50 for the 
maintenance sum for an illegitimate child provided for in the Maintenance Ordinance of 
Sabah. The issue is whether this should be repealed as was done in the 1950 Act? 
The fourth observation made from the interviews conducted is that the single mothers 
are not aware of the existence of laws that confer the right on an illegitimate child to claim 
for maintenance from his parents. Hence, the issue of awareness of their rights arises. 
Finally, the fifth observation made, which the writer feels is the most pertinent of all, 
is the lacuna in the Malaysian laws as to empower the court to order a man to undergo a 
paternity test in order the decide if he is the father of the child. This is very important as, 
if the putative father denies paternity of the child, it would be difficult for the child to 
pursue his claim for maintenance under the law.  
Based on the above Research Findings on the Meaning of a ‘child’ and having referred 
to the positions in Singapore, England and Wales and Australia, the writer would like to 
                                                          
8 Section 2 of the LRA. 
9 Section 2 of the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah 
10 Section 3(1) for a legitimate child and section 3(2) for an illegitimate child. 
11Ibid. 
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suggest the following recommendations in order to overcome the issues discussed above 
in Research Findings: 
1. Legislative bodies to enact a standard definition of ‘child’ in all the three statutes 
to read as follows: 
‘ “child” refers to a person below the age of eighteen years, and includes the 
following: 
(a) a child adopted under the Adoption Act 1952 or the Adoption Ordinance 1960 
of Sabah or the Adoption Ordinance 1958 of Sarawak; 
(b) a step-child, where the step-parent has accepted the child as a member of his 
family; or 
(c) an illegitimate child.’ 
2. In order to avoid any form of confusion, all family laws statutes should standardise 
the age limit of a child to eighteen years. 
3.  To do away with having a separate provision for illegitimate children and thereby 
discriminating them, the 1950 Act and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah should 
merge the duty to maintain legitimate as well as illegitimate children in the same 
provision. In addition, the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah should delete the 
maximum amount of maintenance sum of RM50 to be given to illegitimate children. 
It is impossible to survive with RM50 a month bearing in mind the high cost of living 
at present. 
4. All the three statutes to incorporate a provision empowering the court to order the 
putative father to undergo a test of paternity if he denies paternity. In the alternative, 
the Legitimacy Act 1961 could be amended to include the above provision in order to 
enable the child to prove his paternity. 
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8.2.2 Extending the Duty to Maintain Young Vulnerable Adults 
As has been discussed at length in Chapter 5, non-Muslim young vulnerable adults in 
Malaysia have no recourse to the courts if their parents refuse to maintain them upon them 
attaining the age of eighteen years. Both the 1950 Act12 and the Maintenance Ordinance 
of Sabah are silent on whether a young vulnerable adult is entitled to continue being 
maintained by his parents upon him attaining the age of eighteen. The LRA, in section 95 
expressly provides that a maintenance order ceases when a child attains the age of 
eighteen years, unless if the child is physically or mentally disabled. In the case of 
Karunairajah a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Ponniah13 the apex court gave a literal 
interpretation to the phrase ‘physically or mentally disabled’, thereby shattering the hopes 
of these young vulnerable adults, especially those from broken homes who intend to 
pursue their tertiary education or vocational training. 
Bearing in mind the welfare of these innocent young vulnerable adults and 
considering their future, the writer would like to suggest two recommendations. First, the 
writer proposes that section 95 of the LRA as well as the 1950 Act and the Maintenance 
Ordinance of Sabah should be amended to extend a maintenance order upon a child 
reaching the age of eighteen ‘to cover such further period as it thinks reasonable, to enable 
the child to pursue further or higher education or training.’. This amendment would be 
similar to the respective Islamic Family Law statutes14 which provide that Muslim young 
                                                          
12 As for the 1950 Act, the decision in Kulasingam v Rasammah (supra n.1) has hampered the hopes of young vulnerable adults of 
being maintained by their parents, when the court held that only children below the age of eighteen can claim for maintenance under 
this Act. 
13 [2004] 2 MLJ 401. The court had to decide whether a child who has reached the age of eighteen could continue to claim for 
maintenance from his parents under section 95 of the LRA. Please refer to a detailed discussion of this case in sub-topic 5.3 Judicial 
Decisions in Chapter 5. 
14 For example, section 79 of the Islamic Family Law Act 1984 (Federal Territory) which provides as follows: 
Except- 
(a) where an order for maintenance of a child is expressed to be for any shorter period; or 
(b) where any such order has been rescinded; or 
(c) where any such order is made in favour of – 
(i) a daughter who has not been married or who is, by reason of some mental or physical disability, incapable of maintaining 
herself; 
(ii) a son who is, by reason of some mental or physical disability, incapable of maintaining himself, 
the order for maintenance shall expire on the attainment by the child of the age of eighteen years, but the Court may, on application 
by the child or any other person, extend the order for maintenance to cover such further period as it thinks reasonable, to enable the 
child to pursue further or higher education or training. 
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vulnerable adults have a right to continue being maintained by their parents if they intend 
to pursue their tertiary education or training. It is submitted that in the light of Article 8(1) 
of the Federal Constitution which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law, both Muslim and non-Muslim children should receive similar protection by 
their respective laws in Malaysia. In addition to this extension, the 1950 Act and the 
Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah should also extend the maintenance order in case the 
child is physically or mentally disabled. 
Secondly, the writer would also suggest that if the Malaysian Legislature decides that 
non-Muslim parents can be ordered by the court to continue maintaining their young 
vulnerable adult children, the aforesaid Malaysian Acts could be amended to follow the 
provision in section 66L of the Australian Family Law Act 1975. Section 66L provides 
two situations regarding the court’s power to order a maintenance order in favour of a 
young vulnerable adult.  First, when an application is made for a maintenance order in 
relation to a child who is eighteen or above. Secondly, when an application is made, the 
child is still below the age of eighteen and the issue is whether the court could extend the 
maintenance order beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday. At present, section 95 of the 
LRA currently contemplates the second situation and not the first. It is submitted that it 
would be better to incorporate a separate provision for young vulnerable adults to apply 
for a maintenance order as it would be clearer to the courts that they are dealing with 
children who have reached the age of eighteen and above. 
 
8.2.3 Arrears of Maintenance 
Having examined the three maintenance statutes, the writer found that there is no 
uniformity as to the time-limit for the recovery of arrears of maintenance. The 1950 Act 
provides that the arrears that could be claimed is from the date of neglect or refusal to pay 
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maintenance,15 the LRA provides a time-limit of three years16 and the Maintenance 
Ordinance of Sabah17 implies a time-limit of twelve months. 
In addition to the above finding, the writer also observed that there is a lacuna in all 
three statutes where if the child concerned wants to extend the time-limit for the recovery 
of arrears. 
In order to safeguard the welfare and the rights of these innocent children from being 
manipulated by their irresponsible parents (who have failed to maintain them for a 
considerable period of time) by hiding behind the time-limit imposed by the respective 
statutes, the writer would like to suggest the following recommendations. 
First, the writer would like to suggest that the legislature revisit these statutes and 
enact a standard time-limit for the recovery of arrears of maintenance. This is also to 
prevent statute-shopping, which is akin to forum-shopping, where the parties would 
prefer to apply under the statutory provision which is most favourable to them. 
Secondly, following from the above suggestion, if a standard time-limit is set in all 
three statutes, the writer would also like to recommend that a provision similar to section 
121(3) of the Singapore Women’s Charter which states that arrears of maintenance due 
more than three years cannot be claimed unless allowed by the court under special 
circumstances, be incorporated in all three statutes, where it gives a discretion to the 
courts in special circumstances to extend the time-limit. 
 
8.2.4 Variation or Rescission of Maintenance Order 
Based on the writer’s analysis of the maintenance laws concerning the variation or 
rescission of maintenance orders, it was observed that the statutory provisions in all three 
                                                          
15 Section 3(3) of the 1950 Act. Note also the cases of Amrick Lall v Sombaiavati [1973] 2 MLJ 191 and Ganghagaran v Sathiabama 
[1976] 2 MLJ 77 that held that arrears could only be claimed up to one year. On the other hand, the court in Lee Yu Lan v Lim Thain 
Chye [1984]1 MLJ 56 held that arrears under the 1950 Act could be claimed from the date of neglect or refusal. 
16 Section 98 of the LRA. 
17 Section 3(3) of the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah. 
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statutes (the 1950 Act, the LRA and the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah) are not 
consistent concerning two matters: first as to whom may apply to vary or rescind the order 
and secondly the grounds for the application.18  In addition, it was also observed that these 
provisions give a wide discretion to the courts to decide whether to vary or rescind the 
maintenance order or agreement. However, upon analysing the judicial decisions, it was 
observed that the courts generally have been very cautious in varying or rescinding the 
maintenance order or agreement. 
Nevertheless, the writer submits that among the provisions that have been analysed, 
section 9719 of the LRA (which specifically refers to varying a maintenance agreement) 
is the only provision that promotes and safeguards the welfare of the child. Thus, it is 
recommended that current provisions on varying or rescinding a maintenance order in all 
the three statutes should be amended to incorporate a similar provision as section 97 of 
the LRA. This is to ensure that the relevant statutory provision states that the court should 
take the welfare of the child into consideration before deciding to either vary or rescind a 
maintenance order, and thereby forms a statutory safeguard for the welfare of the child. 
In addition, the writer would also recommend to incorporate the guidelines that are 
stated in section 117(4) of the Australian Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) 
which may be applied by the court in deciding if it is ‘reasonable and for the welfare of 
the child’20 in all the three statutes on maintenance in Malaysia. This is to ensure that the 
court exercises caution, by examining the various guidelines that have been laid down in 
the statutory provision before deciding to either vary or rescind a maintenance order. In 
                                                          
18 Section 6(1) of the 1950 Act and section 7 of the Maintenance Ordinance of Sabah are in pari materia concerning whom may apply 
and the grounds. On the other hand, sections 96 and 97 of the LRA could be distinguished pertaining to whom may apply and the 
grounds of such application. 
19 Section 97 provides that a court may at any time vary a maintenance agreement in favour of a child where it is ‘satisfied that it is 
reasonable and for the welfare of the child so to do.’ 
20 The guidelines are as follows: (a) the nature of the duty of a parent to maintain a child; (b) the proper needs of the child; (c) the 
income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the child; (d) the income, earning capacity, property and financial 
resources of each parent who is a party to the proceeding; (e) the commitments of each parent who is a party to the proceedings; (f) 
the direct and indirect costs incurred by the custodian entitled to child support; and (g) any hardship that would be caused to the child 
or custodian or the liable parent or any other child or person if the court makes or refuses to make the order. 
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such a situation, the decision of the court becomes more transparent as the statute 
concerned imposes a duty on the court to take into account the guidelines therein, thereby 
safeguarding the welfare of the child. 
 
8.2.5 Enforcement of Maintenance Orders 
It is submitted that the all the recommendations made above would be akin to pouring 
water on a duck’s back if the laws on the enforcement of maintenance orders are weak. 
Having analysed the current laws on enforcement of maintenance for non-Muslim 
children in Malaysia in Chapter 7, three observations were made. First, it was found that 
the enforcement measures are minimal and ineffective. The sanctions provided by the 
various laws discussed in Chapter 7 are ineffective to ensure that the paying parents 
adhere to the maintenance order.21 
Secondly, a body such as the Family Support Division or Bahagian Sokongan 
Keluarga (BSK) that is available to the Muslim children, which acts as a mediator in 
ensuring the maintenance orders are adhered to is not available to non-Muslim children, 
despite calls by the relevant Ministry to set up such a body. 
Thirdly, the list of reciprocating countries in the Schedule to the Married Women and 
Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 has remained the same for the past twenty-
years, thereby limiting the possibility of the beneficiary of a maintenance order to enforce 
the order in a foreign jurisdiction. 
The writer has discussed in depth the recommendations in sub-topic 7.5 in Chapter 7 
regarding enforcement of maintenance orders and will summarize the recommendations 
as follows: 
                                                          
21 The sanctions or penalties provided by the current laws are fine, imprisonment, order of committal, execute a bond of good 
behaviour, set aside or prevent disposition of property intended to defeat claims.  
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First, to enhance the enforcement measures that are available in Malaysia at the 
moment. The writer submits that the Singapore model could be incorporated here as 
discussed in sub-topic 7.4.1.22 
Secondly, establish a body similar to the Family Support Division (BSK) for the non-
Muslims as well. This body, which would be set up under the Ministry of Women, Family 
and Community Development, would act as a watchdog to safeguard the welfare of these 
innocent children. 
Finally, it would be good if the Malaysian Government revisits the Schedule to the 
Married Women and Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949 and takes the 
necessary steps to increase the number of reciprocating countries stated therein. As was 
discussed in sub-topic 7.2.2.2 Married Women and Children (Facilities for Enforcement) 
Act 1949 in Chapter 7, more and more women are getting married to foreigners, either 
expatriates or foreign workers. It is of no use if the Malaysian spouse is successful in 
claiming maintenance for her child against her spouse who currently resides in another 
country, if the country where the latter resides is not a reciprocating country as listed in 
the Schedule to the Married Women and Children (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 
1949.23 In particular, countries like Indonesia and Bangladesh, where the majority of the 
foreign workers in Malaysia come from, are not in the list. There are many Malaysian 
women who marry these workers and start a family. As stated above, these women would 
face difficulty in enforcing a maintenance order issued by the Malaysian court in either 
of these countries if the Malaysian Government does not take the necessary steps to 
include these countries in the list of reciprocating countries. 
                                                          
22 Enforcement measures which could be followed from the Women’s Charter are as follows:  1. Ordering the defaulter to undergo 
financial counselling; 2. Ordering the defaulter to perform any unpaid community service under the supervision of a community 
service officer; 3. Ordering the defaulter to furnish security against any future default in maintenance payments by means of a banker’s 
guarantee; 4. Following the attachment of earnings provision; 5. Allowing the judgment creditor to bring proceedings to obtain a 
garnishee order against the judgment debtor; and 6. Compelling a divorced man to declare before his new prospective new spouse that 
he had arrears in maintenance. 
23 Please refer to Appendix E for the List of Reciprocating Countries in the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1949. 
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8.3 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, having analysed the maintenance laws concerning non-Muslims in 
Malaysia and referring back to the objectives of this thesis, the writer respectfully submits 
that it indeed disheartening to note that laws are far from satisfactory. Many measures 
need to be taken by the relevant authorities such as the Parliament and the Government 
in amending the relevant provisions in these statutes. Some of these statutes, as were 
observed during the discussion in the previous chapters, were passed prior to Malaysia’s 
Independence, which makes them more than sixty years old. Sadly, the provisions therein 
are more or less the same since they were passed. There were hardly any amendments 
made to these statutes.  
Be that as it may, in the writer’s humble opinion, the issues raised in this thesis would 
be best resolved if, instead of two or three statutes existing at the same time pertaining to 
maintenance, all family issues be parked under one statute, preferably the LRA (as has 
been done in the Singapore Women’s Charter). Nevertheless, the constitutionality of this 
recommendation arises as the Ordinances of Sabah and Sarawak pertaining to 
Guardianship, Adoption and Maintenance respectively would have to be repealed 
(Malaysia comprises of West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak). Hence the issue as to 
whether this move would affect the special privileges conferred on the natives of Sabah 
and Sarawak under Article 153 of the Federal Constitution arises.  The writer submits that 
this would not be an issue due to four reasons.  
First, the LRA is already applicable to Sabah and Sarawak. Secondly, the legislature 
would have to be extra cautious when it comes to incorporating provisions pertaining to 
the natives of Sabah and Sarawak. Perhaps a separate Part could be enacted in the LRA 
which deals exclusively with family law issues pertaining to the natives. In order to ensure 
that there is no conflict with the native customary laws, these provisions would be drafted 
taking into account the customs of the natives Thirdly, this move would not be the first 
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where it concerns repealing the laws in Sabah and Sarawak in order to bring it under a 
Federal Law. This could be observed in section 109 and the Schedule to the LRA, where, 
with the coming into force of the LRA, all the Ordinances which were in force in Sabah 
and Sarawak then pertaining to marriage and divorce were wholly repealed. Finally, the 
natives are not bound by the provisions in the LRA. As is stated in section 3(4) of the 
LRA, the natives have a right to elect if they intend to be governed by the LRA or follow 
their respective native customary laws. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
above recommendation would not be unconstitutional. 
Finally, the writer strongly submits that parents, as primary caregivers, should not be 
allowed to wash their hands off their responsibility towards maintaining their children. 
The situation is worse off for children from broken homes where one parent would try to 
pass the buck to the other. In addition to the steps that need to be taken by the Parliament 
in revisiting these laws, other authorities such as the judiciary, the government authorities 
and the NGOs should also play their respective roles in ensuring that the welfare of these 
children, who are the future leaders of our country, are not sacrificed at the altar of these 
archaic laws. 
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TITLE                       : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MAINTENANCE LAWS 
CONCERNING NON-MUSLIM CHILDREN AND 
YOUNG PERSONS  IN MALAYSIA 
  
OBJECTIVE OF  
STUDY : To analyses maintenance laws concerning non-Muslim 
children in Malaysia in order to find out the weakness 
that exist and at the same time to recommend reforms 
to rectify the said weakness 
 
OBJECTIVE OF  
THIS SURVEY        : To examine the perceptions of the respondents in order 
to see whether parents still have a duty to maintain their 
children when they reach the age of 18 years at least 
until they obtain their first degree 
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PART A GENERAL INFORMATION 
  
Please tick (√) the relevant box 
1. Sex: 1 Male                                                                                                                                                             
 2 Female  
 
2. Nationality: 1 Malaysian   
      
  2 Non-Malaysian  
 
3. Race: 1 Malay 
 
 2 Chinese 
   
 3 Indian 
 4 Sikh 
 5 Bumiputra from Sabah/ 
  Sarawak 
    6 Others      
 (Please specify _____________________) 
 
4. Numbers of  1 No siblings 
sibling: 
 2 1-2 persons 
   
 3 2-3 persons 
 
 4 5-6 persons 
5 7-8 persons 
  
6 9-10 persons 
 
7 More than 10 persons 
Age:   1 18-20 years 
 
  2 21-23 years 
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3 24-26 years     
   4 27-29 years    
5. Current Place   1 With Parents    
Of Residence:  
  2 With Relatives 
3 Residential College/Hostel 
 4 Renting a Room/House 
6. Location of  1 Urban Area 
 Parents House:  
 2 Rural Area 
 
8. Parents’  1 Government Employee 
Employment:  
2 Private Sector Employee  
3 Self-Employed  
  4  Unemployed  
                                
9.  Monthly  1 No Income 
Income:(RM) 
    2 Less than 1000 
                                 3 1001-2000  
   4 2001-3000  
    5 3001-4000 
6 4001-5000 
 
7 More than 5000 
 
 
10. Cost of your 1 Parents 
study paid by: 
 2 Relatives 
 
Father Mother 
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 3 PTPTN       
 4 Scholarship    
 5 Loans 
                                 6  Others 
 
11. Your monthly  1 Less than 300 
Expenses (RM): 
   2 301-600 
   
   3 601-900 
   4 901-1200 
   5 1201-1500 
   6 More than 1500 
 
You may tick more than one answer for Question 12 
12. Monthly expense on the following: 
 
1 Food                          6 Entertainment 
2 Clothes                          7 Rent/Accommodation 
3 Travelling                          8 Bills 
4 Books                                          9 Handphone 
5 Tuition                          10 Others 
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PART B:  PARENTS DUTY TO MAINTAIN THEIR CHILDREN 
 
 
Instruction: Circle the answer based on the scale of answers given below: 
  
 
 
D1  Parents have a duty to support/maintain 
 their children. 
 
 
D2 The duty of parents to maintain  
 their children is a moral duty. 
 
 
D3 The duty of parents to maintain 
 their children is a legal duty. 
 
 
E1 The duty of parents to support 
 their children ends when the child 
 reaches the age of 18 years or complete 
 his or her SPM. 
  
 
E2 The parents’ duty to support their children 
 ends when he or she completes his or her 
 STPM/A-levels/Matriculation/Diploma. 
 
 
E3 The parents’ duty to support their children 
 ends when he or she obtains her first degree. 
 
 
E4 The parents’ duty to support their children 
 ends when he or she gets a job. 
 
 
E5 The parents’ duty to support their children 
 ends when he or she gets married. 
 
1 2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1. =  Strongly Disagree 
2. = Disagree 
3. = Not sure 
4. = Agree 
5. = Strongly Agree 
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PART C:  INVOLVEMENT OF YOUR PARENTS IN YOUR STUDIES 
Instruction: Circle the answer based on the scale of answers given below: 
  
 
 
 
My Parents: 
 
PN1  Ask me frequently about my studies. 
   
PN2 Advise me to study hard. 
 
PN3 Provide the necessary facilities 
 for me to study. 
 
  
PM1 Monitor my progress in my studies. 
 
PM2 Make sure that I do not unnecessarily 
 spend money. 
  
PM3 Make sure that I inform them about 
 my results in my exams or assignments. 
 
 
PB1  Give me money for my daily 
  expenses when I ask them. 
 
 
PB2 Control my expenditure.  
 
 
PB3 Advise me to reduce my expenses  
  on my handphone bills.  
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
1. =  Strongly Disagree 
2. = Disagree 
3. = Not sure 
4. = Agree 
5. = Strongly Agree 
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The Malaysian law provides that non-Muslim parents’ duty to maintain their child 
ends when the child reaches the age of 18, unless he or she is physically or mentally 
disabled.  However, with reference to Muslims, the law provides that the parents’ 
duty to maintain their children continues until the completion of their first degree. 
Based on the legal provision stated above, please thick (√) the relevant box and give 
reasons for your answer (wherever applicable). 
1. Do you know that a person reaches the age of 
majority when he or she is 18 years old? 
 
2. Do you agree that parents should stop maintaining 
their children once they reach the age of 18? 
 
3. Do you think that an average 18 years old in 
Malaysia without any disabilities has the  
capacity to earn a living for himself or herself? 
 
4. Do you think that an 18 years old in Malaysia 
has the same capacity to earn a living as an 
18 years old in a Western country? 
 
5. Do you think that the Government should 
create an awareness among the parents 
about their duty to continue maintaining their  
 children although they have reached 
 the age of 18 years? 
 
 
Why? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
  
Yes No 
 
PART D:  NON-MUSLIM MAINTENANCE LAWS IN MALAYSIA 
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6. Are you aware that parents who are earning 
 and have to pay income tax to the Government 
 are given a tax deduction for the cost of their 
 children’s tertiary education? 
 
7. Are you aware that parents who are earning 
 and have to pay income tax to the Government 
 are given a tax deduction for the cost of their 
 children’s tertiary education? 
 
 Why? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
7. If Parliament does not change the law, do you think 
that the Government should then provide free tertiary 
education in public Universities in the event certain 
parents do not want to finance the cost of their 
children’s education? 
 
 Why? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. If your answer to the above question is yes, 
do you think that the Malaysian Government 
would be able to finance the cost of tertiary education 
in public universities bearing in mind that Malaysia 
is still a developing nation? 
 
 Why? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW WITH SOCIAL WORKERS 
 
1. Good Morning. (To thank social worker for agreeing to be interviewed.) To ask 
about history behind the shelter home. When it was established? Reasons for 
establishment. 
 
2. Number of residents at time of establishment? 
 
3. Number of single mothers now? 
 
4. How did the single mothers know about the Centre? 
 
5. At which stage do they come here? When still pregnant or after they have delivered 
their child? 
 
6. In your opinion what are the reasons single mothers leave their families when they 
find out they are pregnant? 
 
7. I would like to focus on one particular reason,:- the financial ability to raise their 
children. The single mothers may be worried that they would not be financially 
able to look after their children. Have they attempted to ask the child’s father for 
financial support? 
 
8. Are they aware that their child has a right under the law to claim for a monthly 
allowance from his or her father? 
 
9. In your opinion, do you think that the statistics of single mothers who leave their 
homes and families may reduce if they are aware of their child’s rights to claim a 
monthly allowance from the putative father? 
 
10. In your opinion, what are the measures that should be taken to make these single 
mothers know that they could claim such maintenance for their children from the 
respective fathers? 
 
11. Who do you think should make sure that these measures are taken? 
 
12. Currently, how are these single mothers and the children supported at the Centre? 
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13. Have there been any cases in your Centre where the single mothers have tried 
asking their child’s father for financial support for the child? 
 
14. What are the problems that these young women may face in an event they proceed 
to ask the father of their child for maintenance? 
 
15. The courts have decided that in order to claim maintenance for an illegitimate child, 
one of the conditions that need to be fulfilled is to prove the child’s paternity by 
doing a DNA test. What is your opinion on this condition? 
 
16. Assuming the Court has ordered the father to pay maintenance to his illegitimate 
child. The next issue that arises is whether he would comply with the said order.  
The law provides that in an event the said father fails to comply with the said order, 
the punishment to be imposed would be either a fine or imprisonment for a month 
for every month he has failed to pay the said maintenance. What is your opinion 
on this punishment? 
 
17. The Child Act provides that the maximum punishment – RM20, 000. But the 
problem is that the definition of “chid” does not include illegitimate child. What is 
your opinion? 
 
18. In an event the single mother is unsuccessful, what would be the future of the said 
child? 
 
19. Last question – do you think that the Parliament should take any steps to amend 
the existing laws in order to protect the rights of illegitimate children to claim for 
maintenance from their parents? 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEW WITH SINGLE MOTHERS 
1. The writer thanks the single mother for agreeing to the interview (The writer 
promises anonymity). 
 
2. How long is it since you came to this Centre? 
 
3. How did you know about this Centre? 
 
4. Were you expecting when you came to this Centre? 
 
5. Who will help you financially to look after your child once you have delivered your 
baby? 
 
(Writer explains that she will be asking personal questions. If the respondent does not 
want to answer, it is alright.) 
6. What was your reaction when you found out that you were pregnant? 
 
7. What were the reasons you left your family? 
 
8. (The writer will be focusing on one reason: financial ability to look after the child). 
Have you thought about asking the father of your child for a monthly allowance to 
look after your child? 
 
9. Do you know that your child has a right under the law to ask for monthly allowance 
from his or her father? 
 
10. If you had known about this, do you think you would have asked for it? 
 
11. What are the problems, do you think you would have faced if you had asked for it? 
 
12. Do you think other single mothers who are going through similar problems should 
be made aware of their right under the law? 
 
13. The law states that fathers who do not follows the Court’s order to pay a monthly 
allowance to their illegitimate children would be either fined or jailed for 1 month 
for every unpaid month. Do you think the punishment is adequate? 
14. One last question, in your opinion what are the steps that need to be taken to protect 
the rights of children born out of wedlock? 
 
Thank you. 
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APPENDIX E 
LIST OF RECIPROCATING COUNTRIES IN THE MAINTENANCE ORDERS 
(FACILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT) ACT 1949 
SCHEDULE [Sections 2, 11 and 12] 
RECIPROCATING COUNTRIES 
Australia 
State of New South Wales; 
State of Queensland; 
State of South Australia; 
State of Tasmania; 
State of Victoria; 
State of Western Australia; 
Capital Territory of Australia; 
Territory of Norfolk Island; 
Northern Territory of Australia; 
Territory of Papua; 
Cocos (Keeling Island); 
Brunei, State of; 
Ceylon, Dominion of; 
England 
Guernsey, Bailiwick of the Island of; 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China;  
India (excluding Jammu and Kashmir),  
Jersey, Island of; Republic of; 
Man, Isle of; 
New Zealand; 
Cook Islands (including Niue); 
Western Samoa, Trust Territory of; 
Northern Ireland; 
Norfolk Island; 
Pakistan, Republic of; 
Singapore, Republic of; 
South Africa, Union of; 
Wales. 
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APPENDIX F 
LIST OF RECIPROCATING COUNTRIES IN THE MAINTENANCE ORDERS 
(RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT) ACT 1992 (c. 56) 
Albania  
Algeria 
Anguilla 
Antigua 
Austria 
Australia (Will Trace If the Territory Is Known) 
 Australian Capital Territory 
 Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
 Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
 New South Wales  
 Queensland  
 South Australia 
 Tasmania 
 Territory of Christmas Island 
 Victoria  
Australia  
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Belgium  
Bermuda 
Bosnia And Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
British Solomon Islands 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burina Faso 
Canada (Will Trace If the Provinces Is Known) 
 Alberta  
 British Columbia 
 Manitoba 
 New Brunswick  
 Newfoundland and Labrador 
 Northwest Territories 
 Nova Scotia 
 Nunavut 
 Ontario 
 Prince Edward Island 
 Saskatchewan 
 Yukon Territory 
Cape Verde 
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Cayman Islands 
Central African Republic 
Chile 
Croatia  
Czech Republic  
Cyprus (Northern Cyprus – See Turkey) 
Denmark 
Dominica 
Ecuador 
Estonia 
Falkland Islands & Dependencies 
Fiji 
Finland 
France  
Gambia 
Germany  
Ghana  
Gibraltar 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Guernsey 
Haiti 
Holy See 
Hong Kong 
Hungary  
Iceland 
India  
Ireland – The Republic Of 
Isle of Man 
Israel  
Italy 
Jamaica 
Jersey 
Kenya  
Kiribati 
Latvia 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia (Excluding Yugoslavian Republic) 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Monaco 
Montenegro 
Montserrat 
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Morocco 
Naura 
Netherlands 
New Zealand  
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norfolk Island  
Norway 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal  
Romania  
St Christopher (Kitts) And Nevis 
St Helena 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
South Africa  
Spain (Includes the Canary Islands  
Sri Lanka 
Surinam 
Swaziland Protectorate 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania (Except Zanzibar) 
Trinidad And Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey  
Turks And Caicos Islands 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Uraine 
United States  
Upper Volta 
Uruguay 
Virgin Islands 
Zambia 
Zanzibar 
Zimbabwe  
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APPENDIX G 
LIST OF RECIPROCATING COUNTRIES IN THE FAMILY LAW 
REGULATIONS 1984 - SCHEDULE 2 
Reciprocating jurisdictions 
(regulation 25) 
Austria 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Brunei 
Canada, the following Provinces and Territories: 
Alberta 
British Columbia 
Manitoba 
New Brunswick 
Newfoundland 
Northwest Territories 
Nova Scotia 
Nunavut 
Ontario 
Prince Edward Island 
Saskatchewan 
Yukon 
Territory of Christmas Island 
Territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
Colombia 
Cook Islands 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Fiji 
France 
Germany 
Gibraltar 
Kazakstan 
Hong Kong 
India 
Republic of Ireland 
Italy 
Kenya 
Luxembourg 
Malawi 
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Malaysia 
Malta 
Nauru 
Niue 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Papua New Guinea 
Poland 
Portugal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar) 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkey 
United Kingdom, including Alderney, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and Sark 
United States of America 
Western Samoa 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe    
